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Case No. 20 I 00891-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
RIQO M. PEREA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his ·convictions and sentences for two counts each of
aggravated murder, non-capital first-degree felonies, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202,
and attempted murder, first degree felonies, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203. R156669. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West 2009).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's motion to suppress his

confession in which he argued that he "anticipatorily" invoked his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel during a phone conversation two days before his arrest?

Standard of review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Price, 2012 UT 7,

~

5, 270 P.3d 527 {citation omitted).

Its

underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. !d.
2a.

Should this Court issue an advisory opinion on whether police should be

required to video record stationhouse confessions?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2b. If it reaches this issue, should this Court fonnulate a recording rule or should
it leave this issue to a body better suited to studying the costs and benefits of such a rule?
Standard ofreview. No standard of review applies to these issues.
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that

Defendant's confession was a lie?
Standard of review. The admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. T-Mobile USA, Inc., v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2011 UT 28,

~

41, 254 P.3d

752.
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding for lack of foundation
Defendant's expert's photographs and computer-generated animation of the shooting?
Standard of review.

A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude

evidence. Barrientos ex rel. Nelson v. Jones, 2012 UT 33, ~ 10, 710 Utah Adv. Rep. 35.
5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding some of Defendant's

witnesses when Defendant would disclose those witnesses' identities only if the police
could not investigate their stories?
Standard ofreview. See standard of review for issue 4.
6. Is Defendant's life without parole sentence unconstitutional under the state or
federal constitutions?
Standard of review.

Issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation are

reviewed for coiTectness. Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ~ 7, 158 P.3d 540.
7. Does the cumulative eiTor doctrine entitle Defendant to relief?
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Standard of review. A verdict will be reversed for cumulative error only if the
cumulative effect of several elTors undermines confidence that the trial was fair. State v.

Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, ~ 39, 220 P.3d 136 (citation omitted) (omission in original).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains: U. S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV; UTAH CONST. art. I, §§
9, 24; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7; Utah R. Crim. P. 12 & 16; and Utah R. Evid. 608
& 702.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts. 1
After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant Riqo Perea confessed that he fired

several gunshots from an SUV towards a wedding party. Defendant killed two people,
and seriously injured two others. Seven eyewitnesses, including three who were in the
SUV, cotToborated all or part of his confession.

The drive-by shooting
Defendant is an Ogden Trece gang member. R1925:31. Around 1 a.m. in August
2007, Defendant and several friends visited an Ogden home. R1925:26-28,31,39-40.
Defendant rode in the front passenger seat of a GMC Yukon Denali driven by Dominique
Duran. R1924:6-7;1923:65. Across the street, several people celebrated a wedding.
R1922:76-78,144,155.

Some of the partygoers belonged to the rival Nortenos gang.

R1925 :32; 1926:21,27-28,97.

1

Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ~ 3, 243 P.3d 1250.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Shortly after Defendant's group arrived, an argument erupted between some in
Defendant's group and some of the partygoers.

R1922:83-85;1924:9-11;1925:29-30.

Gang insults were heatedly exchanged and an unknown person fired a gun into the air
once or twice. R1922:85-86,125,136, 147-48; 1925:30-31. Defendant and his friends then
got back into their vehicles, Defendant again sitting in the front passenger seat of Duran's
SUV. Rl922:105-06,110;1924:6-7,13-17;1925:10,32-33. Duran's two young children
and one of her nieces were also in her SUV, along with Angelo Gallegos and Elias
Christopher Garcia. Rl924:8,17;1925:10,32.
The SUV slowly pulled away, coasting west along the street. Rl922:86,107,150.
Defendant climbed out of the passenger window, reached over the roof, and fired ten
shots at the wedding party. R1922:86,89,150;1923:59;1925:10-11,20-21,32-34;State's
Exhibit 80 at 3.
Sarah Valencia and Sabrina Prieto stood on a walkway between the front door and
the carport ofthe home where the party was held. 2 R1922:104-05. Valencia testified that
she saw Defendant fire from the SUV at the party guests. R1922:86,95,107. As the shots
rang out, Valencia ducked and ran east along the front of the home towards the carport.
Rl922:87-88,108. Valencia tried to grab Prieto's ann, but lost her grip. Id. Valencia ran
into the carport, turned south, and headed for the home's side door. !d. Valencia looked

2

A diagram of the crime scene (State's Exhibit 89) and three photos of the home
where the shooting occurred (State's Exhibits 5, 6, & 16) are attached in Addendum I.
Exhibit 89 is oriented with north towards the bottom of the page. The home where the
shooting took place is in the middle of the page facing north. A blue van is parked in the
carport, a silver car is parked behind the van, and a white car is behind the silver car.
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back to see Prieto fall on the doorstep. !d. Prieto had been fatally shot once in the right
side of her chest. R1922:63-65. The bullet traveled downward and from right to left
through her chest. R1922:68.
Richard Esquivel stood on the grass east of the carport when the initial shot or
shots were fired into the air. R1922:145-46. Upon hearing gunfire, Esquivel ran west
between a blue van and silver car parked in the driveway, then north down the driveway,
stopping near his cousin Rocendo Nevarez who stood by the front edge of the white car
parked in the driveway.

R1922:149-50.

Esquivel saw someone climb out of the

passenger side of the SUV and begin shooting over the vehicle's roof as it pulled away.
!d. After the first shot from the SUV, Esquivel knelt down, turned away from the road,

and tried to cover himself. R1922:150-52,161-62. He was shot in the "back shoulder"
and hip but survived. R1922:151. Nevarez was fatally shot in the back. R1922:49.
Keri Garcia stood in the driveway when Defendant started shooting. R1922:12325. She turned and ran south towards the carport. R1922:126,138. She was shot once in
the back, three inches from her spine, but survived. R1922:128. She testified that all the
shots came from the road. Rl922:127.
When the shots began, Lacey Randall stood beside her car-the white car parked
in the driveway.

R1923:10-13.

She testified that she saw someone sitting on the

passenger windowsill of the SUV as it pulled away and that all the shots came from the
SUV. !d. When the shots began, someone pulled her to the ground just before her car
window shattered above her. !d.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Elias Christopher Garcia sat directly behind Defendant in Duran's SUV and saw
Defendant climb back in with a gun in his hand. R1925 :32-34. Garcia and fellow
passenger Angelo Gallegos both testified that Defendant was the shooter. R1925: 1011,20-21,33. Duran, who was romantically involved with Defendant, was reluctant to
testify that he was the shooter, but admitted telling police that the shots came from the
passenger side of her vehicle where Defendant was hanging out the window.
R1924:6,13-18.
After climbing back into the SUV, Defendant threatened the passengers that if
they "said anything, there would be a bullet with [their] name on it." R1925:10-12. He
told Duran to "Drive right" so she would not get pulled over. R1924:19. Defendant and
others later "dumped the gun" in an alleyway. R1925:37.
The bullets recovered from the Prieto's and Nevarez's bodies were both .22
caliber and fired from the same gun. R1922:67-68;1923:116,127. Police recovered ten
expended .22 caliber shell casings in the street west of the home where the party was
held. R1923:59-60,64-65;State's Exhibit 16. The same gun expended all ofthe casings.
R1923:119,127.

The State's ballistics expert could not detennine whether the gun that

fired the fatal bullets also expended the casings, because the murder weapon was never
recovered. R1923: 11 8-19. No other expended casings were found at the crime scene.
R1923:29-31,79. The SUV was undamaged. R1923:41;State's Exhibits 53-54.
Defendant confesses

After waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant confessed to having fired at the
partygoers from the passenger window of Duran's SUV.

R652;State's Exhibit 80.
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Defendant confessed during an interrogation that lasted "less than two hours," and
included "breaks during which Defendant was offered food and water."

!d.

The

interrogation did not include any "physical or psychological force" or any "evidence that
Defendant was coerced, pressured, or threatened." !d.
After confessing, Defendant helped a detective produce a typewritten statement.
R652;State's Exhibit 80. Defendant watched the detective's computer screen as the
detective

typed

questions

and

then

typed

Defendant's

responses

verbatim.

R652;1909:221-22. Defendant initialed the spaces on the typed confession indicating
that he had received his Miranda warnings and understood them. State's Exhibit 80. He
also initialed each page of the confession, and signed at the bottom. !d.
Defendant was 19 years and 9 months old at the time of the murders. R1909:22.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

The State charged Defendant with two counts each of aggravated murder, and
attempted murder. R6-7. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, but
later withdrew it. R63,1237;1920:3-4. A jury convicted Defendant as charged. Rl37584.

After recetvmg a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report and hearing evidence at
sentencing, the trial court identified several aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Rl567-68;1928:158-164. The court ultimately found that "the aggravating circumstances
outweigh[ ed] the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt" and that a
sentence of life without parole (L WOP) was justified under the circumstances.
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R1928:164,167. The court therefore imposed LWOP for both aggravated murder counts
and three years to life for the attempted murder counts. 3 Rl569;1928:164.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court cmTectly denied Defendant's motion to suppress his confession.
Defendant could not "anticipatorily" invoke his Miranda right to counsel during a phone
call with police, because Miranda and its progeny establish that the right attaches only in
the context of custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has strongly
suggested that a suspect cannot "anticipatorily" invoke his Miranda right to counsel.
And the overwhelming majority of courts reject the idea that a defendant not yet in
custody can invoke the Miranda right to counsel. Moreover, Defendant asked to talk to a
lawyer only before talking to police, not to have a lawyer present during his questioning.
II.

This Court should not create a rule requiring police to video record

stationhouse confessions, because Defendant essentially seeks an advisory opinion. He
does not explain how such a rule should function or how it would apply in this case. If
this Court reaches the issue, it should defer the issue to the Legislature or a similar body
better suited to policy making, because fashioning such a rule is a policy decision that
requires balancing various factors and interests. Moreover, this is not the case to create
such a rule because the police did not ignore this Comi's direction regarding recording
confessions. This Court has recognized a written statement as a proper way to record a

Because Defendant committed these crimes while on probation for a third
degree felony charge of possession of a concealed weapon, the trial court reinstated the
original zero-to-five year sentence in that case, and ordered it to run consecutively to the
sentences in this case. Rl569,1928:165.
3
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confession. Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his confession is inadequately
briefed and, in any event, fails based on the trial court's findings, which Defendant
Ignores.

III. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony that
Defendant's confession was a lie. This testimony was inadmissible under rules 608 and
702, Utah Rules of Evidence, because it would have directly commented on Defendant's
credibility and improperly invaded the jury's exclusive province to detennine credibility.
Also, the jury did not need an expert to help them understand that someone might falsely
confess to avoid harm to themselves or others. Defendant has also failed to establish the
reliability of the methodology underlying his expert's opinion where he argues only that
such testimony is generally accepted.
otherwise.

Caselaw and scientific literature demonstrate

Regardless, any en-or in excluding the testimony was harmless given

Defendant's failure to testify and claim that his confession was false, the mountain of
eyewitness testimony corroborating the confession, and the jury instruction on false
confessions.
IV.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion m excluding photos and a

computer-generated animation prepared by Defendant's crime scene reconstruction
expert, because Defendant did not establish adequate foundation for the exhibits. Given
their dramatic impact and potential for editorial manipulation, video animations require a
heightened foundational showing.

Here, no evidence supported the expert's theory

depicted in the animation that there were two other shooters.

Thus, the animation

misrepresented the facts of the shooting. The expert's pictures purporting to reconstruct
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Defendant's view of the crime scene also lacked foundation because, in staging the
pictures, the expert did not use vehicles identical to those at the crime scene, nor did he
know the precise location of one of the vehicles depicted in the photos.
The trial court did not allow the State to unfairly surprise Defendant by raising its
foundation objection when Defendant offered the exhibits at trial. Nor did the court
improperly limit the expert's testimony where he testified to his theory. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting State's Exhibit 89, showing bullet trajectories,
because it was based on a crime scene diagram admitted without Defendant's objection.
Regardless, any error was harmless because the jury heard the expert's theory
about the shooting. Viewing the animation and photos illustrating that theory would not
have changed their verdict. And Defendant's confession and corroborating eyewitness
testimony provided overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
V.

The trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that Defendant's

unnamed witnesses could testify only if the police could investigate their stories. The
integrity of the trial process depended on the police being able to investigate witnesses
whose stories allegedly contradicted seven eyewitnesses and Defendant's confession.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, also requires disclosure of information
necessarv to allow the nrosecution to nrenare its case. Moreover. Defendant nroffered no
-'

.J..

~

..a.

"'

.J..

evidence of any specific threats to these witnesses. Regardless, any error was hannless
because Defendant never proffered the witnesses' specific testimony and the evidence
that Defendant was the shooter was overwhelming.
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VI.

Defendant's L WOP sentences are not unconstitutional.

Defendant lacks

standing to challenge section 76-3-207.7 as vague, because he suffered no harm from the
alleged deficiencies he identifies in the statute. Although he claims that the statute lacks
guidance and standards for imposing LWOP, the court imposed sentence only after
finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt and that LWOP was justified under the circumstances. For
these same reasons, the statute was not vague as applied to Defendant.
The statute does not violate equal protection principles because it is the sentencing
decision, not the statute itself, that creates the classification between those who receive
LWOP and those who do not. Regardless, any disparate treatment is justified by the
unique circumstances of each case and the legitimate State interest in sentencing more
dangerous offenders to a harsher sentence.
The statute does not violate Apprendi, because Defendant's conviction made him
eligible for LWOP. The sentencing court was not required to find any additional fact
before imposing that sentence.
Defendant's sentence does not violate Utah's unnecessary rigor clause, because
that clause applies only to conditions of confinement, not to a sentence itself. Those
challenges must be raised under the cmel and unusual punishment clause. But Defendant
argues that his sentence is cruel and unusual only under the Federal Constitution.
In any event, Defendant's sentence is not cruel and unusual because, as an adult
who was not mentally retarded, he was eligible for a death sentence. Defendant was 19
years and 9 months old when he committed the murders, and his own expert admitted that
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Defendant was not mentally retarded. Moreover, although Defendant claims that he is
mentally immature, it is his chronological age, not his mental age, that determines death
eligibility.

Death is not a cruel and unusual punishment for an adult who commits

aggravated murder. Because Defendant could have constitutionally received a death
sentence, the lesser L WOP sentence is not a cruel and unusual punishment. Even if
Defendant could properly be likened to a juvenile, United States Supreme Court
precedent establishes that LWOP is not a cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles who
commit aggravated murder.
VII. Defendant's cumulative error claim fails because he establishes no error.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS HIS CONFESSION FOR A MIRANDA VIOLATION4
Defendant claims that his confession was obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), because he

"anticipatorily" invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel while talking on the phone
with a detective, but was arrested and questioned two days later without counsel present.
Br. Aplt. at 55-62. He argues that a suspect may invoke his Miranda right to counsel
when interrogation is "imminent." According to Defendant, he invoked his right to
counsel "in the context of an anticipated interrogation" when he told the detective on the
phone that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before the two met. !d. at 60-62.

4

This point responds to Defendant's point IV.
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The trial court correctly ruled that a defendant cannot invoke his Miranda right to
counsel until he is at least in custody. R653-54. Miranda rights are tied to the context of
custodial inten·ogation and therefore attach only in that context. Although the United
States Supreme Court has never decided this precise issue, it has strongly suggested that,
given Miranda's context, a suspect cannot "anticipatorily" invoke his Miranda right to
counsel. Defendant cites no case, nor is the State aware of one, which has held that a
defendant not yet in custody can invoke his Miranda right to counsel.
A.

Factual background.
After the shootings, Detective Thomas called Defendant's cellphone and spoke

with someone who identified himself as Defendant. R1909:235-36. The detective asked
what happened on the night of the murders and Defendant replied "that he wasn't coming
in yet, that he needed to speak with his lawyer first before he came in .... He told me that
he got screwed the last time he spoke with cops and he was innocent."
R652;1909:236,247-48. Detective Thomas had no idea where Defendant was during this
conversation. R652;1909:237.
Two days later, officers found Defendant in Layton, an·ested him, and took him to
the Ogden Police station. R652;1909:207,237;1926:12,13-16. Detective Thomas read
Defendant the Miranda warnings and Defendant agreed to talk.

R652;1909:239-40.

Before reading the warnings, Thomas commented that Defendant had been read his rights
so many times that Defendant "could probably read them back" to him. !d. Defendant
"kind oflaughed and said, 'Yeah, probably."' !d.
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The trial court found no Miranda violation. R651-54 (the

court~ s

ruling is in

Addendum B). The court found that because Defendant was not in custody during his
phone conversation with the detective, no Miranda warning was required, and Defendant
therefore could not invoke his Miranda right to counsel. R654. The court also found that
Defendant received the Miranda warnings after his arrest, waived his right to counsel,

a..11d agreed to speak with police. R652.
B.

The trial court correctly found no Miranda violation.

In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented the prosecution from using
statements "stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant" unless the defendant
is warned that he has a right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney, and then
knowingly and intelligently waives those rights. 384 U.S. at 444, 479. Thus, the Fifth
Amendment grants a person in police custody "a constitutional right to have an attorney
present during an in-custody questioning." 5 State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 296 (Utah
1984). In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court expanded Miranda by holding that once a
custodial suspect has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,"
he cannot be "subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. at 484-85.

This Court sometimes refers to this right as the "Fifth Amendment right to
counsel." See Newton, 682 P.2d at 297 n.1; State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ~· 43, 122 PJd
543 ("[T]he Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation.").
5
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The rules in Miranda and Edwards were fonnulated specifically for custodial
interrogations. In Miranda, the Court first described the custodial circumstances of the
interrogations at issue and then explained that "[a]n understanding of the nature and
setting of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our decisions today." I d. (emphasis
added). Edwards likewise involved a suspect who had been an·ested and was questioned
at the police station. 451 U.S. at 478.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified that Miranda was concerned only with
a suspect's rights during custodial interrogation. In Oregon v. Mathiason, the Court
explained: "Our decision in Miranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to
'custodial interrogation."' 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) (emphasis added). In Rhode Island
v. Innis, the Court stated:

"The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the

'interrogation environment' created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would
'subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner' and thereby undermine the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination." 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 457-58). See also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) ("Miranda is
premised on "the interaction of custody and official interrogation").
Put simply, "[a]bsent the interplay of custody and interrogation, an individual's
. '1
pnv1~ege

.
. . . . 1s
. not t hreateneu.
.l "
p eop le v. Vz'll..a l.o bos, 73 7 N.E.2d
agamst
se_lf-mcnmmat10n

639, 645 (Ill. 2000). As this Court has recognized, Miranda applies only when a suspect
is

~n

custody. State v. Shuman, 639 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1981) ("Miranda warnings are

required only where a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in a significant way.") (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492).
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Defendant's argument that he can anticipatorily invoke his Miranda right to
counsel outside of a custodial interrogation fails because he reads Miranda and its
progeny out of context. Defendant relies on Miranda's recognition that a suspect can
invoke his right to remain silent "at any time prior to or during questioning," and

Edward's recognition that a suspect may choose "to deal with the police only through
counsel." Br. Aplt. at 55-56 (quoting_Miranda; 384 U.S. at473-74;

Edwards~

451 U.S. at

484-85). But Defendant ignores that Miranda and Edwards were concerned only with
custodial interrogation. Because the Miranda-Edwards regime applies only to a custodial
interrogation, the trial court correctly found that Defendant did not validly invoke his

Miranda right to counsel during his noncustodial phone call with the detective. R651-54.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether a suspect can
anticipatorily invoke his Miranda right to counsel. But it has strongly suggested that a
suspect cannot. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991). In McNeil, the
Court rejected an argument that invoking the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a
bail hearing simultaneously invokes the Miranda right to counsel. !d. at 173-81.
McNeil was arrested for robbery and had a bail hearing where a public defender
represented him. !d. at 173. Later that evening, a detective visited McNeil in jail to ask
about an umelated murder.

Id

McNeil waived his Miranda rights and eventually

confessed involvement in the murder.

!d. at 173-74.

He moved to suppress his

confession, arguing that "his courtroom appearance with an attorney [on the um·elated
robbery] constituted an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, and that any
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subsequent waiver of that right during police-initiated questioning regarding any offense
was invalid." Id. at 174.
The Court rejected McNeil's claim. Id. at 174-81. It held that to invoke the
Miranda right to counsel, a suspect must state "his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly
assistance that is the subject of Miranda," in other words, "a desire for the assistance of
a..'1 attorney in dealing 1-vith custodial interrogation by the police." Id. at 17R.

The McNeil dissent suggested that a defendant could avoid this result simply by
invoking his Miranda right to counsel at a preliminary hearing. Id. at 182 n.3. The
majority responded that the Court had "never held that a person can invoke his Miranda
rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation."' !d. (citations
omitted). The Court observed that "[i]fthe Miranda right to counsel can be invoked at a
preliminary hearing, it could be argued, there is no logical reason why it could not be
invoked by a letter prior to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect." Id.
The Court was highly skeptical of the dissenfs logic, noting that "[m]ost rights must be
asserted when the government seeks to take the action they protect against." Id. The
Court continued, "[t]he fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to counsel, once
asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial interrogation does not necessarily
mean that we will a!lmv it to be asserted initially outside the context of custodial
interrogation, with similar future effect." Id.
More recently, in Montejo v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reemphasized that
"the Miranda-Edwards regime ... applies only in the context of custodial interrogation.
If the defendant is not in custody then those decisions do not apply; nor do they govern
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other, noninterrogative types of interactions between the defendant and the State." 556
U.S. 778, 795 (2009). Miranda's concerns do not apply outside of the custodial setting
because "[w]hen a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his
door or walk away to avoid police badgering." ld. The Montejo Court again addressed
and dismissed the claim that a defendant could theoretically invoke his Miranda right to
counsel at a preliminary hearing: "' [w ]e have in fact never held that a person can invoke
his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation."' !d. at
797 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n.3).
Other courts agree that a defendant cannot anticipatorily invoke his Miranda right
to counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this claim in People v. Villalobos: "[i]t
is the right to an attorney during custodial interrogation that Miranda and its progeny
protects. That right does not exist outside the context of custodial interrogation. One
cannot invoke a right that does not yet exist." 737 N.E.2d 639, 645 (Ill. 2000). The court
continued, "[s]tretching Miranda to allow anticipatory invocations of the right to counsel
would extend Miranda far beyond its boundaries and upset the very balance that Miranda
sought to protect-the balance between effective law enforcement and protection of
individual rights." ld. at 646.
The oven:vhelming majority of courts to consider this issue have rejected it See,

e.g., State v. Hurst, 258 P.3d 950, 955-56 (Idaho App. 2011) (collecting cases); State v.
Appleby, 221 P.3d 525, 545-46 (Kan. 2009) (collecting cases); Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d at
643 (collecting cases). For example, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that "many lower
courts, while generally recognizing that the Supreme Court's statements in McNeil and
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Montejo are dicta, have followed those pronouncements and held that an effort to invoke
Miranda rights outside the context of custodial interrogation will not be effective to

restrain police interrogation." Hurst, 258 P.3d at 955-56.
Defendant argues that "[s]ome courts have held that defendants may invoke the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel pre-interrogation, so long as the interrogation was
'imminent.'" Br. Aplt. at 60. But the fact that some courts recognize that a suspect can
invoke his Miranda right to counsel in anticipation of an imminent interrogation says
nothing about whether a suspect can invoke that same right before he is even arrested.
Defendant cites no case holding that a suspect not in custody can anticipatorily invoke his
Miranda right to counsel. Br. Aplt. at 54-62. Nor is the State aware of any such case.

Moreover, all the cases that Defendant relies on involve suspects who were in
custody or courts that entirely rejected the proposition that a suspect could anticipatorily
invoke his Miranda right to counsel. See United States v. Kelsey, 951 F .2d 1196, 1198
(lOth Cir. 1991) (Kelsey "was ... arrested and handcuffed"); United States v. Grimes, 142

F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Grimes was arrested"); United States v. LaGrone, 43
F.3d 332, 339 (7th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with three other Circuit Court of Appeals "that a
defendant may not invoke his Miranda rights outside the context of custodial
interrogation."); People v. Nguyen, 132 Cal. App. 4th 350, 356 (Cal. App. 2005) ("To
conclude defendant asserted her Miranda right to counsel before the officer had
completed the a1Test or sought to question her would permit invocation of Miranda rights
'anticipatorily,' and contravene the views expressed in McNeil."); Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d
at 646 (Miranda rights "do not exist outside the context of custodial inteiTogation"); State
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v. Kramer, 720 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Wis. App. 2006) ("[U]nless a defendant is in custody,

he or she may not invoke the right to counsel under Miranda."); United States v.
Goodson, 22 M.J. 22, 22 (C.M.A. 1986) ("Goodson initially was apprehended"); Pecina
v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ("the time and place" to invoke the
Miranda right to counsel is when police give the Miranda warnings).

Even if Defendant's reading of _Miranda and Edwards were correct. he still would
not be entitled to relief because he never requested counsel's assistance during a police
interview. Defendant said only "that he needed to speak with his lawyer first before he
came in." R652;1909:247-48. Thus Defendant expressed a desire only to speak with
counsel before meeting with police, not to have counsePs assistance during a custodial
interrogation. Therefore, even under his interpretation of the Miranda-Edwards regime,
Defendant did not invoke his Miranda right to counsel.
Allowing suspects to anticipatorily invoke their Miranda right to counsel before
they are in custody would not only sever Miranda from its contextual roots, but also
hamper police by making it difficult for officers to know who they could approach for
questioning. As the United State Supreme Court has "stressed on numerous occasions,
' [o]ne of the principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application."
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 T_LS. 675, 680 (1988) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.

420, 430 (1984)).

Stretching Miranda beyond its boundaries makes its application

difficult and unclear. Moreover, the '"ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is
not an evil but an unmitigated good."' Montejo, 556 U.S. at 796 (quoting McNeil, 501
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U.S. at 181 ). "Without these confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals unpunished.
These are not negligible costs." Jd.
In sum, the trial court conectly denied Defendant's motion to suppress.

II.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CREATE A RULE REQUIRING POLICE
TO ELECTRONICALLY RECORD STATIONHOUSE CONFESSIONS 6

stationhouse confessions because, according to him, (1) the detectives ignored this
Court's "suggestion" to record confessions; (2) recording has many advantages, including
helping courts to resolve admissibility challenges; and (3) other states have recording
requirements. Br. Aplt. at 41-54. Defendant is unclear about what type of recording
should be required, but he apparently favors videotape. !d. at 47-52. Defendant does not
explain the parameters of such a rule or how it would apply in this case. Finally, in one
paragraph, Defendant claims that his confession was involuntary. Id. at 53.
This Court should decline Defendant's invitation to create a recOiding rule,
because he does not explain how such a rule should apply in this case. He therefore
essentially seeks an advisory opinion. Regardless, this is not the case in which to create
such a rule because the police did not ignore this Court's direction regarding recording

recording a confession. And while electronic recording does have many advantages, it is
not without costs.

6

Formulating a recording requirement involves considering and

This point responds to Defendant's Point III.
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balancing a number of variables and interests. Such a requirement is therefore a policy
decision best left to the Legislature or another body better suited to fully examine the
costs, benefits, and parameters of such a requirement.
This Court should disregard Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his
confession because it is inadequately briefed. In any event, this claim fails based on the
trial court's factual findings, which Defendant ignores.

A.

Factual background.
In addition to moving to suppress his confession for a Miranda violation,

Defendant argued that his confession was involuntary because he allegedly had Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and a low I.Q. R256-71. Defendant filed a
supplemental memorandum arguing that the trial court should also consider the failure to
electronically record his confession as evidence of its unreliability. RS00-10.

The confession. While riding to the Ogden police station, Defendant asked why
so many officers came to arrest him. Rl909:238. Detective Thomas replied that the
"word on the street was that [Defendant] was a bad dude." Id. Defendant "laughed" and
replied, "'I'm not bad. I'm just Riqo."' Id.
After arriving at the station, Thomas allowed Defendant to use the restroom before
putting him in the interview room. Rl909:237-39. Defendant asked for and received
water. R1909:207,240. Thomas read the Miranda warnings and Defendant agreed to
talk.

R652;1909:208,239-40.

Detectives Thomas and Gent interviewed Defendant.

R1909:208,240. The conversation "never became adversarial at any point" and everyone
talked in "normal tones." R1909:213,215.
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When Defendant initially denied any involvement in the shootings, the detectives
told him that they did not believe he was being truthful. R1909:209-13. When asked
about his relationship with Dominique Duran, the SUV driver, Defendant smiled and said
he loved her and her kids and that they planned to live together. R1909:214;1926:92.
The detectives then suggested that perhaps Defendant had acted out of concern for
Gent exolained that he
Duran's children \;vho were in the SUV. R1909:214:1926:93.
'
~

offered this suggestion as a way for Defendant ''to minimize his consequences so that he
would be more truthful." R1909:230. Defendant's demeanor began to change and he
leaned forward, looked down, and eventually began to cry. Rl909:214-15;1926:93-94.
Defendant requested and was given tissues. R1909:214-15.
Hoping to give Defendant another way to minimize his actions, Gent asked if
Defendant had aimed high or low when he fired the shots. R1909:215-16. Defendant
explained that he became afraid as the SUV drove off and claimed that he had "blacked
out" and couldn't remember what happened. R1909:217;1926:96.
Gent then encouraged Defendant to tell the truth and asked whether Defendant
reached over the SUV and fired a gun. Rl909:217;1926:97. Defendant responded, "I
just did it."

R1909:217.

rP-DliP-rl,
De -t..._P-ndant_
--~
-· --.._
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Gent asked what kind of gun Defendant had used, and
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ofthe gun police believed was used. R1909:218;1926:97-98.
When asked if he got out of the SUV to shoot, Defendant said that the SUV door
was open and that he stood on the floor and reached across the roof with the gun.
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R1909:218;1926:98. Crying, Defendant said he was upset because he had killed his
cousin. !d.
Defendant agreed to provide a typewritten statement R1909:219;1926: 101. He
asked for and was given food before beginning. R1909:219;1926:103.
Gent opened a fonn document on his computer and positioned Defendant so that
he could read the computer screen. Rl909:219,221-22;1926:101. The fonn contained a
Miranda warning at the top. Id.;State's Exhibit 80 (the typed statement (Exhibit 80) is in

Addendum C). Gent again read Defendant the Miranda warning and Defendant agreed to
dictate his statement. R1909:219-20;1926:105. Gent would ask Defendant a question,
which he typed verbatim, and then type Defendant's answer verbatim as Defendant read
along on the monitor. R1909:221-22;1926:102-06.
Gent first asked Defendant to explain "what happened on the evening of 8-4-07T'
State's Exhibit 80 at 1. Defendant's answer, in part, was "A shot was fired and glass was
breaking[,] I panicked and got scared for the kids and I shot back to protect the kids. I
didn't think I was pointing that low[,] I didn't mean to kill anybody." !d. Defendant later
said, "I grabbed the hand gun I had and I got out of the truck and standed [sic] up and I
let off a couple of rounds to scare everyone away." !d. at 3. Defendant said that he
"stood up from the passenger seat and leaned over the top" and thought he "was just
shooting in the air." !d. He again admitted using a .22 caliber gun. !d.
Gent printed the document and asked Defendant if he could read it. R1909 :22223;1926:106. Defendant "laughed" and said he could. Id. Gent gave Defendant a pen
and instructed him to make any necessary changes. Rl909:220;1926:106-07. Defendant
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made no corrections, initialed each page, and signed the last page. Rl909:223;1926:107.
Defendant also initialed the lines indicating that he had waived his Miranda rights.
Rl926:105;State's Exhibit 80.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Defendant testified that he feared for his safety
during the interview because Detective Thomas told him that the rival gang wanted him
off the street and was seeking retaliation against him and his family.

R191 0:36.

Defendant testified that the detectives "didn't threaten [him] with violence," but he
claimed that "they did threaten me with my family."

R1910:40.

But on cross-

examination, Defendant agreed that "the only reason" he felt fear was "because [his]
brother had reported to" Defendant that the rival gang wanted to retaliate by harming
either Defendant's sister or wife. Rl910:35,37.
Defendant also testified that neither detective ever read him his Miranda rights.
Rl910:40-41. He also claimed that no officer had ever read him the Miranda warnings
although he had eleven juvenile arrests and "three or four" adult arrests. R1910:43-44.
The interview room was equipped with a motion sensor that included a camera
that captured both audio and video. Rl909:208;1926:35-36,88. Detective Gent watched
on a monitor in another room as Detective Thomas administered the Afiranda warning.
R1909:208,225-26. Gent admitted that he could have recorded the interview, but that he
chose not to because: (1) the recording equipment was not reliable; (2) the microphones
in the room were "less than adequate" and would not pick up the voice of a suspect who
was talking softly, mumbling, or crying; and (3) his training and department policy was
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to take typewritten statements rather than to record interviews.

R1909:226-

27;1926:37,127.
Mental health evidence. Defendant's expert Dr. Ronald Houston testified that

Defendant had ADHD. R1909:35-36. He also testified that, although Defendant was 19
years and 9 months old at the time of the murders, Defendant's perfonnance on an I.Q.
test, the \Vechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (\Vii,.IS), \vas equivalent to that of a ] 5 year

old on one portion of the test, and an 11 or 10 year old on other portions.
R1909:22,58,74. Houston measured Defendant's total I.Q. as 77. R1909:33. Houston
conceded, however, that Defendant did not fit Utah's definition of "mentally retarded."
R1909: 101-02. Houston also admitted that he did not administer any "validity or effort
testing," which measures the effort a person is putting forth on the test and detects "feign,
impainnent, and malingering." R1909:75.
The State's expert, Dr. Stephen Golding, testified that there was insufficient
evidence to support a diagnosis of ADHD. R1909:135,150-51. Although he agreed that
Defendant exhibited symptoms consistent with ADHD, he testified that it was impossible
to attribute those symptoms exclusively to ADHD, as opposed to Defendant's early and
extensive drug and alcohol abuse.

R1909:151-52,175-78.

He explained that "given

[Defendant's] profound level of substance abuse ... it would be impossible to disentangle

those things." R1909: 176. Golding also noted that Defendant did well in school until the
fourth grade when he became involved with drugs, alcohol, and gangs, and that
Defendant also did well in structured settings after fomih grade, all of which undermined
an ADHD diagnosis. R1909: 151-54.
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Golding testified that Defendant's I.Q. score was unreliable because Houston did
not administer any validity or "effort" testing. R1909:170-71. Golding noted that there
were "very, very strange anomalies" in Defendant's test scores.

R1909:172.

For

example, Defendant perfonned worst on the simplest part of the test, "picture
completion," but scored "slightly above normal on a much more difficult [part] ... letter
number sequencing." ld. Because that part of the test requires attention and memory
skills, Defendant's high score also contra-indicated ADHD.

R1909:173.

Golding

testified that, I.Q. or "WAIS testing[,] without effort testing in a forensic context is
meaningless. Period." R1909:195-96.

The trial court's findings.

The trial court found that the confession was

voluntary. R651-54 (Add. B). The court found that the oral interrogation "was less than
two hours and included breaks during which Defendant was offered food and water."
R652. The court also found that "[t]here was no physical or psychological force used to
induce the Defendant's statements" and that "[t]here is no evidence that Defendant was
coerced, pressured, or threatened to give the statements." !d. The court specifically
found that Defendant "was not afraid of either Detective Gent or Detective Thomas" and
that Defendant "testified that his fear was from gang retaliation, not from law
enforcement." R653.
The trial court also found that Defendant's alleged mental state did not render his
confession involuntary. Id. Based on its own observations of Defendant's demeanor and
testimony during the hearing, the court found that Defendant "understood all the
questions put to him, both on direct and on cross-examination" and that he "gave
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appropriate answers to all the questions, tracked the questioning well and seemed to be
focused." !d. The court found that the evidence ofDefendanfs "below-average I.Q. and
symptoms of ADHD [were] not sufficient to establish that he did not understand or
appreciate what he was doing when he talked with the detectives." !d.
Finally, the trial court found that "Defendant's testimony that he was not given
}Jiranda wa..rnings \vas not credible, particularly in the face of the written statement with

the printed Miranda warning initialed by Defendant acknowledging that he understood
and waived his rights." !d. The court also concluded that Defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after his arrest and that his statement "was not
coerced, forced or threatened." R654.
B.

This Court should not issue an advisory opinion.

Although Defendant argues that this Court should reqmre police to record
stationhouse confessions, he does not explain what the specific parameters of his rule
should be or what remedy should apply for a violation of the rule. Br. Aplt. at 39-54.
Nor does he explain what effect, if any, such a rule would have in this case. Defendant
therefore seeks what would essentially be an advisory opinion.
An opinion is merely advisory when it will have no "meaningful effect" upon the
narties. See Provo Citv Corv. v. Thomvson, 2004 UT 14,, 22, 86 P.3d 735. "This court

,!_

"'

~

.,._

has consistently refused to issue advisory opinions or resolve purely academic matters
where the outcome will not affect the rights of the parties." Hills v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 2010 UT 39,, 15, 232 P.3d 1049 (citation omitted). Because Defendant does not
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explain how a recording requirement would affect this case, he asks for an advisory
opinion: See id. This Court should therefore decline to consider this issue.
Defendant arguably implies that failure to electronically record his confession
should have resulted in its exclusion. But this claim is unpreserved because Defendant
did not raise it below; therefore, this Court should not consider it. See State v. King, 2006
UT 3," 13, 131 P.3d 202 (explaining that a party must raise an issue in the trial court to
preserve it for appeal and that this Court generally does not review unpreserved issues).
In any event, Defendant's implied argument fails.

This Court has held that

"contemporaneous recording of a confession is not mandated by the Utah Constitution."
State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995).

Moreover, excluding the confession because it was not electronically recorded
goes too far.

The Federal Constitution's Due Process Clause "protects a defendant

against a conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting
introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury
that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit." Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012). Defendant had that opportunity here. The jury knew that the
officers could have videotaped the confession but did not. R1926:35-39,126-27. And
defense counsel emphasized in closing argument that police did not videotape the
confession. R1927:123-24. The lack of an electronic recording in this case affected the
weight of Defendant's confession, not its admissibility. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723.
Therefore, Defendant demonstrates no e1Tor in the admission of his confession.
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C.

This Court has endorsed recording confessions in writing.

This is not the case for fashioning a recording requirement because, contrary to
Defendant's argument, the detectives did not ignore this Court's direction to record a
confession. Relying on State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995), Defendant argues
that "[t]his Court expressly and repeatedly has asked police officers to record confessions
in police stations." Br. Aplt. at 40-42. He implies that this Court has urged electronic
recording and that, as evidenced by this case, police "have ignored this Court's
repeatedly patient calls for a unifonn system of recording." !d. at 40-42, 43. But in
Villarreal, this Court recognized that police can make an acceptable record of a

confession by "written or electronic means." See 889 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added).
This Court cannot fault the police here for using a method that it has expressly endorsed.
This Court's concern in Villarreal was that police record a confession in the
defendant's own words. See id. Villarreal confessed to an officer who, later that day,
typed up his memory of Villarreal's statement.

See id.

The officer did not have

Villarreal sign the confession and Villarreal denied at trial that he ever confessed. See id.
This Court nevertheless held that the confession was properly admitted and rejected
Villarreal's contention that the Utah Constitution mandates contemporaneous recording
of a confession.
See id. at 426-27. This Court reco2:nized
that such a rule "would denrive
- ,__,
.....

the courts of much evidence that is generally reliable." !d.
This Court also observed that it had "previously addressed the importance of
making a contemporaneous record of a defendant's confession by written or electronic
means" in State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 891 (Utah 1989). Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426
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(emphasis added).

In Carter, the defendant confessed to a detective who later

"apparently" dictated his memory of Carter's confession while Carter listened. See 776
P.2d at 890. The officer stopped "after every few lines to ask [Carter] whether what was
dictated was accurate." Id. The officer then printed the confession and Carter signed it.
I d. While this Court held in Carter "that admission of the confession was not prejudicial

error;" this Court did "not sanction the particular manner in which it was recorded." Id.
at 891.
Villarreal noted that the Carter Court had criticized the officer's failure "to record

the defendant's confession verbatim and endorsed the practice of tape recording
confessions, at least when possible." 889 P.2d at 426. This practice "better ensures that
the confession is accurate when presented to the finder of fact" and avoids the problems
inherent in any attempt to recall someone's precise words. Id. Thus, "[w]hen a fonnal
confession is given in a police station, it could, and should be recorded." Id. at 427. This
Court observed that "electronic or other recording of a confession is a simple and
inexpensive means of preserving critical evidence in an accurate fonn and should be
implemented." Id. (emphasis added).
The concern in Carter and Villarreal was that a JUry hear the defendant's
confession in his mvn words. Thus Villarreal held that police could record a defendant's
words "by written or electronic means." 889 P.2d at 426 (emphasis added). Therefore,
contrary to Defendant's argument, this Court has not "expressly and repeatedly" asked
police to electronically record stationhouse confessions. Br. Aplt. at 42.
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In any event, the Detectives here complied with Villarreal's suggestion to "make a
contemporaneous record'' of Defendant's confession "by written ... means." 889 P.2d at
426. The detectives did not record the interrogation where Defendant initially confessed.
R1909:226-27.

But Detective Gent made a contemporaneous record of Defendant's

confession in Defendant's own words. R1909:219-23;1926:101,106-07; State's Exhibit
80. Thus, the jury heard "a contemporaneous record" of Defendant's confession in his
own words.

See Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 426.

Because the police here recorded

Defendant's confession by means that this Court has endorsed, this is not the case in
which to fashion a recording requirement.

D.

This issue is better left to the Legislature or similar body better suited
to policymaking.
Defendant argues that this Court should create an electronic recording requirement

because recording has obvious benefits and other states have imposed such a
requirement.

Br. Aplt. at 42-54.

This Court should leave this policy issue to the

Legislature or other similar body better suited to rulemaking.
Most states that have adopted a recording requirement have done so by legislative
action or court rule, not by judicial mandate. See Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law

in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 16 Rich.
J.L. & Tech. 9, 4-33 (2010). By one commentator's count, seventeen states and the
District of Columbia have adopted an electronic recording requirement, but only five
states have done so by judicial mandate. See id. at 3, 21-3 0. The others have done so by
legislative action or court rule. !d. at 4-33.
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For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently held that "the legislature is
better suited to gather and assess the facts necessary to establishing a recording
requirement." See State v. Lockhart, 4 A.3d 1176, 1199-1200 (Conn. 2010). This was so
because "such a rule requires weighing competing public policies and evaluating a wide
variety of possible rules," tasks better suited to a legislative body. See id. at 1198. The
court found persuasive similar holdings from the Vermont, Tennessee, and Montana
supreme courts. See id. at 1191.
The Vennont Supreme Court refused to nnpose a recording requirement "by
judicial fiat" because "[t]he most appropriate means of prescribing rules to augment
citizens' due process rights is through legislation." State v. Gorton, 548 A.2d 419, 422
(1988). Likewise, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that because "[t]he determination
of public policy is primarily a function of the legislature ... the issue of electronically
recording custodial interrogations is one more properly directed to the General
Assembly." State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 772 (Tenn. 2001) (quotation and citation
omitted).

The :Montana Supreme Court noted the potential benefits of a recording

requirement, but left "the imposition of any such procedural requirement to the
legislature and to individual law enforcement agencies." State v. Grey, 907 P.2d 951,
v. Raibon, 843 P.2d 46, 49 (Colo.
App.
1992)956 (Mont. 1995);
. see also People
....
.... ....
~

(refusing "to mold our particular view of better practice into a constitutional mandate
which would restrict the actions of law enforcement agents in all cases").
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to create a recording
requirement and instead "establish[ed] a committee to study and make recommendations
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on the use of electronic recordation of custodial inten·ogations." See State v. Cook, 847
A.2d 530, 547 (N.J. 2004).

The court did so because such a rule would require a

"balancing of the benefits to suspects in custodial interrogations with any drawbacks to
law enforcemenC' Id. at 545.
These decisions are consistent with this Court's precedent regarding policy
decisions. For example, in State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995), this Court
noted the complex and competing interests involved in "formulating an insanity defense.''
This Court therefore held that "[t]his delicate balancing of public policy is better
accomplished in the legislature than in the courts." Id.
A legislative or similar body is better suited to crafting an electronic recording
requirement because the issue requires weighing a number of factors and competing
policy interests. The State does not dispute that an electronic recording requirement
would have benefits. 7 But there are also real costs to consider and a number of factors
and policy considerations to be balanced.

For example, an electronic recording

requirement may "reduce the ability of police officers to obtain truthful confessions and
admissions" because "[c]ommentators acknowledge that suspects may be reluctant to
speak candidly in front of a camera."

Cook, 847 A.2d at 544 (N.J. 2003) (citation

omitted). i\dditional considerations include "[t]he financial cost of purchasing; installing

7

In fact, in 2008 the Utah Attorney General's Office, in cooperation with statewide law enforcement organizations, drafted a "best practices" statement for law
enforcement that recommends electronic recording of custodial interviews and gives
guidelines for doing so. R509-l 0.
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and maintaining electronic equipment, as well as training officers on the proper use of the
equipment, [which] would be a significant expenditure." Lockhart, 4 A.3d at 1195.
A recording requirement also involves several practical considerations.

For

example, there is the question of "what pm1ion of an inteiTogation ought to be recorded."

See Cook, 84 7 A.2d at 544. Other issues involve what exceptions should apply and what
remedy to provide for a violation of the rule. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted "the
lack of unifonnity among the rules created by high courts of other states'' as one reason to
defer the matter to the legislature. See Lockhart, 4 A .3d at 1197.
Also, video recording custodial inteiTogations will not necessarily make it easier to
determine a confession's voluntariness.

See G. Daniel Lassiter, et al., Videotaped

Confessions: Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 28 Law & Pol'y 192, 194 (2006).
Researchers have documented that the camera angle used to record confessions can "have
an unintended prejudicial effect on trial participants' subsequent evaluation of the
voluntariness of the confessions." Id. at 195-96. Studies have shown that "the biasing
influence of camera perspective tainted not only assessments of voluntariness, but also
perceived likelihood of guilt and sentencing recommendations." Id. Thus, fonnulating
an electronic recording requirement is a task better left to the legislature or similar body
that can fully evaluate the various considerations involved.
E.

Defendant's challenge to the voluntariness of his confession is
inadequately briefed.

In one summary paragraph, Defendant asserts that "the trial court eiToneously
determined the voluntariness of his confession." Br. Aplt. at 53. The entirety of his
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claim is that his "relative youth" and alleged "mental illnesses coupled with interrogation .
tactics" rendered his confession involuntary because "the facts of his case nearly mirrored
those of State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, 984 P.2d 1009."
inadequately briefed.

Jd.

His claim is

Moreover, the trial court's findings, which Defendant ignores,

establish the voluntariness of his confession.
Defendant has inadequately briefed t11is claim because he does not develop his
argument or cite any supporting authority beyond Rettenberger. Br. Aplt. at 53. He does
not set forth the voluntariness standard. See id He also ignores the trial court's findings
and thus makes no attempt to demonstrate that those findings are clearly erroneous or ·
that, despite the fmdings, his confession was nevertheless involuntary. Therefore, this
Court should not address this issue. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998)
(refusing to consider inadequately briefed issues). In any event, the trial court's findings
establish that Defendant voluntarily confessed.
The Fifth Amendment does not protect individuals against all self-incrimination.
See State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah 1998) ('"[F]ar from being prohibited

by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently
desirable."' (citation omitted)). Rather, it "protects individuals from being compelled to
give evidence against themselves." Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80,

~

11 (quotations and

citation omitted). Thus, '"coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not "voluntary."'" Id. at 1013 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 167 (1986)).

Compulsion does not occur merely because officers used a

technique designed to elicit a confession. Nor does the Constitution "prohibit every
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element which influences a criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions.~~ United

States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977). "[T]he test is whether, considering the
totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne." !d. at 188;

accord State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 936 (Utah 1998) (the coercive tactics must have
overcome "the defendant's free will"). Moreover, "'there must be a causal relationship
be"t'.veen the coercion and the subsequent

confession."~ Rettenberger~

1999 UT 80,

~

18

(citation omitted).
The circumstances of Defendant's confession included no coercive police activity
and thus bear no resemblance to Rettenberger. The police in Rettenberger made at least
thirty-six false statements, used the "false

friend~'

technique, threatened Rettenberger with

the death penalty, and refused to allow him to call his mother during an interrogation that
spanned two days, and included 22 hours in solitary confinement without pillow or
blanket.

1999 UT 80,

~~

21, 24, 29, 33-35. Rettenberger was eighteen but had the

maturity level of a fifteen-year-old, a below-average I.Q., little prior experience with the
judicial system, suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder, and exhibited symptoms of
other mental impairments.

I d. at ~ 3 7.

exploited his mental deficiencies.

!d. at

The intenogating officers recognized and
~~

38, 45.

And Rettenberger's confession

-

contained "little information that was not first provided or smnzested bv
., the interro2:atin2:
_...
.....

officers." !d.

at~

...................

40.

In contrast, Defendant's "interrogation was less than two hours and included breaks
'--

during which Defendant was offered food and water." R652. Defendant also confessed
to details that police had not disclosed.

The evidence of Defendant's low I.Q. was
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unreliable because Defendant's expert did not administer any validity or effort testing.
R1909:75,195-96.

Defendant's

ADHD

diagnosis

was

likewise

questionable.

R1909:151-54. Moreover, after observing Defendant testify, the trial court found that
any mental deficiency did not affect the voluntariness of Defendant's confession. R653.
Defendant's claim that the officers "admitted" to using manipulative techniques,
like "minimization, threats and false friend tech_niques," misrepresents the record. Br.
Aplt. at 53. The detectives did admit to suggesting ways that Defendant could minimize
his culpability. R1909:230. But they never admitted to threatening Defendant or using
the false-friend technique. Rather, the trial court found that the officers used "no physical
or psychological force" during the interrogation and that there was "no evidence that
Defendant was coerced, pressured, or threatened." R652. The court also found that any
fear Defendant felt "was from gang retaliation, not from law enforcement." R653.
In short, Defendant's interrogation was nothing like Rettenberger's. No coercive
police tactic overbore Defendant's will. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that
Defendant's confession was voluntary. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ~ 18.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION
WASALIE 8

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding expert
testimony that his confession was a lie. Br. Aplt. at 26-38. Defendant sought to call Dr.
Richard Ofshe, a sociology professor, to testify that his confession was a lie because it
8

This point responds to Defendant's Point II.
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was "obtained tlu·ough the use of a psychologically coercive motivational tactic."
Ofshe's Repmi at 2 (in a sealed manila envelope marked R746). Ofshe believed that
police had "capitalized" on the allegation that the rival gang was seeking revenge against
Defendant or his family by promising that if Defendant confessed, he and his family
would be protected. Id. at 3.
Defendant argues that this testimony was admissible because (1) jurors do not
understand that an innocent person might falsely confess, (2) false confessions can occur
when police "use psychological tricks and subtle fonns of coercion" and (3) the young
and mentally ill are especially susceptible to these techniques.

Br. Aplt. at 26-33.

Defendant likens this expert testimony to the eyewitness identification expert testimony
in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103. Br. Aplt. at 33-35. Defendant discounts
the trial court's findings that he did not demonstrate the reliability of Ofshe's testimony,
claiming that the trial court "did not conduct a Rimmasch hearing or in any way assess
the reliability of the science." Br. Aplt. at 25-26. Defendant argues that false confession
expert testimony "should be presumptively admissible," apparently because other courts
have admitted such testimony in some form. Br. Aplt. at 35, 36-37, Addendum F.
The trial court was well within its discretion to exclude Ofshe's testimony. It was
inadmissible under rules 608(a) and 702(a), Utah Rules of Evidence; because

jt

would

have directly commented on Defendant's credibility and thus invaded the jury's exclusive
province to judge credibility.

It was also inadmissible under rule 702(b) because

Defendant did not establish that Ofshe's methodology was reliable. Regardless, any error
in excluding the testimony was harmless given (1) Defendant's failure to testify and thus
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challenge the truthfulness of his confession, (2) the mountain of eyewitness testimony
corroborating the confession, and (3) the jury instruction on false confessions.
A.

Factual background.
The State moved to exclude Ofshe's testimony as unreliable and unhelpful under

rule 702, an improper comment on Defendant's credibility under rule 608, and more
ureiudicial than nrobative under rule 403. Utah Rules of Evidence. Rl 064-94. At the

....

.L

..J

..

hearing on the motion, defense counsel did not produce Dr. Ofshe to testify about the
reliability of his methodology, nor did counsel request an opportunity to do so in the
future. Rl919:58-67 (the argument and ruling on the admissibility of Ofshe's testimony
is in Addendum D). Rather, defense counsel argued that the State bore the burden to
prove the unreliability of the testimony. R1919:58. Defense counsel also argued that the
court should allow Ofshe to testify at trial because it had authorized funds to hire Ofshe.
Rl919:60.

Counsel also argued that if Ofshe could not testify specifically that

Defendant's confession was a lie, then he should be allowed to testify generally "that
there are false confessions" and that a "number of factors that go into that." Rl919:74.
The trial court excluded the testimony. Rl609-14; 1919:70-73 (the ruling is in
Addendum E). The court based its ruling on the parties' memoranda, and "the studies
and applicable literature" therein. R1609. The court found that Defendant had not shown
that Ofshe's principles and methods were reliable under Rule 702 because, among other
things, (1) the core of Ofshe's research-cases in which he believes false confessions
occurred-"are not unifonnly accepted within the scientific community as being valid
false confession cases"; (2) "the methodology employed [by] Ofshe in identifying false
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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confessions is not generally accepted within the scientific community"; (3) "Ofshe has
never attempted to quantify his theories through any sort of empirical data"; (4) his
hypothesis "lacks support from any empirical data and [has] not been adequately
studied"; (5) Professor Paul Cassell's research shows that "Ofshe was only able, at best,
to correctly identify a false confession 55% of the time"; and (6) Ofshe's opinions are
unsupnorted bv anv "emnirical data or credible research." R1610-12. The court also
-

.J.

..,.

...

.1.

ruled that the testimony would "invade[] the fact finding function of the jury." R1612.
The trial court ruled that Ofshe' s testimony was also inadmissible under Rule
608(a) because it would comment directly on Defendant's credibility. Id. Finally, the
court concluded that the unfair prejudicial effect of Ofshe's unreliable opmwn
substantially outweighed any probative value under Rule 403. R1613-14.
The trial court noted that its ruling did not prevent Defendant from developing at
trial his theory that the confession was coerced. Rl919:73. The court also agreed to
instruct the jury on false confessions. Id.
At trial, Defendant did not testify or introduce evidence of his alleged ADHD and
low I.Q. R1927:5-6. Detective Thomas testified that he "never made [Defendant] any
promises at the station at any time" and that the subject of "keep[ing the rival gang] off of
[Defendant]" never came up during the stationhouse interview. R1926:4 7. Consistent
with the trial court's findings on the motion to suppress, the detectives denied at trial
employing any physical or psychological force to induce Defendant's statements. R65154;1925:24-54,59,112-32.
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Defendant proposed a jury instruction on false confessions and reminded the trial
court that it had agreed to give the instruction. Rl922:34. The State objected that the
instruction was itTelevant because Defendant did not testify that his confession was false.
R1927: 15. The trial court gave the instruction because it viewed Defendant's initial
denial of involvement, coupled with his later admission, as "some evidence" of a false

committing a crime" and listed factors to consider in evaluating a confession's reliability.

!d. (the instruction is in Addendum F).
B.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion.

"'Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining whether expert scientific
evidence is admissible."' T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 2011 UT 28,

~

41, 254 P.3d 752 (citation omitted). This Court will reverse a trial court's decision to
exclude an expert witness "'only if . . . no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court."' !d. (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, "prohibits any testimony as to a witness's
truthfulness on a particular occasion." State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah
1989). It states, in part, that a witness's credibility "may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the fonn of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the
evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." Utah R. Evid.
608(a).
"Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth a two-part test for detennining
whether expert testimony is admissible." T-Mobile, 2011 UT 28, ~ 42. First, under Rule
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702(a), the expert's opinion must be "necessary to assist the trier of fact" and the expert
must possess "the necessary 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' to
provide such assistance to the trier of fact." I d. (quoting Eskelson v. Davis Hasp. & Me d.
Ctr., 2010 UT 15,

~

9, 242 PJd 762). "Second, rule 702(b) requires that the specialized

knowledge that forms the expert's testimony be reliable, based on sufficient facts, and be
reliably applied to the facts." !d. (citing Utah R. Evid. 702(b )).
1. Expert testimony that Defendant lied was inadmissible under rules
608(a) and 702(a).

The trial court correctly ruled that Ofshe's testimony was inadmissible under
rules 608(a) and 702(a). As explained, rule 608(a) prohibits testimony about "a witness's
truthfulness on a particular occasion." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 391. Testimony opining
that Defendant lied to police would have -directly commented on Defendant's credibility.
It was therefore inadmissible under Rule 608(a). See id.; Utah R. Evid. 608(a).

Rule 702(a) also barred Ofshe's opinion. The rule allows only expert testimony
that is necessary to help the jury, and "' [e]xpert opinion testimony should not be
permitted to invade the field of common knowledge or the province of the jury."' Patey
v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31,

~

21, 977 P.2d 1193 (citation omitted); Utah R. Evid. 702(a).

The jury is "the sole evaluator of witness credibility.'' Clopten, 2009 UT 84,

~

36. Rule

702(a) therefore barred Ofshe's opinion that Defendant's confession was a lie. See id.
(holding that eyewitness identification expert could not "tell the jury that a specific
eyewitness identification either is or is not accurate").

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Other comis agree that expert testimony that a suspect lied to police invades the
juris sole province to judge witness credibility.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the

exclusion of a psychologist's testimony that the defendant's police statements were likely
false because such testimony would do "little more than 'vouch for the credibility of
another witness' and thereby 'encroach[] upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to
make credibility detenninations."' Uvzited States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Likewise, the l\1issouri Court of Appeals affirmed the
exclusion of expert testimony that the defendant had characteristics "which tend to be
present in people who make false confessions" because that testimony would "invade the
province ofthejury." State v. Wright, 247 S.W.3d 161, 168 (Mo. App. 2008).
Even if Ofshe's testimony were not a direct opinion on Defendant's credibility, it
would still be inadmissible under Rule 702(a) because it would not "help the trier of fact"
to understand an issue they were incapable of grasping on their own. See Utah R. Evid.
702(a). The fundamental inquiry in determining whether expe1i testimony will "help the
trier of fact" is "whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average
individual." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
The jury did not need Ofshe's opinion to understand a claim that Defendant's
confession might be false.

Ofshe would have opined that Defendant lied to protect

himself or his family from harm. R746 (Ofshe's Report at 2-3). The jury did not need an
expert to explain that a person might lie to avoid harm to himself or others. Rather, a
claim that a defendant lied to· protect another "is precisely the type of explanation that a
jury is capable of resolving without expert testimony." Adams, 271 F.3d at 1246.
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Defendant cites various law review and journal articles for the proposition that
jurors "are completely unaware" that suspects might falsely confess. Br. Aplt. at 31-33.
But research from false confession experts themselves undennines this premise. False
confession experts base their claim that jurors are unaware that false confessions occur on
a survey of District of Columbia potential jurors. Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confession in America, The Champion, Vol. 41, No. 10, p. 31. That survey showed that

68% of respondents believed that suspects falsely confess "not very often" or "almost
never." !d. Those results do not demonstrate that jurors "are completely unaware" that
false confessions occur.

Rather, as one commentator noted, "[i]mplying that these

answers foreclose even the possibility of false confessions within the minds of jurors is
simply wordplay: 'not very often' and 'almost never' do not mean 'never."' David A.
Perez, The (In)admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, 26 Touro L. Rev. 23,
56-57 (2010). The data actually confinn "most juror's beliefs that concede the possibility
of a false confession in a given case, while also noting its statistical improbability." !d.
In sum, Ofshe's testimony that Defendant's confession was a lie was inadmissible
under Rules 608(a) and 702(a). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding it.
2.

General testimonv
" that defendants mav falselv confess was also
inadmissible under rules 608(a) and 702(a).
~

~

Defendant argues, as he did below, that even if Ofshe's specific opinion that
Defendant lied was inadmissible, his general testimony that "there are false confessions"
and that a "number of factors that go into that" was admissible.
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Br. Aplt. at 36;

R1919:74. The trial court properly excluded that testimony because it would have been
irrelevant and unhelpful.
Testimony about general "factors that go into" a false confession would have been
irrelevant because Ofshe's opinion was based entirely on his unsubstantiated belief that
Defendant confessed out of fear of retaliation from the rival gang. R726 (Ofshe' s Report
at 2-3). Ofshe did not identify any other factors, like Defendant's alleged mental state, or
specific interrogation tactics, that supposedly resulted in a false confession. !d.
Additionally, general testimony "that there are false confessions" would not meet
Rule 702's requirement to help the jury. Testimony amounting to '"nothing more than an
assertion that false confessions do occur' . . . would be of no assistance to the jury"
because "the testimony would be 'so abstract, vague and speculative that its relevance
and probative value [would be] virtually nil."' State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83, 96 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted).

Therefore, the trial court properly

exercised its discretion to exclude Ofshe's general testimony.
3. Defendant did not show that his expert's methodology was reliable.

The trial court also properly exercised its discretion in excluding Ofshe's opinion
because Defendant did not show that the methodology underlying that opinion was
reliable. Rule 702(b) reauired the trial court to determine whether Ofshe' s methods and

-

~

-- .

-

~.

·'

!.

principles were (i) "reliable," (ii) "based upon sufficient facts or data," and (iii) "reliably
applied to the facts of the case." See Utah R. Evid. 702(b ). This showing "is satisfied if
the principles or methods ... are generally accepted by the relevant expert community."
Utah R. Evid. 702(c). Defendant had to establish that Ofshe's methodology was reliable.
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See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 393 n.3 ('"[T]he proponent of scientific evidence [bears] the
burden of establishing a proper foundation as a prerequisite to admissibility, especially in
a criminal case."); see also Utah R. Evid. 702 (Advisory Committee Note) (recognizing
that the proponent of expert testimony must establish its reliability).
Defendant essentially argued below that Ofshe's methodology was generally
accepted.

Defendant never asked to have Ofshe testify about the reliability of his

methodology. Rather, defense counsel relied on cases from other jurisdictions that had
allowed some fonn of expert testimony on false confessions. R1171-80. Defendant also
argued that the trial court should allow Ofshe to testify because it had authorized funds to
hire Ofshe. R1919:60. Likewise, Defendant contends on appeal that false confession
expert testimony '"should be presumptively admissible," again citing to cases admitting
the testimony in some form or another. Br. Aplt. at 35, 36 n.34, Addendum F.
But the fact that some courts have admitted such testimony does not establish its
general acceptance. Rather, far from being generally accepted, the reliability of this
testimony is highly contested and a number of courts have excluded the testimony. False
confession experts themselves also admit that their principles and methods lack a sound
scientific basis. Therefore, given the evidence before it, the trial court properly exercised
its discretion to exclude the expert testimony as unreliable. Rl609-14.
The principles and methods underlying false confession expert testimony are not
generally accepted. For example, the Michigan Court of Appeals affinned the exclusion
of false confession expert testimony from Ofshe's co-author, Dr. Richard Leo, because
the principles and methods underlying such testimony were unreliable. See People v.
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Kowalski, No. 294054, 2010 WL 3389741, at *3 (Mich. App. 26 August 2010). The
court held that "Dr. Leo's conclusions were based on the study of confessions that he
subjectively determined, without definitive evidence, were false" and that "there is no
way to test or quantify Dr. Leo's methodologies or to decipher a known error rate." !d.

See also Lyons v. State, 652 S.E.2d 525, 531 (Ga. 2007) (affinning the trial court's
had not reached a verifiable stae:e
exclusion of Ofshe' s testimony.. because his "theory
.,
-" of
scientific certainty"), overruled on other grounds by Garza v. State, 670 S.E.2d 73 (Ga.
2008)); see also Free, 798 A.2d at 95 ("[W]e are not satisfied that Dr. Kassin's premises
[regarding false confessions] have gained general acceptance.") (quotation and citation
omitted).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court likewise affinned a trial court's decision to
exclude false confession testimony from Dr. Saul Kassin because he conceded "that there
was no empirical data on the number of false confessions ... that there is no scientific
basis for distinguishing true from false confessions," and that one of his articles
recognized that further research in the field was "sorely needed." Commonwealth v.

Robinson, 864 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (Mass. 2007). The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the
exclusion of Dr. Leo's testimony on false confessions, because "he could offer no expert
insight into the actual likelihood that coercive interrogation tactics will lead to a false
confession" and because he had "not fonnulated a specific theory or methodology about
false confessions that could be tested, subjected to peer review, or pennit an error rate to
be detennined." State v. Wooden, No. 23992, 2008 WL 2814346, at *4 (Ohio App. July
23, 2008).
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Professor Paul Cassell has observed that "[t]he admissibility of expert testimony
on false confessions is quite controversial" and that "the clear trend in the cases is that, at
the very least, courts should preclude any testimony on the truth or falsity of a particular
confession." See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and The "Innocent": An Examination

of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction From False Confessions, 22 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol'y 523, 588 (1999). He continues: "It is not at all clear that acceptance of conclusions
about false confessions yet exists." !d. at 589. Rather, "the empirical data on false
confessions could be described as 'tentative and fragmentary."' !d. Indeed, as Professor
Cassell has noted, leading false confession researcher Dr. Saul Kassin himself has
concluded that because confession evidence has been largely overlooked by the scientific
community, "'the current empirical foundation may be too meager to ... qualify as a
subject of 'scientific knowledge' according to' the rules governing expert testimony." !d.
at 589-90 (quoting Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, Am.
Psychologist, Mar. 1997, at 221, 231). And Professor Cassell has also criticized Leo and
Ofshe's methodology because their success rate in determining true from false
confessions was only 55%, even giving them "the generous benefit of the doubt." !d. at
587-89.

methodology does not allow them to determine the rate at which false confessions occur.
For example, Ofshe has admitted that "it is presently not possible to quantify the number
and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of
justice." Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees:
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A

Response to Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach" to the False Confession Problem,
1997 DENY. U. L. REv. 1135 (1997). Leo acknowledged in a 2009 article that "we do not
know how frequently [false confessions] occur." Richard A. Leo, False Confessions:

Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. Ad. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 332,

~

4

(2009).
In the years since Professor Cassell's article, researchers still have not established
a sound foundation for false confession theory. Saul Kassin recently acknowledged again
that "there is no known incidence rate of [false confessions], and to our knowledge
empirically based estimates have never been published." Saul M. Kassin et. al., Police-

Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 Law & Hum. Behav. 3, 5
(20 10).

According to one commentator, the admissibility of false confession expert

testimony involves a "contentious debate being played out on all levels of state and
federal courts." Perez, (In)admissibility, 26 Touro L. Rev. at 35, (supra).
Defendant relies on a Seventh Circuit holding that Ofshe's testimony was
admissible to help the jury understand the phenomenon of false confessions. Br. Aplt. at
37 (citing United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345 (ih Cir. 1996)).

However,

Defendant omits that the prosecutor in Hall "did not challenge the scientific basis of the

-

nroffered testimonv." 93 F.3d at 1344.

~

On remand from the Seventh Circuit, the trial court admitted Ofshe's testimony.

See United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997). However, the trial court
would not allow Ofshe to "explicitly testify about matters of causation, specifically,
whether the inteiTogation methods used in this case caused Hall to falsely confess." I d. at
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1205. The court found that, given the lack of scientific basis for such an opinion, "such
testimony would be speculative and prejudicial." Id.
The fact that some courts have admitted various fonns of false confession expert
testimony does not establish the reliability of such testimony. On the contrary, the above
case law and literature demonstrates that false confession expert testimony is not

generally acceptedc
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Defendant discounts the trial court's extensive
findings that Ofshe's methods and principles were unreliable. He claims that the trial
court "did not conduct a Rimmasch hearing or in any way assess the reliability of the
science." Br. Aplt. at 25-26. On the contrary, the trial court evaluated the reliability of
the testimony based on the infonnation that the State and Defendant provided, which
consisted of "the briefs, the studies and applicable literature referenced in the briefs."
R1609. The trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing that no one asked
for. See Utah R. Evid. 702 (Advisory Committee Note). Rather, "admissibility under the
rule may be determined based on affidavits, expert reports . . . and memoranda of
counsel" and evidentiary hearings will not be routinely required. I d.
Moreover, because Defendant never produced Ofshe to testify, nor sought an
opportunity to do so, the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Although defense counsel did mention a "Rimmasch hearing," he did so only to argue
that it was the State's or the trial court's responsibility to seek such a reliability hearing.
R1919:58,60. Defendant never requested a Rimmasch hearing. Id. At the hearing on the
State's motion to exclude Ofshe, defense counsel emphasized, "we are not here on a
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Rimmasch hearing. The State ha[ d] an opportunity, they could have requested one; they

haven't." R1919:58. Later, defense counsel argued that because the trial court had
granted counsel funds to hire Ofshe, the court should allow him to testify at trial.
R1919:60. Counsel asserted that if there was an issue about the reliability of Ofshe's
methods, the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate reliability before it
authorized funds to hire Ofshe. 9
But Defendant had to either produce Ofshe or ask for the opportunity to do so
because he had the burden to establish the reliability of Ofshe's testimony.

See

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 393 n.3. Defendant cannot fault the trial court for not holding a

hearing on the reliability of false confession expert testimony when he never asked for
such a hearing and instead relied on caselaw to argue that the testimony was reliable.
4. Any error in excluding the testimony was harmless.
Regardless, any error in excluding Ofshe's testimony was harmless. Exclusion of
expert testimony is harmful "only if there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the verdict
would have been different had the expert testimony been included." Clopten, 2009 UT
84, ~ 39 (citation omitted). Defendant does not show a reasonable likelihood that Ofshe's
testimony would have resulted in a different verdict, because ( 1) Defendant provided no
evidentiary foundation to support his claim that his confession was false, (2)

After acknowledging that other courts have excluded Dr. Ofshe's testimony as
unreliable, counsel stated, "I guess we should have a Rimnwsch hearing or should have
had one to determine that. But at this point, the Court's appointed him as an expert.
We're asking that he be able to testify as an expe1i and ask for some sort of Rinunasch
[sic] that could show that he's not reliable, I think that it would be incumbent upon the
Comito allow his testimony." R1919:60.
9
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overwhelming evidence from eyewitnesses corroborated Defendant's confession, and (3)
the trial comi gave an instruction on false confessions.

a. No evidence supported the expert's opinion.
Expe1i testimony is unnecessary when no evidence supports the expeti' s opinion.

See Clopten, 2009 UT 84,

~

33.

This Court held in Clopten that while eyewitness

identification expert testimony can help a jury understand factors that might lead to a
mistaken identification, such testimony is unnecessary when those factors do not affect
an identification.

See id.

Likewise, there was no basis for false confession expert

testimony here, because the jury heard no evidence of any factor that could have caused
Defendant to falsely confess. See id. See also In re Detention of Law, 204 P.3d 230, 236
(Wash. App. 2008) (false confession expert testimony "is only relevant when a party
claims that he confessed to something he did not do").
Here, Ofshe's testimony would not have affected the verdict because Defendant
provided no evidentiary foundation for his claim that he falsely confessed. As explained,
Ofshe's opinion depended entirely on Defendant's claim that the police had promised to
protect him from the rival gang if he confessed. R746 (Ofshe's Report at 2-3). But the
detective's version of the interview does not support that claim, and Defendant did not
testifv to suooort it. R1927:5-6. In fact Defendant did not testify at all. See id.
-'

.l ..t

~

-

Detective Thomas testified that he "never made [Defendant] any promises at the
station at any time" and that the subject of "keep[ing the rival gang] off of [Defendant]"
never come up during the stationhouse interview. Rl926:47. Additionally, as the trial
comi found, "no evidence" showed that Defendant "was coerced, pressured, or threatened
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to give the statements," or that any "psychological force [was] used to induce the
Defendant's statements." R652. Therefore, no evidence supported Ofshe's opinion that
Defendant falsely confessed to seek protection from gang retaliation.
Defendant argues that his alleged ADHD and low I.Q. contributed to his allegedly
false confession. Br. Aplt. at 35-38. But Ofshe did not rely on those factors to fonn his

Nor did Defendant introduce an;.r evidenc.e at
trial of his alleged ADHD and low I.Q. Therefore, no evidence supported a theory that
Defendant's mental state led to a false confession.
Defendant argued below that exclusion of Ofshe's testimony prevented Defendant
from testifying at trial. Rl928:25-27. The record refutes that argument. After trial,
Defendant moved to arrest judgment asserting, among other things, that the trial court
erroneously excluded Ofshe's testimony. Rl509-16. In denying that motion, the trial
court noted that there was no evidentiary basis for Ofshe' s opinion because Defendant
did not testify. R1928:23-24. Defense counsel retorted that his decision not to call
Defendant was driven by the trial court's ruling excluding Ofshe's testimony. R1928:2527. The State objected that it was too late for defense counsel to make a record on that
issue and the trial court agreed, noting that the issue had arisen at the pretrial hearing on

not be allowed to testify unless Defendant also testified and claimed that he falsely
confessed. R1919:53-54. Defense counsel never argued at that hearing that he could call
Defendant only ifthe court also allowed Ofshe to testify. R1919:43-75. On the contrary,
the trial court explicitly told Defendant that its ruling excluding Ofshe did not prevent
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Defendant from developing his theory at trial that .his confession was false. R1919:73. Therefore, the exclusion of Dr. Ofshe did not prevent Defendant from testifying.
Moreover, Defendant's argument that he could not testify unless Ofshe also
testified was illogical. Because Ofshe's opinion depended on Defendant's version of the
detectives' statements, Ofshe's testimony depended on Defendant testifying to his
version of the interview, not vice versa.
In short, no evidence supported Ofshe's opinion that Defendant's confession was
false. Therefore, any error in excluding that opinion was harmless.

b. Seven eyewitnesses corroborated Defendant's confession.
Any error in excluding Ofshe was also harmless because overwhelming
eyewitness evidence corroborated Defendant's confession that he was the shooter. Three
eyewitnesses, including two who were in the SUV with Defendant, identified him as
having fired the shots. Sarah Valencia and SUV passengers Angelo Gallegos and Elias
Christopher Garcia all testified that Defendant was the shooter.
1925:10-11,20-21,33.

R1922:86,95,107;

Four other eyewitnesses corroborated the central details of

Defendant's confession. Richard Esquivel and SUV driver Dominique Duran testified
that all the shots came from the passenger side of the SUV where Defendant admitted he
was sitting. R1922:150;1923:11-13;1924:6,13-18. Lacey Randall testified that she saw
someone sitting on the passenger windowsill on the SUV as it pulled away and that all of
the shots came from the SUV. R1923: 11-13. And Keri Garcia testified that all the shots
came from the direction of the road. R1922:127. Given the foregoing evidence, the jury
would not have likely reached a different result even if it had heard Ofshe's testimony.
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c.

The jury was instructed on false confessions.

Finally, the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on false confessions mitigated
any hann that might have stemmed from its ruling excluding Ofshe. Instruction 56 told
the jury that "an individual might falsely confess to committing a crime" and encouraged
the jury to consider several factors in judging the validity of Defendant's confession
including: "the spontaneity of the statement,'' "[w]hether deception, trick, threats, or
promises were used to obtain the statement," "[t]he defendant's physical and mental
condition, including age, education, and experience," and "whether an attorney was
present when the statement was given." R1364-65 (Add. F).
Given the lack of evidentiary basis for Ofshe's opinion, the overwhelming
evidence corroborating the confession, and the jury instruction, Ofshe's opinion would
not have created a reasonable likelihood of an acquittal.

Therefore, any error was

harmless. See Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ~ 39.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO
EXCLUDE EXHIBITS FROM DEFENDANT'S CRIME SCENE
RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT FOR INSUFFICIENT FOUNDATION 10

The trial court allowed Defendant's crime scene reconstruction expert James
Gaskill to testify that, in his opinion, there were two other shooters, one in the carport
area shooting towards the street and another who might have been shooting from inside
the white car in the driveway. Rl926:213-25. Gaskill testified that the bullets that hit
Nevarez and Esquivel could not have been fired from the SUV. Rl926:22l-25. The trial

10

This point responds to Defendant's Point I.
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court excluded for lack of foundation

Gaskill~s

computer generated animation depicting

the supposed two additional shooters, still photographs from that animation, and photos
purporting to recreate Defendant's view from the SUV. R1926: 181-82 (the relevant
transcript pages are in Addendum G).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding the animation and photos
because they 'vere merely demonstrative exhibits that aecurately reflected the

expert~s

opinion. Br. Aplt. at 12, 15-17. Defendant further argues that the trial court allowed the
prosecution to unfairly surprise him when it moved midtrial to exclude the exhibits for
lack of foundation. Br. Aplt. at 12-15. Defendant also asserts that the trial court unfairly
limited

Gaskill~ s

State~s

witnesses.

testimony by not allowing him to cmmnent on the credibility of the
Br. Aplt. at 22.

Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court

erroneously allowed the State to use a crime scene diagram to illustrate bullet trajectories.
!d. at 22-23.

A.

Factual background.

Before trial, the State moved for an order preventing Gaskill from testifying in a
way that commented on the credibility of the State's witnesses. Rl917:28, 33 (Add. G).
The trial court granted the

State~s

motion. R1917:38-40. It ruled that Gaskill could

testifY about his theory of the shooting and explain that "based on his examination he
doesn't agree with the conclusion that was reached by some of the witnesses." !d. But
the court agreed that Gaskill could not testify that he did not "find these witnesses to be
credible." R1917:39.
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· As explained, Gaskill testified at trial that he believed that there were shooters in
the carport and perhaps inside the white car, and that, in his opinion, the shooter in the
carport shot Sabrina Prieto in the chest as she ran south towards the side door of the
house. R1926:213-25. Gaskill also testified that, given the position of vehicles in front
of the house and given the location of the expended casings in the street, the bullets that
hit Esquivel and Nevarez could not have been fired from the SlN. R1926:221-25.
To support Gaskill's trial testimony, Defendant sought to introduce a computergenerated animation depicting the other two supposed shooters, still photos from the
animation, and photos allegedly recreating Defendant's view from the SUV. R1926:13750. The State moved to exclude the exhibits for lack of foundation. !d.
The trial court expressed frustration that this issue had not been addressed before
trial. R1926: 141. The prosecutors explained that although defense counsel provided a
copy of the animation about two weeks before trial, counsel told them that the animation
was not finalized and "things were going to be changing." R1926:140)45. Defense
counsel did not provide the final version until the Friday before the Tuesday trial.
R1921:1;1926:140. The prosecutors did not receive the photos until the day after trial
began. R1926:148.
The trial court nevertheless allowed Gaskill to try to establish foundation for the
animation and photos. R1926: 155. Regarding the animation, Gaskill testified that he did
not create it himself and could not remember the name of the person or persons that did,
or even the name or location of their company. R1926:163-64. Gaskill was uncertain
whether the people who created the animation had any background in bioengineering,
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biomechanics, forensic pathology, or kinesiology. R1926:166. Gaskill could not recall
whether he had provided the animators with a copy of the medical examiner's report. !d.
Gaskill believed he gave the animators some crime scene photos, but could not
specifically recall which ones. R1926: 166-6 7. Gaskill admitted that the animation did
not show the precise trajectory for the bullet that struck a female victim as she
appr"'~"hed
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shooting from inside the white car was based on photos of a bullet hole in the car's
window. R1926:213-17. Gaskill admitted on cross-examination that he could not know
for sure which way the bullet traveled through the window without examining the actual
window, which he did not do. R1926:236.
Gaskill admitted that the photos purporting to depict Defendant's view from the
SUV did not reflect precisely how high Defendant would have been, because the photos
were not taken from a Yukon Denali, the kind of vehicle involved in the shooting.
R1926:174. Gaskill also admitted that the pickup truck that he placed in front of the
house in the staged photos was not the same size, make, or model as the truck parked in
· front ofthe house on the night ofthe shooting. R1926:167-68. Gaskill also did not know
the exact location of the car that he parked in front of the truck in the staged photos.
R1926:229-31.
No physical evidence or eyewitness testimony supported Gaskill's opinion that
there were two other shooters. Sarah Valencia testified that no one besides Defendant
fired the shots occurring after Defendant and his companions got into the SUV.
R1922:89. She saw no one shooting from the carport area where she and Prieto ran for
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cover. Id. And Gaskill admitted on cross that Prieto could have been shot while she
stood in the front yard and then run to the side door of the house. R1926:249-52.
Keri Garcia, who also ran towards the carport for cover, testified that all the shots
came from the road and that there was no one shooting in the carport or in the grass east
of the carport. R1922:128. Richard Esquivel confinned that when the first shots were
fired in the air by an u!1Jcr10wn individual; no one else was in the grass east of the carport
where he stood, and that he did not hear any later shots coming from that area.
R1922:151-52. No expended bullet casings were found in that grassy area or the carport
area. R1923:29-31,79. And the SUV in which Defendant was riding was undamaged.
R1923:41;State's Exhibits 53-54.
Esquivel was "positive" that no one was inside the white car parked in the
driveway. R1922:152. And Lacey Randall, who owned that car and had been standing
by it for an hour when the shots began, testified that no one was inside her car.
R1923:10-13. She instead testified that all the shots came from the SUV. Rl923:11-13.
Ten expended shell casings were found in the road west of the home where the
shooting occurred. R1923:57,59-60. The locations of the casings are indicated by black
dots on State's Exhibit 89. R1923:78;1927:58; State's Exhibit 89 (Add. I). The State's
ballistics expert testified that the casings were found where he would expect them to be
given that the shots were fired from the roof of a moving SUV. R1927:91-62. He
testified that casings roll easily on hard surfaces. R1923: 126;1927:61. Some of the
casings also looked like they had been run over or stepped on. Rl923:125.
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The trial court ultimately ruled that Gaskill had not provided sufficient foundation
for the animation and still photos from it because there was "no basis" to find that the
animation had "any semblance to what we are talking about in this case." R1926:178-82.
Moreover, Gaskill did not prepare the animation and could not explain "what went into
it" or "who was involved in it." !d.

The court found that the staged photos lacked

sufficient foundation because they did "not accurately depict" the crime scene. !d. The
court therefore excluded the animation and the photos labeled Defendant's Exhibits 14,
15, and 20-27. !d.
B.

The trial court acted well within its discretion to exclude Defendant's
computer-generated animation and crime scene reconstruction photos.
Whether a party has laid an adequate foundation for an exhibit is a decision left to

the trial court's discretion. See Carpenter Paper Co. v. Brannock, 376 P.2d 939, 940
(Utah 1962) ("It is the prerogative of the trial court to determine when such foundation is
laid.").
"Video animation is a powerful evidentiary tool" and "can have greater weight
and longer-lasting impact than conventional testimony." Clark v. Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d
605, 612 (S.C. App. 1998) (citing 2 McCormick on Evidence§ 214 at 19 (4t1-J ed. 1992)).
The "maxim 'a picture is worth a thousand words"' applies to video animations. State v.

Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 8 (La. 1990).
Given its persuasive power, video animation "has the potential to mislead if used
improperly." Clark, 504 S.E.2d at 612. "[S]taged video reproductions which stray from
original facts create impressions that prove especially difficult to limit." !d.
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"'The

extreme vividness and persuasiveness of motion pictures ... is a two-edged sword. If the
film does not portray original facts in controversy, but rather represents a staged
reproduction of one party's version of those facts, the danger that the jury may confuse
art with reality is particularly great.'" Trahan, 576 So.2d at 8 (quoting McConnick on
Evidence, § 214 (2d ed. 1972)). Moreover, "'the vivid impressions on the trier of fact

.

created by the viev-.ring of the motion nictures 'x'il! be narticularlv difficult to limit or,- if
~

~

~

the film is subsequently deemed to be inadmissible, to expunge by judicial instruction."'
I d. (quoting McCormick on Evidence, § 214 (2d ed. 1972)).

Given video animation's "dramatic power, trial judges should carefully and
meticulously examine proposed animation evidence for proper foundation, relevancy and
the potential for undue prejudice." Robinson v.
1088 (lOth Cir. 1994).

~Jv!issouri

Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083,

Video animation also requires "heightened guarantees of

trustworthiness because of its susceptibility to editorial distortion." Clark, 504 S.E.2d at
612.
Computer-generated video animations lack sufficient foundation for admissibility
when they are inconsistent with trial testimony and do not accurately reflect facts in
evidence. For example, in Trahan, the Louisiana Supreme Court "concluded that while a
recreation need not be exact in every detail, the important elements of the test must be
identical or very similar to the scene in order to have probative value." 576 So.2d at 7.
The video reenactment of Trahan's version of a shooting was inadmissible because its
depiction of the victim's position was inconsistent with the defendant's testimony. See
id.
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Likewise, the trial court in Clark properly excluded a computer-generated
animation of a car accident because the animation was "inconsistent with prior
testimony," including the partis own expert, and did not accurately portray the vehicle's
speed. 504 S.E.2d at 611, 614. On certiorari review, the South Carolina Supreme Court
affinned. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 538 (S.C. 2000). While acknowledging
that the mere fact that an "animation in inconsistent with testimony or evidence presented
by the opposing party should not necessarily lead to its exclusion," the Clark court held
that proper foundation requires that "the important elements must be identical or very
similar to the scene as described in other testimony and evidence presented by the
animation's proponent" to satisfy the foundational requirement that it "constitute a fair
and accurate representation" of the evidence. !d. at 537.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the admission of a computer-generated
animation of a shooting in Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1178-82 (Pa. 2006),
holding that, to be admissible, an animation must be (1) "properly authenticated," (2)
relevant, and (3) not unfairly prejudicial under the relevant Pennsylvania rules of
evidence. ld. at 1178-79. The animation in Serge was "properly authenticated" because
the positions of the actors it depicted were supported by the physical evidence of the
victim's wounds, including the wound trajectories. See id.
This Court considered the foundation for admitting crime recreation evidence in

State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353-54 (Utah 1997).

Pearson was convicted of

aggravated murder for intentionally shooting and killing a highway patrol trooper during
a high speed chase on I-70. See id. at 1349. Pearson's theory was that the killing was
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merely reckless, because had he intended to kill the trooper, his aim would have been
more accurate than the evidence showed. See id. at 1350.
To support his theory, Pearson offered evidence of a simulation purporting to
recreate the shooting. !d. In the recreation, two people shot from the passenger-side
window of a moving tmck at a target mounted on a trailer thirty feet away being towed
along a country road at about 45 miles per hour. !d. 1350; 1353.

The facts at trial;

however, were that Pearson shot from the driver's side of his vehicle at officers who were
120 feet away while traveling 75 miles per hour on Interstate Highway 70. !d.
This Court held that the trial comi properly excluded the recreation evidence
because it "bore only a limited resemblance to the facts of the case." !d. at 1353.
Although "exact duplication is not necessary," this Court explained that the "numerous
significant differences between the simulation scenario and the real events" rendered the
evidence inadmissible. !d. at 13 54.
The trial court here correctly found that Defendant had not established sufficient
foundation to admit the animation and photos.

Not only did no evidence support

Gaskill's theory about two other shooters, the evidence contradicted that theory. All the
witnesses testified that no one was shooting from the carport or inside the white car. No
shell casings were found in the can;>ort area. R1923:29-3l 5 79. Moreover, no evidence
established exactly where Sabrina Prieto was standing when she was shot in the chest.
Therefore, Gaskill's theory that she was shot while she ran south through the carport was
pure speculation. Gaskill himself admitted that she could have been shot in the front yard
and still have mn to the side door of the house. R1926:249-52. He also admitted that the
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animation did not depict the correct trajectory for the bullet that is depicted as striking
Prieto in the chest. R1926:169. Giventhe unique persuasive power of video animation
evidence, and the concomitant need to carefully scrutinize such evidence, the trial court
acted well within its discretion in excluding Defendant's animation for lack of
foundation. See Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d at 612-14; Trahan, 576 So.2d at 7-8; Serge, 896
A.2d at 1178-82.
The trial court also acted well within its discretion in excluding Defendant's
photos attempting to recreate Defendant's view. The photos did not accurately represent
Defendant's view because they were not taken using vehicles that were the same height
and size as those involved in the crime, nor did Gaskill know exactly where the car
parked in front of the truck in the staged photos was. As with the recreation simulation in
Pearson, Gaskill's photos bore only a limited, if any, resemblance to what actually
occurred in this case. Therefore, the trial court properly excluded them. See Pearson,
943 P.2d at 1353-54.
C.

The prosecution timely raised its foundation objection.

Defendant argues that the trial court allowed the prosecution to unfairly surprise
him by allowing the foundation objection midtrial. Br. Aplt. at 12-15. Likening the
prosecution's objection to a motion to suppress, Defendant argues that rule 12(c)(l)(B),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure required the prosecution to raise this issue at least five
days before trial.

Id

Defendant also asserts that exclusion of the animation and

photographs contradicted the trial court's earlier ruling allowing Gaskill's testimony. Jd.
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The prosecution properly objected to the foundation for Gaskill's animation and
photos when Defendant offered them.

Rule 12 requires a party to file a motion to

suppress at least five days before trial. See Utah R. Cri. P. 12(c)(l)(B). Here, the
prosecution was not seeking to suppress illegally obtained evidence. Rather, it was
challenging the foundation for Defendant's exhibits. Therefore, rule 12's deadline is

have raised its objection five days before trial. Defendant did not provide the finalized
animation until the Friday before the Tuesday trial, and did not provide the photos until
the day after trial began. See R1921:1;1926:140;148.
The prosecution's foundation objection could not have unfairly surprised
Defendant.

As the party offering the exhibits, Defendant had to establish adequate

foundation for them. See Barrientos ex rel. Nelson v. Jones, 2012 UT 33, ~ 31, 710 Utah
Adv. Rep. 35 (holding that under Utah R. Evid. 901, party seeking to admit exhibit has
burden to lay proper foundation for exhibit). Defendant was therefore on notice that he
had to be prepared to establish sufficient foundation.
Nor did the trial court's ruling excluding the exhibits for lack of foundation
contradict its earlier ruling that Gaskill could testify about his theory of the case. The

could not comment on other witnesses' credibility. R1917:39-40. As explained, the trial
court allowed Gaskill to testify about his theory. R1926:213-25. The trial court did not
rule pre-trial that the animation and photos were admissible. See id. Therefore, its later
exclusion of those exhibits did not contradict its earlier ruling.
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D. The trial court did not improperly limit the expert's testimony.
In one sentence, Defendant asserts that the trial court "gutted" Gaskill's testimony
by allegedly "repeatedly prohibiting him from testifying about any facts if they
contradicted witness testimony." Br. Aplt. at 22. On the contrary, Gaskill testified to
facts that contradicted other witnesses' testimony. As explained, he testified that he
believed there were shooters in the carport and likely inside the white car, and that the
bullets that hit Esquivel and Nevarez could not have been fired from the SUV.
R1926:213-25. To the extent that the trial court refused to allow Gaskill to comment on
other witnesses' credibility, those rulings were correct. See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d
388, 392 (Utah 1989) (Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(l) "bars admission of an expert's testimony
as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion").

E.

The trial court acted well within its discretion to admit State's Exhibit
89 showing bullet trajectories.
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted State's Exhibit

89, a diagram of the crime scene with bullet trajectories drawn in, because the diagram
was not exactly to.scale. Br. Aplt. at 22-23. The trial court properly admitted the exhibit
because Defendant did not object to admitting the crime scene diagram that Exhibit 89
duplicated; that exhibit was as close to scale as the State's witness could make it.
Based on measurements from the crime scene, an investigator prepared a diagram
that, although not precisely to scale, was as close as possible.
diagram was admitted as State's Exhibit 2 without objection.

R1923:78-79.
R1923:79-80.

The
After

Gaskill testified, the prosecution had its ballistics expert take a copy of exhibit 2 and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

draw in three bullet trajectories. R1927:57-58. That diagram was admitted as State's
Exhibit 89. ld. (a copy of Exhibit 89 is in Addendum I).
In addition to the five bullets that hit the victims, one bullet shattered the rear
passenger window of the white car in the driveway and then likely struck the car's
windshield.Il R1923:89,92;1927:59. A second bullet traveled through the open window

lodged in the dashboard. R1923:64;1927:59-60. The trajectories for these two bullets
are shown in State's Exhibit 89. R1927:59. A third bullet ricocheted off the white car's
fender, denting it. R1923:90;1927:59-60. That possible trajectory is shown as a yellow
triangle on Exhibit 89. R1927:59-60.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibit 89 because it was
based on the crime scene diagram admitted as State's Exhibit 2, which Defendant did not
object to. R1923:79-80;1927:57-58. That diagram was based on measurements from the
scene and, although not precisely to scale, was as close as the investigator could make it.
R1923:78-79. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted State's Exhibit 89.
F.

Any error was harmless.

Even if the trial court en·oneously excluded Defendant's exhibits or admitted
E:x_hibit 89, Defendant has not shown harm. '"An erroneous decision by a trial court

Il Although the State's expert could not say for certain that the bullet hit the
windshield, the windshield damage was consistent with a bullet impact, the w·indshield
was undamaged before the shooting, and the hole in the rear window aligned with the
windshield damage. R1923:14;1927:59. Crime scene investigators did not find a bullet
inside the white car, but were not surprised because bullets ricochet, disintegrate, and can
disappear in a car's air vents. R1923:86-88,102.
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"cannot result in reversible etTor unless the error is
4,

~

harmful.~"'~

State v.

Honie~

2002 UT

54, 57 P .3d 977 (citation omitted). "An error is hannful if it is such that absent the

error, there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome, undermining our
confidence in the result." Jd. Defendant has the burden to show harm. Id.
Defendant argues that the exclusion of the animation and photos "drastically
limited" his defense. Br. "A..plt. at 17. But as explained, the trial court allowed Gaskill to
testify about his version of the shooting. R1926:213-25. Viewing the brief animation
and photos depicting that theory would not have changed the jury's verdict, especially
where no physical or other evidence corroborated Gaskill's theory. Likewise, excluding
State's Exhibit 89 would not have affected the jury's verdict where they heard the
testimony that the exhibit illustrated.

Moreover, Defendant's confession and the

corroborating eyewitness testimony provided overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Any
error regarding the exhibits was therefore harmless. See Honie, 2002 UT 4, ~54.

v.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION TO
EXCLUDE DEFENSE WITNESSES WHEN DEFENDANT REFUSED TO
ALLOW POLICE TO INVESTIGATE THEIR STORIES

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously refused to allow him to call
certain unnamed witnesses who allegedly would have provided exculpatory testimony,
thereby denying him a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. Br. Aplt. at 63-76.
He argues that the trial comi erroneously ruled that he "could only call these witnesses if
he allowed law enforcement to investigate their claims." Br. Aplt. at 64. Because of
alleged threats of gang retaliation, Defendant asserts that the trial comi should have
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required him to disclose the witnesses' identities only if the police could not, in tum,
disclose the witnesses' identities to others as pm1 of investigating the witnesses' stories.
Br. Aplt. at 63-64. Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to take "critical steps"
necessary to protect these witnesses, like closing the courtroom or allowing them to
testify anonymously. Br. Aplt. at 64-67.

The trial court acted 'x1ell '~vithin its discretion in rulinQ that these alleged \~litnesses
'-'

~

could testify only if the police could investigate their stories. The prosecution, the trial
court, and the public have a vital interest in the integrity of the trial process. Rule 16,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, also requires disclosure of information necessary to
allow the prosecution to prepare its case. Investigating these alleged witnesses' stories
was essential because their credibility was a crucial issue.

Moreover, Defendant

proffered no evidence of any specific threats to these witnesses. Regardless, any error
was hannless because Defendant never proffered the witnesses' specific testimony and
because the evidence that Defendant was the shooter was overwhelming.
A.

Factual background.

Before trial, Defendant moved to allow four witnesses to testify without revealing
their identity to anyone, including the prosecution or law enforcement.

R733 at

4; 1686,1915:15-16 (the trial court's order-R1686-88-and the relevant transcript pages
are in Addendum H). Defense counsel said that two of the witnesses would testify that
Defendant "is not the one that shot the gun from the car.'' R1915:16. The other two
witnesses would testifY that "someone else, not [Defendant] admitted to them that they
had done the shooting." R1915:16. Counsel believed that revealing these witnesses'
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identity would result in gang retaliation against them. !d. Defense counsel proffered that
instances of gang retaliation had already occurred against a "Mr. Ashton" and
Defendant's family. R1915:14.
Defense counsel offered to reveal the witnesses' names to the prosecution and
police, but only on the condition that the police not reveal the names to anyone. R733 at
4;1915:18-19,26-27,37-38. Defense counsel explained that he did not want poliee to be
able to ask others "Jane Doe just told me that so and so confessed to this. What do you
say about that?" R1915:38. In other words, defense counsel did not want police to be
able to investigate by asking others about the witnesses' stories, or whether the witnesses
were present at the crime scene. R733 at 4;1915:37-38. The trial court was surprised that
defense counsel allegedly had four witnesses who could clear Defendant, but would not
allow police to verify their stories. R1915 :41.
The trial court was unwilling to allow the alleged witnesses to testify without
giving police an opportunity to investigate their stories. R1686-87;1915:58-62. The
court explained that "if these people are not willing to give their identity to the
prosecutors and [allow] law enforcement [to] follow up on what they are going to say,
then they are not going to testify." R1915:62. Therefore, the trial court directed defense
counsel to see if the vvitnesses were willing to testify if the police could investigate their
stories, and to report his findings within two weeks of trial. R1687; 1915:58-62.
Ifthe alleged witnesses were willing to testify, trial court offered to consider any
steps necessary to protect them, including allowing them to use an alias while testifying
and closing the courtroom. R1915:36,57-58. The court thus took those matters under
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advisement. R1688;1915:57-58. At subsequent hearings, detailed below~ the trial court
reemphasized that it was willing to protect the witnesses if they were willing to testify.
R1916:41; 1919:40-42.
Two weeks before trial, defense counsel filed a "response on discovery order,"
stating that he had been able to find only two of the witnesses and that neither was

State moved to disqualify defense counsel for a conflict of interest because he was
placing the four witnesses' interests above Defendant's. Rl098-1113. A hearing on the
disqualification motion was held eleven days before trial. R1916:1,3.
At that hearing, defense counsel contradicted his earlier proffer of the witnesses'
testimony, stating that three of the alleged witnesses would testify that they were present
at the scene and "that things happened differently than some of the State's witnesses
testified to." R1916:44. Counsel alleged that the fourth witness would have testified that
someone told the witness that he-the other individual-was the shooter. I d. Counsel
told the court that the two witnesses he could not locate "are the two lesser quality."
R1916:36. Counsel later told the court that the nvo witnesses he could not locate were
two of the three who would say that they were present. R1916:44.

R1916:44-45. Counsel agreed to do so, id., but nothing more is in the record.
Defense counsel reaffinned that the two witnesses he did find were not willing to
testify if the police could investigate their stories. Rl916:19,41. He then explained that
he had made a "tactical decision" not to call either witness because he believed that if he
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called them despite their unwillingness to testify, then they would deny any knowledge of
the case and ever having talked to defense counsel, and that would make counsel "look
bad in front of the jury." R1916: 19-20.
Defense counsel argued that the conflict of interest issue was moot because he had
decided not to call either witness. R1916:19-22. Counsel also represented that another
attorney had discussed the issue with Defendant and that Defendant was willing to
proceed with the trial as scheduled without the witnesses. I d.
The trial court wanted to ensure that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived
any conflict of interest. R1916:25-35. It therefore appointed conflict counsel to inform
Defendant about the issue and detennine whether he was willing to waive any conflict
and proceed without the witnesses. R1916:25-35;1919:11-12.
Five days before trial, conflict counsel testified that he had discussed the issue
with Defendant, that Defendant fully understood it, and that Defendant was willing to
waive any conflict of interest and proceed with his current counsel and without the
alleged witnesses. R1919: 13-23. Defendant testified and confinned conflict counsel's
testimony.

R1919:26-34.

Defendant also signed a written "waiver of conflict or

potential conflict of interest."

R 1919:3 2-34; Defense Exhibit 1 received 3I 411 0 (in

unpaginated manila envelope) (Add. H). The trial court therefore found that Defendant
had knowing and voluntarily waived any conflict or potential conflict. R1919:35-43.
The trial court reemphasized that its ruling regarding the witnesses was based on
its responsibility "to insure a fair trial." Rl919 :3 7. The court believed both sides should
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have the opportunity to investigate the "background" and "check on the story" of any
witness who would testify at trial. R1686-88;1919:37.
B.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion.
Defendant argues that the alleged threat of gang retaliation justified allowing him

to call his alleged witnesses anonymously without the police having the opportunity to
investigate their stories.

Br. Aplt. at 63-76.

He also asserts that the trial court

erroneously refused to take precautions to protect the witnesses, such as closing the
courtroom or allowing them to testify using pseudonyms. Br. Aplt. at 68, 71-72.
The record refutes Defendant's argument that the trial court refused to take
precautions to protect the witnesses. The trial court repeatedly stated that it was willing
to consider protective measures like closing the courtroom or allowing the witnesses to
use a pseudonym.

R1688;1915:36,57-58;1916:41.

The alleged witnesses ultimately

chose not to testify because they did not want the police to be able to investigate their
stories, not because the trial court was unwilling to protect them if they testified.
R1915:57-62;1916:41;1919:40-42.

Therefore, Defendant's claim that the trial court

erroneously refused to protect his witnesses lacks merit.
The trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling that Defendant's alleged
witnesses could testify only if the police could investigate their stories. "A defendant's
right to present a defense ... is not absolute." United States v. Serrano, 406 F .3d 1208,
1215 (lOth Cir. 2005). Rather, a criminal defendant's right to present relevant testimony
'"may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the
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criminal trial process."' Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987) (quoting Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).

One such interest is the integrity of the criminal trial process itself. See Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410-18 (1988).

In Taylor, the United States Supreme Court

affinned the exclusion of a defense witness as a discovery sanction, where the defendant
offered no justification for failing to timely identify the witness. See id. at 401-0 5. The
Court held that a defendant's right to present witnesses "cannot automatically and
invariably outweigh countervailing public interests."

See id. at 414.

Rather, "[t]he

integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable
evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient
administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of
the trial process must also weigh in the balance." ld. at 414-15.
The Supreme Court recognized that "[ d]iscovery, like cross-examination,
minimizes the risk that a judgment will be predicated on incomplete, misleading, or even
deliberately fabricated testimony." ld. at 411-12. The Court further expiained that the
'"State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense' is merely one
component of the broader public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts."

!d. at 412 (quoti11g Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1970)). Discovery rules
"minimize the risk that fabricated testimony will be believed." Id. at 413. And "the
court, as well as the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the
pollution of perjured testimony." ld. at 417.
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The United States Supreme Court has also held that discovery rules are proper to
insure "both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts
crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 80
(1970). Thus, the Court affinned the constitutionality ofFlorida's notice-of-alibi rule and
rejected the defendant's claim that he had "the right to surprise the State with an alibi
defense." !d. The Court held that the "adversary system of tria! is hardly an end in itself;
it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their
cards until played." !d. at 82.
A jury cannot accurately judge the truthfulness of a witness's testimony unless the
opposing party can conduct a thorough cross-examination. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S.
129, 130-32 (1968). In Smith, the Court held that the prosecution's refusal to reveal the
name of a witness who participated in a controlled drug buy violated the defendant's
confrontation and due process rights. !d. at 130-33 & n.3. The court explained that
"[p]rejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper
setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the
jury cannot fairly appraise them." !d. at 132.
Threats to a witness's safety cannot justify completely barring an opposing party
from investigating the \Vitness's story. See Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d 203, 221
(Cal. 2000). In Alvarado, a county jail inmate was murdered by order of the Mexican
Mafia.

See id. at 206-08.

Credible threats were made against three inmates who

witnessed the murder. See id.

The prosecution sought to call the three inmates at

Alvarado's trial but, given the threats, refused to reveal their names. See id. Instead, the
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prosecution provided the defense with transcripts of the witnesses' grand jury testimony,
their custodial status, criminal histories, police reports of their prior crimes, and
infonnation about their cells. See id. at 207 & n.2, 220. The trial court refused to require
the prosecution to disclose the witnesses' names, despite the defendanfs arguments that
the names were necessary to allow him to investigate their stories. See id. at 207-08.
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the prosecution could not
withhold the identities of "crucial witnesses whose veracity and credibility are likely to
be central to the prosecution's case." Id. at 220. The court noted that United States
Supreme Court and California court decisions "establish that whenever nondisclosure of
a witness's identity will prevent the effective investigation and cross-examination of a
crucial witness, the confrontation clause precludes the prosecution from relying upon the
witness's testimony at trial while refusing to disclose the witness's identity." !d. at 205.
Given the foregoing authority, the trial court acted well within its discretion in
refusing to allow Defendant's alleged witnesses to testify unless the police could
investigate their stories. The vital "interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical
facts" at a criminal trial required that the prosecution have the opportunity to investigate
these witnesses. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412. These witnesses' credibility was crucial.
Their alleged testimony bore directly on the identity of the shooter and contradicted not
only the testimony of seven eyewitnesses-whose stories the police were able to
investigate-but also Defendant's confession. The alleged witnesses could have easily
fabricated testimony that they saw someone else shooting or that someone else had
confessed to them. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow
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Defendant to withhold these witnesses' identify, because nondisclosure would have
significantly impaired the prosecution's "ability to investigate or effectively crossexamine them." Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 220.
Moreover, rule 16(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, allowed the trial court to
order Defendant to provide any infonnation that the prosecution required to prepare its
case.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 16(c).

Rule 16(c) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise

provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor ... any ... item of
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to
the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case." Id. Given the
nature of the alleged witnesses' testimony, the trial court properly found good cause for
requiring disclosure of the alleged witnesses' identity. See id.
Additionally, Defendant did not show that any threat to these witnesses was
sufficiently credible to justify precluding the prosecution from even investigating their
stories. Defense counsel proffered that a "Mr. Ashton" and members of Defendant's
family had experienced gang retaliation. R1915:14.

Counsel also proffered that the

alleged witnesses believed that they or their families could be killed if they testified or if
their identities were disclosed, and that they feared even the police talking to others about
their stories. R733 at 3;1915:36-38. But defense counsel never proffered any specific
evidence substantiating the alleged threats. The trial court therefore had no evidence that
the alleged witnesses were in any actual danger.
Defendant argues that Alvarado is inapplicable because it is based on a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, and the prosecution possesses no such
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right. Br. Aplt. at 75. While the prosecution has no constitutional right to confrontation,
it does have a procedural right to cross-examine defense witnesses. See State v. Young,
853 P.2d 327, 357 (Utah 1993) ("the right to testify may be conditioned on the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant"); see also United States v. Gwy, 74 F.3d
304, 309 (1st Cir. 1996) (recognizing prosecution's procedural right to cross-examine
defendant's witnesses). The "interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts" at a
criminal trial also justified the State's need to investigate. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 412.
Defendant contends that other courts have allowed the prosecution to call
witnesses whom defendants could not investigate. Br. Aplt. at 67-72. Those cases,
however, are distinguishable. Defendant cites Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799, 802-03
(Fla. 1992), for the proposition that merely having a witness's true name "may be enough
of a basis to allow for adequate cross-examination." Br. Aplt. at 72. But Marshall held
that a witness could testify using a number, rather than a name, because the procedure
"did not hamper cross-examination or the defense's ability to investigate the background
of the witness." See 604 So.2d at 803.
Defendant cites Nelson v. Crowley, No. 07 Civ. 849 (RJS), 2009 WL 498909
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2009), for the proposition that a witness's identity is not always
" cntica~
· • 1 .._or
-f.

•
•
" nr
n ..A
1 at 72. In Ne.son,
l
cross-exammat10n.
~p.t.
the prosecution was allowed

to withhold the name of a confidential infonnant. See 2009 WL 498909 at *5. That
procedure did not prejudice Nelson, however, because he wanted the infonnant's name to
discover only prior testimony and could not "articulate a reason why the Undercover's
name was relevant to developing evidence of specific bias." !d. at *6.
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Defendant argues thatin People v. Wheaton, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1348, 47 Cal. Rptr.
2d 418 (Cal App. 1995), a Califomia Comi of Appeal held that the prosecution could
withhold witnesses' names "until the moment they took the stand." Br. Ap1t. at 67.
Defendant C01Tectly represents the holding. See 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 423. However, the
Califomia Supreme Court arguably overruled Wheaton in Alvarado, discussed above,

\Vhen it held that the prosecution could not withhold the identity of crucial witnesses. See
Alvarado, 5 P.3d at 223.

Finally, Defendant argues that the D.C. Circuit affinned the govemment's use of
anonymous witnesses at a murder trial in United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1997).

Br. Aplt. at 72.

But the defendants in White complained only about the

government's use of anonymous witness testimony at a pre-trial hearing to detennine the
admissibility of hearsay testimony from a witness that the defendants had murdered. See
116 F .3d at 911, 914. Moreover, the court held that the defendants failed to establish any
"special reason in favor of disclosure" of the witnesses' identities. See id. at 919.
As explained, several reasons favored discovery of Defendant's alleged witnesses'
identities here because investigation and thorough cross-examination of these alleged
witnesses was critical to the trial's integrity. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-18; Alvarado, 5
P.3d at 220. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
witnesses where Defendant refused to allow the police to investigate their stories.
C.

Any error was harmless.

Any enor in excluding Defendanf s alleged witnesses was hannless g1ven
Defendant's failure to proffer their specific testimony and the overwhelming evidence of
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Defendanfs guilt.

Defense counsel never proffered any specifics about the alleged

testimony despite the trial court's direction to do so. R1916:44-45. Rather, counsel only
explained that some witnesses would testify that they were present and that Defendant
was not the shooter, while others would testify to hearsay statements that someone other
than Defendant had confessed to the shooting. R1915:16. Counsel offered no other
details about hmv these witnesses could lc11ow that Defendant was not the shooter, or why
their hearsay statements were sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Counsel could locate
only two of these witnesses, but was unclear about which witnesses those were.
Defendanf s failure to provide any specifics about these alleged witnesses' testimony
belies his claim that exclusion of their testimony harmed him.
l\1oreover, defense counsel's unwillingness to allow the police to investigate the
witnesses' stories raises serious questions about their reliability.

Given the general

proffer and questionable nature of the alleged testimony, Defendant fails to demonstrate
that exclusion of these witnesses hanned him, especially in light of the overwhelming
evidence of his guilt, including his confession.
VI.
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL
Defendant argues that his L WOP sentences are unconstitutional because the
sentencing statute, section 76-3-207.7, is vague under the state and federal constitutions,
violates Utah's unifonn operation of laws provision and the Federal Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause, and allows a judge to impose sentence in violation of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Br. Aplt. at 79-85. Defendant also argues that sentencing a
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mentally immature person to L WOP for aggravated murder violates the Utah
Constitution's unnecessary rigor provision and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
under the Federal Constitution. Br. Aplt. at 86-98.
A.

Factual background.
At sentencing, the trial court heard evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the

potential sentences, including evidence regarding Defendant's character, background,
history, and mental and physical condition. R1928:37-168. The trial court also received
a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report detailing the facts of the offense and Defendant's
criminal history, background, and life history. R1476.
The State emphasized the facts of Defendant's crime:

he fired ten shots at a

wedding party, killing two people and seriously injuring two others. R1928:40. The
State also emphasized Defendant's lengthy criminal record: 44 entries on his juvenile
record alone over a nine-year period.

R1421-24;1928:39,161.

Defendant was on

PI()bation for possession of concealed dangerous weapons-a sawed-off shotgun and a
.22 caliber revolver-when he committed the murders.

R1928:40.

Time spent on

probation and in treatment programs had not deterred his criminal activity. R1928:39-40.
The State also argued that Defendant's loyalty to the gang culture justified L WOP.
R 1928:45-46. While incarcerated, Defendant wrote several letters to family and fellow
gang members manifesting his loyalty to the gang. R1407-08,1445-48,1928:45-46. One
letter, addressed to "Tha Assasin [sic]," praised a fellow inmate for committing a driveby shooting that led to five counts of attempted murder. R1408,1451-53.

After his

conviction in this case, Defendant composed and performed a "rap" during a phone call
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from jail. R1928:48-52. The song included these alarming lyrics: "So it's destined for
me to burn in hell or live my life in a cell. So what does it matter, to cock it, squeeze it,
and make your brain splatter.... I'm so [unintelligible] f----d and ready to shoot. I don't
pack a strap to look cute, I pack a strap to kill you. See I stay true." R1928:50,52,15964;State's Sentencing Exhibit 2.
The State also emphasized Defendant's remorseless and callous attitude toward his
victims.

R1928:43-44.

Defendant told the pre-sentence investigator that he was not

responsible for the murders. R1476 at 10;1928:43-44. Defendant also stated, "I did feel
sympathy for the family, but now I can [h]onestly care less." !d. Defendant believed that
the police had allowed the victims' family to retaliate against his family. !d. Defendant
added, "So f--- their family and these lying, crooked cops. I'm innocent, I don't give a
f--- what the jury says." !d.
In arguing against LWOP, Defendant played video statements from his mother and
wife. Rl928:69-70,121-43. He also presented testimony from a mitigation expert and a
mental health expert.

R1928:61-75,76-120.

The mental health expert believed that

Defendant had the "ingredients" for rehabilitation, but that it was impossible to determine
at sentencing whether he could be rehabilitated. R1928:106-09. The expert believed that
Defendant's attitude '.X.'ould be an important factor in the likelihood of his rehabilitation,
and acknowledged that Defendant's attitude in his "rap" song and his statement about the
victims was "disturbing." R1928:112-13. The expert also acknowledged that Defendant
had engaged in a "lifelong process ofcriminality." R1928:116-17. He also agreed that
Defendant had displayed "a chronic pattern and inability to obey society[' s] rules" and
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suffered from antisocial personality disorder, a disorder "characterized by a disregard of
the rights of others." !d.
Most tellingly, Defendant's expert agreed that Defendant was "dangerous to the
conduct.'~

community" and had a "high risk of repetitive criminal

R1928: 118.

Defendant's "global assessment functioning" score was 10, "as low as you can go."

The expert agreed that Defendant was "an extremely dangerous person." R1928: 119-20.
As explained, Defendant's expert had conceded in an earlier hearing that
Defendant did not fit Utah's definition of "mentally retarded." R1909:101-02.

The

expert also admitted that he did not administer any "validity or effort testing," in
conjunction with the I.Q. testing. R1909:75.
Before imposing sentence, the trial court delineated the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. R1567-68;1928:158-164. It found the following mitigating factors: (1)
Defendant was relatively young-19 years and 9 months-when he committed the
murders; (2) Defendant lacked formal education, having finished only the 9th or 1Oth
grade; (3) Defendant had a low I.Q. and learning disorder; and (4) Defendant was polite
during the trial. R1909:22,1928:158-59.
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people who were also both young-22 and 29-and seriously injured two others; (2)
Defendant emptied his gun into a crowd; (3) Defendant's actions had far-reaching effects
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for all the victims' families/ 2 (4) despite his youth, Defendant had a lengthy criminal
record; (5) Defendant remained loyal to a gang lifestyle; (6) Defendant's own expert
agreed that Defendant was a danger to others; (7) Defendant was on probation when he
committed the murders and had absconded from supervision; (8) Defendant showed little
hope of rehabilitation because he refused to accept responsibility for his actions,
demonstrated no remorse, and manifested "a horrible attitude about this case"; (9)
Defendant's expert diagnosed him with an antisocial disorder; and (10) Defendant's "rap
song" was "troubling." R1928: 159-64.
The trial court found that "the aggravating circumstances outweigh[ ed] the
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt" and that L WOP was justified under
the circumstances. R1928:164,167. It therefore imposed LWOP for the two murders.
R1569;1928:164.
B.

Defendant lacks standing to challenge section 76-3-207.7 as
unconstitutionally vague; regardless, the statute was not vague as
applied to him.
Section 76-3-207.7 allows a sentence of LWOP or 25 years to life for non-capital

aggravated murder. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (West Supp. 2011). It states:
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony
aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court.
""'' 'T"'.
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~L) 1ne sen ence unaer 111s sectiOn Stlau e 111e m pnson w1tuout paro1e or
an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for
life.
I d.

12

One of the deceased, Rocendo Nevarez, planned to marry his girlfriend; she
gave birth to his daughter just weeks after his death. R1928:159.
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Defendant argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague under the state and
federal constitutions because it gives no guidance about when L WOP is merited and no
standard of proof for imposing that sentence.

Br. Aplt. at 79-83.

Defendant lacks

standing to raise this claim. In any event, the statute was not vague as applied to him.
1.

Defendant lacks standing.

'" [B ]efore a party may attack the constitutionality of a statute he must be
adversely affected by that very statute."' State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah
1998) (quoting Sims v. Smith, 571 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1977)). Defendant lacks standing
to challenge section 76-3-207.7 as vague, because the alleged statutory deficiencies he
identifies did not adversely affect him. The sentencing court imposed L WOP only after
finding "that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt" and that LWOP was therefore justified. R1928:157-64,167.
This was not a standardless or arbitrary sentencing proceeding.

Therefore, even if

Defendant has correctly identified a deficiency in the statute, he lacks standing to raise
the issue. See Munson, 972 P.2d at 421.
2. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant.

For these same reasons, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to
Defendant. Because Defendant does not claim infringement of a First Amendment right,
he can challenge the statute only as applied to him. See State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ,-r 27,
174 P.3d 628 ("[W]here, as here, a defendant's claim does not concern an alleged
infringement of a First Amendment right, the defendant must first show that the statute is
vague as applied to his conduct."). This Court will '"presume the legislation being
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challenged is constitutional, and [will] resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality."' State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35,

~

9, 233 P.3d 476 (quoting Wood v. Univ.

of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, ~ 7, 67 P.3d 436).
A sentencing statute is vague only if it does "not state with sufficient clarity the
consequences of violating a given criminal statute.'' United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 123 (1979). \Vhen the deatl-I penalty is not at issue, a sentencing statute need
not establish "fonnal rules of procedure" for detennining the appropriate sentence. See

State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1988). For example, this Court found no vagueness
in a sentencing scheme that allowed a court to select between sentences of differing
severity when "the sentence of highest severity is dependent upon a determination of the
existence of aggravating circumstances, while imposition of the sentence of lowest
severity is dependent upon a determination of the existence of mitigating circumstances."

See State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559 (Utah 1987).
For the same reasons that Defendant lacks standing, Defendant cannot
demonstrate that the statute was vague as applied to him. Section 76-3-207.7 clearly
established the applicable penalties for non-capital aggravated murder and the trial court
imposed sentence only after finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Defendant's vagueness
challenge is meritless. 13 See Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123; Bell, 754 P.2d at 58; Egbert,
748 P.2d at 559.

13

To supp011 his vagueness claim, Defendant selectively quotes from a legislative
committee hearing on section 76-3-207.7 to give the appearance that the legislature
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C.

Section 76-3-207.7 does not violate Utah's uniform operation of laws
provision or the Federal Equal Protection Clause.

Defendant also argues that section 76-3-207.7 violates the Utah Constitution's
unifonn operation of laws provision and the Federal Equal Protection Clause because,
according to him, the statute disparately treats similarly-situated offenders-aggravated
murderers where the prosecution is not seeking death-without any rational basis for the
disparate treatment. Br. Aplt. at 83-85. Defendant argues that the statute "creates two
subclasses: (1) persons sentenced to the presumptive life without parole; and (2) persons
sentenced to the lighter sentence of twenty-five years to life." Br. Aplt. at 84.
Defendant's equal protection and uniform operation of laws claims fail because
section 76-3-207.7 does not create separate classifications; rather, it treats all similarly-

intended the bill to make LWOP a foregone conclusion in every non-death aggravated
murder prosecution. Br. Aplt. at 79-80. He quotes the bill's sponsor as stating
'"everyone knows' that the defendant will receive life without parole and 'we're just
required by case law and statute to do it this certain way. It does not make sense."' Br.
Aplt. at 80 (quoting Aggravated Murder Amendments: Hearing on S.B. [114} Before the
H Jud. Comm., 2007 Leg., 2007 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (statement of Sen. Gregory
Bell)). This alleged legislative history is irrelevant because Defendant does not claim
that the statute is ambiguous. See Harvey v. Cedar Hills City, 2010 UT 12, ~ 15, 227
P.3d 256 (legislative history is relevant "only if the statutory language is ambiguous or
unclear"). Regardless, Defendant misrepresents the bill's history.
The sponsor was not explaining that section 76-3-207.7 would make LWOP a
foregone conclusion. Rather, he was explaining the need for the bill by relating a new
district court judge's complaint that in an aggravated murder case he tried under the
unamended statute, he had to follow the procedures for a capital case-providing
specially qualified defense counsel and a twelve-member, death-qualified jury-even
though the prosecution sought only LWOP. House Jud. Comm., 9 February 2007,
hearing on S.B. 114 at 00:20-01:50, available at http://le.utah.gov/av/smil?int=55591
(last visited 13 July 20 12). The sponsor explained that the bill was intended to avoid
these costly death-penalty procedures in non-death cases. See id. The legislative history
therefore does not support Defendant's vagueness claim.
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situated defendants-those convicted of aggravated murder-the same.

The comi' s

sentencing decision, not the statute, creates the classification that Defendant identifies.
In analyzing a statute under Utah's uniform operation of laws provision, this Court
asks (1) "what, if any, classification is created under the statute," (2) "whether the
classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate treatment," and (3) whether
'"the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.'" State v. Drej,
2010 UT 35,

~

34, 233 P.3d 476 (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132,

~

12, 63 P.3d

667). This Comi looks "to the plain language of the statutory scheme to determine what
classification is created by a legislative enactment." Id. at

~

35. If a statute survives

scrutiny under Utah's unifonn operation of laws provision, it is also constitutional under
the Federal Equal Protection Clause because "the Utah provision is at least as rigorous as
the federal guarantee." Id.

at~

33 n.5.

Section 76-3-207.7 does not create any classification.

Rather, the aggravated

murder statute creates a class of non-capital murders who are subject to sentencing under
section 76-3-207.7. The aggravated murder statute provides that if the prosecution does
not file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, then "aggravated murder is a
noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section 76-3-207.7." UTAH
CODE A.l'~,J.

§ 76-5-202(3)(b) (\Vest Supp. 2011).

Section 76-3-207.7 then treats all non-capital aggravated murderers the same. It
provides for one of two sentences:

L WOP or 25 years to life depending on the

circumstances of the case. See id. § 76-3-207.7(2). The classification between those who
receive the two sentences arises from the judge's sentencing decision, not the "plain
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language of the statutory scheme." See Drej, 2010 UT 35, ,-r 35. Because the statute
treats all non-capital aggravated murders the same, Defendant's equal protection and
unifonn operation of laws claims fail.
But even if the statutory language did create a classification, it does not violate
equal protection principles. The differences in the sentences received are attributable to
t..~e

unique circumstances of each case.

Defendants \:vith more

-

wei2:htv.~

a2:2:ravating

--

-

circumstances than mitigating circumstances will receive LWOP and vice versa.
Therefore, similarly situated offenders are not treated differently, and reasonable
objectives merit the difference between the two sentences. See Drej, 2010 UT 35, ,-r 34.
In State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 262 (Utah 1986), this Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme for child sodomy.
Bishop argued that by requiring minimum mandatory sentences for child sodomizers but
not for other felonies, the statute violated equal protection principles. See id. at 265-66.
This Court rejected that argument, holding that "[e]qual protection of the law provisions
do not preclude people from being treated differently under the law as long as there is a
reasonable basis for the difference." See id. at 266. The Court held that a sentencing
statute needed only to "have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest"
because criminal offenders are not a suspect class, nor is the opportunity for parole a
fundamental constitutional right. See id. at 266. Given the State's interests in protecting
children from sexual abusers, the Court had no difficulty finding that the sentencing
statute in Bishop did not violate equal protection principles. See id. at 266-67.
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Likewise, the L WOP statute is reasonably related to the legitimate state interests
of dete1Ting murders and protecting society. Our regard for human life justifies a serious
sentence for aggravated murder. And where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, as in this case, the State has a
legitimate interest in pennanently removing that more dangerous offender from society.
Therefore, the LWOP statute does not violate equal protection principles. See id.

D.

Section 76-3-207.7 does not violate Apprendi.
In one cursory paragraph Defendant argues that his sentence violated the rule of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Br. Aplt. at 85. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. In Ring,
the Court held that Arizona's death-penalty scheme violated Apprendi because the
maximum sentence that could be imposed based on the jury's verdict was life
imprisonment, and death became a possibility only after a sentencing judge found at least
one aggravating factor. 536 U.S. at 596-97.
"The 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). Apprendi applies
only to sentencing findings that involve "facts historically found by the jury.'' Oregon v.

Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 169 (2009). Thus, Apprendi did not apply to an Oregon sentencing
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statute that required a judge to find certain facts before imposing consecutive sentences.
Id. at 163-65.

Here, Defendanfs sentence complies with Apprendi because the trial court was
not required to find any additional fact before L WOP was permissible.

Rather, the

prescribed statutory maximum sentence that could be imposed based on Defendant's

conviction for aggravated murder \Vas "life in prison \Vithout parole." See UTi\H CODE
ANN.§ 76-3-207.7. Defendant therefore demonstrates no Apprendi violation.

E.

Defendant's sentence does not violate Utah's unnecessary rigor
provision or the Federal Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause.
Defendant also argues that sentencing someone with his particular characteristics

to LWOP for aggravated murder violates the Utah Constitution's unnecessary rigor
provision and the federal constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Br.
Aplt. at 86, 96-98. He argues that this Court should regard him as a juvenile because he
was only 19 years old at the time of the murders and his I.Q. test results equated to the
perfonnance of someone much younger; he is borderline mentally retarded \Vith an I.Q,
of only 77; and he has ADHD. Br. Aplt. at 86-96. He further asserts that his sentence is
unconstitutional because he has the potential to refonn and change. Br. Aplt. at 94-96.
To support his federal constitutional claim, Defendant relies on United States Supreme
Court precedent that categorically prohibits death sentences for juveniles and the
mentally retarded. Br. Aplt. at 96-98.
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1. The unnecessary rigor clause is inapplicable.

Defendant's unnecessary rigor claim fails because that clause applies only to
conditions of confinement, not to the terms of a sentence itself. Article I, section 9 of the
Utah Constitution states: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or
imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 9. "[T]he
last sentence makes section 9 broader than its federal counterpart." State v. Lafferty,
2001 UT 19,

~

73, 20 P.3d 342. However, that provision does not apply to challenges to

the proportionality of a particular sentence. See Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ,-r 17, 184
P.3d 592. Rather, "the cruel and unusual punishment clause ... is directed to the sentence
imposed." Jd.
Defendant challenges his sentence solely under Utah's unnecessary rigor clause.
Br. Aplt. at 86-96. Because that clause applies only to conditions of confinement, his
unnecessary rigor claim is meritless. See Dexter, 2008 UT 29, ~ 17.
But even if Defendant had challenged his sentence under Utah's cruel and unusual
punishment clause, his claim would fail because he was eligible for a death sentence. A
punishment is cruel and unusual under the Utah Constitution only "if it is 'so
disproportionate to the offense committed that it shock[ s] the moral sense of all
reasonable [persons] as to what is right and proper under the circumstances."' Lafferty
2001 UT 19, ~ 73 (quoting State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ~ 18, 993 P.2d 854). "Only
rarely will a statutorily prescribed punishment be so disproportionate to the crime that the
sentencing statute is unconstitutional. Since sentencing statutes are necessarily based on
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numerous, imprecise considerations, substantial deference must be accorded to the
prerogatives of legislative power 'in determining the types and limits of punishments for
crimes."' Bishop, 717 P.2d at 269 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)).
Because a death sentence for Defendant would not have been cruel and unusual, the
lesser LWOP sentence cannot be so.
Neither Defendant's low LQ. nor his alleged mental immaturity would have
precluded a death sentence in this case. The federal constitution prohibits execution of
the mentally retarded. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). But Defendant's
own expert conceded that Defendant was not mentally retarded. R1909: 101-02.
Nor would Defendant's alleged mental immaturity have disqualified him from a
death sentence.

The evidence of Defendant's alleged mental condition was highly ·

suspect. Defendant's expert based his findings of low I.Q. and corresponding mental
immaturity on Defendant's I.Q. test results. R1909:33,58,74. But the expert did not
administer any effort testing to measure the validity of those scores.

R1909:75.

Defendant's expert also conceded that Defendant's failure to complete school would
negatively affect his I.Q. score. R1909:96. The State's expert observed "very, very
strange anomalies" in Defendant's I.Q. test results and he explained that any I.Q. testing
without effort testing is "meaningless." Rl909:172,195-96.

The State's expert also

noted several factors that undermined Defendant's ADHD diagnosis. R1909:151-54,17578. Therefore, no solid evidence established Defendant's alleged mental immaturity or
ADHD.
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Second, a defendant's chronological age, not his alleged mental age, is the
relevant inquiry for detem1ining death penalty eligibility. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 574 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that 18 is "the age at which the
line for death eligibility ought to rest" because that is the age "where society draws the
line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood." The Court recognized that
thi~
----- hriP"ht
---o--

line mle
"to the obiections alwavs raised against categorical rules"
. was subiect
- -..,
-~

J

.,

_.

-

and that "[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an
individual tums 18." Id. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that "a line must be drawn,"
and that age 18 was the proper place to draw that line. Id.
Other courts agree that under Roper, the crucial factor is chronological age. See,
e.g., State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810, 830 (La. 2008) ("Roper established a bright-line

demarcation for application of the standard announced therein, rather than a standard
which could be applied to a defendant's 'mental age' on a case-by-case basis."); Hill v.
State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 2006) ("Roper only prohibits the execution of those

defendants whose chronological age is below eighteen"); United States v. Mitchell, 502
F.3d 931, 981 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a 20-year-old defendant was eligible for a
death sentence despite his claim of emotional immaturity); Parr v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d
245, 261 (5 1h Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant who was 18 years and 4 days old when
he committed murder was eligible for the death penalty under Roper); Rogers v. State,
653 S.E.2d 31, 35 (Ga. 2007) (rejecting 19-year-old murder defendant's claim that a
death sentence was unconstitutional because he possessed the "attributes of a juvenile
offender").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The death penalty is not a cruel and unusual punishment for aggravated murder
under either the federal or the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,
~~

137-39, 20 P.3d 342; State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278-79 (Utah 1989) (listing

cases). Here, Defendant was 19 years and 9 months old when he cmmnitted aggravated
murder and therefore eligible for a death sentence. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. If the
death penalty would not have been a cruel and unusual punishment for Defendant's
crimes, then his lesser sentences of L WOP cannot be unconstitutional.
Defendant argues that L WOP is as harsh as death, especially for a young person.
Br. Aplt. at 95-96. On the contrary, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court
have held otherwise. This Court has recognized that the death penalty "is different from
all other penalties." State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986). This Court has also
explained that the "death penalty is 'the most solemn and final act that the state can take
against an individual."' Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

~

113 (quoting State v. Wood, 648 P.2d

71, 80 (Utah 1982)). According to this Court, '"[ d]eath in its finality, differs from life
imprisonment more than a hundred-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two."' Wood, 648 P.2d at 81 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)).

In Roper, the United States Supreme Court held that "the death penalty is the

most severe punishment." See 543 U.S. at 568. As these cases recognize, death is a more
severe punishment than L WOP.
Even if Defendant's alleged mental age were relevant and he truly possessed the
mental age of a juvenile, that fact would not have precluded L WOP. The United States
Supreme Comi recently recognized that L WOP can be an appropriate punishment for a
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juvenile murderer. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). In Miller, the
Court held that a mandatory L WOP for a juvenile murderer is unconstitutional. See id.
But the Court declined to "foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in
homicide cases," provided that the sentencer is allowed to consider the juvenile's
individual characteristics. See id. As explained, the judge here considered Defendant's
individual characteristics.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that murder
requires more serious punishments than other crimes. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2026-27 (2010). In Graham, the Court prohibited LWOP for juveniles whounlike Defendant-commit non-homicide crimes.

See id.

In so holding, the Court

explained that juveniles who kill are categorically more deserving of the most serious
fonns of punishment because the "'severity and irrevocability"' of murder renders it
unique among crimes "'in tenns of moral depravity and ofthe injury to the person and to
the public."' !d. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008)).
Moreover, 46 jurisdictions (44 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government) allow LWOP for juvenile murderers. See id. at 2034-35. Only six states
forbid it.

See id.

Therefore, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions agree that

L\VOP is a proportionate punishment for a juvenile who commits murder.
In this case, Defendant's LWOP sentence for killing two people, almost killing
two others, and endangering several others does not "'shock the moral sense of all
reasonable [persons] as to what is right and proper under the circumstances."' Lafferty
2001 UT 19, ,-r 73. Defendant showed no regard for human life when he fired ten shots
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into a crowd. He unequivocally boasted of his lack of empathy for his victims and his
loyalty to the gang lifestyle that motivated the murders. Defendant also had a lengthy
criminal history and previous rehabilitation efforts had failed. Defendant's own expert
admitted that Defendant was an extremely dangerous person with a high risk for
repetitive criminal conduct.

Furthermore, the trial court heard all the evidence of

Defendant's background and history, including evidence of his age and mental state, and
still concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

Given these circumstances, Defendant's

L WOP sentence is not cruel and unusual under the Utah Constitution. See id.

2. Defendant's sentence is not cruel and unusual under the federal
constitution.
Defendant also contends that his sentence is cruel and unusual under the United
States Constitution. Br. Aplt. at 57-58. For the reasons explained above, that claim fails.
See Lafferty, 2001 UT 19,

~

73 (recognizing that Utah's provision is "broader than its

federal counterpart").
VII.
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE
Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error
doctrine.

Br..A1plt. at 108-109.

This Court "will reverse a jury verdict under the

cumulative etTor doctrine only 'if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines
... confidence that a fair trial was had."' State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ~58, 191 P.3d
17 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ~ 73, 28 P.3d 1278 (omissions in original)).
As demonstrated, Defendant has not shown any error.

His cumulative error claim
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therefore fails. See id. (rejecting a cumulative error claim where the defendant failed to
demonstrate any error).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affinn.
Respectfully submitted on August 1, 2012.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

As~

stant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be req~ired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
amendment XIV
§ 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article I, Section 9. [Excessive bail and fines-Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or
hnprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.
Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207.7 (West 2011) First degree felony aggravated
murder- N oncapital felony- Penalties- Sentenced by court

(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony
aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court.

(2) The sentence under this section shall be life in prison without parole or an
indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life.
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Utah R. Crim. P. 12. Motions
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which,
unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with
this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon
which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a
memorandum unless required by the court.

(b) Request to Submit for Decision. If neither party has advised the court of the
filing nor requested a hearing, when the time for filing a response to a motion
and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for
decision. If a written Request to Submit is filed it shall be a separate pleading so
captioned. The Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the
motion was served, the date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the
date the reply memorandum, if any, was served, and whether a hearing has been
requested. The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If
no party files a written Request to Submit, or the motion has not otherwise been
brought to the attention of the court, the motion will not be considered submitted
for decision.
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, including
request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by
written motion.
(c)(l) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(c)(l)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or
information ;
(c)(l)(B) motions to suppress evidence;
(c)(l)(C) requests for discovery where allowed;

(c)(l)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants;
(c)(l)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy; or
(c)(l)(F) motions challenging jurisdiction, unless good cause is shown why
the issue could not have been raised at least five days prior to trial.
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to
Utah Code Section 76-3-402(1) shall be in writing and filed at least ten days
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prior to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing
within ten days of the entry of conviction. Motions for a reduction of criminal
offense pursuant to Utah Code Section 76-3-402(2) may be raised at any time
after sentencing upon proper service of the motion on the appropriate
prosecuting entity.
(d) Motions to Suppress. A motion to suppress evidence shall:
(d)(l) describe the evidence sought to be suppressed;

(d)(2) set fort11 the star;.ding of the rrlo1.rant to rr1ake the applicatior1; ru~d
(d)(3) specify sufficient legal and factual grounds for the motion to give the
opposing party reasonable notice of the issues and to enable the court to
determine what proceedings are appropriate to address them.

If an evidentiary hearing is requested, no written response to the motion by
the non-moving party is required, unless the court orders othenvise. At the
conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court may provide a reasonable
time for all parties to respond to the issues of fact and law raised in the
motion and at the hearirLg.
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court
for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record.
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.

(g) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings
at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law
as are made orally.
(h) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
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Utah R. Crim. P. 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:

(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant
to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor
has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to
the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at
least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to
1nake disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make
disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be
inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. The
prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further
dissemination of sensitive information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent
ilnproper use of the information or to protect victims and witnesses from
harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the
further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological
or medical reports.

(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or
inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, that limitations on the further
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dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall
be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the
appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
rnay oraer sucn parry to penrLit tne mscoverj or mspecnon, grant a conniluance,
or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
'f
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(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:

(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other
bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;

(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the
alleged offense. Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required
for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such
appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the
accused to appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless
relieved by order of the court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for
revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's
case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt
of the accused and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court
should deem appropriate.
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Utah R. Evid. 608. A Witness's Character for Truthfulness or Untruthfulness
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness's credibility may be attacked or
supported by testimony about the witness's reputation for having a character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about
that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
witness's character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule
609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's
conduct in order to ai..i..ack or support tl-te witr1ess' s character for b.·uthfulness. But
the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are
probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has
testified about.
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege against
self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness's character for
truthfulness.
(c) Evidence of Bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by other
evidence.

Utah R. Evid. 702. Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.

(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis
for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or
methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
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(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEB __..,.
STATE OF UTAH

··---..;

FINDINGS OFFACT, CONCLUSION
OF LAW AND ORDER OF THE
COURT ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE
CONFESSION

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 071901847

vs.

Nov- 6 2aag

RIQO MARIANO PEREA,
Defendant.

JUDGE ERNIE W. JONES

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the
Confession. There are two issues to be decided in this Motion. First, was Defendant in
Custody when he indicated that he wanted to talk to a lawyer, and second, was the
confession the product of coercion or duress.
Both parties prepared briefs and testimony was

he~d

on July 2, 2009 and July 17,

2009. Having reviewed the evidence, the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court makes
the following findings and rulings.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On August 4, 2007, Ogden Police were summoned to a report of shots fired.

Two people were killed and two people injured.
2. During the investigation, Officers received Defendant's cell phone number and
Detective Thomas placed a call to him on August 5, 2007.

·mr-lllr -llfrlrll.IH lfll·--QO 651
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3. At that time, the Defendant's physical location was unknown to the officers.
4. Detective Thomas asked Defendant if he would agree to meet with.police and
give them his story.
5. Defendant indicated that he wanted to speak with his la\V-yer first because the last
time he spoke with the police he had "gotten screwed."
6. Defendant was not in custody, nor were there any indicia of arrest during this
conversation.
7. Defendant "·vas arrested

t'v\ro

days later on .i\u~..1st 7, 2007.

8. Upon his arrest, Defendant was given Miranda warnings at least twice.
9. Defendant waived his right to an attorney and agreed to speak with the officers
on August 7, 2007.
10. After giving a verbal statement, Defendant assisted Officer Gent in preparing a
written confession to the murders and attempted murders.
11. Defendant was once again given Miranda warnings and the warnings were printed
at the top of the written statement. Defendant if'..itialed the warnings and the
waiver and signed the written confession.
12. Defendant did not ask for an attorney after his arrest despite multiple A1iranda
warrungs.
13. There was no physical or psychological force used to induce the Defendant's
statements.
14. There is no evidence that Defendant was coerced, pressured, or threatened to give
the statements.
15. The duration of the interrogation was less than two hours and included breaks
during which Defendant was offered food and water.
16. An officer was sent to get Defendant a burger and the detective offered to wait
until Defendant had eaten before starting on the written statement.
17. Defendant indicated that he would eat while the detective typed.
18. Defendant was offered and given bathroom breaks as needed.
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19. Defendant's chronological age was 19 years and nine months at the time of his
confession.
20. The evidence that Defendant has a below-average IQ and symptoms of ADHD
are not sufficient to establish that he did not understand or appreciate what he
was doing when he talked with the detectives.
21. Defendant had the intellectual ability to understand the questions and give the

answers that he did. This determination is based on all of the testimony,
including th.at of the Defendant on July 17, 2009.
22. Defendant specifically testified that he was not afraid of either Detective Gent or
Detective Thomas.
23. Defendant testified that his fear was from gang retaliation, not from law
enforcement.
24. Defendant's testimony that he was not given Miranda warnings was not credible,
particularly in the face of the written statement with the printed Miranda warning
initialed by Defendant acknowledging that he understood and waived his rights.
25. In listening to Defendant's testimony during the evidentiary hearing, it was clear
that he understood all the questions put to him, both on direct and crossexamination.
26. Defendant gave appropriate answers to all the questions, tracked the questioning
well and seemed to be focused.
27. Based on the observations of the Defendant's testimony, the Court concludes that
Defendant understood and understands the nature of the proceedings.
28. TI1e Defendant's IQ is not so low that he could not understand the question and
answer of the interrogation that took place.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

1. Miranda is not required for non-custodial interviews.
2. Defendant was not in custody during the telephone conversation.
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3. Miranda requires two factors: that the person is in custody and that he is being
questioned. Absent custody, there is not an effective invocation of Miranda rights.
4. Defendant gave a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights after his
arrest on August 7, 2007.
5. Defendant's statement to the police on August 7, 2007 was not coerced, forced or
threatened.

J

/.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, and based on all the testimony, documents, briefs, and the
preliminary hearing transcript, the Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

/\('i. y

Dated this

_.....,3=-- day of~er, 2009

,.---·<s:'

1

// __

~~-v~v~-·
--E{rue W. Jones
District Court Judge

\
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OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
STATEMENT
OFFENSE: Homicide
CASE: 07-62701
TIME/DATE: 8-7-07 1840 hrs
STATEMENT OF: Riqo Perea
DOB: 11-7-87
SSN: 529-71-5236
ADDRESS: 315 32nd
PHONE:
EMPLOYMENT:
WORK PHONE:

ORIGINAL

1) You have the right to remain silent.
2) Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3) You have the right to talk with a lawyer and have him or her present with you while you are being
questioned.
4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one can be appointed to represent you before y questioning, if you
wish.
5) Do you understand each of these rights that have been explained to you? --"4--I:---T'-7F~~+-6) Having these rights. in mind, do you wish to speak to me and give a statement? _____,____,~~~You are notified that statements you are about to make ma:y be presented fo a magistrate or judge in lieu of your
sworn testimony at a preliminary examination. Any false statement you make and that you do not believe to be
true may st~u to criminal punishment as a "class A misdemeanor. I have read and understand the above
.
.
statement:
Following is a voluntary statement given by Rico Perea, to Detective Jim Gent Ogden City Police Department.

Q. Can you tell me what happened on the evening of 8-4-07?
A. We went and got some beer and liquor from the store. We went to the view for a minute and looked at the fire
works. After that we didn't want to stay so we went to 20th and get beer at the Chevron. We went to my Aunt
Christina's and we stayed for a minute but people started arguing. We went to the truck to see if the kids were
okay. After that I heard some one say fuck you punks big time Norte. A shot was fired and glass was breaking I
panicked and got scared for the kids and I shot back to protect the kids. I didn't think I was pointing that low I
didn't mean to kill anybody. After that we drove off and I told Nicky to drive off she told me no and I told her to
drive off. So we drove off and I told her to drop me off on 7th street and to take the kids home. From there I have
just been on the run. I just kept running.
Q. Who was with you in the SUV at the View?
A. Me and Nicky and the two girls and Chris.
Q. Who was in the red car at the View?
A. Demon, Misty, Flaco and Nadine.
Q. Were the same people in the same vehicles when you went to by beer?
A. Everyone was the same as always.
Q. Which vehicle arrived at Christina's first?
A. Mine did.
Q. Was the red car right behind you?
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Q. Who got out of your car?
A. Me but when I got back Chris wasn't in the car.

Q. Do you know where Chris was?
A. No I wasn't paying attention to him I was worried about the kids.
Q. When you got out of the SUV where did you go?
A. I went into Christina's house to use the bathroom.
Q. Did anyone else go into the house with you?
A. No Flaco was in there already.
Q. Was anyone with him?
A. Just his girlfriend. Sarah and Sabrina were in the door way.
Q. Did anyone say anything to you inside the house?
A. Sarah said that Aunt Christina didn't want anyone in the house why she wasn't there.
Q. Did Sabrina say anything to you?
A. No she didn't. I just gave her a what's up glance.
Q. Have you ever had trouble with Sabrina before?
A. No I haven't.
Q. What did you do when Sarah told you to leave?
A. She didn't tell us to leave.
Q. Did you talk to Sarah about not being allowed in the house?
A. No.
Q. Did Flaco?
A. Yes because he was in the house. He said he had permission from Christina to be in the house. He told her
that and that's why she let me in.
Q. Did Sarah and Flaco get into an argument?
A.No.
Q. When you came out of the bathroom was anyone in the house?
A. No.
Q. Did you know where they all went?
A. When I came outside everyone was in the street.
Q. What was happening out there?
A. Nicky and Flaco were arguing about being in the house and that we didn't have permission. Flaco told her
Christina gave us permission. Flaco then told her you know what were leaving we don't want no trouble.
Q. This Nicky is different then the Nicky that was driving the SUV correct?
A. Yes. We can say that it's Nicky Valencia.
Q. Did Flaco walk away from Nicky V.?
A. Yes he did.
Q. Where was Nicky V and Flaco standing when they were arguing?
A. I'm not sure but I'm guessing they were in the driveway at the wedding party across the street.
Q. Did you go over there?
A. No I didn't.
Q. Did you see anyone else standing near Nicky V or Flaco?
A. Just the whole crowd I'm guessing. When we pulled up there was people all in the driveway and around the
house.
Q. Was Chris back in the SUV?
A. No.
Q. Were the kids okay?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened next? Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. People I was with were getting ready to walk back to the cars and then some dude from their party came out
of nowhere and said fuck you punk's big time Norte. After that there was a bunch of commotion and then a shot
was fired. I ducked and checked on the kids. I started to hear glass break and I grabbed the hand gun I had and I
got out of the truck and standed up and I let off a couple of rounds to scare everyone away.
Q. When you say you stood up what do you mean?
A. I stood up from the passenger seat and leaned over the top and I thought I was just shooting in the air. I didn't
aim at anybody.
Q. Was the SUV moving when you were shooting?
A. I was getting ready to.
Q. Did you shot any more?
A. No I didn't.
Q. Did anyone else shoot?
A. I wasn't paying attention I was just trying to get out of there.
Q. Was anyone in your SUV hurt?
A. After we stopped and check no no one was hurt.
Q. Was there any damage to your SUV?
A. Not sure I didn't check to look.
Q. DO you know how many rounds you fired?
A. I don't.
Q. What type of gun to you use?

A. A .22
Q. What color was it?
A. Black.
Q. Was it a revolver or a semi-automatic?
A. A semi.
Q. Do you know how many rounds were in the gun?
A. No I don't.
Q. Do you know how many rounds it holds?
A. I don't.
Q. Can you tell me where the gun is now?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Did you give it to anyone?
A. I would rather not say.
Q. Once everyone was checked and they were okay what did you do?
A. I got dropped off on 7th street and kept running.
Q. Was anyone with you?
A. I ran by myself.
Q. Where did Chris go?
A. I don't know.
Q. Did anyone else run from the SUV?
A. I wasn't worried about anyone else so I'm not sure. I told Nicky to take the kids home and I jumped out and
started running.
.
Q. Did you stop any place?
A. In a back yard. I called someone to come pick me up and after that I just went and hid out.
Q. Have you talked to anyone that was there that night since you have been hiding?
A. No I haven't.
Q. Going back to the shooting. Did you see where the person was that shot the first shot?
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Q. 'Where do you mean. Was it behind your SUV. Or was it by Christina's house. Or was it from the Norte
party?
A. It wasn't by Christina's. It wasn't directly behind me. I'm guessing it came from the Norte party.
Q. Did you see anyone get hit by your gun fire?
A. No I didn't.
Q. When did you learn that people were shot?
A. When people started to call my phone.
Q. Did you think about calling the police to tell your story?
A. I did but I didn't think anybody would believe me.
Q. Did you try to call for help for the people that were hurt?
A. No the help was already there.
Q. How did you feel when you heard that two people died?
A. I felt like I was dead myself.
Q. Did you know the victims?
A. Yes I did. One was my cousin. I didn't know but my family called and asked why I shot my cousin. I didn't
mean to shot anybody.
Q. What do you think should happen to someone that shots two four people and kills two of them?
A. It depends on what the situation is.- I mean if it was intentionally then I think they should go to prison. I was
scared and I was trying to protect her children_
Q. Do you mean Nicky's kids?
A. Yes.
Q. What if a person kills people but didn't mean it. \Vhat should happen to them?
A. I think they should go to prison to but not for as long as people think they should. If it's to protect somebody
is what I'm saying.
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. I apologize to the victim's families. I didn't mean for anything to happen to them that nighL If I could take it
back I would. I will accept the consequences for my actions for protecting someone_ I'm just like them I will
have to live with this for the rest of my life.

Your signature below indicates that you have read the above statement and it is true and correct to the best of
your knowledge and belief.

' Date

2J-- ?-o?
Date

TYPED BY: Detective Jim Gent
TIME: 1930 hrs
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SECCH> JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY I STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.

case No.

071901847

)
RIQO M. PEREA,

Defendant.

APR 0 6 2010

)
)
)

BEFORE THE HON:>RABLE ERNIE W.

~

SECOND DISTRICT COURT
2525 GRANT AVENUE
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

M:>TION HEARING
MARCH 04, 2010

REPORTED BY:

KATIE HARMJN, CSR, RPR
(801) 634-5549
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1

purposes for the finding, is specifically that the Court finds

2

that Mr. Perea has concurred with both conflict counsel and

3

Mr. Richards now and he has made a direct statement that he

4

believes it's in his best in'terest to go forward, specifically

5

in way of any conflict or potential conflict.

6
7

I will make that finding.

THE COURT:

appropriate.

I think it's

All right.

8

Anything else then on the motion, Mr. Richards?

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

MR. SHAW:

11

THE COURT:

No.

No, Your Honor.
Can we move -- I don't know if maybe you

12

have a preference, but I thought maybe we could deal with the

13

State's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr -- how

14

do you say it?

15

one or if you prefer to

Ofshe.

16

MR. HEWARD:

17

THE COURT:

I don't know if you want to deal with

That's fine.
Well, I did get State's request for

18

discovery notes, but I -- my question is, and I almost think we

19

could dissolve this issue without that.

20

the State feels about it.

21
22

MR. LYONS:

going to rule.

But I don't know how

I guess it depends on how Your Honor is

We might be able to --

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. LYONS:

Your Honor, what I want to do is just lay

25

out in summary briefly the State's reasoning why Dr. Ofshe
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1

needs to be excluded.

And then I want to talk specific in more

2

detail under the specific rules in cases why he needs to be

3

excluded.
At the outset, Your Honor, already knows this but the

4
5

defense does have the burden of proof -- in a situation like

6

this to prove that the testimony of an expert witness is

7

admissible.

8

latitude in performing this gate keeping function.

9

reversed only if you were having to use discretion and that you

And Your Honor knows that you are granted wide
It would be

10

are to view expert testimony as the Court has put it with

11

"rational skepticism."
The first reason under this is Rule 608, Dr. Ofshe

12
13

can't testify that this confession was coerced as he puts it in

14

his report.

15

Court to determine only.

16

unreliable.

17

it's the State's opinion it's the same thing as commenting on

18

the credibility of the witness.

19

credibility of a witness are the exclusive function of the

20

jury.

21

That is a legal conclusion.

And that is for the

He can only testify that this is

However, if he testifies that it is unreliable,

And determinations of

Next under 702, his research is sharply contested.

22

This is not research that is generally accepted within the

23

scientific community in which he operates.

24

scientific data to back up his conclusions.

25

methodology have never been tested in a random sampling of

He has no
His theory and
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1

criminal cases.

Because he has no data his methods and

2

theories have not been tested by other independent researchers,

3

there is no peer review of his data and his conclusions do not

4

meet Rimmasch's inherent reliability standard.
Under 403 his testimony should be also excluded.

5

He

6

is not going to be commenting on the credibility of the

7

witness.

8

opinion is due to the unfair danger -- due to the danger that

9

his testimony would unduly influence the jury.

10
11

He has little to no relevance under 401.

The State's

The prejudicial

affect of his testimony precludes him from testifying.
Finally, we believe that much of his testimony would

12

include hearsay.

And as Your Honor look at carefully his

13

reports he makes many, many statements about -- I guess, he

14

makes many findings in his report about statements that he --

15

in conversations that he has with Mr. Perea -- or is it Perea?

16

Now I'm confused.

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

MR. LYON:

It's always been Perea.
Mr. Perea notes conversation.

And it's

19

the State's position you can't use Dr. Ofshe and an end run to

20

get in the Defendant's version of the facts before the jury.

21

And that's essentially what he would be doing.

22

Going into more detail, Your Honor.

As Your Honor

23

well knows, Rule 608(a} allows testimony concerning a witness's

24

general character and representation for truthfulness or

25

untruthfulness, but prohibits any testimony as to a witness's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

truthfulness on a particular occasion.

2

clear that you can't have someone come in and try to act as a

3

human lie detector.

The case law is very

4

The concern that we have and, frankly, the concern

5

that the courts have expressed in situations like this, they

6

don't want a battle of the experts corning in and trying to help

7

with the fact finding and credibility.

8

role of the jury.

9

that role of the jury.

10

That is the exclusive

You can't have an expert come in and assert
Rirnrnasch made is it very clear that

this sort of testimony is categorically barred under Rule 608.

11

And frankly, there is a large body of case law that

12

shows it's error for an expert witness to come in and comment

13

on the truthfulness or untruthfulness of a witness on a

14

particular occasion.

15

when you have an individual like Dr. Ofshe who has, frankly,

16

impressive credentials.

17

a well respected university.

18

these credentials still substantially sway in telling the jury

19

how they should view this evidence, which offends the very

20

purpose of Rule 608.

21

This problem is particularly compounded

He is well educated.

He had taught at

The problem is the danger of

The testimony of Dr. Ofshe doesn't add anything to

22

this case.

23

come in and do, and that is to assess the credibility of the

24

profession.

25

a lecture to the jury.

The jury can already do what he is purporting to

As such, his expert testimony would amount to only

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46

Noteworthy Reporting

1

Case No.

071901847

Next, under 702 as Your Honor knows Rimmasch is

2

really the seminal case on this issue.

3

get in scientific evidence.

4

notice of the sciences inherent reliability or that can be

5

established through testimony.

6

this situation can take judicial notice of this sort of expert

7

testimony.

8

DNA.

9

There are two ways to

One is the court may take judicial

I don't think that the Court in

It's not generally accepted like something like

Therefore the only avenue they can get it in through

10

is through this testimony.

The appellate courts say that

11

there is a high threshold for admissibility in order to insure

12

that evidence is sufficiently reliable to go to the jury.

13

What's guarded against is the tendency for the jury to abandon

14

it's role as the fact finder and adopt the judgment of an

15

expert without ever assessing the validity of the scientific

16

under opinions of its conclusions.

17

evidence must show that the science is inherently unreliable or

18

it must be excluded .

So the proponent of this

Now, in this situation they have proffered some of

. 19

20

his testimony and I guess the relevant question is:

Is it

21

reliable?

22

determining reliability of scientific evidence.

23

are application of generally accepted principles in the

24

scientific community, conclusions based upon data gathered

25

through acceptable research methods, imperial studies that show

And the case law seems to suggest some factors in
Some of them
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a clear trend or data over numerous tests.

2

easily replicated and consistent over time.

3

071901847

Hypothesis that is

And as we look at these -- those sort of factors and

4

Dr. Ofshe's testimony, it's clear that he doesn't meet these

5

criteria.

6

in the scientific community.

7

brief, the Commonwealth versus Robinson the -- that trial court

8

excluded the testimony of another kind of cohort of Dr. Ofshe,

9

and that's Dr. Paul or

10

Dr. Ofshe's conclusions are not generally accepted
In the case that we cited in our

excuse me Dr. Saul Kassin.

And part of the reasoning for excluding that

11

testimony is because that he admitted presently there is no

12

scientific basis for distinguishing true and false confessions,

13

more research is sorely needed in this area of research, and in

14

mock jury experiments jurors were able to accurately

15

distinguish between false and true confessions.

16

So if there is no scientific basis how can it be

17

verified through other studies?

The principles that Dr. Ofshe

18

and his cohorts propose have been verified through study and

19

replication by independent review because there is no data for

20

individuals to study or compare to.

21

independent review because he -- even Dr. Ofshe admits that he

22

can't tell exactly how false confessions happen without this,

23

some sort of independent verification, these principles

24

aren't -- certainly aren't going to be accepted within the

25

scientific community.

They can't send data for
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Moreover, Dr. Ofshe isn't adding something that the

2

jury can't already do.

3

can distinguish between false and true confessions just as well

4

as they can.

5

Dr. Ofshe admitted that there wasn't -- it wasn't possible to

6

quantify the number and the frequency of false confessions or

7

the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of justice.

8
9

Their research shows that mock juries

So he has nothing to be adding to this.

In 1997

And recently he still admits that they can't make
that determination.

They don't know how frequently false

10

confessions occur.

11

and nexus between empirical data there is no basis for Ofshe to

12

testify that the police in this case produce a specific result,

13

namely a false confession.

14

accurately distinguish between true and false confessions or

15

calculate the rate at which false confessions occur, how can he

16

tell this court and this jury the likelihood of a false

17

confession?

18

and show that his methodology is correct and absent meeting

19

this threshold his testimony is not admissible.

20

And without an established innocence rate

If he can't -- if he can't

His data to -- he lacks data to support his theory

Further, Dr. Ofshe's conclusions aren't founded on

21

proper research.

Professor Paul Cassell, who, Your Honor

22

probably knows and teaches up at the U, he has studied and

23

responded to many of Ofshe's papers and publications.

24

that Ofshe had never taken a randomized sample to determine how

25

often false confessions occur.

He notes

Professor Cassell, on the other
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hand has randomly sampled cases in the Salt Lake City Area and

2 · he has never found one false confession.

Because Ofshe has got no real data, he has to rely on

3
4

the sweeping conclusions and generalizations about all

5

confessions about his study to specific cases.

6

as I read through this article that was attached and I'm

7

assuming that Your Honor received it, as well.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LYON:

Specifically,

Yeah.
He sites transcripts from actual

10

interviews where police have interrogated individuals and he

11

cites these as examples for this is a technique that police use

12

to produce a false confession.

13

says whether these interviews did, in fact, produce a false

14

confessions or not.

Well, the problem is he never

And just out of curiosity, there was one that was

15

that was listed in there, a Salt Lake case, it was that

16

in

17

was Calvin Shane Myers.

18

I

19

that -- he sites to that case for the proposition of techniques

20

that they produce false confessions.

21

some shepardizing.

22

case to killing his ex-girlfriend who was, in fact, pregnant at

23

the time.

24

direct appeal.

25

habeas review that he should have been charged with aggravated

This is back in, I think about,

did just a little bit of research on it.

'94.

And they cite to

I looked up his case, did

Interestingly enough, he confessed in that

He was charged with capital murder.

He had no

He only raised it for the first time on a
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1

murder basing it upon his pregnant girlfriend, I believe he

2

wasn't

he didn't know that she was pregnant or -But what's really interesting to me is that there

3
4

were no challenges to his confession.

There was nothing.

5

Which seems to me and, I mean, obviously, I have to admit I

6

don't know all the details of this case, but if that's not even

7

raised, that seems to strongly suggest that he gave a true

8

confession.

9

misleading to the court.

So these examples that he sites are completely

10

And much of the research that is -- that he bases

11

his -- that he bases his papers on are secondary references

12

like newspaper articles and reports.

13

the media, we know that they frequently sensationalize stories

14

and don't give the full report.

And with all respect to

Dr. Ofshe sites to 29 false confession cases, nine of

15

16

which are undisputed.

17

knowledge in order -- for him to make the conclusion that this

18

was a false confession which leaves 20.

19

cases are highly disputed based upon Professor Cassell's

20

research.

21

and review original court documents.

22

They require no specific or particular

Nine of the those

Professor Cassell has taken a lot of time to go back

One of the examples that Professor Cassell has looked

23

at is -- that Dr. Ofshe sites as a false confession, the

24

federal trial judge looked at that case on habeas review not

25

once but twice.

He watched a video of the confession and the
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1

judge made very specific findings, very lengthy, that this, in

2

fact, was a valid and reliable confession.
Interestingly enough, that's not ever given to us by

3
4

Dr. Ofshe.

5

remaining 11 cases, there is only a 55 percent average, which

6

is as we know is just barely better than flipping a coin.

7

an error rate that high how can his expert testimony be

8

admissible?

9

and his error rate absolutely precludes his testimony from

10

11

Giving Ofshe the benefit of the doubt off these

With

His failure to follow acceptable research methods

coming into this court.
In Lyons versus State, the Georgia Supreme Court

12

recently reviewed that Dr. Ofshe's theories quote had not

13

reached the verifiable stage of scientific certainty and that

14

his false confession theory was inadmissible at trial.

15

doesn't have the research to back up his theories and therefore

16

he can't give an opinion.

17

the -- his resume for him to come in and testify.

18

nexus however between his credentials and his opinion.

19

He

He basically is wanting to rely on
There is no

I guess, one other point to his research methods, he

20

really is only relying on a handful of false confession

21

proponents in order to advance his research.

22

handful of these individuals that are researching this and they

23

are all citing to one another; none of them are doing proper

24

research but they continue to publish more and more articles

25

citing to one another.

There is a

I mean, it's just -- it just seems a
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1

little absurd to the State.

2

in the State's opinion that is not valid and proper research.

3

They all lack empirical data and

Moving on under Rule 403, his testimony should

4

certainly be excluded as well.

5

criteria in determining the admissibility of expert testimony

6

under Rule 403.

7

upon undeniably valid scientific premises, has a high degree

8

and power of accurately determining the existence or

9

non-existence of a fact at issue.

10

And Rimmasch there were three

And that is that the scientific proof is based

In this case we certainly can't determine with a high

11

degree of certainty whether there is or is not a false

12

confession.

13

they admit, Ofshe and his other individuals that they

14

researched this, they can't

15

degree of accuracy the rate at which false confessions occur.

16

The final prong is that it is easily replicable and

There is at least a 45 percent error rate.

And

that they can't assess with any

17

it's application to similar situations has been tested and

18

validated often.

19

validated these methods and theories.

20

going to help the jury make their ultimate determination.

21

is just wanting to comment on credibility.

22

situation the danger of unfair prejudice is extremely high.

23

When he comes in and he wants to tout his credentials, the

24

danger that the jury is going to defer to him based upon his

25

credentials is extremely high and his testimony would not out

No studies have been done and no one has
His testimony is not
He

So under this
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weigh the probative value.
Finally, the defense can't use Dr. Ofshe as an end

2

3

run to get in their version of the events in front of the jury.

4

And when Your Honor looks at the report by Dr. Ofshe, he says

5

that he based a lot of his conclusions upon interviews, an

6

interview that he has with the Defendant, his version of the

7

facts that he says notes that the Defendant gave to him.

8

problem is that he can't come up and sit in that chair and then

9

tell this jury, well this is what the defendant says, this is

The

10

his version of the events.

They can't use that as an end run.

11

The Defendant has an absolute right to testify but he has to

12

get up and tell those versions of the events to the jury.

13

can't put it in through Dr. Ofshe.

They

With regards to the reply that Mr. Richards filed, he

14
15

sites to the State versus Clopten, which is that recent case

16

that came out about eyewitness identification.

17

very different from what he have here.

18

agreed that the eyewitness identification expert met the

19

Rimmasch standard.

20

standard.

21

exonerations in the United States.

22

That case is

In that case both sides

Here we do not agree that he meets that

They cite to Professor Gross, his article for

First of all, we haven't had a chance to even look up

23

and verify these statistics and assertions that he makes.

24

importantly though, those are not -- the statistics and the

25

things they cite in Professor Gross, Dr, Ofshe doesn't rely on
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1

in his conclusion, that's completely irrelevant.

2

cite to the case of State versus Griffin, where Judge Hatfield

3

allowed them to use -- I think it was either Ofshe or Leo, one

4

of these individuals, if they wanted to in their trial.

5

They also

As Your Honor knows, we cite to the Maughan case

6

where Judge Hatfield recently decided as well -- interestingly

7

enough, Judge Hatfield specifically states in his ruling on the

8

Maughan case that he allowed that testimony if they so desired

9

during Griffin, it carne up in the course of a five-week trial.

10

And it appears to the State that this is kind of an error on

11

the side of letting it in situation.

12

states in the Maughan case that's had a further chance to

13

reflect carefully and consider based upon briefs and data and

14

he has rejected the testimony of Dr. Leo or Dr. Ofshe,

15

whichever of the two is going to testify.

But he specifically

•

He stated that he would be willing to give a jury

16
17

instruction on this.

18

that.

19

situation here.

20

Hatfield indicated, we could base it on Utah case law and they

21

can still argue that the jury they can still -- the jury will

22

still have a chance to assess the credibility of the witnesses

23

and decide whether this confession is unreliable.

24

don't have to have it from Dr. Ofshe.

25

And the State doesn't have a problem with

I think the jury instruction would certainly cover the
There is -- we could base on -- as Judge

But they

They simply want Dr. Of she to come in and testify as
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1

to the likelihood of a false confession or the likelihood of

2

false confessions in general.

3

is no data to suggest at what frequency these false confessions

4

occur.

5

false confession in this case?

As I have already stated, theres

So how is he going to opine as to the likelihood of a
It's pure speculation.

He's

Moreover, he is implicitly telling this jury if he

6
7

were to come in and testify that the defendant's confession

8

wasn't true and to disbelieve the police.
Here again, that's in direct violation of the rules.

9
10

It's also

11

have allowed Dr. Ofshe to testify.

12

to note that as the Supreme Court said in State versus Crosby,

13

the standard put forth in Rimmasch is more stringent then what

14

is put forth in Daubert and some of these other cases which

15

these other courts may have been relying.

16

they cite to numerous cases in which some courts
I think it's very important

So Utah has a more stringent standard in order to

17

admit this.

18

Dr. Ofshe concedes that it's impossible to estimate within

19

reliability the rate at which false confessions occur, without

20

reliable estimates, the frequency of false confessions, if it's

21

possible to derive a meaningful evidence for the degree with

22

which particular interrogation techniques may be associated

23

with false confessions.

24
25

The State is asking to grant this motion because

And due to the lack of statistically reliable
evidence the current research doesn't -- does not form a
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5

The few cases that Dr. Ofshe sites in his article are

6

not based upon randomly selected cases, but are rather selected

7

for study because they are deemed to have a high probability of

8

being false, bearing -- because they bear some of the hallmarks

9

of what they perceive to be false confessions.

Therefore,

10

citing to go those sort of cases appears to be more antedotal

11

than reliable empirical data.

12

So it's the State's position, Your Honor, that under

13

Rule 608, 702, 403, the Rules of Hearsay, Rirnmasch, and on his

14

progeny, that the State's motion should be granted.

15

THE COURT:

16

Mr. Richards, before we hear from the defense can we

17

just take a short recess?
RICa~JIDS:

18

MR.

19

THE COURT:

20

recess.

23
24
25

Thank you, Mr. Lyon.

Is that okay?
That would be great.

Let's take about a 15 or 10 minute

And then we'll hear from the defense.
(Break taken.)

21

22

All right.

THE COURT:

Court is again in session.

All right.

We are back in session State versus Perea.
Did I get it right?
name the whole time.

I think I've mispronounced his

I know -- I have it should be Perea and I
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keep saying Perea.

2

3

MR. RICHARDS:

I thought you said it right most of

the time.
Did I?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

071901847

Tell me if I say it wrong.

I will but I think you have done it

correctly all the way.
Oh, have I?

7

THE COURT:

8

You know, I was going to say you know you're getting

9
10

old when you find the attorney citing cases that you tried
years ago.

That Crosby case that was Mr. Lyon cited.

11

Yeah, go ahead, Mr. Richards.

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

At the outset I think it's important to note that we

Thank you, Your Honor.

14

are not here on a Rimmasch hearing.

The State has an

15

opportunity, they could have requested one; they haven't.

16

so, we are not really taking testimony and the studies or the

17

articles that Mr. Lyons sites to I think are primarily an

18

article written by Paul Cassell.

19

take that as an authoritative thesis.

20

it's the ultimate authority on it.

21

And we know that Mr. Cassell's opinions are not always followed

22

by the Supreme Court.

And

And I don't know that we can
I certainly don't think

He just has his opinion.

23

I point specifically to the case of State versus

24

Dickerson, which is the case that he argued to the Supreme

25

Court asking that the Miranda be overturned and we know the
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1

result on that.

2

some sort of an authoritative figure on this issue, I don't

3

think holds a whole lot of water.

4

So, the fact that we cite to Paul Cassell as

I think that one thing that does hold a whole lot of

5

water is some Utah Supreme Court decisions.

6

specifically to -- and I note, specifically, the absence of the

7

citations to these two cases in the State's brief.

8

cases which I have included kind of stiffen up in my brief are

9

the State versus Retenberger, a 1999.

10

years after Rimmasch.

11

case.

12

And I point

Those two

Which coincidently is 10

So this is the, I guess, newer Rimmasch

But, in State versus Retenberger the court cited

13

substantially to the study done by Dr. Ofshe and also his

14

colleague, who was mentioned Dr. Leo in determining the

15

validity and reliability of false confessions.

16

sighted to those and acknowledged the importance in the

17

authoritative position that those studies take.

18

Retenberger

Furthermore, even in a more recent case that of State

19

versus Mauchley.

I hope I said that right.

M-A-U-C-H-1-E-Y.

20

That's a 2003 Utah Supreme Court decision, as well.

21

Supreme Court in that case cited to Dr. Ofshe studies,

22

specifically mentioning those studies in their decision quoting

23

to go to the decision,

24

irrational action" a Denver law review article authored by

25

Of she and Leo.

The Utah

"To confess falsely rational choice and
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So those are two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions

2

that decided and accepted Ofshe as an expert in this particular

3

field.

4

search and admittedly I haven't had a whole lot time and I had

5

Brittany do some work on it.

6

research on it.

We have a number of other cases and I did a Westlaw

7

We found some cases.

And J. Richards also did some

We included some of those,

but

8

certainly not all.

9

this and found over 60 appellate decisions which have upheld

I think I have done a previous search on

10

Ofshe's testimony of these kind of cases.

11

number of them kind of in a sprinkling of different

12

jurisdictions, but included two from Utah, as well.

13

We have cited a

Dr. Ofshe has been admitted in over a 100 cases where

14

he's testified in the United States specifically on false

15

confessions, specifically on what we are asking that he be

16

allowed to do in this case in this trial.

17

accepted by them.

18

And he's been

The fact that there are some courts that may have

19

denied him we don't know the reasons.

20

Rimmasch hearing or should have had one to determine that.

21

at this point, the Court's appointed him as an expert.

22

asking that he be able to testify as an expert and ask for some

23

sort of Rimmasch that could show that he's not reliable,

24

think that it would be incumbent upon the Court to allow his

25

testimony.

I guess we should have a
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I speak specifically and it troubles me a little bit

2

that they quote from Paul Cassell's article that there is

3

really no empirical studies and no findings of exonerations.

4

They ignore my reference to the article on false confessions,

5

exonerations in the United States.

6

briefly mentioned that.

7

And I realize Mr. Lyons

But under is that decision -- or excuse me under that

8

article by Professor Gross they have done some empirical

9

studies.

Number one, they found 51 of the 328 exonerations

10

since 1989, so 15 percent of them the defendant's confessed

11

falsely to a crime that they did not

12

don't know that we can accept a 15 percent fail rate in a death

13

penalty case.

14

somebody to jail for a year or even to prison for five years.

15

We're talking about executing someone.

16

co~~it,

15 percent.

And I

I mean, we are not talking about sending

And I think under all of the rules that the Supreme

17

Court has come down with and all the decisions that the Supreme

18

Court has come down with, they certainly recognize that death

19

is different.

20

that may be okay with the State, I don't know; it shouldn't be.

21

It certainly is not okay with me and is certainly not okay with

22

this Court to have a 15 percent fail rate.

And I think a 15 percent fail rate -- while,

23

The false confessions go up even higher when we are

24

talking about individuals who are under 18 at the time of the

25

crimes at which they confessed to.

And

= recognize
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1

but he also has the AD/HD and you've heard the previous

2

testimony of Dr. Houston on that issue.

3

that there was a 44 percent rate of false confessions with

4

people under 18.

5

action the AD/HD he was under it.

6

Those come into play

Riqo is barely over that.

If you take into

Ones that are mentally retarded and I understand my

7

client is not that either, although there is a significant

8

deviation in his IQ, they have a 69 percent rate.

9

about empirical studies, there have been.

So talk

And there are

10

statistics.

And these kind of statistics bode very heavily

11

against allowing false confessions in the courtroom.

12

It's interesting to note that counsel in their brief

13

even states that they acknowledge that people confess falsely,

14

and I'm reading on page 11.

15

proposition that virtually everyone accepts.

16

that that means counsel, Mr. Lyons, himself, some criminal

17

defendants falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.

18

That's a universal-- everybody accepts that.

19

Quote Dr. Of she advances a
And I'm presuming

He then goes on and this troubles me.

From this

20

Dr. Ofshe makes a second suggestion, so venial as to command an

21

assent, that the persons involved in or interested in the

22

criminal justice system should review such cases with the view

23

to the systematic improvement of the system.

24

if we know there are false confessions and people are convicted

25

on false confessions, why would we want to review cases with

Why in the world
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the view of the systematic improvement of the system?

2

I mean, if we are looking for truth that's exactly

3

what this court has always done, and that what we'll continue

4

to do, don't we want to do something that's going to assist the

5

trier of fact in arriving at the truth, this systematic

6

improvement of the system, is

counsel apparently against.

As far as the rules allowing the admission of this

7

8

evidence I think are clear.

9

expertise and certainly Dr. Ofshe does, he has been doing this

That if an individual has

10

for years, he's testified in a hundred-plus cases.

He's been

11

cited in numerous cases, including those by the Utah Supreme

12

Court.

13

Court and certainly benefinical to the trier of fact, the jury

14

in this case.

I think that kind of assistance is beneficial to the

I think it's important --well, again, coming back to

15
16

that, everybody recognizes that there are false confessions.

17

The problem is getting to it.

18

an analysis of the Clopten case.

19

is hot off the press December of 2009.

20

recent case than Clopten.

21

decision.

22

cite it's in my brief.

And I want to go through kind of
And that's

boy, this one

You can't get a more

And that's also a Utah Supreme Court

It was cited if you want it but I don't have the

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

Clopten covered an issue of false eyewitness

Right.
I have a copy if you want it.
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1

identification.

2

court previously in the Long decision and it's progeny that

3

there are significant deficiencies in eyewitness testimony.

4

And there are a number of people that have been convicted in

5

eyewitness testimony inappropriately -- or wrongly, I should

6

say.

7

And the Court in Clopten recognized as has the

They cite these same studies these percentages of the

8

exonerations in coming to that conclusion.

9

is well aware the -- over 50 percent of the people that have

10

been exonerated off death row of 159 have been exonerated on

11

death row over 50 percent were -- there was false eyewitness

12

identification.

13

That is, the court

Now, 50 percent versus 15 percent I still think

14

that's a significant figure and one that certainly would

15

suggest that the Court allow the testimony of Dr. Ofshe to

16

instruct and to give information to the jury.

17

Going through the Clopten decision they made several

18

specific findings.

19

a number of bad confessions.

20

me, bad eyewitness identifications.

21

we also know that there are a number of bad confessions.

22

State acknowledges that ln their brief.

23

fact.

24

their article -- excuse me or the decision.

25

Number one, is that there was -- there are
We know that happens -- excuse
Similarly in confessions
The

It's a well-known

They go through and cite -- I will read a little bit of

"In the absence of expert testimony, a defendant is
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l

left with two tools, cross-examination and cautionary

2

instructions with which to convey the possibility of mistaken

3

identification to the jury."

4

part:

5

when it comes to addressing the appearance of eyewitness

6

identification."

7

And then here is the significant

"Both of these tools suffer from serious shortcomings

And I think we have the same problem here.

The problem is that the jury says Oh, Mr. Perea

8

confessed we don't need to listen to anything else.

9

same thing as -- and maybe even more so, on eyewitness

It's the

10

identifications, they say, well, somebody identified him we

ll

don't have to go any farther.

12

that cross-examinations doesn't help or isn't effective and

13

it's -- jury instructions as you say, is recommending are also

14

ineffective.

15

in a false confession case.

16

And the court had recognized

And I would submit that their equally ineffective

The Court goes on to say quote such testimony

17

performs two beneficial functions and he's been talking about

18

testimony of an expert witness to point out the deficiencies in

19

eyewitness identifications.

20

that they used in that case or wanted to use.

21

jurors about certain factors,

22

correlations between competence and accuracy and has a strong

23

but counterintuitive impact reliability an eyewitness.

24

other words, the testimony enables jurors to avoid concern

25

common pitfalls.

And this would be Dr. Dodd at -It teaches the

such as weapon focus, and weak

In

And it goes on.
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Secondly, it assists jurors by quantifying what most

1

2

people already know that an expert -- an expert may discuss,

3

for example, the degree to which an accuracy was affected and

4

then it goes through some additional criteria.
The case is almost identical on a false confession.

5
6

You people know that periodically there is false confession.

7

The problem is, is cross-examination isn't effective, jury

8

instruction is ineffective and having an expert witness to get

9

up and testify that there is that problem is something that

10

would be extremely beneficial to obtaining the truth in the

11

verdict, which is the ultimate goal in this case.
One more quote I would like to get and this is a very

12
13

short one.

Subsequent research however has shown that

14

cautionary instruction does little to help a jury spot mistaken

15

identification.

16

that the same would be true in a false confession case.

I would submit unquote.

And I would submit

Based upon that, we're asking the Court to do two

17
18

things.

Number one is allow Dr. Ofshe to testify specifically

19

as to Mr. Perea.

20

his review of the records, his tremendous background and

21

knowledge in this area, that Mr. Perea's confession was tainted

22

or false.

And that given his examination of Mr. Perea,

23

Secondly, if the Court won't do that, we would ask

24

the Court to allow Dr. Ofshe to at least come in and testify

25

similarly to what was allowed in Clopten, to allow him to come
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1

in and say, hey, there is such a thing as false confession,

2

there is a number of things that lead up to false confession,

3

and these are some of the items.

4

cautionary instruction does little according to the Utah

5

Supreme Court, and we know cross-examination probably does even

6

less, according to the Utah Supreme Court.

7

Because we know that

So based upon that we are asking the Court to allow

8

the full testimony of Dr. Offshe as requested.

9

a fall back position allow him at least to testify as

10

generalities.

And if not, as

Thank you.

11

Unless you have any questions?

12

THE COURT:

13

Mr. Lyons, any rebuttal or response?

14

MR. LYON:

15

The defense's arguments seems to be based on one more

No.

Thank you, Mr. Richards.

A few things, Your Honor.

16

of emotion.

Though the State wants this Court to rule

17

according to the law and what the law and what the rules state.

18

First, the defense cites to Retenberger and is that Mauchley or

19

-- I don't know I'm not sure how to pronounce that.

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

MR. LYONS:

22

For the proposition that Dr. Ofshe has been cited by

23

our Utah Supreme Court, I have, in fact, read those cases, and

24

Mauchley or Mauchley or however you pronounce it, I dealt with

25

the corpus delicti rule, Retenberger which is completely

Mauchley.

I'm not sure how to pronounce that case.
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1

different from what we have here, they cited to as well for

2

general propositions.

3

In both of those cases they cite -- they use Dr.

4

Ofshe for general propositions, stuff that frankly,

5

common sense.

6

defendant what they confess to should match the facts of the

7

case.

8

groundbreaking research that they are giving here.

9

this is really common sense.

I think is

Such as, when an interrogator interrogates a

I mean, honestly, I mean, it's --this is not

10

I mean,

The fact that Ofshe had testified in other courts and

11

in other states doesn't really hold much weight for the State.

12

As I've indicated before, I think Rimmasch has a much more

13

stringent standard than perhaps these other states where they

14

are testifying too.

15

Gross study.

16

important to note that Ofshe doesn't include this in his

17

analysis.

18

would suggest that he can testify.

19

They have cite again, talking before the

I think as I have pointed out before, it's

There is no empirical data that Ofshe relies on that

Talking about Clopten, that case is completely

20

different than what we have here.

Both parties agree that

21

there was a large body of research to show there is a

22

fallibility in eyewitness identification, both parties agreed

23

that that met the Rimmasch standards.

24

gave the Long Instruction instead of allowing an expert to come

25

in and testify.

The trial court still

We are -- that is completely different from
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1

what we have here.

We do not agree that Dr. Ofshe meets the

2

Rirnrnasch standards.

Clopten has no precedent in this case.

3

The defense is wanting you to allow Dr. Ofshe to come

4

and testify that the defendant's confession was false.

5

again, that goes back to commenting on the credibility of a

6

witness, which is strictly forbidden.

7

want you to allow him to come testify as to generalities of

8

false confessions.

9

Your Honor, that is United States versus Binalli, this is a

Here

In the alternative they

And as we've noted in one of our briefs,

10

situation where -- that they encountered and they found that

11

the thrust of this sort of testimony is the same.

12

individuals have falsely confessed then confessions are just as

13

likely to be false as true.

14

testimony substantially outweighs the minimal probative value.

15

And that is the State's position.

16

Because some

The prejudicial effect of this

For him to come in and testify -- well, about false

17

confessions in general, then that's the thrust of his testimony

18

and that's --the prejudicial effect is --substantially

19

outweighs the probative value.

20

is sufficient evidence before this Court based upon the proffer

21

of these experts for the Court to exclude Dr. Ofshe.

22

the Court disagree the State would request a full

23

hearing to further question Dr. Ofshe.

The State believes that there

Should

Ri~masch

24

Unless the Court has any questions I'll submit.

25

THE COURT:

No.

All right.
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I think I'm ready to rule on the

issue.

3

Just by way of background, of course, the Defendant

4

filed notice that they intended call Dr. Ofshe

5

Anyway, we were going to call him as an expert on the subject

6

of coerced confessions and then the State has filed a motion in

7

limine to exclude his testimony from coming in.

8
9

Dr. Ofshe?

I guess, the first thing and I don't know how
significant it is, but, you know, originally the defense filed

10

a motion to suppress the confession.

11

that.

12

and was not involuntary.

13

carries, but for example I know that I have made that finding.

14

I know we don't let the jury know that.

15

that either party can let the jury know that the Court has

16

ruled against the Defendant on a suppression of the confession.

17

And we did a hearing on

And the Court found that the confession was not coerced
I don't know how much weight that

And there is no way

And the reason we don't let them know is that it

18

would carry way too much weight for the jury.

19

knew that the judge had ruled on this very subject and then

20

found that the confession was not coerced, I mean, a lot of

21

them, well, when we're done we find that there is some

22

legitimacy to the confession.

23

If the jurors

And I guess, I think that's the right ruling that we

24

don't let jurors know that.

25

concept that somehow we allow an expert to come in and comment

But I'm having trouble with this
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1

on the same confession.

2

coerced.

3

on somebody that they are an expert on the subject.

4

I worry that it carries way too much weight with the jury on an

5

issue that is so critical to the case.

6

To say, I find that the confession was

And I'm just having trouble with slapping this label
I just --

The next thing is I just question whether or not we

7

need an expert opinion on this subject.

8

reached a point now where we're allowing experts to testify --

9

first of all, we make them an expert and then they testify on

I mean, we have almost

10

everything.

11

it's just to me we've turned into, like you say, a battle of

12

the experts.

13

And I know that that is not counsels' fault,

You know, the real question here is:

but

Is this

14

something that really requires expert testimony to assist the

15

jury in arriving at a decision?

16

experts on DNA, and fingerprints, and autopsies, and

17

ballistics.

18

is the type of subject that requires expert testimony.

19

problem I'm having is rule 702 that talks about the testimony

20

of experts.

21

threshold requirement here, which as read under 702(b) it says:

22

"If the science or other principles underlying the testimony

23

meets a threshold showing that they are reliable and are based

24

upon sufficient facts or data and have been reliably applied to

25

the facts of the case."

I mean, I know we allow

But boy, I just have a tough time believing this
The

And I just don't think that we can meet the
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1

And so, I guess I agree with Mr. Lyons.

2

know how much reliability this has when we're talking about

3

whether or not the confession was coerced.

I just don't see it

4

as being a scientific study in that sense.

You know, it just

5

seems to me that a jury of lay people can decide the question

6

as to whether or not a confession is reliable, involuntary, or

7

coerced without having an expert testify on that issue.
I just think it's really impossible as I read through

8
9

I just don't

the briefs and the studies.

Really it's just impossible to

10

estimate with any degree of reliability the rate at which false

11

confessions occur.

12

we're talking about.

13

evidence.

14

the opinions about the false confessions.

I think that's really the heart of what
There is just no statistical reliable

There is no empirical data between the research and

I guess, I put a little more weight into what

15
16

Professor Paul Cassell did in his study.

As you know, he did

17

that in 1999 when he was professor of Law at the University of

18

Utah.

19

And then he decided he didn't like doing that so he went back

20

to teaching law school.

21

when he said that the success rate to identifying false

22

confessions is no better than 55 percent.

23

pointed out, the likelihood of it being a false confession is

24

no greater than if we flipped a coin.

25

just stuck my mind as being something very significant.

Of course, he then went on to become a federal judge.

But I just thought it was significant

And as Mr. Lyon

It's just --to me that
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1

just don't think this is science.

2

his opinion and he's done some studies and he has testified in

3

other courts.

4

number of courts, too.

5

and I'm not sure that it makes any difference.

6

that it makes it right or wrong or admissible or not

7

admissible.

8
9

I do agree it's -- it may be

But he's also been excluded from testifying in a
And I don't know what the percentage is
I don't know

It just seems to me that certainly cross-examination
of the officers available to the defense to expose the

10

officers' conduct in obtaining the confession.

11

the defense can develop their theory of whether it was a

12

coerced confession in the argument.

13

instruction is appropriate here.

14

concerns coerced confession.

15

And certainly

I do think that a jury

And I will give one that

So based on what I have read in the briefs and also

16

the oral arguments, the Court is going to grant the State's

17

motion in limine.

18

either in generalities about coerced confessions or about the

19

confession in this particular case.

And I won't allow Dr. Ofshe to testify

All right.

20

Anything else I need to address on

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

do that real quick.
Sure.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

I need to just make a record, if I can

I just wanted to make sure that the

Court has in the file Dr. Ofshe's opinion letter.
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I do, yeah.

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

071901847

And I would like to make that --

Part of the record.
part of the record.

And that would

be what he would testify to if he were called.
Okay.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RICHARDS:

I would also like to make a proffer

8

that if he were called to testify in generalities.

He would

9

lay out some of the stuff he has in the letter that in essence

10

instruct the jury that there are false confessions.

11

instruct the jury specifically that there are number of factors

12

that go into that.

13

metirum of knowledge.

And then the jury would at least have that

You attached that to your brief or memo?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

MR. HEWARD:

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

notice is what I did.

19

appreciate it.

20
21
22

23
24

25

THE COURT:

there.

He would

I thought I filed it.
No, there
I filed it with the expert witness
If I could submit that I would

Yeah, look at the file.

But certainly,

I

MR. RICHARDS:

I think it's

don't have any problem with it.
I

filed the expert witness notice with

his cv with his report, I believe.
THE COURT:

I thought it was there, too.

I don't

have the file here in front of me.
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They just

want to make it part of the record.

3

MR. SHAW:

4

THE COURT:

5

Case No.

No.

All right.

Anything else on that,

Mr . Richards?

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. RICHARDS:

9

THE COURT:

I think that's that on that one.

Now,

Could we visit marital privilege?

That was the next one I was going to go

10

to.

Well, let me ask.

11

both sides.

12

response he said, number one, they weren't going to use it

13

unless the Defendant testified or if somehow in all of that

14

they found a confession.

15

shorten this?

But it sounded to me like when I read Mr. Heward's

I don't

does that help maybe

Does it just placate it?

MR. HEWARD:

16

I don't know -- I'm glad to hear from

I think you are actually referring

17

specifically to the jail recordings and that is listed in our

18

facts.

19

privilege.

20

I thought Mr. Richards was going to talk about spousal

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me tell me you what I'm

21

thinking, before -- and I'm glad to hear from both sides first.

22

But it just seems to me that -- do I

23

marital privilege if we're finding that this isn't privileged?

24

I mean, if it's not-- there is an expectation of privacy.

25

eve~

need to get to the

To me, the real issue here is whether or not when you
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WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., STE 230
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
TELEPHONE: (801) 399-8377

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER RE: STATE'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE DR. OFSHE

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JUN 0 3 2U1!J

RIQO MARIANO PEREA,

Case No. 071901847

Defendant.

Judge: ERNIE W. JONES

In preparation for trial, Defendant filed a notice of expert witness stating that Dr. Richard
Ofshe would testify at trial that the Defendant falsely confessed to police. TI1e State filed a
motion in limine, requesting that this Court exclude Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony. Defendant
filed a response to the State's motion, and this matter came before the court on March 4, 2010.
Having read the briefs, the studies and applicable literature referenced in the briefs, and heard
argument, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Dr. Richard Ofshe has a background as a professor of sociology, teaching at the
University of California from 1981 to 2003.
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2. Dr. Ofshe has authored several books and numerous articles in the field of
sociology.
3. Dr. Ofshe has also authored several articles dealing with the topic of false
confessions.
4. In research and writing these articles, Dr. Ofshe relies on specific cases where a
false confession has been given. These false confession cases, however, are not
uniformly accepted within the scientific community as being valid false
confession cases.
5. Based upon these cases, Dr. Ofshe identifies police tactics and common signs
amongst suspects who allegedly falsely confessed.
6. The methodology employed Dr. Ofshe in identifying false confessions is not
generally accepted within the scientific community.
7. Dr. Ofshe has never conducted a random sample of suspects interrogated by
police to verify whether these factors he identifies as producing a false confession
did in fact produce a false confession.

8. Beyond identifying common characteristics of alleged false confessions, Dr.
Ofshe has never attempted to quantify his theories through any sort of empirical
data.
9. Dr. Ofshe has not relied on any studies analyzing empirical data gathered from a
random sample of suspects interrogated by police regarding false confessions.
2
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10. Dr. Ofshe's hypothesis that certain police interrogation methods produce false
confessions lacks support from any empirical data and have not been adequately
studied.
11. Professor Paul Cassell is a professor oflaw at tt~e University of Utah and a retired
federal district court judge.
12. Professor Cassell has researched and studied the area of false confessions.
13. Professor Cassell has reviewed and critiqued researched and writing done by Dr.
Ofshe.
14. In reviewing cases cited by Dr. Ofshe as a false confession, Professor Cassell
concludes that Dr. Ofshe was only able, at best, to correctly identify a false
confession 55% of the time.
15. Professor Cassell has performed random samplings of criminal cases in efforts to
determine the rate of false confessions. In this random sampling, not a single case
showed any evidence of a false confession.
16. Dr. Ofshe formed an opinion in this case based upon the Defendant's written
confession to police, the testimony of the interrogating detectives from the
hearing for the motion to suppress, the transcript of the preliminary hearing,
transcript of a phone conversation, selected portion of the police report, Detective
Gent's handwritten notes, handwritten notes of Defendant, an interview
conducted with Defendant.

3
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17. Based upon this material, Dr. Ofshe opined that the detectives coerced and
psychologically manipulated Defendant into confessing to a crime he did not
commit.
18. The Cou...-1. finds Dr. Ofshe's opinion to be unreliable.
19. The Court finds the research and conclusions ofProfessor Cassell to be more
reliable.
20. Given the research performed by Dr. Ofshe and Professor Cassell, it is impossible
to estimate with any degree of reliability the rate at which false confessions occur.
21. There is no empirical data or credible research that supports Dr. Ofshe's opinions
regarding false confessions.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has previously ruled that Defendant's confession was voluntary. Dr. Ofshe's
proposed testimony that Defendant's testimony was coerced is a legal conclusion
previously rejected by the Court and invades the fact finding function of the jury.
2. Dr. Ofshe's proposed testimony comments on the reliability or unreliability of the
witnesses. Witness credibility determinations are reserved exclusively for the jury, and
thus violates Utah Rules of Evidence 608(a).
3. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch standard because they are based upon
principles not generally accepted within the scientific community.

4
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4. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch standard because they are not based
upon data gathered through acceptable research methods.
5. Dr. Ofshe's conclusions do not meet the Rimmasch standard because there have been

insufficiet1t studies regarding the area of false confessions to sho\v a large enough sa.111ple
to establish a clear trend over numerous tests.
6. Under Rimmasch and its progeny, Dr. Ofshe's opinions do not meet the inherent reliably
threshold.
7. Because Dr. Ofshe's testimony does not meet the standards set forth in Rimmasch, and
his testimony would comment on the credibility of the witnesses, permitting his
testimony regarding generalities of false confessions violates Utah Rules of Evidence
401.

8. The jury is capable of making determinations of witness credibility and Defense Counsel
has an opportunity to cross examine witnesses regarding the reliability of Defendant's
confession.
9. Because the jury can make these determinations, permitting Dr. Ofshe to testify as to the
characteristics of false confessions and false confessions in general amounts to an
unreliable and irrelevant lecture.
10. Given Dr. Ofshe's impressive credentials, even permitting Dr. Ofshe to speak in
generalities about false confessions creates a danger that his testimony would unduly
influence and invade the jury's exclusive role as fact finder, and thus the prejudicial

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Rules ofEvidence 40 I.

ORDER
Based on the Court's foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court
grants the State's Motion in Limine and hereby prohibits the proposed testimony of Dr.
Richard Ofshe. ·

/1

DATED ~day ofMay, 2010

6
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INSTRUCTION NO.

7~

In some situations, an individual might falsely confess to committing a
crime that was never committed or was committed by someone else. Therefore, a
defendant cannot be convicted solely on the basis of statements made out of court,
without corroborating evidence of the reliability of the statements. It is the duty of the
jury, in evaluating the defendant's statements, to determine for itself whether the
defendant's statements are sufficiently trustwmihy for consideration. The jury must
independently decide what weight, if any, it wishes to give to the defendant's
statements in making its decision.
The jury may consider whether or not the defendant's statements fit or are
consistent with the known facts and circumstances of the crime.
The jury may also consider whether or not the defendant's statements
demonstrate that the defendant had specific personal knowledge of details of the crime
that were not made public or suggested by police, and would not be easily guessed.
The jury may also consider the following factors, or any other factors it
deems appropriate, in determining the credibility of the defendant's statements:
1. Evidence as to the spontaneity of the statement;
2. Whether deception, trick, threats, or promises were used to obtain the
statement;
3.

The defendant's physical and mental condition, including age,. .

cor364
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education, and experience; and
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Februa:z:y 26, 2010

1
2

PROCEEDINGS

3

* * *
THE COURT:

4

All right.

We 1 re back in session.

5

always forget about the court reporter.

6

frantically working.

7

give me a sign.

She 1 s over there

If you need a break, make a signal or

Okay?

8

:MR. HEWARD:

9

THE COURT:

10

I

:MR.. HEWARD:

There is one -Sure.

Go ahead.

There is one issue I 1 d like to address

11

just before M,... Shaw goes into the other motion or some of the

12

other motions.
There was a discussion earlier about Mr. Richards

13
14

having already consulted with Mr. Cole.

15

case.

16

considered.

17

someone who has no notice, no relationship, no allegiance to

18

anyone.

19

representation, that that would not qualify.

And based upon that we would object to Mr. Cole being
I think there needs to be truly independent sides,

And I believe by Mr.

THE COURT:

20

21

Mr. Cole.

:MR.. HEWARD:

23

THE COURT:

25

Okay.

EUc.~ds

making that

Well, let me talk to Mr. Balis and

That might solve the problem.

22

24

Based upon -- on this

Thank you.

Did you want to deal then with the motion

in limine on Mr. Gaskill?
MR. SHAW:

That's fine, your Honor.

Let me also mark
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5

And if I might hand this. to the

1

this if we may as No. 2.

2

court.

3

from counsel dated February 4th, 2010 from James H. Gaskill,

4

consultant in forensic science.

It 1 s Exhibit 1.

5

That is the report that we received

Your Honor, talking with Mr. Richards, my proposal

6

would be that we address our motion in limine as follows:

7

First, I want to address the content of Mr. Gaskill 1 s report

8

generally, and that 1 s why I think it 1 s irrportant to go through

9

this.

And then we recognize in looking at this that

10

Mr. Gaskill is likely going to be qualified to testify to

11

certain

tb~ngs.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. SHAW:

All right.
The problem I have at this jU-"'l.cture

14

primarily is with the way some of these opinions are phrased in

15

this report.

16

testify as to this report reflects in certain circumstances.

17

l'.nd if I might, I would just like to go through the report and

18

point those issues out to the court.

19

And I think it 1 s improper for Mr. Gaskill to

T'ne first paragraph talks about the information that

20

Mr. Gaskill reviewed.

21

investigation leads me to question the accuracy of statements

22

made by several witnesses in this case. "

23

The first sentence after that says, "My

An expert does not get to take the witness stand and

24

start questioning the accuracy of witnesses.

He cannot testify

25

in the fo:r:m. of an expert opinion as to a witness 1 s credibility.
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1

And so we want a very clear instruction relative to that.

2

Mr. Gaskill can tell this court and this jw:y what he 1 s done in

3

investigating this case, he can talk about his qualifications

4

and he can render opinions, but to phrase an opinion in that

5

context is improper.

6

opinion, and it is essentially telling the jurors don't believe

7

these witnesses because I don't.

8

And so that' s our objection, number one.

9

It 1 s an improper characterization of his

And that's clearly improper.

If you look -- if you look down at the second-to-last

10

paragraph on page 1, it says, "Several of the witnesses also

11

claim to have seen the Defe..T'ldant well e..T'lough to recognize 'him

12

and see a gun in his hand.

13

the area's not well lit" -- well light -- well lit it should

14

say.

15

associated with your office," this is talking to Mr. Richards,

16

"on a night similar of the one in question we found it

17

impossible to

18

six feet away, let alone describe a gun in someone' s hand at

19

that distance.

20

This event occurred at night and

"In a reconstruction conducted by me and several persons

distin~Jish

an individual more than five to

n

Again, that opinion is couched in a claim essentially
questioning the credibility of witnesses.

22

opinion saying several witnesses said this, that's improper.

23

Again, that's a characterization of witnesses' testimony.

24

that should not be allowed under any of the rules of evidence.

25

When he phrases

tl-~t

21

And

Again, the next paragraph, one of the cLoceased
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1

victims was shot in the chest as she was running away from the

2

roadway and the second surviving victim was shot in the back

3

while his testimony clearly states he was facing the shooter.

4

Again, Mr. Gaskill is presumably reviewing

5

preliminary hearing testimony and making assumptions which he

6

is prepared to testify about regarding that witness's

7

credibility at the preliminary hearing or at trial.

8

is clearly not the proper realm of an expert witness.

9

And that

Again, now look at the second page, we have more of

10

the same, last sentence, "There are numerous ways this shooting

11

could have happe..11ed but t..'l,e one presented by the

12

seems impossible. "

13

Mr. Gaskill cannot render opinions in that fashion such that he

14

questions credibility of witnesses in his statements in front

15

of that jury.

16

opinion thus and so, but: he cannot attack the witnesses in his

17

statem.e..'""lts.

18

~'litnesses

Again, I just want to make this very clear,

He can say, my investigation leads me to fonn an

And that's our primary objection to

tt~t.

We would -- we would propose to just put

19

Mr. Gaskill -- Mr. Richards may want to respond first, but we

20

would propose to have Mr. Gaskill take the stand and I would

21

like to question t.d.m reg-eliding his resume, CV and some of his

22

qualifications and then readdress the court.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

Why don't we do that, and I can just

24

address it all, or however you want me -- do you want me to

25

address the issue?
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1

THE COURT:

Well, why don' t we have Mr. Gaskill

2

testify so we can get him out of here and have he won't have to

3

spend all day waiting.

I mean, it' s up to you.

4

:MR. RICHARDS:

5

THE COURT:

It doesn't matter to me.

Mr. Gaskill, did anybody notice you've

6

become a T.V. celebrity?

7

weekends he was up at the Gorge.

8

looked really good.

9

10

THE WITNESS:

If you want to know what he does on
That was good, Jim.

Well, not that I saw anybody about

that.

11

THE COURT:

So now he's an expert on fisr..ing too.

12

* * * *

13

JAMES H. GASKILL,

14

cal.led by the State, having been dul.y

15

Swo.:rn, is examined and testifies as follows:

16

* * *
:MR. SHAW:

17

18

Let's offer also Exhibits 1 and 2

fonnally.

19
20

THE COURT:

Any objection?

One is the report.

I

believe No. 2 is his curriculum vitae.

21

MR. RIC'dARDS:

22

THE COURT:

No objection.

I '11 ac:hni t Exhibits P-1 and P-2 .

23

(State's Exhibit Nos. 1 & 2

24

Were received into evidence. )

25

You

I
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1

2

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAW:

3

Q.

Good morning, Mr. Gaskill.

4

A.

Good morning.

5

Q.

State your full name for the record.

6

A.

James H. Gaskill.

7

Q.

How old are you?

8

A.

68.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

A.

CUrrently I'm semi-retired.

Almost 68 .
And can you explain your current occupation?
I have an adjunct

11

professor position at Weber State University, and I do a little

12

consulting.

13

Q.

14

Okay.

Do you have a copy of your resume in front of

you or do you need one?

15

A.

I have one with me.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Do you have one?

18

Q.

I can give you one.

That's a copy of what's been

19

marked as Exhibit 2 in this case, which is your resume, is it

20

not?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

I'm not exactly sure when I last updated it.

24

year or so.

25

Q.

Okay.

And how current is it?
Last

CUrrent within the last year?
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1

A.

Probably.

2

Q.

Okay.

Yeah.

I want to ask you just same ver.y general

3

questions about it and then same specific questions about it.

4

Your education is indicated as a Master of Science in Biology

5

at the University of Utah, right?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Attained in 1970?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You also have a Bachelor of Science Zoology,

10

University of Utah in 1967.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

All right.

Is that correct?

Then you list same specialized training

13

courses in that resume starting in 1971 and then continuing

14

down through 2005.

15

A.

I do.

16

Q.

Okay.

Do you see where I am looking?

And I would like to know specifically in the

17

general sense whether any of these specialized trair..ing

18

courses, and if you recall and can point out specifically which

19

ones, whether or not they dealt with crime scene investigation.

20
21

A.

Virtually all of them dealt with crime scene

investigation.

22

Q.

How do you define crime scene investigation?

23

A.'

I define crime scene investigation as examining what

24

went on in a crime in attempting to reconstruct or detennine

25

what occurred in the commission of that crime.
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1

2

Q.

Okay.

And is crime scene investigation different

than forensics?

3

A.

Crime scene investigation is part of forensics.

4

Q.

How does it differ?

5

A.

I don 1 t, I don 1 t know that we can -- forensic is a

6

very broad ternt.

7

criminal matters, it includes every science from psychiatry to

8

chemistry to physics to biology.

9

evaluate a legal issue from a scientific point of view, that 1 s

10

11

It includes civil matters, it includes

Anytime scientists attempt to

forensics.

Q.

All right.

And specifically what I am interested in

12

is your qualifications because you carry yourself as a

13

forensics scientist, do you not?

14

A.

I

15

Q.

And what I am interested in is the difference that

do.

16

you perceive in this case as a forensic scientist versus the

17

person on the ground at the crime scene.

18

differences?

19

A.

Jl...re t'lere

The person on the crime scene is a forensic

20

scientist.

By definition that 1 s part of the umbrella of

21

forensic scierJ.ce.

22

which he or she only takes photographs, for example, or only

23

collects fingerprints, for example.

24

general knowledge of many areas, so it may take photographs,

25

may collect evidence, may actually conduct examinations,

That po-rson may have a specialized area in

Or that person may have a
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1

chemical or physical examinations on the scene.

2

So the idea that somehow only the person who goes to

3

the crime scene is a crime scene investigator, or only someone

4

who -- doesn't do anything else is a crime scene investigator,

5

many forensic scientists go to an occasional crime scene.

6

go to lots of crime scene.

7

scene, that' s what they

8

anything else.

9

scene investigator from the rest of forensic science.

10

Q.

Many

Sometimes people who go to crime
what they do.

They don' t do

So it's not like we can unentangle that crime

And since you bring that up, when is the last crime

11

scene t.'h.at you investigated or physically appe=..red at during

12

the course of the crime scene investigation itself?

13

words --

In other

14

A.

Well, as I would define that, the last time --

15

Q.

I 'm not asking you to define it.

16

~cifically

17

scene as law enforcement or CSI processing the scene?

18

the last time that happened for you?

I'm asking you when

was the last time you personally were on a crime
When is

A.

January of this year.

20

Q.

January of this year?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

Where -- where and when

23

A.

In fact, it was at the scene of the crime we're

19

24

25

I

~cifically?

discussing today.
Q.

Well, but I 'm talking about when, when law
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1

enforcement is processing the scene, when's the last time you

2

were out on a crime scene contemporaneously with law

3

enforcement as they processed the scene?

4

last for you?

5

That would be quite a few years ago

that I went with law enforcement.

7

enforcement doesn't-- or didn't go with -law enforcement,

8

doesn' t mean I wasn't investigating the crime scene.

10

Q.

stricken.

Just because I went with law

Objection to that response and move that it be
The question was, how many years for you?

11

A.

I don't :know.

12

Q.

I want a ruling, your Honor, first.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SHAW:

15

THE COURT:

16

Q.

17

A.

18
19

20
21

.~.-

I don't know.

6

9

-.

A.

When did that happen

Sustained.

It was not responsive.
I' 11 sustain the objection but

(BY MR. SHAW)

When was the last time for you?

I don't recal.l the last time.

It would have been

several years.

Q.

Several

and several years meaning more than five,

more than 10, more than 15?

A.

Probably, probably five.

I -- it would have been a

22

long time ago because I -- my official capacity has changed in

23

those years.

24

anymore.

25

Q.

So I don't typically go with law enforcement

Okay.

It's true, is it not, that you were relieved
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1

of your duties at the crime lab, former Weber State Crime Lab

2

in 1994 or five?

3

A.

I think that it was -- it may have been '93.

4

Q.

Okay.

I 'm looking at your resume, page 2, where you

5

say, Crime Lab Director Weber State University.

6

correct, 1972 to 1994?

7
8

Yeah, I 1 m saying there may be -- that may be

A.

incorrect.

9

Q.

And so I am

It may be
It may be

1

1

93.

93.

Okay.

While we 1 re on that subject,

10

can you tell me the circumstances of your leaving or of the

11

cri.'Ue lab demise at Weber State?

12

A.

In -- in the early nineties,

1

93,

1

94, somewhere in

13

that time period, t.l-:te Weber State University Crime Laboratory

14

was part of the State Department of Public Safety umbrella,

15

although we were never actually completely affiliated with

16

them.

17

bosses so to speak.

18

how much detail you want.

They didn 1 t control us.

They didn 1 t -- they weren 1 t our

That relationsi".ip dissolved.

I don 1 t know

19

Q.

.P..s much as you recall.

20

A.

Well, it was a pretty big part of my life for several

21

months.

22

relevant to this, but it was a mutual agreement.

23

let the state do all the crime lab work officially, and Weber

24

State would get out of the business.

25

done administratively, and I didn 1 t do it, nor did I object to

I don' t know that everything I recall would be
We agreed to

It was a matter that was
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1

it.

2

stopped doing crime lab work and started full-time teaching.

3
4

But I'd always been a member of the faculty, so I simply

Q.

Was there an event or were there events that

precipitated the crime lab's demise --

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

-- specifically that you recall?

7

A.

Several.

8

Q.

can you tell us what those were?

9

A.

I think they were primarily budgetary.

The state

10

didn't want to fund us adequately.

11

can't continue to

12

And there were some allegations which were never proven or

13

established.

14

Q.

Allegations of misconduct?

15

A.

I think you could say that there were some

~..Jbsidize

And Weber State said we

t.'l-).e operation of t.'l-).e laboratory.

16

allegations of some misconduct and there were some allegations

17

of misconduct is as good a word as a..?J.y, I g'..less .

18

Q.

I 'm sorry.

19

A.

I said misconduct is probably as good a word as any.

20

Q.

Were there also allegations of being incompetent?

21

A.

Not that I know of.

22

Q.

Excuse me?

23

A.

Not -- I was never confronted

24

Q.

Not that involved you?

25

A.

-- with allegations of incompetence, no.

I

didn't hear your answer.
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1

Q.

Not that involved you.

2

A.

I don 1 t know of any that alleged the lab was

3

incorrpetent.

4

Q.

5

Is that fair?

You were responsible, however, for all activities at

the crime lab according to your resume.

Is that correct?

6

A.

That is correct.

7

Q.

And responsible for all personnel at the crime lab,

8

correct?

9

A.

That is correct.

10

Q.

Okay.

I want to go back to page 1 of your resume.
t.~ose

11

You 1 ve indicated that virtually all of

special training

12

seminars would have included same crime scene investigation

13

type instruction.

Is that correct?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Are you able to look at those seminars and tell us

16

specifically what agendas were on each of those at this point

17

in your career?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Do you have any certifications, certificates of

20
21

completion for those specialized training seminars?
A.

I might r.ld.ve a few, but not many.

The FBI Academy

22

training, I probably could produce a certificate.

I could

23

certainly produce a report card that says I passed, but most of

24

t.."lese, there were not certifications generated.

Certification

25

was pretty much a non-issue in the early years.

So we went and
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1

2

we learned and we discussed and we moved on.
Q.

Okay.

So as I understand your testimony then, you

3

might be able to produce one certificate of completion or a

4

report card for that seminar?

5
6
7

8

A.

Yeah, I might be able to.

These are pretty old, and

I'm not one that saves everything .in my life.
Q.

these

Okay.

So you have no agendas, correct, for any of

s~s?

9

A.

That's correct.

10

Q.

You have -- you have one certificate of completion or

11

report card?

12

A.

I think so.

13

Q.

Okay.

And I'm not going to hold you to that.

That' s fine.

You

14

think so.

But have you -- as you s.i t here today,

15

you can't recall the curriculum for these particular seminars

16

from 1971 to 2005 --

17

A.

That's right.

18

Q.

-- or can you?

19

A.

No, I cannot.

20

Q.

I had a question relative to the number of times

21

you've testified.

You indicate on page 2 of the resmne that,

22

again, looking at previous employment, if you want to refer to

23

that with me, you talk about the crime lab director, and I

24

believe the third full sentence or maybe the fourth full

25

sentence you say approximately 2000 cases were processed each
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1

year ranging from misdemeanor to capital homicides.

2

say, "I've testified more than 1500 times in cases from simple

3

drug possession to one which involved Ted Bundy. "

4

me the

5

Mr. Ted Bundy?

~ifics

And you

Can you give

of the case in which you testified involving

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Go ahead.

8

A.

This is a case I believe that the state prosecuted

him for aggravated kidnapping.

9

I'm not sure of the charge.

It

10

involved a young woman who was in a shopping mall in Salt Lake

11

and was confronted by a.'l ;ndividual and a str.1ggle e..'lsued, to

12

make things brief, in which blood was transferred onto this

13

woman 1 s coat.

I typed the blood and subsequently typed the

I

14

blood of Ted Bundy.

15

same, the same blood.

16

Q.

Okay.

Testified in court that they were the

Then again, looking at page 3 of your resume

17

under legal ex:p:=o_rience, you indicate you 1 ve testified more than

18

2000 times.

19

which is it, 1500 times or 2000 times?

20

difference in my view.

21

...

~.

And I'm not, I'm not ti:ying to be nasty here, but
500, that's a lot of

You know, I 1 ve really -- I've tried a couple of times

22

to figure out exactly how many times I've testified.

23

it's -- certainly it's much closer to 2000 than 1500.

24

more than likely more than 2000.

25

Q.

And

It's

Over what period of time?
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1

A.

1971 to the present.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

And your testimony from '72 to '94 would have

been primarily for the state?

4

A.

Primarily but not exclusively.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Okay.

You testified for defense on occasion then?

And in the last, what, 15, 16 years from '94

8

through the present has your testimony been for the state or

9

for the defense primarily?

10

A.

PrObably 50/50.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

Do you keep an ongoing

+-=!.]

ly as to the cases

you've testified in for the state versus the defense?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

You've never kept a record such as that?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

So there's no way to check that?

17

A.

It would be pretty laborious.

18

Q.

No way for counsel to check it certainly, right,

19
20

A lot of courts.

because you haven't kept a record?

A.

I haven' t kept a record.

Courts keep records .

If

21

you wanted to go back to all the courts a.1'1d go through every

22

case, you could figure it out.

23

counties in Utah and testified in Idaho and testified in

24

Wyoming and testified in Nebraska, and so I don't know that

25

there' s any way that realistically you could do that.

But I've testified in 28 of 29
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1

Q.

You could have, of course, kept track?

2

A.

I could have, but I didn 1 t.

3

Q.

Okay.

'·

Now, do you, do you consider yourself to have

4

an area of expertise in forensic science that you consider

5

yourself better trained at than other areas?

6
7

A.

I -- there 1 s same areas that I would think that I 1 m

stronger in than other areas, yes.

8

Q.

Tell me what those are.

9

A.

I don 1 t do any toxicology; that is, analysis of body

10

fluids and tissues for the presence of toxins.

11

hand\'Iriti.."lg compariso!".s.

12

generally forensic science areas.

So those would be two areas +hat are

I think bloodstain analysis, firea.nn.s comparison and

13

14

I don 1 t do

generally trace evidence would be my strongest areas.

15

Q.

Bloodstain, firear.ms and trace evidence?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

Are you a certified associate or member of 14-.FI'E?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

I do.

21

Q.

What is AFTE?

22

A.

Association of Firear.m and Tool Mark Examiners.

23

Q.

Have you ever been certified?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Do you know what it takes to be certified?

You know what AFrE is, right?
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A.

1

No, not offhand.

I think I've looked at those

2

qualifications before, but I've ·never -- I haven't memorized

3

them.

Q.

4
5

Do you teach firearms examination at Weber

State College?

A.

6

7

Okay.

I teach i t as part of a class that I teach.

It's not

a class that we devote the entire semester to, but, yes, I do.

8

Q.

What class specifically?

9

A.

CUrrently it's Criminal Justice 1350.

10

Q.

Criminal Justice 1350?

11

A.

That's correct.

12

Q.

And that aspect of firear.ms training in the context

13

of Criminal Justice 1350 is what percentage of the course?

14

A.

Maybe 15 percent.

15

Q.

15 percent, maybe?

All right.

Do you teach at Weber

16

State presently classes involving the examination of bullet

17

impact on glass?

18
19

A.

I

I deal with that somewhat in the same class, but

again, the class, the upper division classes which I started in

20

which I taught for 30 years, we spent a lot more time then than

21

I do now on an adjunct basis.

22
23

Q.

And is that -- is glass examination part of that

Criminal Justice 1350 or not?

24

A.

It is.

25

Q.

Okay.

And what percentage?
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1

A.

Oh, 5 percent.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Since you add -- since you added, how long ago

since you were a full professor or a retired professor?

4

A.

I am originally retired in 2000.

And then I was

5

hired back for a couple of years.

6

I'm not really sure exactly how that -- I'm not exactly sure

7

what years I stopped being full time and became part time.

8
9

Q.

Over

So I'm thinking 2004, 2005.

the years in your employment at Weber State as a

professor full time, did your teaching of classes relative to

10

criminalistics and criminal justice ever involve, say, more

11

t.~"'l

15 percent delegated to firearms examination or training?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

14
15

Can you tell me what specific classes would

have involved more than that?
A.

The classes that are currently being taught would be

17

Q.

I mean, b-.f you, what you

18

A.

Right.

16

19

I'm saying those classes evolved over the

years.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

So originally there was a class, an upper division

22

class that we called crim.inalistics; about a fourth of that

23

would have been fireanns training.

24

class in which about 50 percent is firearms and tool marks and

25

impressions .

That evolved into now a
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1

Q.

Do you teach that class?

2

A.

Not currently but I have, and I started it.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15

When was the last time that you taught that

class?

A.

Several years ago.

I don't remember exactly what

years I did or did not teach a class.

Q.

Okay.

more than 10?

A.

And I understand.

More than five, though, or

Can you tell me?

Not more than 10, but maybe more than five, maybe

right around five.

Q.

Okay.

N0\'-1 ra"l

you tell me what specific trair.ing you

have relative to reconstruction of a crime scene?

A.

Well, I started my career with the state medical

examiner.

Q.

And let me do this.

Let me do this because I 'm

16

interested to know training relevant to this particular case

17

a."'ld your opir..ions

18

you in your answer.

19

ev~~thing,

20

of this case and the training that you believe supports your

21

opinions.

22

A.

form_~ ~"'l

this case.

Okay?

If tr..a.t helps

I don't, I don't expect you

to go through

just what you've done with regard to reconstruction

Okay.

I

received training at the State Medical

23

Examiner's Office in gunshot wounds and trajectories and

24

general homicide investigation techniques.

25

Q.

When was that?
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1

Sixty-seven through

1

70.

I went to Santa Clair

2

County Laboratory Criminalistics as a research associate.

3

trained there for three months in the summer of 1970.

4

training in all the general areas of crime lab including crime

5

scene investigation, went to crime scenes, went to other

6

laboratories, went to the California State Crime Lab, received

7

training in firea.nns, received training from the people in the

8

Santa Clair County Lab, which included same of the pre-eminent

9

forensic scientists of the day Lo Phong and Alfred Besoy

10

(phonetic), to name two.

11

The..'rl

e\T9..."'Y H me 'tle I

I

Received

d go to a SE!I'.inar I a."ld these are

12

the major seminars that I attended that are on my resumes, then

13

we received additional training, workshops and so forth.

14

as I said before, I can 1 t tell you exactly which one of these.

15

Same of them I might recall but not -- I can 1 t give you

16

specifics.

17
18

19
20
21

-,

A.

Q.

And

So it 1 s been -- it 1 s been a 40-yea.r training.
Okay.

How do you define reconstruction for pw:poses

of your forensic expertise?
A.

Well, reconstruction is when you attempt to after the

fact dei:el:mine things that occurred.
Q.

Okay.

Is it inportant after the fact to base your

22

ultimate reconstruction opinion on evidence, physical evidence

23

found at the scene?

24

A.

Absolutely that 1 s part of it.

25

Q.

Also important to base your opinion on testimony?
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1
2

A.

Everything we can find out about it is what we base

our opinion on.

Q.

3

Okay.

And you've really listed, I guess, in your

4

reports same of the things that you would consider in

5

reconstruction, correct, by listing those eight items at page 1

6

of your report as things you examined in this particular case,

7

right?

8

A.

Right.

9

Q.

Is it also important, though, to fonn an opinion

10

based upon all of those factors, physical evidence, witness

11

testi.'!'.ony, autopsy reports?

12

just came up with opinion randomly, you want to base it on

13

underlying facts and data, correct?

I mean in other words, you don't

14

A.

Exactly.

15

Q.

And you think you've done that in this particular

17

A.

I

do.

18

Q.

I

want to go to your report a little bit.

16

19

case?

Do you

have a copy of that?

20

A.

I do.

21

Q.

You note in your report -- let' s see -- you note in

22

your report at 12 , the big paragraph in the middle of page 1

23

that you have not seen any evidence that the cases, that is the

24

22 caliber cases recovered from the scene were examined for

25

fingerprints, right?
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1

A.

That's what it says.

And at that time I did not have

2

reports from the Weber County CSI.

3

reports.

4

5

Subsequent I received those

That' s what I wanted to know.

Q.

Have you received

those yet?

6

A.

I have.

7

Q.

And you looked at that data?

8

A.

I have.

9

Q.

Do you have any problems with that particular data?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Do you think it was done

12
13
14

campeta~tly

and correctly?

In so far as you can tell from the report at least?
A.

Yeah.

These are all my students.

MR. RICHARDS:

I trust them.

Your Honor, I'm going to object at

15

this point.

16

looking at his qualifications.

17

a practice

18

opportunity to depose, or whatever you want to call it, their

19

expert witnesses.

20

opportunity at this point to do the same with my experts.

21

got the report.

22

can argue the qualifications .

23

credibility rather than qualifications, but I don't want it to

24

at least evolve somehow into cross examination of Mr. Gaskill.

25

My understanding of this hearing is that we are

~Tt'..ir..ation

I don't want this to turn into

of Professor Gaskill.

I don't have that

I don' t think they should have that

They can go through the qualifications .

MR. SHAW:

They
We

Most of it goes to weight or

That's fair.

That's fair enough with
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1

respect to the last question.

2

THE COURT:

But I guess one of the questions that I

3

have, is your motion to preclude him from testifying or just

4

restrict what he testifies?

5

6

MR. SHAW:

Restrict.

made that clear early on.

That's the motion.

7

THE COURT:

8

an expert; you're just saying

9

MR. SHAW:

10

11

Yeah, we -- and I thought I

You're not objecting to him testifying as

Right.
-- you want it limited to what he

THE COURT:
testifies to?

12

MR. SHAW:

Right.

As I reviewed the memorandum we

13

filed in support of our initial motion and then had a further

14

opportu.."li. ty to review this, that's our position.

15

regard to the last question, that's fine.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR.

18

THE COURT:

19

Q.

SH.~:

But with

I '11 strike that.

So I' 11 sustain the objection.
That's fine.

(BY Mt<.. SHAW)

We' 11 sustain your objection.
:VJOving down, though, relative to your

20

report, I do want to know upon what facts and data you relied

21

to detennine as you say in the last paragraph on page 1, "One

22

of the deceased victims was shot in the chest as she was

23

running away from the roadway, and a second surviving victim

24

was shot in the back while his testimony clearly states he was

25

facing the shooter. "
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

And I 'm going to renew my objection.

2

I guess we're getting into his deposition area.

3

that's appropriate in this case in this -Well, I agree this isn't a dry run, but I

THE COURT:

4

don't think

I

5

do want to give you a little leeway on trying to explore the

6

issues as to what he can or can't testify.
MR. SHAW:

7
8

specifically with regard to that statement that he relied on.
MR.. RICHARDS:

9

10

Yeah, I just want to know what facts

Well, would I have an opportunity to

examine all their experts?
Well, I guess you can file a motion in

THE COURT:

11

that's what it is designed for to figure out whether

12

limine

13

or not the witness can testify and if so to what.

14

Go ahead, Mr. Shaw.

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

rather than -~"leo:cy

MR. SHAW:

20

THE COURT:

And so do I.

-- that's why we do the motion is to

figure out where we're going with r.Lis testimony.

22

Q.

23

A.

Do you want to repeat the question?

24

Q.

Yeah.

25

that this is not

a dry run; it's not a mini trial but

19

21

I agree wi ~"1. your

THE COURT:

17

18

These are really trial objections

(BY MR. SHAW)

So go ahead.

Can you answer that question?

What facts and data did you rely upon for the

opinion reflected in your last -- in the last paragraph of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
JAMESMachine-generated
H. GASKILL
- Direct
OCR, may
contain errors.by MR. SHAW

29

1

page 1?

2

A.

The location of the gunshot wounds I relied on the

3

report from the state medical examiner on the deceased victim

4

and medical reports which I received regarding the second

5

surviving victim.

6

testimony of the preliminary hearing testimony from an

7

individual with the deceased who testified they were running

8

away.

9

in fact, facing the roadway and watching the shots being fired.

10

And as far as their position, I relied on

And the second surviving victim testified that he was,

So that 1 s what I relied on.

Q.

11

Okay.

You made same stateme.'1ts on page 2 about the

12

directionality of the glass shatter in the white Cavalier.

13

you recall that?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Can you tell me the facts and data upon which you

Do

16

base your opinion in that the right-rear passenger window of

17

t."le Cavalier was broke.."'l from a shooter shootL'""lg from the inside

18

out?
:MR. RIC"'.dA...'RDS :

19
20

my objection.

21

then he does it.

22

23

Mr. Shaw says, no, I realize I can 1 t do that and

It's a d1:y run of the trial.

THE COURT:

A.

Again, your Honor, I 1 m going to renew

Overruled.

Go ahead.

If you 1 11 allow me to mention the report, I said

24

photos indicate that the hole in the passenger window was made

25

from the inside of the car, not the outside of the car.
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1

may be somewhat of a mischaracterization to say I call i t a

2

bullet hole.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

But, but I relied on the photos --

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

-- for my decision.

7

Q.

Simply photographs, correct?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

photos.

11

exa1nination would be better than photograp1ls?

12

A.

And 40 years of experience.

But what I am asking for is you are looking at

Clearly you would agree, would you not, that on-site

Depends on who is making the examination.

13

certainly prefer to see firsthand.

14

I rather see firsthand than see a photo, of course.

15

Q.

Okay.

I would

If you are asking me would

So there are -- you would agree that there are

16

limitations with regard to photographs being take."l of glass

17

shatters tl'-.Leit may or may not support t.'l-}e opinion?

18

MR. RICHARDS:

19

MR. SF..AW:

20

THE COURT:

21

A.

I renew my objection.

W.:::oil, wait a minute.
Overruled.

T'nat's clearly --

Go ahead.

Certainly you could take, you could take a photograph

22

that wouldn' t show you anything.

You could take a photograph

23

that would be perfectly clear that would, that would answer the

24

question just as well as being there.

25

that are fine.

Photographs can be done

Everyone would agree with that.

If you don't
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I

1

have the window, then you look at what you have.

2

we do as forensic scientists; we look at what we have and we

3

always wish we had more and we always wish we'd been there to

4

see it happen, but we never are, so we have to use what we

5

have.

Q.

6

Okay.

That's what

So do I understand your testimony then

7

relative to that window shatter, is you are not saying that it

8

was a bullet hole?
don't have any evidence that it was a bullet hole.

9

A.

I

10

Q.

Okay.

11

A.

It had to be something travelling very fast.

12

Q.

Okay.

Could have been anything?

And the likelihood is -- I mean are you able

13

to give us a probability as to the likelihood of what could

14

have caused that window shatter other than a bullet?
A.

15

Well, the likelihood is it's a bullet.

What I am

16

saying I don' t have any evidence it was, and I don' t believe

17

a.""ly evide."lce was collected ~~ere by the cri...""ne scene people tr..at

18

establishes that it was a bullet.

19

Q.

A bullet wasn't found, right?

20

A.

Well, unless I get another report that indicates it

22

Q.

We'll stipulate that it wasn't.

23

A.

Okay.

24

Q.

All right.

21

25

was.

So wit."l regard to the glass itself and

photographs, do you also -- do you agree or disagree that -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
JAMES H. GASKILL - Direct by MR. SHAW
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

1

well, strike that.

That' s asked and answered.

Did you have any involvement with the reconstruction

2
3

animation that defense counsel has provided us a week or 10

4

days ago, whenever it was?

5

I consul ted with them.

A.

I didn't have anything to do

6

with the actual making it, but I consulted with them, the

7

individual who prepared it.
Okay.

8

Q.

9

production?

10

But you had nothing to do with its actual

That' s correct.

A.

We met a couple of times and we

11

talked it over, a."ld I told him w:P.at I t.lLought.

12

proceed-Ad to make it.

13

Okay.

Q.

Jl..nd he

What about the videotape of the scene I

14

believe in January, early Janua....-y, did you have anything to do

15

with that?

16

A.

17

an obseJ:Ver.

18

Q.

19

I was there, but I did not operate the camera.

I was

You have no knowledge as to. the hilux capabilities of

the camera that was used?

20

A.

No, I don't.

21

Q.

Okay.

In your forensic expertise do you know wheb..,_er

22

or not lux capability of a camera

23

MR. RICHARDS=

24

MR. SF..AW:

25

MR. RICHARDS=

Your Honor --

Well, wait a minute.

This is --

Can I make an objection before he

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
OCR, -mayDirect
contain errors.by MR. SHAW
JAMESMachine-generated
H. GASKILL

33

1

argues?

2
3

THE COURT:
we?

4
5

I'd like a standing objection if you are going to overrule me.
THE COURT:
like.

We' 11 make a standing objection if you'd

There really wasn't a question other than --

8

MR. RICHARDS:

Well, it's the series of questions

9

that's been going on and on and on.

10

of them, and I guess I'm overruled.

11
12

THE COURT:
Q.

(BY MR. SHAW)

And I move to strike all

We'll note the objection.
You're a forensic scientist.

You've

13

had experience with photograph and video in your 40 years,

14

right?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

And do you agree that the lux capability of a video

17

camera, or still camera for that matter, can determine the

18

outcome on what is seen on videotape?

19

A.

Sure.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

22

J

I 'd like to renew my objection, and

MR. RICHARDS:

6
7

We don't know what the question is, do

And you didn' t have anything to do with the

production of that video?
A.

I was there and we all discussed how we were going to

23

set this up, where should the vehicle be, etcetera, etcetera,

24

and where should the camera be etcetera, etcetera.

25

operate the camera, but I stood a few feet away from it as the
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1

video was prepared.
Q.

2

Okay.

Was made.

Did you participate in assessing the

3

climatological data on the evening that the videotape was taken

4

such that it could have reflected or should have reflected what

5

was occurring climatologically on August 5th, 2007?
A.

6

I did not determine any of that climatological data

7

other than to ask is this the same moon phase, etcetera.

8

asked questions, but I did not make determinations.
Q.

9

10

So, and you asked whether or not moon phase

was the same but nothing else?
A.

11
12

Okay.

So I

snowing?

13

Q.

I asked about the weather.

Was it

Obviously it wasn't snowing but
Yeah.

Okay.

That's all.
Mr. Richards, any questions?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

can short circuit this.

17

in any area,

18

Was it rair..i.."'l.g?

~"ld

Yeah, I 've just a couple.

And maybe I

Are you saying that he's not qualified

if you are, t..'lj,e."'l. I '11 address those areas.

MR. SHAW:

No.

I've told the court very clearly that

think Mr. Gaskill can testify on certain areas regarding

19

I

20

firearms.

21

things.

22

creclibili ty or phrase his opinion so that it affects a jury's

23

determination as to the credibility of the witness.

24

jury question.

25

He can probably talk about glass, those kinds of
But, but I don 1 t think he can testify regarding the

That 1 s a

That 1 s what I object to.

MR. RICHARDS:

That's the only issue we're discussing
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1

at this point then?

2

MR. SHAW:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

Because then I don 1 t have any questions.
At this point, yes.
Okay.

All right.
At a later point, I mean do I need to

ask other questions?
MR. SHAW:

7

Well, we need the court 1 s ruling on my

8

view of his report and some direction from the court.

9

can address it further if we need to.

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE COL'IRT:

12

Do you \i'a."lt to have 1'-..im

excused then at this time?
MR. SHAW:

14

MR. RICHARDS:

Sure.
Well, could I have him stay for just a

minute just in case something else arises?

16

THE COURT:

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

I don 1 t have any questions then.

All right.

13

15

Then I

Okay.

So you want to step down?

This one is yours .

All right.

So any other evidence on this

issue?

20

MR. SHAW:

No, your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. SHAW:

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. RICHARDS:

Is there any argument on the matter or -I think I 1 Ve argued it sufficiently.
I 1 d like to argue.

Sure.

Go ahead.

I guess as I understand the State 1 s
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1

objection or problem to Professor Gaskill's testimony is the

2

way that he phrases things.

3

can observe people to testify, he can read reports of testimony

4

and then he can opine it given the facts on the ground, and I 'm

5

able to determine I don' t believe that it could have happened

6

the way the witness says that it happened.

7

experts, CSI individuals testify to, they do it all the time.

8

Let me give you a couple of examples.

9

I believe that an expert witness

That' s what

If an individual defendant, let's say, says I have

10

never touched that gun and, therefore, I didn 1 t shoot the

11

p=>-rson, if the CSI individ"P=- 1 then testifies, a"l ex,pc-._rt, he can

12

say, well, that couldn't be correct because I have his

13

fingerprint on the trigger.

14

That's what experts do.

If an individual comes in in a personal injury case

15

and says I complain of pain somewhere in my body, an expert

16

witness physician can get up and testify, well, I've looked at

17

all t..'l-te reports, we 1 ve done the x-rays, we don 1 t see any

18

evidence that would cause that kind of pain, so I diSJPUte that

19

he has pain.

20

experts do.

21

I

mean, those are the kinds of things that

He c•ai"l certainly say I've done wr1ate-ver groundwork

22

regarding the lighting.

That's one of the items that counsel

23

brought up.

24

than five feet.

25

30 or 40 or 50 feet away, he could say, well, that would be

The knife, I can say a person could not see more
And if this person is saying he saw something
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That is something experts do.

1

impossible.

2

hire them to do.

And that's what we

3

I -- sometimes we get into semantics, I guess, but I

4

think an expert can say I 've heard the testimony and the facts

5

on the ground would suggest that's the way the witness

6

testified would be impossible.

I think he can do that.

7

I would sul:mi t it with that.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SHAW:

10
11

12

THE COURT:

All right.

Anything else, Mr. Shaw?

Do I need to further respond, I guess?
If you want to, you can.

I don' t know if

,..,.,.. ................
,.....,..,. ....
you wanted to ....,_
MR. SHAW:

I think I made a record clearly enough at

13

the beginning of what the State' s position is.

14

wholly inproper for an expert to opine regarding credibility

15

and make statements like I question the accuracy of witnesses.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SHAW:

18

THE COURT:

I think it's

Okay.

It's what it com.es down to.
I think I 'm ready to rule.

T"nese are

19

difficult because you are dealing with part of the case.

20

don't know how the witness is going to shake out, what the

21

witnesses are going to say.

22

You

So having said that, obviously, you know, the defense

23

has to lay a foundation as to Mr. Gaskill' s qualifications and

24

what he did and everything, but some of this I think goes more

25

to weight than admissibility.

You know, experts are always
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1

called to give an opinion based on their examination of the

2

crime scene or reconstruction.

3

right.

Sometimes it's very difficult to reconstruct a crime

4

scene.

And again, that all goes to the weight of the evidence.

5

The scene may be very different when Mr. Gaskill went there

6

than when it actually happened.

7

all goes to the weight and let the jury decide whether or not

8

he really observed the same thing that the witnesses observed

9

at the time of the events.

10

They may or may not have it

I don't know.

But again, this

But I mean, I don't think there's any question he can
t.~t

11

testify

12

were such and such, and based on his observation, it would have

13

been impossible to see somebody five feet away or whatever.

14

But again, it may not

15

the eyewitnesses.

16

he -vre.."lt there at r'.ight, t.lJ.e lighting conditions

r~ve

been the same for him as it was for

I don't know.

I think he can testify based on his examination, you
t.~e

17

know, somebody in his opinion was shot in

back or shot in

18

the stomach or shot in the front, or whatever.

19

about the angle of the shots.

20

photographs and not seeing evidence of residue or whatever.

He can talk

He can talk about looking at the

21

I guess I kind of agree with both of you.

22

think even as an expert on that opinion, I don't think he can

23

say based on my examination I don't find these witnesses to be

24

credible.

25

he can say that based on my examination, you know, this gun was

I don't think he

ca...""l

say that.

I don't

I do think, however,
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1

fired from a particular position or an angle and that' s in

2

conflict with what some of the witnesses testified to.

3

So I do think he can testify that based on his

4

examination he doesn't agree with the conclusion that was

5

reached by some of the witnesses, assuming they testify

6

differently than he does.

7

can' t get in the business of talking about credibility, that

8

this witness isn't credible.

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICU.J.\RDS:

12

THE COURT:

But I also agree with the State, he

So

Okay.

All right.

So that' s my ruling.

J1..ll right.

Like I say, sometimes these things change

13

as the trial goes on and the witnesses testify differently than

14

what we thought.

15

the motion in limini as to this issue of credibility, but deny

16

the motion in limine to preclude James Gaskill from testifying.

So I guess what I am going to do, I' 11 grant

MR. P.ICHF>.RDS:

17

But you

a..."'"e

allowing him to say that

18

my examination of the evidence is in conflict with my

19

witnesses' statements?

20

THE COURT:

21 1 forward.

Otherwise, why would you put on an expert?

22
23

I the

Assuming that's the evidence that comes

whole reason for an expert

.

~s

That's

to say my opinion is

different than somebody else' s testimony.

24

MR. RICHARDS :

25

THE COURT:

Perfect.

All right.

Thank you.

Anything else on that issue?
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1

Did you want to have Mr. Gaskill excused then?

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. SHAW:

5

Yeah, we can have him excused.

Are you all right with that, Mr. Shaw?
Yes , your Honor.

(This portion of the motion was concluded. )

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22

23
24
25
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1

break, the same as if it were presented now?

2

okay?

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

That's fine.

Okay.

Would that be

I can do that.

All right.

Do you want to call

your first witness then?

6

MR. SHAW:

7

THE COURT:

We need to approach the bench, Your Honor.
Okay.

(Whereupon a conference was held at the bench. )

8
9

THE COURT:

All right.

Members of the jury, we need

10

to take up a matter out of your presence.

11

with the bailiff and give you just another short recess.

12

should just take a few minutes.

13

It

(TI-...e following proceedirtgs were rteld in open court after the
jury left the courtroan. )

14
15
16

So if you will go

THE COURT:

You may be seated.

Let's have the record

reflect that the jury is not present.

17

Do you want to deal with your first motion first?

18

MR. RICHARDS:

I would, Your Honor.

And at this

19

juncture the defense would move to dismiss the case, Your

20

Honor.

21

heard the evidence.

22

And I will make some brief arguments.

I know you have

I just want to make several points.

Number one is the CSI evidence that actually ties my

23

client to this.

We don't have fingerprints.

We don't have a

24

gunpowder residue test.

25

it to him versus anybody else either in the SUV or elsewhere.

We have no CSI information that ties
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So now we're left down to statements.

1

And we have

2

statements from Sarah which is internally inconsistent, Sarah

3

Valencia.

4

other witnesses, that far away.

5

actually puts the gun in his hand.

6

heard his testimony.

7

where

8

which is a stretch.

9

shooting, whether he is Bhooting in the air or not.

She certainly couldn't see according to all the
She is the only one that
We have Christopher and you

That again, he's inside the car can't see

where Riqo is, assuming you believe his testimony;
You -- he doesn't see where he is

You have Angelo, also -- if you believe his testimony

10
11

or not, interesting call.

12

whether Riqo is shooting in the air if, in fact, he is.

In

13

Riqo 's testimony -- well, at least his statement that

have

14

is that he was shooting in the air.

15

saw Riqo didn't a gun.

a prima facia case to go forward.
THE COURT:

18

19

\·le

Dominique clearly said she

So when you boil it down to that, there is certainly

16
17

But he never sees the shooting,

All right.

We ask the Court to dismiss.
State want to be heard on

that?
Briefly, Your Honor.

20

MR. SHAW:

21

Sarah Valencia, Elias Christopher, and Angelo

22

Gallegos all say the Defendant was the shooter, all say the

23

Defendant was shooting while leaning up over the right front

24

passenger side of the car through the window, out the window,

25

out the door, standing on the floor somehow leaning and
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1

pointing and shooting at the direction of the party.

2

Keri Garcia also testified she doesn't identify the

3

shooter.

4

the right front passenger seat.

5

the scene, contrary to what counsel says, puts the shooter in a

6

location that would allow for those bullet -- or excuse me, the

7

.22 casings to be recovered in the roadway from a location

8

having been shot from that vehicle.

9

Court to enter into the :iury' s province.

10

Lacey Randall also testified the that shooter was in
The CSI physical evidence at

Counsel is asking this
And we would ask the

Court to deny the motion.
All right.

11

THE COURT:

12

Anything else, Mr. Richards?

13

MR.. RICHARDS:

14

THE COURT:

Submit

Nope.

All right.

~

.....

.LL...

I think Mr. Shaw just pointed

15

out the question of the credibility of witnesses, of course, is

16

for the jury.

17

believe a particular witness who testifies.

18

based on the testimony that the Court's heard clearly there is

19

enough evidence for this case to go to the jury.

20

deny your motion to dismiss.

21

That's their job to decide whether or not they

Now we have another matter that we wanted to take up
out of the presence of the jury.

23

Mr. Gaskill's testimony is that--

25

And so I'll

All right.

22

24

It seems to me

MR. LYON:

I guess, concerning

Your Honor, the State has prepared a trial

brief for the Court and for counsel.

We would at this time
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\!

1

make a motion to exclude Mr. Gaskill.

2

please.
If the Court would like a moment to read through the

3
4

brief that's fine.
THE COURT:

5
6

MR. LYON:

8

while we argue this.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. LYON:

11

THE COURT:

13

It's a little bit lengthy.
It's 15 pages.

Why don't you at least

tell me what your position is or what the issue is.

7

12

So we can argue this,

minutes.

The State would like Mr. Gaskill excluded

You want him to leave the courtroom?
That's correct.
Can we do that then for just a few

If you' 11 wait outside.
MR. LYON:

Your Honor, the defense has given us, we

14

received on Friday morning when we came into court there were a

15

number of videos that were given to us.

16

computer animations that are -- what appears to be

17

reconstructions, according to Mr. Gaskill, of the crime scene

18

and how these events took place.

19

Some of these are

The second issue is of what appears to be a homemade

20

video of the defense counsel and Mr. Gaskill and members of the

21

defense team.

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

MR. LYON:

We are not going to use that one.

Okay.
Yeah.

The homemade we're not.

Then I guess we just have to talk about
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1

the computer animation.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. LYON:

Okay.
As well, there is numerous photographs

4

that the defense counsel has provided to us, I think, on

5

Wednesday that we would also like excluded.

6

can just address first the computer animation then I' 11 be

7

happy to talk about the photographs.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LYON:

If the Court

I

Okay.
As we note in our brief, Your Honor,

10

citing AR,

"Computer generated animation is a powerful

11

evidentiary tool that must be used with great care because it's

12

of dramatic power.

13

scrutinized for proper foundation, relevance, accuracy, and the

14

potential for undue prejudice."

Animation then must be carefully

15

And that's really the standard that we would like the

16

court to take in looking to see whether this computer animation

17

starts to even approximate what has taken place.

18

State's position that --based upon the testimony that we have

19

heard in this court from these witnesses, that the computer

20

animation doesn't even start to approximate what we've heard.

21

It's the

Mr. Gaskill has obviously read police reports and

22

some witness statements and he's put together a computer

23

animation that in essence shows a second and a third shooter.

24

One of the shooters would be back in the carport area right

25

back in --and I'm referring to State's Exhibit No. 2,
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1

somewhere around this vicinity in front of the blue van and

2

silver car.

3

be inside the Chevy Cavalier.

4

would be helpful to the Court to take a look at this first and

5

so you know what we're talking about.

There is also another shooter that's depicted to

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. LYON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. LYON:

The animation

and maybe it

How long is it going to take?
I think they are about 30 seconds each.
The animation is 30 seconds?
Yes.
Do we have that here?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICHARDS:

12

MR. LYON:

Yes.

Do you want me to look at it?

We have looked at it.

I'm just saying

13

would it be helpful for the Court to look at it or would you

14

like me to just explain it?

15

THE COURT:

Well, you know, the whole problem is just

16

exactly what I have been fearing.

17

of 10 people waiting and here we are doing things that I think

18

should have been done before the trial.

19

blaming you, Mr. Lyon, but this is what I always worry about.

20

We get in the middle of trial and now we ask the jury to go sit

21

and twiddle their thumbs while we decide whether to admit

22

evidence or not.

23

24

MR. LYON:

You know, you've got a jury

I'm not necessarily

And for the record, we received this on

Friday.

)

25

THE COURT:

I guess that's my biggest concern,
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1

Mr. Richards.

Is that true?

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

MR. LYON:

No.

When did you give it to the prosecution?
I believe

Your Honor, we have looked at a previous

6

version over at Mr. Richard's office a few weeks ago.

7

indicated that things were going to be changing.

8

the final version until Friday.

9
10

THE COURT:

one you saw a couple weeks ago?
MR. RICHARDS:

12

MR. HEWARD:

And the only -I'm sorry.

May I make the record

because I'm the one who received it?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. HEWARD:

16

walked in 7:45 Friday morning.

17

where I sit a stack of disks, 7:45 last Friday.

18
19
20

He didn't get

So is this one different though than the

11

13

He

THE COURT:

you saw before?

All right.
When we walked into this courtroom -- I

Okay.

Mr. Richards had sitting at

And is it different than the one

I mean, I guess that's my question.

MR. RICHARDS:

The only difference, Your Honor,

is

21

that the -- there is an additional car out front, based upon

22

what information we had and a couple of the models, or whatever

23

you want to call them, people in the thing have blue clothing

24

on and dark hair rather than white everything.

25

difference.

That's the only
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1

2

Let me ask:

THE COURT:

though that's got to leave tomorrow?

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. LYON:

So here we are -- what do we do wait

Well this will just take a moment, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

8
9

Yes.

until Thursday now to

6
7

Is Mr. Gaskill the witness

Well, it may be a moment to look at it

but it may take longer than that for me to decide whether or

10

not this comes in.

That's what I -- I mean, you are just

11

literally dumping this in my lap in the middle of the trial.

12

And I know sometimes that can't be avoided but, boy, I don't

13

understand why this wasn't taken care of before we started the

14

trial like all the other motions.

15

this jury to just sit and wait while we try to sort through

16

this kind of thing.

I don't think you can expect

To me the issue is much bigger than just looking at

17

18

30-soundbite or, you know, recreation of the scene.

19

I'm going to have to look at this and decide whether it comes

20

in or not.

21

think.

22
23

So where do we go?

MR. LYON:

Obviously,

Kind of put me in a box, here I

Well, if Your Honor would like to look at

it we would like to just show Your Honor.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. LYON:

Okay.

Go ahead really quickly.

And then we would like to argue it.
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1

just bring it up to the Judge.

2
3

MR. RICHARDS:

Here is the two -- here is the two

that are really -- Oh, you got it.

4
5

We have all seen this.

THE COURT:

Okay.

What we are about to see, is this the

most recent animation?

6

MR. LYON:

7

THE COURT:

That's correct.
Okay.

(Whereupon the Judge views the animation.)

8
9

THE COURT:

That's it.

All right.

So I guess we

10

should have the record reflect that you've shown me two

11

different, I guess animations.

MR. LYON:

12

Is that right?

That's right.

Two different animations.

13

One of them is marked as defense.

14

an aerial view of the crime scene showing different shooters.

15

The second video is what's labeled by the defense as "shooter's

16

view."

17

believe to be the shooter in the carport facing north out

18

towards 1050.

19

And it's

THE COURT:

It's the aerial view-- it's

shows from the perspective of who they

All right.

And how does this differ than

20

the one you received some time ago?

21

showed me were the ones you received on Friday, right?

22

MR. LYON:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

I assume the ones you just

That's correct.
How does that differ than the one you

received earlier?
MR. LYON:

It's mostly the same.

There is some minor
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1

differences as far as they've changed -- they put a vehicle in

2

front of that blue truck out front.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. LYON:

Okay.
And I think that they've tweaked a little

5

bit, I think, some of the trajectory of the bullets.

6

honest with you, Your Honor, I've watched it once at

7

Mr. Richard's office.

8

making changes and that's when it was brought here.

9

remember
THE COURT:

10
11

MR. LYON:

13

THE COURT:

I don't

And Mr. Richards what are the

-- all the differences ..
-- between the one you got some time ago

and the one you've got here?
MR. RICHARDS:

15
16

He indicated they were going to be

differences --

12

14

To be

There are two differences.

One is

that the white -- well, there is a car out front.
Okay.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. RICHARDS:

Which would be the pick-up truck, the

19

blue pick-up truck.

20

to that.

21

girls in blue, it used to be white dresses.

22

of having dark, which is what they have, it used to be white

23

hair.

24
25

Because there were witnesses who testified

Second, is the two at the very end of the -- the two
And then instead

So those are two differences.
THE COURT:

All right.

So just for the record, you

supplied that to the prosecution when?

The first time when
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1

Mr. Heward is

2

3

MR. RICHARDS:

was the first or second Monday in February, as I recall.
So early February?

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

exactly when date was.
THE COURT:

7

8

All right.

MR. HEWARD:

Yes, February one.

Honor, he showed it to us at that time.

THE

CO~~T:

Okay.

When did you pick it up, do you

know?
MR. HEWARD:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. RICHARDS:

I didn't pick it up.
You never did or -We had it there, but I don't know if

they had a -So you've had a chance to look at it in

19

THE COURT:

20

early February, the State did.

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

THE COURT:

23

They carne to my

We didn't pick it up at that time, Your

15

18

So you sent that over or

office at 9:30.

13

14

But I'm not sure

But I think it was

MR. RICHARDS:

11

12

That was -- yeah.

Mr. Heward went over to pick that up in early February?

9
10

Just looking at my calendar I think it

February 1.

And then you have made the most recent on

February the 12th available to the prosecution?

24

MR. HEWARD:

25

MR. RICHARDS:

No.

The most recent was last Friday.

It was Friday.
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Oh, last Friday.

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

I mean,

nominal changes.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. HEWARD:

6

That had the two changes.

Well, last Friday the 12th.
But not February, the 12th of March.

All right.

7

MR. SHAW:

8

MS. SIPES:

9

MR. SHAW:

Can I step in as long as everyone else is.
I'm not.
Well, I just want to -- I just want to

10

show Mr. Richards, I got a defendant's response to a motion for

11

reciprocal discovery on February 19th.

12

video and these animations, the rough animation, came on that

13

day February 19th.

14

MR. RICHARDS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17

THE COURT:

18

And that's when the

February 19th.

So February 19th?
A month ago.

And then the last one was March 12th,

right?

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SHAW:

Yes.

So the State's position is what?
The State's position is there is not a

22

foundation to show these videos.

23

taken a look at these.

24

shooter from the Cavalier.

25

evidence presented in this court to suggest that there are

When --Your Honor has just

It shows a shooter from the carport, a
There has been absolutely no
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1

there is a second shooter back in the carport or in the

2

Cavalier.

3

The testimony is all to the contrary.

Every witness

4

that's taken the stand has testified that they only saw one

5

shooter.

6

We have asked specifically, Lacey Randall, Keri Garcia, Sarah

7

Valencia, Richard Esquivel, they all say there was no one

8

shooting back from the home.

9

One shooter only and that was from the maroon Denali.

Lacey Randall was leaning up against her Cavalier for

10

an hour and testified that no one was inside that vehicle, yet

11

they want to somehow put a shooter inside of that vehicle.

12

mean, she testified she was standing up against that car until

13

she got pulled down.

14

I

There is absolutely no one that's going to be

15

testifying that there was any sort of shooting coming from that

16

backside of the home.

17

they show the shots coming from that shooter view.

18

example, the shot that I'm assuming is Sabrina Prieto, the

19

shooter is standing directly in front of Ms. Prieto, she comes

20

running by and the shot comes, enters perpendicularly into her

21

chest.

22

shooter was firing.

23

in order for the trajectory that bullet traveled inside of

24

Ms. Prieto that that individual would have had to have been

25

standing above her or she would have to have been ducking down.

Also, when you look at the animation
For

There is no slope whatsoever to the angle in which the
The medical examiner has testified
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1

That video doesn't depict anything like that.
The same thing goes for Mr. Nevarez's.

2

Which gets

3

into rule 702B.

4

requirements in order for expert testimony to be admitted into

5

a court before a jury.

6

report, the autopsy reports, that Mr. Gaskill had that he

7

relied upon in making his expert opinion and in creating

8

computer animation is completely wrong.

9

i t ' s - - he arrives at these gross errors and he wants to

10

As Your Honor knows there are the three

The -- again, the testimony or the

I mean, it's

present that to the jury as if that's the way it is.

11

The reality is, the medical examiner has already

12

testified that it's completely contrary to the evidence.

13

he is trying to put forward to the jury is completely in

14

contradiction to the evidence that's been presented in this

15

court.

16

and obviously has not applied this

17

he -- this, I guess, science.

He obviously hasn't relied on sufficient facts and data
the information to what

Additionally, the witnesses haven't

18

What

have testified

what's depicted in this animation is completely

19

that the

20

contrary to that.

21

sort of foundational testimony that there was another shooter

22

in the back.

23

hearsay statements.

24

something in a police report that, obviously, made him think,

25

well, there might have been a second shooter.

There is absolutely no one to put on any

Mr. Gaskill can't just come in and rely upon
Now, he might have read some statement or
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The problem is what's before the Court is that there

1

2

is not a second shooter.

3

statements to put forth his opinion.

4

for that.·

5

THE COURT:

He can't come in and rely on hearsay
So there is no foundation

Didn't we have a hearing though on

6

whether or not Mr. Gaskill could testify?

7

this several weeks ago.

8

9
10

MR. LYON:

I thought we did

Well, we had some preliminary questions

about Mr. Gaskill we didn't have anything specific about these
videos.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LYON:

Right and I understand that.
Apparently we have been requesting who

who is going to lay the proper foundation for these

13

this

14

videos and we have yet to hear who is going to be laying that

15

foundation.
THE COURT:

16
17

18

You said something about photographs,

too.
MR. LYON:

There is some photographs that we

19

received, for the record, on -- would be last Wednesday would

20

be the 10, I believe.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. LYON:

Okay.
These photographs were -- I'm not sure who

23

has taken them.

24

have parked a big truck -- I'm not quite a truck expert; it

25

looks like some sort of large Ford 350 -- about where the blue

But they've gone out to the crime screen they
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1

truck would be.

2

pictures from -- looks like standing on top of a car or

3

something which would be for Your Honor somewhere around in

4

here in front of this blue truck referring to State's Exhibit

5

No. 3 going back -- looking back towards the Nava horne.

6

The problem with these photos is -- I mean, the

7

photos show Mr. Richards and I think it's Mr. Gaskill --you

8

can just see the tops of their heads.

9

no -- there no one going to be -- going to be able to lay

There is absolutely

10

foundation as to -- that these photo correctly and accurately

11

depict what the individual inside that SUV would have been

12

seeing.

13

14

THE COURT:

photographs also?

All right.

So you are objecting

Do you know how many there are?

15

MR. LYON:

16

Do you have copies for us?

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20
21

22

--

They then trying to take -- they've taken

I don't know.

Yeah.

How many are there?
The ones they are complaining about I

think, there are two.
THE CLERK:

I just marked from 9 to 27.

So I guess

that would be 18.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE CLERK:

Well, there is

Nineteen.

--

There would be --

They are numbered.

Oh, you

,:-''

25

you know what?

You skipped 18.

So this it 18.
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

Yeah.

2

there is another four or five.

3

THE COURT:

4

you want to put on the record.

5

I think, on this, too.

6

MR. LYON:

All right.

See there was two and then

Mr. Lyon, anything else that
We can hear from Mr. Richards,

Well, I guess, in summary, Your Honor,

7

there is not an adequate foundation for this to come before the

8

jury.

9

animation isn't based upon sufficient facts and isn't reliably

10

Mr. Gaskill's animation and these pictures or --his

applied and therefore can't come in as expert testimony.

11

THE COURT:

12

Mr. Richards.

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14

I haven't had a chance to read the State's brief on

All right.

Just briefly.

15

this.

16

We have given them this copy of this video.

17

were a couple of minor changes after Mr. Gaskill viewed it.

18

asked that those be done.

19

February that those changes were corning and I specifically told

20

them what the changes would be.

21

forever to produce it.

22

gave -- the next day I gave it to counsel.

23

I got it the exact same moment you did 10 minutes ago.
As I say, there
He

I told counsel on the first of

And it took our video person

The moment it -- the day I got it I

The foundation is going to be laid through

24

Mr. Gaskill.

25

listened to the evidence.

He is going to get up and testify that he's
He's listened to all of the -- you
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1

know, read through the transcripts.

2

witnesses statements.

3

together this reconstruction video.

4

videos are done.

He's read all the

And based upon all of those he's put
That's how reconstruction

That's how they are always done.

If I point the Court to State versus Hodge, which is

5

is out of

6

a 008 case 196 Pacific 3rd 124 where the State

7

Ogden hereby, too, by the way.

8

well aware of video reconstructions.

9

versus Hodge, the police produced a reconstruction video and

I did the appeal.

I'm very

In that case, State

10

that was introduced over the defendant's objection.

11

was produced and the victim testified, well -- as the video was

12

being played as to what she thought had happened.

13

not unusual.

The video

So that's

These are done all the time.

14

As far as getting it at the late day, I would remind

15

the Court that we received such a huge stack of information at

16

a late date that it's not even comparable to how much we have

17

given them.

18

Duran, he records that testimony doesn't tell anybody about it,

19

and, no, he didn't tell counsel about it.

20

long ago.

21

That critical tape

22

all of their stuff we get the Wednesday before trial begins.

23

And I know it's not counsel's fault so I want to be very clear

24

I'm not complaining about them.

25

didn't give it to them.

We -- get this.

The recording that Gent did with

That was produced so

We get that on the Wednesday before trial begins.
the only tape recorded conversation of

It's apparently Gent that
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1

We get information -- well, Wakefield testifies about

2

the gun.

3

of things and the Court let that in.

4

We had no knowledge about the -- all of those types

As far as this being accurate, I think the evidence

5

clearly would indicate that it is very accurate.

6

the car was moving; that's important.

7

the gun would have -- had to have been stationary for it to

8

give out the casing patterns.

Number one,

Wakefield testifies that

Yet the Court allowed that in.

So I think that there is no question that we have

9

10

provided this information to them.

11

object to it.

12

the foundation, how he came up with this.

13

it, if they think it doesn't adequately represent they can

14

certainly cross-examine him as long as they want.

Professor Gaskill is going to talk about all of

THE COURT:

15

They have plenty of time to

If they don't like

Let me just ask, Mr. Richards:

16

the relevance of the photographs?

17

what is it you are going to testify to concerning
MR. RICHARDS:

18
19

What is your theory?

Or

What he is going to say, Your Honor,

is if -MR. LYON:

20

21

What is

Your Honor, we would like you to look at

these photographs.
All right.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RICHARDS:

Let me

I've got a copy for the

Most of the photographs in that stack are ones that the

24

Court.

25

State produced in their discovery so they were taken at the
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1
2

scene.
What they are going to testify to on some of the

3

photographs, the ones of the pick-up truck that were put there,

4

that according to Mr. Gaskill -- Professor Gaskill, the person

5

to produce this kind of a pattern of bullet casings, would have

6

had to have been stationary here.

7

testify to is if we take a line from where it would have to be

8

stationary to where the bodies -- where the people were at that

9

were shot, Mr. Nava and Mr. Esquivel, that they would have had

And what he is going to

10

to have gone right through the cab of that truck.

11

thing he is going to testify to.

That's one

12

The other one which are -- also just trajectory and

13

these are very recent of out the front window where that ends

14

up and he'll testify about that.

15

bullet either way, that would be the angle for it.

16

that's really what those pictures show.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. RICHARDS:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. LYON:

21

All right.

If you were to follow the
And so

Anything else?

That's all I have.

State want any response?
Yes, Your Honor.

Has Your Honor had a

chance to look at those photos?

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. LYON:

I have.
First as to the animation, Your Honor,

24

again, going back to foundation, this was one of the questions

25

asked by Mr. Shaw in the hearing with Mr. Gaskill on
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1

February 26th, page 33, line two.

2

involvement in the reconstruction animation that defense

3

counsel has provid~d us a week or 10 days ago, whenever it

4

was?"

5

Answer:

"Did you have any

"I consulted with them.

6

anything to do with the actual making of it.

7

him, the individual who prepared it."

8
9

I didn't have
I consulted with

He hasn't even been in the process of creating this
video.

He was going to be laying the foundation for that.

10

Additionally-- again, it's 403, whatever minimal relevance

11

this video has it's outweighed by prejudicial value.

12

these photos, I mean, here again, Your Honor, this is

13

misleading stuff.

14

This is completely misleading to say that this is what the

15

individual in that Denali would have looked like.

16

trying to put this -- recreate a crime scene and without anyone

17

laying proper foundation that this is what the view would have

18

been like, this is how large the truck would have been.

19

is completely misleading information, Your Honor.

20

one that can lay a foundation that this is an accurate

21

representation of the crime scene as it was.

22

As to

We're looking at page 12 of their photos.

This is --

This

There is no

And as to the impossibility of shooting over a truck,

23

we don't know how big that truck was at the scene relative to

24

what's here.

25

that these pictures accurately depict the way the crime scene

There is no one that can lay a proper foundation
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1

was on the day of the shooting.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Well I guess the only

3

way to resolve it is to hear from Professor Gaskill.

4

guess you will just have to take your chances with him on the

5

stand.

6

the foundation than the animation doesn't come in.

7

doesn't lay a foundation for the photographs then they don't

8

come in.

9

11

And you can call him as a witness and if he doesn't lay

THE COURT:

13

THE COuitT:

He will be.

Let's bring in the jury then.

(The following proceedings were held in open court after the

jury entered the courtroan.)

15

17

He is going to be your next

witness?
MR. RICHARDS:

16

Okay.

All right.

12

14

If he

Okay?
MR. RICHARDS:

10

So I

THE COURT:

Let the record reflect that the jury is

now present.

18

Mr. Richards, do you want to call your next witness?

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

THE COURT:

21

Professor James Gaskill.

Thank you.

* * *

22

PROFESSOR JAMES GASKILL,

23

Called by the Defense, having been duly

24

sworn, is examined and testifies as follows:

25

* * *
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1
2

DIRECT EXAMINll...TION
BY MR. RICHARDS:

3

Q.

State your name, please.

4

A.

My name is James Gaskill.

5

Q.

And Professor Gaskill, would you tell us what you do?

6

A.

Currently, I'm mostly retired.

7

work.

8

the Department of Criminal Justice.

9
10

I do some consulting

I still teach some classes at Weber State University in

Q.

And your focus as far as profession through all the

years has been what?

11

A.

I'm a forensic scientist.

12

Q.

And you have heard the term "CSI"?

13

A.

.

Yes, I have.

14

Q.

What is that?

15

A.

Stands for crime scene investigator, crime scene

16

investigations.

17

process of collecting and preserving evidence and analyzing it

18

to reconstruct what occurred during that incident.

19

Q.

It's a term used to describe the people or the

What I would like to do is ask you what your

20

certificates and training have been as far as this profession

21

as a forensic scientist.

22

A.

I have a Bachelor's and a Master's Degree from the

23

University of Utah in biology.

Subsequent to that I went to

24

work for the State Medical Examiner doing autopsies and

25

investigations of dead bodies.

And I worked there until 1970.
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I went to Santa Clara County and worked as a research

1

2

associate in Santa Clara County Crime Lab.

3

that I came to Weber State, was hired to teach and to start and

4

operate a crime laboratory.

5

laboratories that did -- excuse me -- that did sophisticated

6

kinds of analysis.

7

who collected evidence, of course, but as far as the State

8

Crime Lab there wasn't a functioning laboratory.

And subsequent to

At that time there were no crime

There were fingerprint people and people

And so I started a laboratory at Weber State as part

9

10

of my faculty responsibilities.

11

I examined evidence.

12

And at the same time I taught forensic science and have

13

continued to teach since then.

14

So I ran the crime laboratory.

I went to crime scenes.

I testified.

In 1994 we divested Weber State University of the

15

crime laboratory.

16

Lab.

17

but I still continued to do consulting, officers would call me

18

with questions, attorneys would call me.

19

continued to be a practicing scientist.

20

It became Department of Public Safety Crime

So I then was faculty who didn't do the crime laboratory,

And so I have

I have been a meiT~er of the American Academy of

21

Forensic Science and have attended many, many seminars

22

workshops and meetings with that organization.

23

California Association of Criminalists, the NorthWest

24

Association of Forensic Scientists, and the Utah Chapter of the

25

International Association for Identification.

Also with the
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I have been to FBI laboratory training in Quantico,

1

2

Virgina.

3

States in the last 40 years.

4

Weber State University, at Brigham Young University, at Wyoming

5

Community College.

6

the Wyoming Police Academy Organization and the Utah Peace

7

Officer Standards and Training.

8

police academies.

9

Q.

I have been to training in places all over the United
I have taught forensic science at

I have been certified as an instructor from

So I have taught at those

Let me ask a few other questions.

You heard some of

10

the prosecution's crime scene investigators testify over the

11

last couple of days; is that right?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And they mention knowing you.

14

A.

Sure.

15

Q.

So you taught them?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

All right.

Did you know them?

They are my students.

As far as testifying at trials, have you

18

ever been qualified as an expert witness to testify in criminal

19

trials?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

How many times?

22

A.

2000 to 2500 times.

23

Q.

By the defense or by the prosecution?

24

A.

Both.

25

Q.

Okay.

How much of each or do you know?
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1

A.

Well, when I was working for the State Crime Lab --

2

when I was operating the State Crime Laboratory I would say

3

that the bulk of the cases that I testified in were testimony

4

for the prosecution.

5

Q.

But you still did some for defense during that time?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

But since then it's probably-- maybe a few more

9
10
11

12

prosecution than defense, but certainly a higher percentage of
defense since I retired from the crime lab.
Q.

Okay.

Have you testified in murder trials for the

prosecution before?

13

A.

Yes, I have.

14

Q.

How many?

15

A.

I don't know a number.

16

Q.

Been more than one or two?

17

A.

Certainly.

18

Q.

Okay.

And have you testified recently for the

19

prosecution for the State of Utah as an expert witness within

20

the last 10 years?

21

A.

Oh, certainly within the last 10 years.

22

Q.

Within the last five?

23

A.

I'm trying to think about the last time I testified

24

for the prosecution in Utah.

25

was, but it's been certainly the last few years.

I don't remember the last time it
The last time
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1

2
3

I testified for the prosecution was in Idaho.
Q.

And I want to talk specifically about areas of your

expertise in the forensic science business.

4

A.

Okay.

5

Q.

I guess, that was a lousy question, wasn't it?

6

A.

Couldn't tell if it was a question.

7

Q.

Could you tell us what your areas of expertise are?

8

A.

I have been qualified as an expert in many areas of

9

forensic science.

I've testified as a crime scene

10

reconstruction expert, blood expert, a fingerprint expert, a

11

firearms expert, hairs, glass, paint, soil, shoe prints.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Glass.

14

Q.

-- and firearms?

15

A.

Firearms.

16

Q.

And general crime scene reconstruction?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Now, you were hired by me to investigate this case;

19

Specifically though glass --

is that correct?

20

A.

Yes, it is.

21

Q.

At least from a crime screen investigator standpoint?

22

A.

That is right.

23

Q.

Or a forensic science standpoint?

24

A.

Yes.

25

I

don't really

there is no one who just is a

crime scene person and doesn't do other kinds of things.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Machine-generated
OCR, may
errors. by MR.
Professor James
Gaskill
- contain
Direct

RICHARDS

We
160

1

have to -- you have to have an understanding of what it is

2

you're doing.

3

scientists and to a large extent all forensic scientists do

4

some crime scene reconstruction and investigation.

5

we try to tie this whole package together so it's not just a--

6

somebody working over here, and somebody working over here, and

7

we are not communicating.

8

and some of this.

So all crime scene investigators are forensic

That's how

Somebody who has just this expertise

9

Q.

To try to put together the whole picture?

10

A.

Exactly.

11

Q.

Having those general areas of expertise is important?

12

A.

Right.

13

Q.

Okay.

And in this particular case, the one we're

14

talking about today, what information did you utilize in coming

15

up with your opinions?

16

A.

Well, I have been to the crime scene, itself, severnl

17

times.

I have read police reports.

18

reports from the officers as to what they did.

19

information from the CSI from Weber County CSI, people -- some

20

of whom testified here.

21

have read some medical reports of those persons who were

22

injured but didn't die.

23

photographs and done some of my own investigation.

24

Q.

25

1050 North?

I have read interviews and
I've read the

I read the medical examiner report.

I

I have made measurements and taken

You have been out to the crime scene here on 717 East
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

How many times have you been out there?

3

A.

I think four, maybe.

4

Q.

Have you gone day time or nighttime?

5

A.

Both.

6

Q.

And during those times that you have gone out, did

7

Four or five.

you have someone taking pictures for you?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And you had an opportunity to examine those

10

photographs?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And would they be accurate representations of what

13

14

you saw there?

A.

I think within the limits of the enviromental

15

conditions they were accurate.

16

accurately represent what we could see.

17

Q.

Okay.

Now, specifically were you able after your
everythin~r

18

examination of

19

forget anything else?

20
21

22
23
24
25

A.

I would say that they -- they

that you have looked at -- and did we

Is that about what you looked at?

Well, I might be forgetting something, but if I am I

don't know what it is.
Q.

I guess, you sat through all of the testimony so far;

is that right?
A.

Certainly, the testimony of the preliminary hearing.

I looked at those -- at that transcript.

And I have also been
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1

in the courtroom, I think with the exception of opening

2

exercises, I think, I have been --

3

Q.

Open statements?

4

A.

Opening statements.

5

Q.

So you have listened to the testimony of the

6

I have been here all the time.

witnesses from the stand?

7

A.

I have very carefully.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

And as you have examined all of this evidence

have you come up with some opinions?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

And what would the opinions

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COtJRT:

14
15

16

Your Honor, may I voir dire the witness?
,,
A.L.L
right.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAW:

Q.

Mr. Gaskill, I'm interested first to know about an

17

animation that you may have had some part in.

18

you questions about that.

19
20

A.

I'm not.

I want to ask

You did not create that animation?

I'm not the person who created.

I'm not

the computer specialist who created that.

21

Q.

Who created it?

22

A.

I'm not exactly sure if there was more than one.

23

man named Josh.

24

think is the primary person.

25

Q.

And I don't remember Josh's last name.

A

I

Do you even know the company that created it?
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1

The name of the company I don't know.

A.

I know that

2

I know two of the people who are involved and one of them is

3

Brown and the other one is Josh.

4

Q.

Where is the company located?

5

A.

I don't know if they have a headquarters.

6

I don't

know where it is.

7

Q.

Did you deal with them personally?

8

A.

I

9

Q.

Talk to him face to face?

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

What about the other person?

12

A.

Not in this case.

13

situations .

14

Q.

Talked to him on the telephone?

15

A.

I don't know that I talked to him on the telephone in

16

dealt with Josh personally, yes.

I

have dealt with him in other

this case.
Q.

17

Okay.

In consulting with those individuals, did

18

you -- do you know their backgrounds to whether or not they

19

have any education in physics?
A.

I don't.

22

Q.

The answer to the question is:

23

A.

The answer is

24

Q.

Do you have if they have any background in

20

21

25

I have worked with Josh on one other case

and
I don't know.

Right?

bioengineering?
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1

A.

I don't know.

2

Q.

Do you know if they have any background in

3

biomechanics?

4

A.

I don't know.

5

Q.

Do you know if they have any background in forensic

6

pathology?

7

A.

I don't know.

8

Q.

Do you know if they have any background in

9

10
11

videography, videography as opposed to animation?
A.

Can you clarify?

I'm not sure that I know the

difference between those two.

12

Q.

Moving pictures as opposed to animation.

13

A.

I don't know if they have any videography -

14

Q.

Do you know if they have background in kinesiology?

15

A.

I don't know.

16

Q.

Do you know what kinesiology is?

17

A.

I think I do but

18

Q.

Tell us what it is.

19

A.

It's the study of motion.

20

Q.

Study of muscle and body movement?

21

A.

Correct.

22

Q.

Do you know what biomechanics is?

23

A.

Study of the mechanics of biological organisms.

24

Q.

Would you agree that it is the application of

25

mechanical forces to living organisms?
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1

A.

Certainly.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

And you don't know whether these two had any

background in those things, right?

4

A.

I don't.

5

Q.

All right.

The animation that you created, did you

6

show these individuals the medical examiner's report relative

7

to the trajectory of the wounds that Sabrina Prieto suffered

8

and Rosendo Nevarez suffered?

A.

9

We discussed that.

If I showed them the specific

10

report or if they had a copy of it I don't recall.

11

was a topic of discussion between me and Josh.
Q.

12

But that

As you sit here today, you don't know whether they

13

had a copy of the medical. examiner's report for each of these

14

two victims; is that fair?
A.

I don't personally remember if they had a copy or

17

Q.

You didn't give it to them?

18

A.

I don't -- I don't remember if I did.

19

Q.

Okay.

15
16

20

not.

And do you know whether or not you showed them

any photographs.

Crime scene photographs?

')1

...

A.

I believe I did.

22

Q.

Believe you did or did you?

23

A.

Well, my memory is not perfect in that area so I'm

~

24

going to say that I believe I did.

25

knowledge of that.

But they had -- they had
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Q.

1
2

take it that you cannot tell this Court which specific

3

photographs from the crime scene you may have showed these two

4

individuals; is that fair?

5

A.

That's correct.

6

Q.

Now, in this animation that you created, and for that

7

matter in the photographs that you created, did you do anything

8

to try to replicate the size of the blue Ford truck in Exhibit

9

2, parked on the south side of 1050 North?

10

A.

I don't think that we specifically tried to replicate

11

that.

We used a pick-up truck that was the same -- half ton

12

pick-up, three-quarter ton pick-up, general size.

13
14

Q.

You don't even know if the blue truck was half ton or

a three-quarter ton, do you?

15

A.

No, I don't.

16

Q.

And the photos that you have produced are late

17

model

18

maybe one-ton truck, isn't it, Mr. Gaskill?

is a late model large Ford at least three-quarter ton,

19

A.

Well, that's fair to say.

20

Q.

Is that fair?

21

A.

I wouldn't quibble whether over it was a one-ton,

22
23
-,

Taking from your response then, Professor Gaskill, I

three-quarter ton, or half ton.
Q.

lmd with respect to any vehicle that may have been

24

parked in front of that truck -- and, again, may have been

25

parked in front of that truck, you have no description of that
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1

particular vehicle to rely on, correct?

2
3

A.

I have a description from another party who was

there.

4

Q.

Did they identify it as to make, model, or size?

5

A.

That person did identify it as to make and model,

7

Q.

What did they say?

8

A.

They said it was a Lincoln Towncar.

9

Q.

Lincoln Towncar?

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

Who was that person?

12

A.

That person, I believe, lived next door to the Nava

Q.

I see.

6

13

14

yes.

horne.

The blue Ford truck in the photograph -- and

15

in the photographs -- crime scene photographs and the

16

photograph that you -- and then the photographs that you took

17

sometime this winter, that is clearly a different make and

18

model of vehicle, correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

You did nothing to try to assure -- you did nothing

21

to try to contact the manufacturer and replace that blue Ford

22

with an accurate replica of it; is that fair?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Is it also fair to say that the animation that you

25

created does not show a proper angle of entry to the female
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1

victim that is approaching the carport?

A.

2

3

I don't think it's absolutely accurate that we get it

right.

4

Q.

So that's not accurate?

5

A.

Well,

6

Q.

Okay.

I believe it's not precise, that's correct.
And you would concur, would you not,

7

Mr. Gaskill, that as a crime scene reconstructionist you want

8

to try to make things accurate.

A.

9

10

right.
Q.

11
12

Within the limits of what we can do that's exactly

Okay.

Moving for the photographs that were taken,

when were they taken?

13

A.

Which photographs are you referring to?

14

Q.

Oh, the ones that counsel has shown the court.

15

A.

I don't believe I know which ones they are.

16

MS. SIPES:

17

MR. RICHARDS:

18

THE COURT:

19

He wasn't there.

Could we have the record reflect what it

is?

20

MR. SPJ\W:

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

MR. SHAW:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Exhibit 9.

Q.

It is Exhibit-- Defendant's Exhibit.
No. 9-27.

Oh, you got them marked separate?
Each one of these is marked separately.

Just take a moment and look at those.

are familiar with them.

Make sure you

Have you looked over those
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1

photographs?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And it looks to be photographs taken on different

4

dates because some have snow in the picture and some do not,

5

right?

6

A.

That's right.

7

Q.

There are a couple of crime scene photographs in

8

9
10

those, correct, in that Exhibit, Exhibit 9-27?

A.

They are -- by that do you mean that there were a

couple that were taken by --

11

Q.

CSI.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

Yes.
But the photographs -- and I want to be

14

specific about this.

Were you present when all photographs

15

were taken in Exhibits 9-27 other than the CSI photographs, you

16

were personally present?

17

A.

18

little bit?

19

Q.

Well, I think you need to answer yes or no first.

20

A.

The answer is no.

21

Q.

Okay.

They are -- if I cannot answer yes can I elaborate a

Now, I want you to identify which specific

22

photographs you were not present for -- and I don't want those

23

to be -- I want to go through the exhibit and identify

24

specifically the ones that you were not there for.

25

A.

I was not there for 9.

I was not there for 10.
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1

was not there for 11.

2

for 13.

3

photograph is.

I was not there for 12.

I was not there

I'm not sure-- 17, I'm not sure exactly what that
Eighteen

4

Q.

Excuse me.

5

A.

So whether I was there or not I'm not sure.

6

Q.

Let me just see if I can approach the witness and see

7
8

9

Let me stop you right there.

which one you are referring to.

A.

Yeah, 17 is page nine.

Mine don't have numbers.
If you have the same form

that I have, the same pages that I have.

10

Q.

Okay.

So 17 is a maybe, you don't know?

11

A.

Correct.

12

Q.

I'm not sure about 18.

I was not present for 19.

13

Was not present for -- excuse me.

14

And 25, 26, and 27 are not photographs so -MR. SHAW:

15

I was not present for 19.

Let me approach and make sure I --

16

A.

Those were three that were part of the animation.

17

Q.

Okay.

So 25, 26, are 27 are not photographs?

18

A.

Yeah.

They are part of the animation.

19
20

21

So I wasn't

present when they were made either.
Q.

Are there any other photographs here or is this

exhibit at the end?

22

A.

The ones that I didn't mention I was present for.

23

Q.

Okay.

So the ones that you were not present for you

24

cannot tell this Court whether or not they fairly and

25

accurately reflect what's depicted in the photographs because

1
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1

2
3
4

5

you weren't there?

A.

In so far as the way it still looks, I can certainly .

say whether it does still look like that or not.
Q.

My question though is:

You didn't do the

photography, correct?

6

A.

That's correct.

7

Q.

And you were not present when they were taken?

8

A.

That's correct.

9

Q.

So you have no knowledge specifically as to who took

10
11

12
13

the photographs, correct?
A.

Aside from having listened to the witnesses in this

trial I don't.
Q.

Okay.

Or how the photographs were taken relative to

14

lighting conditions, zoom quality of the lens, whether the lens

15

was zoomed or not?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

Now, the photographs that depict snow on the

ground, when were those --- you were present for those, I guess?

19

A.

Yes, I was.

20

Q.

When were those taken?

21

A.

I think there were two different times when they were

22
23

24

25

taken, and I think since January of this year.
Q.

Now, albeit you were present, you did not take the

photographs yourself personally, right?
A.

That's correct.
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1

Q.

Someone else did?

2

A.

Right.

3

Q.

So, in fact, some of those photographs have you in

4

the picture?

5

A.

Yes, they do.

6

Q.

Okay.

The photographer then operating the camera

7

when those photographs were taken, was the one who clearly

8

created it, snapped the photo, right?

9

A.

Sure.

10

Q.

Did you have any involvement in telling him how to

11
12

13
14
15

take the picture?
A.

Yeah, we discussed the -- yeah, we discussed how we

were going to take the pictures.
Q.

Yeah.

Did you direct him specifically as to his placement

and what you wanted him to show on those photographs?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

All right.

18

A.

There may be one that he took at night in there but

Those were day time?

19

I'm not sure about that one.

20

about now were daytime ones.

The ones that we are talking

21

Q.

Who took the pictures, Mr. Gaskill?

22

A.

Michael Stuart.

23

Q.

He is not a photographer, is he?

24

A.

I don't know his background with whether or not he

25

was -- had training in photography or not.
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1

2
3

I

Q.

He is an investigator for the defense.

A.

He is an investigator.

Q.

More specifically, with respect to the photographs

4

that were taken while you were present, you don't know that

5

they accurately and fairly depict the view of a shooter from

6

the Yukon Denali?

7

A.

You can't say that to this Court, can you?

I have not taken pictures from a Yukon Denali.

So I

8

can say that they reasonably accurately depict the information

9

that I have acquired regarding that shooting.

10
11

Q.

But you weren't standing on a Yukon Denali taking

those photographs while they were being taken, correct?

12

A.

Correct.

13

"'a!::•

So you don't know the exact or precise height of the

14

shooter at the time this incident occurred standing on that

15

Yukon Denali, right?

16

A.

That's right.

17

Q.

So you don't know whether that shooter was standing

18

19
20

on the floorboard or the seat for that matter?
A.

There has been some conflicting testimony about that

as a matter of fact.
That's all.

21

MR. SHAW:

22

THE COURT:

23

Mr. Richards.

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

MR. SHAW:

All right.

Thank you.

And, Your Honor 1 based on that the State
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1

would move to exclude 9-27.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SHAW:

4

THE COURT:

5

I don't think he has offered them yet.
Okay.

Well, I just want to make sure.

I will give a chance to be heard on that

at that particular time.
I don't know where it went.

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

MS. SIPES:

The one you gave to him.

8

THE COURT:

He's got your exhibit.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (cent 'd.)

9
10
11

BY MR. RICHARDS:
Q.

Let me go through real briefly.

And maybe we're

12

beating a dead horse, but let me go through this.

13

11, 12, and 13 are all crime scene investigation photos that

14

you received from Sandy Ladd; is that correct?

So 9, 10,

15

A.

I received them from you.

16

Q.

Well, from me but

17

A.

But they were, in fact, portrayed to me as

18
19

20

photographs taken by Sandy Ladd.
Q.

Okay.

And then on 14 and 15, those were taken just

this last week; is that correct, last Friday?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Okay.

23

A.

I was.

24

Q.

And Mike Stuart took the pictures?

25

A.

That's right.

And you were there?
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1

Q.

And you directed him where to be and what to shoot?

2

A.

Right.

3

Q.

And do they accurately reflect what you intended them

4

to reflect?

5

A.

Yes, they do.

6

Q.

Exhibit 16 is a Google picture; is that right?

7

A.

It could be.

I don't -- it says it's a Google

8

picture so I have to go along with that.

9

when it was taken.

But I wasn't there

10

Q.

You were not there when it was taken, were you?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

You have been to the scene?

13

.11..

...

I have .

14

Q.

Does this accurately reflect what the scene looks

15

like in a daytime photo looking from the east toward the west?

16

A.

Yes, it does.

17

Q.

All right.

And Exhibits 17 and 18 were both taken

18

from the reconstruction video that you had produced, correct?

19

One is kind of hard to see because it's so dark.

20
21

A.

Seventeen and 18, yes.

Excuse me.

Are you talking

about page 17 and 18?

22

Q.

Exhibit 17 and Exhibit 18.

23

A.

Okay.

24

Q.

Exhibit 17 is this one here.

25

A.

Yes, 17 and 18.

I just want to make sure that I know
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1

what I'm talking about.

So, yes, that --

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

Well, that's my understanding.

4

Q.

Nineteen is, again, a photo from Sandy Ladd?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 are all photographs that

7

were taken while you were present a couple of weeks ago,

8

correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And do they accurately depict what you wanted them to

11

depict?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

All right.

14
15
16
17

And then 25, 26, and 27

--~

O..l..C:

_,,

0.-L...J...

~+-~11
.;:;::.l.-..J.....L....J...

shots out of the video that you had produced, correct?
A.

That's --yes, that's my understanding and that's

what they look like.
Q.

And the purpose of these photos, particularly, the

18

reconstruction ones of the video is to at least give an

19

indication of what you believe may have happened this night?

20
21
22

A.

Right, I think it's easier to understand pictures

sometimes than it is word descriptions.
Q.

All right.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SHAW:

I'll move for admission of 9-27.

Any objection?
No objection to 9-13 and 19, since those
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1

are CSI.

We do renew our objection with regard to 14 and 15.

2

3

THE COURT:

MR. SHAW:

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Nineteen, I believe is the CSI photo.
So 9-13 plus 19 there is no objection.

And the ones you did object to were --

7

MR. SHAW:

8

THE COURT:

9

So no objection to 9-13.

And what was the other one?

4

6

Let's hold on.

14 and 15.
Did you want to make a. record as to why

you are objecting?

10

Yes.

MR. SHAW:

Those are photographs taken as I

11

understand it, last Friday or some Friday here in the recent

12

last couple of weeks.

13

~fit.

14

MR. SHAW:

RICHARDS:

Last two, three weeks, yeah.

Snow on the ground, vehicles present that

15

clearly are not the same as the crime scene depicted by CSI,

16

investigators on scene.

17

truck in the photograph.

18

driveway.

19

is not a Cavalier.

20

accurately reflect the scene counsel has indicated or asked the

21

witness whether they accurately reflected what the witness

22

wanted them to reflect.

23

accurately reflect the scene of the crime such that they have

24

value for this jury.

25

accurate depiction of the scene on the night of August 5th

You have a newer model large Ford
You have another white car in the

Apparently, intended to replicate the Cavalier.

It

Those are photographs that do not

But the issue here is:

Do they

Our objection is that they were not an
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1

2007.

2

There are also individuals placed in the photograph

3

that we have no foundation for their being placed in particular

4

locations.

5

seen over and above the roof of the truck.

6

has testified that he doesn't know exactly how high Mike Stuart

7

was standing when he took those photographs.

8

an attempt to replicate a shooter's view over the top of the

9

truck depicted in 15 -- 14 and 15, they don't know.

We have no foundation for their height, they can be
Professor Gaskill

No one has made

10

replicate that.

11

standing from the same position of the shooter.

13

we should

16

-. .....J-..:

.t-

ctUllL.L \..

1 A
.L "± f

Mr. Richards, do you want to tell us why
1 C::.
.L J •

MR. RICHARDS:

14
15

No one made an attempt to take a photograph

THE COURT:

12

They can't

I would be happy to.

Maybe just a

couple of questions.
So 14 and 15, but 14 specifically

Q.

Let me clarify,

17

MR. SHAW:

18

MR. RICHARDS:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SHAW:

'cause I'm not done.

Oh

Well, I'm sorry I just -Well, I misspoke with regard to numbers.

21

Mine, again, aren't numbered, Your Honor.

And the photos that

22

I was speaking of specifically are:

23

are the photographs taken here in the snow with vehicles placed

24

and so on.

So my record with respect to 14 and 15 was wrong

25

initially.

It should be 20-24.

20, 21, 22, 23, 24.
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1

2

THE COURT:

objecting to?

3

MR. SHAW:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SHAW:

THE COURT:

Yes correct.

And that clearly is taken

So it's 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24;

is that right?

10

MR. SHAW:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SHAW:

13

This is one that shows somebody standing

during the snow.

8

9

Fourteen I am -- this is one where.

by the white car in the driveway.

6

7

What about 14 and 15, what are you

Yes.
Okay.

Any others?

And the animations, 25, 26, and 27.

And I

can make a further record on those if you want me to.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

Let me hear from Mr. Richards then.
Well, Your Honor, the photos that

16

Mr. Professor Gaskill directed to be taken are depictions of

17

the scene of the crime at a later date, no different than

18

State's Exhibit No. 1, the big board where they had the Google

19

picture from the sky.

20

the crime.

21

into Professor Gaskill exactly what he was trying to get at in

22

these pictures.

23

admitted.

24
25

That certainly wasn't taken the night of

And these are no different than that.

I' 11 get

Maybe we need to do that before we have them

I don't have any problem doing them individually.
THE COURT:

Well, I think the key here is whether or

not these photographs accurately depict what happened or where
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1

things were positioned or what the situation looked like at the

2

time of the crime back in August '07.

3

Professor Gaskill say is I don't know that they depict what it

4

looked like back in August of '07.

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

THE COURT:

7

But Exhibit 1 is an aerial showing the

Nobody has tried to put cars or people

MR. HEWARD:

in anybocty's position in Exhibit No. 1.
THE COURT:

10
11

Any more than Exhibit 1 depicts that?

street and all.

8

9

And what I'm hearing

It's a huge difference between Exhibit 1

and 14-24 so --

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE

COL~T:

Well --

&1yway I'm going to exclude photographs

14

14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24.

They just do not accurately

15

depict what it looked like at the time of the -- occurred at

16

the crime.

17

seems to me that Professor Gaskill can't lay any kind of a

18

foundation for the animation here.

19

don't know what went into it.

20

in it.

Exhibits 25, 26, 27 I'm going to exclude.

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

THE COURT:

It just

He didn't prepare it.

We

We don't know who was involved

Well, he testified as to who did it.

Well, he can testify as to his theory of

23

the case.

But the animation doesn't -- you are not even close

24

to laying a foundation to get the animation in.

25

no basis for showing that it has any semblance to what we are

There is just
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1

talking about in this case.

2

Go ahead.

3

MR. SHAW:

4

Your Honor, if I may interrupt just

briefly.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SHAW:

7

All right.
Seventeen is also a still of the animation

we've objected to that.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SHAW:

The animation is out.
And I don't know what 18 is.

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SHAW:

13

That's also animation.

It's animation.
Eighteen is animation and we've objected

to

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

So anyway, that's my ruling.

Q.

Seventeen and 18 are both out.

Are there some

All right.

We'll do without pictures.

you've testified previously as to

17

all of the information that you used in corning up with your

18

opinion; is that correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

All right.

And were there some things that would

21

have helped you, you know, perfect world, had certain items

22

that would have helped or assisted you in corning up with your

23

expert opinion, Professor Gaskill?

24

A.

Of course.

25

Q.

Can you describe to the jury what that is, what they
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1

are?
A.

2

we don't have the guns.

We don't have the tests that

3

might have been done on the vehicles regarding the presence or

4

absence of gunpowder.

5

car.

6

that was in the driveway.

In fact, as far as I know, we don't have the white car

Q.

7
8

We don't have the window from the white

And let me interrupt.

On the window of the white

car, could that have been saved?

9

A.

Sure.

10

Q.

How would that be done?

11

A.

Tape.

12

Q.

Just put some tape?

13

A.

Yeah, we have extra wide tape that we can put on that

14

so that it wouldn't fracture any further and then preserve

15

that.

16

Q.

But to the best of your knowledge that wasn't done?

17

A.

To the best of my knowledge it wasn't done.

18

Q.

The gunpowder testing, could you explain what that

A.

Well, first I think I need to define a couple of

19

20

is.

21

terms.

There is a term that we use "GSR" which stands for

22

gunshot residue.

23

residue that comes from the primer.

24

the cartridge that the firing pin strikes, which initiates the

25

burning of the gunpowder.

It really applies very specifically to
That is the little part of

The gunpowder constitutes a lot more
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1

material than the primer does.

2

And sometimes we use GSR, gunshot residue, to test to

3

see if someone has perhaps fired a gun.

4

I'm going to refer to is to look for the gunpowder.

5

shoot a gun the projectile comes out the barrel and then there

6

is a cloud of gunpowder.

7

of it's partially burned.

8

of course, contact the area near where the barrel of the gun

9

is.

Let's

The other tests that

some of it's burned.

Some of it is smoke.

So we can test for that.

When you

Some

And that will,

That's an entirely different

10

test.

11

certainly, not as difficult to do.

12

gunpowder residue test on, for instance, the top of the SUV,

13

that wasn't -- as far as I know it wasn't done.

14
15
16

It's not as sophisticated as the GSR test.

Q.

That was not done.

And

So we could do that

What would that have. shown had it

been done potentially?
A.

Well, if a gun is laying across the top of the

17

vehicle so that the barrel is reasonably close to the top of

18

the vehicle -MR. SHAW:

19

20

23

Your Honor, that assumes fact

not in evidence.
THE COURT:

21

22

Objection.

Well, no.

I'm going to allow it.

Go

ahead.
MR. SHAW:

Can we have some foundation then for how

24

he is able to place the gun in a relatively close -- in a close

25

position to the vehicle and have
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MR. RICHARDS:

1
2
3

Q.

I will ask him.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

You listened to the testimony in

court here these last several days?

4

A.

Yes,

5

Q.

And did you hear any testimony regarding the shooting

6

I did.

of a weapon from the SUV?

7

A.

Yes, I did.

8

Q.

And based upon that testimony were you able to at

9
10
11
12

least understand what they were trying to say was happening
with the gun or where it was being shot from or at?
Well, the problem is that there is some conflict.

A.

They don't all agree.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

And so it's the job of the forensic scientist to see

15

if he can come up with a way to see which, if any, of the

16

statements are correct or incorrect.

MR. SHAW:

17
18

Objection, Your Honor.

So that's what we are talking about here.

A.

19

MR. SHAW:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

MR. SHAW:

22

THE COURT:

That's responsive to the question.
No, I think it was very

Hove that it be stricken.
I think he needs to stick with the

23

science rather than trying to comment on the credibility of

24

witnesses.

25

He is reconstructing the scene of the crime.

That's what I'm worried about.

That's not his job.
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1

I'm going to sustain the objection.

2

MR. SHAW:

3

THE COURT:

4
5

Q.

Record may be stricken?
Yes.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

Well let me ask it this way:

You

heard the testimony of Sarah Valencia, did you not?

6

A.

I did.

7

Q.

And she testified that she thought she could see my

8

client shoot the gun toward the people in the yard, correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And if you had gunpowder residue testing, assuming

11

that that was accurate, would you -- would that assist you in

12

this analysis?

13

A.

....

Yes, it would .

14

Q.

In what way?

15

A.

The presence of gunpowder on the top of the car would

16

indicate that.

17

MR. SHAW:

I want to renew the objection.

There is

18

no foundation yet still insufficient foundation laid for that

19

response.

20

MR.

RICP~S:

I think he has testified as to what

21

their witness said and now he can explain why the gunpowder

22

test --

23

THE COURT:

Again, I think he needs to stick to the

24

physical evidence.

That's my concern here is he is being asked

25

to reconstruct the scene of the crime.

He is not here to
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1

comment on the credibility of witnesses and whether he agrees

2

with their conclusions or not.

3

with the physical evidence, if you would.
MR. RICHARDS:

4

5
6

Q.

Okay.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

In any event, there was no

gunpowder testing done?

7

MR. SHAW:

8

THE COURT:

9

So I think you need to stay

Q.

Asked and answered, Your Honor.
No, go ahead.

(BY MR. RICHARDS)

One more time.

How about about a sodium

10

rhodizonate?

I butchered that.

11

A.

No, you did just fine.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

And as far as

14

rhodizonate, which ever way, tomato, tomato.

15

none of those tests were done in the testimony that I have

16

heard.

17
18
19

Q.

As far as I know

How would that have assisted us, the sodium

rhodizonate test?
A.

It's a test to detect the presence of lead.

So if

20

lead is there that's a strong indication that a bullet was

21

there.

22

information.

23

Q.

24

No. 38.

25

A.

And if it's not done then we're simply without that

Let me show you what's been marked State's Exhibit
What is that?
This is a picture of the white vehicle that was in
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1

the driveway at the scene.

2

windshield of the vehicle.

3

4

5
6

Q.

Okay.

And if you had a sodium rhodizonate test on

that what would that have been able to tell us?

A.

It would have been able to tell us whether there was

residue of lead in -- or in that defect.
So that wasn't done?

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

Excuse me?

9

Q.

That was not done?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

And it shows a defect in the

And then there was also testimony of an dent

of some sort in a fender on the same vehicle; is that right?

13

......

14

Q.

'II.

And I think it's Exhibit 36?
THE COURT:

15

Mr. Richards, do you want him to show the

16

jury so they know which photograph you are referring to?

17

don't know if they have been able to see -- any I know they saw

18

it earlier but --

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

THE COURT:

21

I can certainly hold it up.

Why don't you so they can see the

photographs you are referring to.

22

Q.

So 38 is this one here, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

That's this one here.

25

I

And in 36 which is the dent in

the car?
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1

A.

Correct.

2

Q.

A sodium rhodizonate test would have helped us in

3

what way on that one?

4
5

A.

Same thing.

It would have said that there was --

there was not lead in that defect, in that dent.
Q.

6

Now, you have heard the testimony of --well, let's

7

see.

8

than the actual video at the scene or something.

Is there anything else that you would like to add, other

A.

9

Well, sure.

Well, those are things that physical

10

evidence wise, I felt were very important, would like to have

11

had.

12
13

Q.

You know, you heard the testimony of Mr. Wakefield,

correct?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And about the 10 cartridges.

16
17

18

What conclusions did

you reach on the 10 cartridges.
A.

Well, I concurred with David on that, that all 10 of

those cartridge cases were fired from the same weapon.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

I conclude that those were fired from a quite

21

stationary position, that is, the person firing that gun was

22

not moving very much.

23
24
25

Q.

So you agree with him that the person firing that

would have had to have been stationary?
MR. SHAW:

Well, objection.

That's a
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1

mischaracterization of his answer.

2

what he said.

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

A.

5

Right.

Q.

"Not moving very much."

You know, so certainly not down the street.

MR. RICHARDS:

6

Excuse me.

"Not moving very much" was

All right.

Could I get that screen?

You also don't disagree with -- in other words, you

7

agree with Dave Wakefield regarding the two slugs that they

8

the bullets that were taken from the two victims bodies?

9

A.

Yes, I agree that those two -- I have examined those

10

microscopically using the same procedure that Mr. Wakefield

11

did.

12

same gun, but there is no way to determine whether those two

13

bullets in those 10 cartridge cases were fired from one gun or

14

two guns.

And I agree that those two bullets were fired from the

We can't match the bullet to a fired case.

15

Q.

Are you familiar with this picture?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

And this is a picture of the street that we're

18
19

talking about looking from east down westward, correct?
A.

Yes.
Can you tell us which Exhibit that is?

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

Defense.
Defense 16?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

That that would be Exhibit 16,

Q.

Yes.

And you heard the testimony of the shooting from
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1

various witnesses on the stand, correct?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And if

what can you tell us about the evidence on

4

the ground from the CSI photographs in comparison to where you

5

would expect shell casings?
MR. SHAW:

6

Well, objection without further

7

foundation.

8

testimony he is relying.

I don't -- I think he has to give us on what

THE COURT:

9

Fair enough.

Did you listen to the testimony of Sarah Valencia?

Q.

10

All right.

MR. SHAW:

11

Well, wait a minute that's a leading

12

question.

Ask the witness what it is specifically that he

13

wants to rely on and have him tell us, not have counsel lead

14

him.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

All right.

Sustained.

All right.

Whose testimony did you listen to regarding the --

Q.

where you would expect the bullets to be?
I listened to all of the testimony of all of the

A.

prosecution witnesses.
And what did they say regarding the shooting that

Q.

would be of importance to your analysis?

A.

There is consistency in -- on several areas of their

testimony.

Q.

One is that an initial shot or shots -Okay.
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1

A.

-- followed by some relative1y short period of time.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

And then more shooting.

4

Q.

All right.

5

A.

There is also pretty consistent testimony from the

6

witnesses that the vehicle, the SUV, was traveling down the

7

street as the shooting was occurring.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

And that the shooting ended when the vehicle took

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

So those are three that are pretty consistent things.

10

off.

And assuming that the shell casings -- assuming it

13
14

was a semiautomatic .22 pistol that was being fired, and given

15

that the shooting occurs in a moving

16

expect the shell casings to end up?
MR. SHAW:

17

of the moving vehicle.

19

allow him to -THE COURT:

21

Q.

where would you

Wel1, objection as to foundation.

18

20

ve~icle,

Speed

We don't have anything laid relative to

Sustained.

Let me give you a hypothetical.

Assuming that there

22

was a vehicle moving at a rate of speed of five to 10 miles an

23·

hour down the road shooting a .22 caliber semiautomatic pistol,

24

where would you except the shell casings to be?

25

MR. SHAW:

Objection.

There is no facts in evidence
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-.

1

to allow that hypothetical unless they can link it up in the

2

future.

3

hypothetical.

There is no facts in evidence to allow that

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

A.

No.

Overruled.

Go ahead.

You can answer that question.

Well, if the vehicle, and therefore the gun, is

7

traveling down the road, then there should be cartridge cases

8

strewn along the path of the vehicle.

9
10

Q.

back.

And we have tried to present that here.
So you would expect

11

MR. SHAW:

12

approach the bench, if I may.

13
14
15
16

17

THE COuttT:
recess here.

20

Well, at this point I want to object and

Why don't we give the jury a little

We've been going for a while.

Members of the jury, if you'll go with the bailiff
and take a short recess.

(The following proceedings were held in open court after the

ju_ry left the courtroan. )

18
19

Let's go

THE COURT:

Let's have the record reflect that the

jury has now left.

21

Mr. Shaw, you were about to say something.

22

MR. SHAW:

Yes.

When I looked at the Goggle

23

photograph in this picture it was unclear to me what it was

24

trying to show.

25

misrepresent the facts in evidence.

There is -- what they try to do here is
This No. 16 appears to
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1

have shell casings is what they are showing down the road

2

starting at a location way east of the Nava home, which no one

3

has testified to, and continuing in succession all the way

4

home.

5

case, clearly not.

That is clearly not the state of the evidence in this

THE COURT:

6

I think you can cross-examine him.

That

7

may not -- I mean, there is evidence about shots being fired

8

from the SUV whether it was stationary.

9

pull out and leave.

At some point it does

And I think you can cross-examine as to

10

that.

11

Mr. Gaskill's conclusion or theory.

12

at least to give us his theory of the case and you certainly

13

can cross-examine as to that.

14

MR. SHAW:

But I realize your evidence may be different than
But I think he is entitled

Then my objection would be he has to find

15

a starting point for the second group of shots.

16

us what that foundation is; I mean where it starts.
THE COURT:

17

I

He has to tell

do think we need to lay a little better

18

foundation, rather than just having him give a conclusion all

19

the way down.

20
21

MR. RICHARDS:
that.

Okay.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24
25

Well, Your Honor, I have tried to do

I

And I get cut off and objected to and

can live with that.
THE COURT:

Okay.
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MR. RICHARDS:

1

But we have a witness here that's an

2

expert witness.

3

testified that he's done that.

4

upon the testimony that I heard on the stand, which is what he

5

was trying to do that I would expect to see this.

6

I see this.

7

He can listen to the testimony.

He can then comment that based

But instead

I think that's not commenting on the

THE COURT:

Okay.

I just think he needs to be

8

careful.

9

opinion that he doesn't believe these witnesses.

Because what I'm concerned about is him rendering an

10

that's a comment on their credibility.

11

decide.

12

and render an opinion based on that.

13

He's

And I think

That's for the jury to

He can stick to the facts and the physical evidence

MR. RICHARDS:

If I have a witness that says that the

14

car is shooting -- car is moving, shots are being fired with a

15

semiautomatic weapon-- and that's their witnesses, that's not

16

ours, that's their witnesses -- I can have him comment and say

17

based upon the evidence I heard I would expect to see shell

18

casings according to this.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

grouped into a 15 --

22

THE COURT:

Right.
I wouldn't expect to see them all

I don't have any problem with that.

23

I'm concerned about is him starting to comment on the

24

credibility of the people who have testified.

25

to stay away from that.

What

I think you need

)
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

Okay.

And maybe he is not going there.

But I

got the impression he was trying to.

4

MR. SHAW:

And for the record, so it's clear, each

5

and every witness has one shot -- I'm using Exhibit 2 --

6

somewhere behind -- one shot somewhere behind the Yukon Denali,

7

essentially or at least in line with the red vehicle parked on

8

the street somewhere in here.

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

MR. SHAW:

One or two.

One or two, right.

And then -- then the

11

shooting doesn't commence until some period of time goes by and

12

it commences somewhere out in the roadway.

13

are saying.

This Exhibit depicts shell casings following

THE COURT:

14

That's what people

Right.

And again, I think you can

15

cross-examine him as to the discrepancy between his conclusion

16

and what you have got by way of physical evidence.

17
18

Before we break though, Mr. Richards, I wanted to
ask:

Did you mark the animation as an exhibit has that been

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

THE COURT:

I haven't yet.

I can do that.

You probably should.
Okay.

And because I know -- I'm not going to

23

let it in based on what I've heard so far.

24

need to mark that as an exhibit.

25

is going to be?

But we probably

Do we know what number that
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

No.

I've got four of them here.

Defendant's 28-32 was that -And while we have the break, Your

Honor, -Okay.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. RICHARDS:

I would like to argue one more

7

time.

I mean, I didn't want to do it in front of the jury,

8

certainly.

9

support his theory as to what happened.

But I think he can lay foundation that would
And then the animation

10

just puts life to that or gives effect to it.

11

different than what the State is doing with their bringing in a

12

gun that wasn't at the scene and you let that in.

THE

13
14

COu~T:

foundation here.

Well, what the problem is:

There is no

That's the problem.

MR. RICHARDS:

15

And that's no

16

either.

17

the size of the gun.

18

THE COURT:

There is no foundation for the gun
we didn't know that's the kind of gun,

That wasn't

I think that's a different story.

19

what I heard him say is I don't know who created it.

20

know how it was created.

21

creating it.

22

created it.

23

there.

24

25

But

I don't

I don't know what they relied upon in

I'm not sure the background of the people who
I mean, you can't just throw an animation up

You have got to lay a foundation for it.
From what I heard from Professor Gaskill, the

foundation is totally incomplete here.

So it may
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1

certainly can testify to his theory.

2

the amination come in at this particular time.

3

MR. RICHARDS:

I'm just not going to let

And yet, we let in all of the

4

testimony of these witnesses that is so contradictory and so

5

impossible.

6

THE COURT:

Well, but that's --the difference is

7

there you are talking about their credibility as witnesses.

8

And that's for the jury to decide, whether not they believe a

9

particular witness.

MR. RICHARDS:

10
11

That's -And the State can cross-examine

Professor Gaskill.

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COt.i"RT:

We plan to.
Well, yeah.

I just don't think you can

14

just put up an animation and say, you know, this is our theory

15

of the case.

16

mean, I don't know how they arrived at any of the stuff in the

17

animation.

18

carport.

19

20
21

22

23

There has got to be some foundation for it.

I

I mean, the animation has got the shooter up in the
And I --that's got to be a first, doesn't it?
MR. RICHARDS:

Well, I'm going to have Professor

Gaskill talk about that.
THE COURT:

And I guess, he can testify to it.

I'm

just saying there is no foundation for the animation that's -MR. RICHARDS:

Well, maybe it was premature for the

24

State to voir dire on that.

I wasn't going to get into that

25

one until he had given all his foundation.

But anyway, we will
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1

proceed and -Okay.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

Should we take a break?

4

obviously going to have to go beyond 2:00.

5

can finish.

We are

So his testimony

6

You are not going to be available tomorrow?

7

THE WITNESS:

8

THE COURT:

9

Yeah.
All right.

later in the day.
MR. RICHARDS:

10

I'll have the record reflect we're back

THE COURT:

12

in session.

Anything before I bring in the jury?

14

MR. RICHARDS:

15

THE COURT:

16

That's okay.
(Break Taken. )

11

13

So we may have to go a little

We just need our client.

Let's have the record reflect then

Mr. Perea is present.
Want to bring in the jury then?

17

18

(The following proceedings were held in open court after the

19

jury entered the courtroom.)

20

THE COURT:

21

jury is now present.

Let's have the record reflect that the

22

Go ahead, Mr. Richards.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

25

Q.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Now, we were -- before we broke we were talking about

the shell casings.

And you've listened to the witnesses
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1

testify and, specifically, you testified just a moment ago

2

about the first one or two shots.

3

knowledge where were those -- at least according to the

4

witnesses, where were those fired from?

MR. SHAW:

5

To the best of your

Again, Your Honor.

He is asking this

6

witness to comment on what the witnesses have said.

7

improper question for an expert.

8
9
10
11

THE COURT:

That's an

Well, I think he can testify as to what

his recollection is as far as the location of the first shots.
Overruled.
Q.

Would you go up to Exhibit No -- whatever that is

12

2, and point to us where, to the best of your knowledge

13

according to the witnesses, those shots were fired?

14

A.

According to the witnesses the first shots were fired

15

somewhere in the roadway on the other side of the red car by

16

the mailbox in that area to the east of the home in the

17

roadway.

18
19

Q.

Okay.

And were there any shell casings found in that

area after examining all of the reports you got from CSI?

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

And have you had an occasion to go out to the scene

22

and measure the distance between where the front of that car

23

would be and where the nearest shell casing is?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Could you explain to the jury how you did that?
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1

A.

With the tape measurer, measure along the roadway.

2

Q.

How far was that?

3

A.

About 75 feet.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

Thank you.

6

Q.

In your experience could a shell casing from the .22

7

You can have a seat.

travel that far?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Why not?

10

A.

There is not enough energy.

11

Thank you.

They don't travel that

far when they eject.

12

Q.

How far do they normally travel?

13

A.

It varies; 10, 15 feet.

14

Q.

Seventy-five feet would be possible or not?

15

A.

Not in my opinion.

16

that casts its empties 75 feet.
Q.

17

18

I have never heard of any weapon

Okay.

And did you have an occasion to determine the

levelness of the road?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

When did you do that?

21

A.

At the same time that I measured the length of the

22

road, the distance.

23
24
25

Q.

And could you describe to the jury the grade of the

A.

From east to west our level indicated it's almost a

road?
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1

flat dead level road from east to west.

2

was not a hill.

3

There is no incline.

There was no -- there
It's a pretty flat road.

Q.

And you did that with a -- how did you determine

5

A.

A regular construction level.

6

Q.

Thank you.

4

that?

I want to go to -- well, and then to the

7

best of your recollection as far as what the witnesses were

8

saying about the SUV, you heard testimony it was coasting or

9

driving at normal speed, correct?

10
11

12

A.

That was -- coasting or moving, that's what I recall

the witnesses saying.

Q.

And assuming that it was coasting or moving, where

13

would you expect a forensic scientist -- where would you expect

14

shell casings to be located?

15

MR. SHAW:

16

THE COURT:

17

Go ahead.

Objection.
No.

Foundation, Your Honor.

Overruled.

18

A.

If -- can I stand?

19

Q.

Please do, yes.

20

A.

If the vehicle pulls out into the road from behind

21

the white car on the north side of the road across the street

22

from the Nava house, if it pulls out and the shooting begins

23

somewhere in front of the driveway and continues on to where

24

the cartridge cases are found in front of the driveway west of

25

the Nava home, then I would expect that cartridge cases would
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1

be strewn along the pathway of the vehicle.

2

do.

3

You fire it, it ejects, so the cartridge case would be about as

4

far away as you have moved, give or take.

5

there is variation.

6

They don't -- they can roll around a little bit.

7

expect a pattern of cartridge cases along the roadway.

8
9
10
11

12

You fire,

it ejects, vehicle moves a little bit further~

All right.

Q.

That's what they

Defense Exhibit 19.

They certainly do

They don't go exactly the same place.
But we would

Let me show you what's been marked
This is a photograph -- where did we get

this photograph?
You gave it to me and Sandy Ladd testified that I

A.

believe she took those photographs so we got them from the CSI.

13

Q.

14

depict?

15

A.

And what does this particular Defense Exhibit 19

Each of those yellow markers depicts the location of

16

one of the cartridge cases that were found in the roadway and

17

this is on the -- can I?

18

19
20

Please do, yes.

Q.

You don't need to ask permission you

can just go up.
Okay.

A.

So this area here in the driveway on the west

21

side of the Nava home, which is the -- the Nava driveway is on

22

the east side.

23

The cartridge cases are found in the roadway, in the approach

24

to the driveway, and out of the roadway, and in front of the

25

driveway.

So this is the driveway to the adjacent house.

And each of those yellow tabs depicts one of those
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1

cartridge cases and those tabs are there so that you can see

2

where they are and locate them when you go further away and so

3

forth.

Q.

4

And can you give an opinion as to where a

5

semiautomatic .22 caliber shooter would be to result in a

6

pattern such as in Exhibit 19?

7

A.

I can.

8

Q.

Please do for the jury, please.

9

A.

We don't know.

10
11

MR. SHAW:

Objection.

that?

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE

14

COu~T:

Probably the same that --

Yeah.

Based on the testimony he's heard.

This is his opinion as to where he thinks the shooter was or --

15

16

Where is the foundation for

Go ahead.
A.

Over-ruled.

Well, we don't know exactly what gun was used.

So we

17

don't know exactly the range.

18

Mr. Wakefield and I agree on this, most weapons eject the

19

cartridge case to the right.

20

then to the right, and typically from about this far in front

21

to about maybe a little bit in back.

22

cartridge case locations if they -- if they are where they

23

fell, then the shooter had to be back in the area west of the

24

blue pick-up and likely in the roadway or not on the other side

25

of the road but from maybe the middle of the road or to -- into

But most weapons

So the gun is facing this way,

So we -- based on these
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1

the driveway area.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And you examined locations based upon CSI photographs

5

Now, you went to the scene; is that correct?

that you had; is that correct?

6

A.

It is.

7

Q.

And you put another vehicle and pick-up truck in in

8

trying to set this up; is that correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And where would you have located that?

11

A.

Located it about where the blue pickup truck is there

12

based on the photographs that we have from CSI and --

13

Q.

Including Exhibit No. 10?

14

A.

Yeah, that's exactly right.

15

Q.

And did you -- were you able to get a vantage point

16

from where you would expect a gun to be shot to result in

17

cartridges being where they are at and going toward where the

18

victims Mr. Esquivel and Mr. Nevarez ended up?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

Exhibit No. 8.

Let me show you what's been marked Defense
And I ask you if you recognize this picture.

22

A.

I

23

Q.

And that's an exhibit that we have put together from

24

25

do.

an aerial photograph, correct.

A.

That's what-- yes, that's what I have been told.
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1

Q.

About 717 East 1050 North.

2

A.

Right, it is.

3

Q.

Does it appear to be the same?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

And ther·e are four cars put on there.

Obviously, they were added since the photograph?

7

A.

Right.

8

Q.

Would they be in the approximate positions according

9

to the pictures that you have such as 19 and others from CSI?

10

A.

Yes.

11

MR. SHAW:

Well, let me -- for the record, make an

12

objection with respect to the white car parked on the south

13

side of the street in front of the truck.

14

in the record as to where that was precisely.

15

west of the mailbox.

16

was west of the mailbox.

17

mailbox.

18

exactly.

They have got it

There is no evidence in record that it
No evidence that it was east of the

There is simply no evidence where it was parked

THE COURT:

19

There is no evidence

Okay.

It's got to depict what happened

at the time of the murder.

21

unless you can lay a foundation that that is where the vehicles

22

were .

23
24
25

It's just

you can't just --

20

I mean
MR. RICHARDS:

Well, we'll ignore the white car in

front of the blue truck.
THE COURT:

Okay.
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MR. SHAW:

1

2

ignored?

3

Well, but wait a minute.

How can it be

It is thrown in front of the jury with no foundation.
MR. RICHARDS:

Well, he already testified, Your

4

Honor, that one of the witnesses said that or -- he talked to a

5

witness.

6

If you are going to use a diagram it's

THE COURT:

7

got to be accurate, that's all I'm saying.

8

reflect what happened on August 5th 2007.

9

not corning in.

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. RICHARDS:

It's going to
If it doesn't, it's

May I just have one moment?

Okay.
Your Honor, Keri Garcia testified that

13

she didn't park there because there was a car there.

She got

14

there right before the shooting occurred so she testified.

15

That's their witness

16

THE COURT:

Again, I'm not going to get in an

17

argument over what the witnesses or did or did not say.

18

jury can decide who testified to what.

19

if you are going to put up a diagram it better be accurate as

20

to where the vehicles were located.

21

~iR.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RICHARDS:

RICHARDS:

The

But it just seems to me

That's all I'm saying.

Well.

It's not admissible.
But the problem, Your Honor, is that

24

the State's exhibit --that's no more accurate because we know

25

there was a car here.
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MR. SHAW:

1

Well, wait just a minute.

The State's

2

exhibit is what was depicted by the CSI when they got there and

3

took photos at the crime scene.

4

do is create a scene that was not there and there is no

5

foundation for that car.
THE COURT:

6
7

10

This is just a suggestion.

Can't you

just use Exhibit 2, which has already been introduced?
MR. RICHARDS:

8
9

What Mr. Richards intends to

idea.

Thank you.
Q.

I'll use Exhibit 2, that's a better

Thank you, Your Honor.

You heard the testimony of Richard Esquivel as to

11

where he was located in relationship to the white car that was

12

in the driveway; is that correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Could you with those stickers put on Exhibit --

15

State's Exhibit No. 2 where his testimony was that they were

16

located?

17

A.

I will use a red one if that's okay.

18

Q.

That's great.
MR. SHAW:

19

Any color you would like.

Well --

20

Q.

And how about where Mr. Nevarez was located?

21

A.

I don't think it's entirely clear to me were

22

Mr. Nevarez was located but it was next to Mr. Esquivel.
MR. SHAW:

23
24

25

Exactly.

If it's not clear to the witness

where -THE COURT:

Then he can't put --
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MR.

1
2

RICEUL~S:

exhibit.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

THE COURT:

Well, we will take off that one.

Can we have the record reflect what color

dot you are using.

THE WITNESS:

8

9

If he doesn't know where they were.

Let's just talk about Mr. Esquivel then.

6
7

-- then he shouldn't be marking the

I'm taking the yellow one off, if I

can.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICHARDS:

Red dot.

12

THE WITNESS:

If I can.

13
14
15
16

If you can.

Pretty good sticker better

than I expected it to be.

A.

The red dot then would be the location of

Mr. Esquivel.

Q.

All right.

Now, did you -- using the pick-up truck

17

that you put at the same place as the blue truck was, and in

18

going back to where the -- you would expect a shooter of a .22

19

caliber semiautomatic, where they would be as a result in the

20

casing pattern that was depicted in Exhibit 19, were you able

21

to determine whether or not a shooter would be able to actually

22

shoot Mr. Esquivel from that location?

23

24

25

A.

If Mr. Esquivel is here, from my view here, you

couldn't see Mr. Esquivel; we'd have to look through the truck.
MR. SHAW:

Objection.

This witness was not on scene

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Professor JamesMachine-generated
GaskillDirect
by MR.
OCR,
may contain cont'd
errors.

RICHARDS

209

1

looking through the truck that night.

THE COURT:

2

3

cross.

4

he observed.

5

Q.

6
7
8

Okay.

I will let you cover that on

I think he's entitled to give his opinion based on what
Overruled.

Now Mr. Esquivel also testified that maybe he went

down on his knees.
A.

That's what I was-- that's what I'm basing my--

with Mr. Esquivel down on his knees if --

9

Q.

Would it --

10

A.

I couldn't see someone down on their knees from this

11
12
13

vantage point over the truck.
Q.

And so would

it~

have been possible for Mr. Esquivel

to have been shot from somebody in the

14

A.

I couldn't see.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

The truck was in the way.

S~J

at that location?

So that's what I can say.

Now, Mr. Nevarez was somewhere right next

beside Mr. Esquivel according to Mr. Esquivel's testimony.

17

A.

According to Mr. Esquivel's testimony.

18

Q.

And would you have been able to see someone next to

19

Mr. Esquivel and shoot them from that SUV located where you

20

would have to be to result in that casing pattern?

21

A.

I couldn't see anyone if they were in that position.

22

Q.

Okay.

You can have a seat for now.

I want to talk

23

about the darkness and it's effects on the witnesses.

24

happen to go to the scene at nighttime?

25

A.

Did you

Yes.
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1

2

Q.

And you had an opportunity to see the CSI photo which

we have depicted as Exhibit No. 9 Defense.

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And that's a picture of what?

5

A.

It's a picture of the white car in the driveway.

6

This same white car next to the red dot in -- yeah, State's

7

Exhibit 22.

8

9

Q.

That's the white car in the driveway.

Now, you went out to the scene on a night in January;

is that correct?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Did you check the moon phases?

12

A.

Yes.
Would the moon phase be

13
14

~-

well, tell us what the

moon phase was the night of the --

15

A.

The night of --

16

Q.

Of the incident.

17

A.

of the incident -- the night of the -- that we

18

went out the moon phases were similar and according to the

19

calculations the moon was almost certainly not over the top of

20

the mountain when this incident occurred.

21

been a dark night, a dark moon.

22

Q.

So it would have

And looking at that particular picture, Exhibit No.

23

9, defense, would that be about how -- tell us after having

24

visited the scene at night how far you could see.

25

A.

The night we were there it was a little darker than
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1

that picture.

2

they would have to be within 4 or 5 feet, in other words you

3

could see a shadow or a silhouette.

4

they had to be pretty close to him.

5

Q.

6

No. 10.

7

correct, as 9?

And in order to recognize someone for example

But to recognize someone

Let me show you what's been marked Defense Exhibit
Now, that's a-- virtually the same

8

A.

From the same location, yeah.

9

Q.

Go back to -- now back.

p~otograph,

After having visited the

10

scene at nighttime, which photograph most accurately reflects

11

what the sighting condition would be?

A.

12

The first one, the dark one, is a certainly lot -- a

13

lot closer to what I observed than the second one.

14

one appears to have been -- and I believe Sandy testified that

15

she either overexposed it or used an artificial light.

The second

16

Q.

I think she testified on this one she used a flash.

17

A.

(Witness nods head.)

18

Q.

Okay.

19

darker than that?

20
21

And so you are saying it would have been even

A.

Yeah.

When I was there it was a little darker than

Q.

And let me talk -- if we could go down to Exhibit No.

that.

22

This is another pict~ure of that same vehicle taken from a

23

11.

24

different angle; is that correct?

25

A.

Yes.
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2

And this, again, is one that's illuminated by

Q.

1

artificial light?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Fair statement?

5

A.

I'm sure it was and that's reinforced by Sandy's

6

testimony.

8

Now, there was a window broken in that car; is that

Q.

7

correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And let's go to the next slide, Exhibit No. 12.

11

is that a picture of?

12

A.

It's a close up of that rear passenger window.

13

Q.

And were you able to view and make any opinion

14

What

regarding that window?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Could you describe to the jury what you were able to

17

determine?

18

A.

Well, that -- from the photographs it is pretty clear

19

that there is a partial circle there in the broken edge of the

20

window, which is consistent with a projectile penetrating the

21

window at that point.

22

Q.

Let me give you this.

You can just push this little

23

button and get a little red button.

24

caused by a projectile.

25

hole?

And so what was the --

And so that appears to be a bullet
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1

A.

It certainly could be.

2

Q.

Is there anything else it could be?

3

A.

It could be a lot of things.

4

really fast.

5

Q.

In a parked vehicle however, probably a bullet hole.

6

A.

I wouldn't dispute it's a bullet hole; I just don't

7

have any proof that it is.

8

9

If they were traveling

Q.

All right.

Were you able -- if you had had the

window would that have been of assistance to you?

10

A.

Certainly.

11

Q.

In what way?

12

A.

Well, we could have tested it, as we spoke about

13

earlier, for the presence of lead, for example, and could

14

have

15

always better to have it in hand than have a picture.

Q.

Okay.

But we didn't get that and I understand that

16

that may be one that just wasn't picked up in all of the

17

picking up.

18

Are you able to utilize these photographs and are

19

there a couple -- there are other ones; is that right?

20

is another view, that's Exhibit 13.

21

determination based upon examination of the photographs?

Were you able to make a

22

A.

I made some determinations, yes.

23

Q.

Could you describe to the jury what that

24
25

There

determination is?

A.

Well, I think I have already mentioned that I believe
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1

that the -- there is a -- some projectile that apparently

2

penetrated the window from, you know, at this point in the

3

window.

4

Q.

5

penetrated?

6

A.

Can you tell from which direction that bullet

Well, I can look at the photograph and tell you what

7

it looks like.

8

I'm looking at a photograph.

9

10

Q.

Okay.

But I can't -- I wasn't able to observe that so

Using the photograph, which is the best

evidence that we have, what did you determine?

11

A.

This is -- can I explain -- do a little explanation?

12

Q.

Yes, please.

13

A.

This is what is called a "tempered

_, __ .;.
<::J.LCl;J.::>.

II

Ar1d

14

tempered glass is designed so what when it breaks it's under

15

tension.

16

pane, it will shatter into lots and lots of little pieces.

17

And instead of just breaking like an ordinary window

And so you can see that there are lots of fracture

18

lines in this.

19

would probably separate and maybe a few of them would stay

20

together.

21

that are shattered down in there.

22

And if you give it a little tap, all of those

But there is a whole bunch of other little pieces

But when glass is penetrated by a rapidly moving

23

projectile, the projectile will punch some of the glass out in

24

front of it as it goes through.

25

does that instead of just making a straight hole right through

And very commonly, when it
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1

the glass it will make, like, a crater so that one side of the

2

glass will be

maybe the hole will be this wide and the other

3

side will may

this way it kind of catered out like so.

And in this case if you look in this area right in

4
5

here, there is what appears to be a tapering edge.

6

is on the exit side.

7

projectile, when they go through the entrance side is narrower

8

than the exit side.

9

this photograph at least, that the taper is on the side we are

10

The taper

So the bullet goes -- or other

So if you look at that it appears that, in

facing which is the outside of the window.

11

Q.

Which would indicate?

12

A.

If, in fact, that is the case, if, in fact, that

13

taper is where it appears to be from the photograph that would

14

indicate that the projectile came from inside and exited out

15

the window and not from the outside into the vehicle.

16
17

Q.

Is there any other evidence from CSI that would

support that conclusion?

18

A.

I don't --

19

Q.

The slug for instance?

20

A.

Well, there is a lack of evidence that would indicate

21

maybe that's the case.

22

Q.

Bad question.

Is there any lack of evidence?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Could you explain that to the jury?

25

A.

Well, if the bullet -- if a projectile bullet, for
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1

example, went in, then we should be able to find it in the car.

2

We didn't find it in the car so that's kind of negative

3

evidence and doesn't really prove that that's the case.

4

certainly it makes me wonder where is the bullet and they have

5

searched pretty throughly.

6

students.

But

I have a lot of faith in my

Q.

All right.

9

A.

Oh, yes, absolutely.

10

Q.

She is a good CSI?

11

A.

She is.

12

Q.

But you can't be certain from these two items of

7

8

13

You know Sandy Ladd and you have faith ln

her?

evidence or lack thereof which way

+-"h--l.,.l.l.C

bullet

,.....'!lT'nO

\,_.,I,..U.~L\_..

frorr1·?

14

A.

That's correct.

15

Q.

It's just one of those things that's a question mark

16

maybe?

17

A.

That's right.

18

Q.

Okay.

Now, you heard the testimony of the location

19

of Mr. Esquivel.

And you testified to that just a minute ago

20

in the red dot.

You also heard testimony from Sarah Valencia

21

and Keri Garcia as to the location of Sabrina Prieto when she

22

was shot; is that correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And if you could maybe with a blue -- with a yellow

25

sticker put on the board there on Exhibit No. 2, where you
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1

believe that she was at based upon that testimony, if you can.

2

MR. SHAW:

3

THE COURT:

Wel1, and I'm going to object.
He's got to be a 1ittle more definite

he's got to know exactly where they were, otherwise

4

than

5

it's just a waste of time to put it on.

6

Q.

Well, let me have you describe to the jury what

7

evidence we have as far as where she was at and what position

8

she was in.
MR. SHAW:

9
10

THE COURT:

Does he

If he does, he can put the sticker on Exhibit 2.

If

he doesn't he is not going to be able to.
MR. SHAW:

15
16

Well, again, the question is:

know where they were standing at the time they were shot?

13

14

That's a comment on

the evidence.

11
12

Well, wait a second.

okay with that.

But not with just --

THE COURT:

17

The Court asked a better question but I'm

That's what I'm getting at.

Is he

18

apparently knew where the first person was but not the second.

19

Now we are asking for two more.

20

about their location.

21

Q.

I think he's got to be sure

Do you have any evidence that you have heard from the

22

stand that would indicate where Sabrina Prieto was at when she

23

was struck by the bullet?

24
25

A.

Yes.
MR. SHAW:

Well, again, isn't that -- Your Honor,
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1

isn't that a cormnent on this evidence?
THE COURT:

2

scene.

4

that's fine.

6

understanding.

7

correct.

9
10
11
12

I don't have any problem with that.

MR. SHAW:

Q.

That's okay.

But he has to say it's his

It's not a conclusion that is to be drawn as

THE COURT:

8

Well, he is trying to reconstruct the

If he wants to rely upon what somebody else said,

3

5

This jury --

All right.

Is this your understanding from listening to the

witnesses where was she at when she was struck?
A.

The witnesses indicated to me, at least, that the

witness was on the side of the east side of the Nava
MR. SHAW:

13

I 'm g-oing to object to

14

characterization of the witness's testimony.

15

completely inaccurate and unsupported by any record period.
THE COURT:

16

That is

Unfortunately, nobody bothered to mark

17

that originally where they were.

18

got an opinion based on the testimony where he thinks they

19

were, then I don't have any problem with that.

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

THE

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23

24
25

COL~T:

Okay.

So I don't know.

But if he's

Go ahead.

So go ahead.
And there is various witnesses would

put it in a range that was made.
A.

You can put it in a range.

But on the side of the

house under the carport leading to or near the side entrance of
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1

the house.

2

Q.

Okay.

And

3

MR. SHAW:

4

THE COURT:

Again, I have -And I'm going to give you a chance to

5

cross-examine.

6

believes as to where they were standing when they were shot.

This is his explanation.

7

MR. SHAW:

8

THE COURT:

9

Go ahead.

This is what he

But that -- okay.
Okay?

10

Q.

What direction was she facing when she was shot?

11

A.

The testimony was that she was running towards the

12

house.

13

MR. SHAW:

Objection.

14

This has to be clear

15

THE COURT:

That was not the testimony.

Well, and, again, you will have a chance

16

to cross-examine him as to whether that was the testimony.

17

jury knows what the testimony is.

18

You know what the testimony is and if he's wrong you can point

19

that out on cross.

20

what he believes where they were standing when they were shot.

21

Okay?

MR. SHAW:

23

THE COURT:

25

They have been taking notes.

But for right now, this is his theory of

Overruled.

22

24

The

Q.

Okay.
Go ahead.

So there is a range there by the side of the house

and you were saying which direction you believe that the
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1

2
3

witness said she was facing?

A.

The witness said she was running to get into the

house.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

A.

Either facing east or facing south depending on

6
7
8

So she would have been facing south?

whether she had rounded the corner or not.
Did you have an opportunity to review the medical

Q.

examiner's report?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Where was she shot?

11

A.

In the chest.

12

Q.

Okay.

Assuming that she was shot in the chest facing

13

south or southeast, could someone from a

14

roadway there have fired the fatal shot?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

Okay.

Su~

driven along the

You heard the testimony of Richard Esquivel,

17

as far as where he was at when the shots were fired or when he

18

got hit; is that correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And could you describe would it have been possible

21

for him to be hit by somebody in the SUV based upon his

22

testimony?

23

24
25

A.

Well, certainly someone -- someone here.

As long as

we don't have a truck in front of him.

Q.

Okay.
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1

A.

Then somewhere along in here and he -- someone

2

standing here or driving here could have shot him easy.

3

someone back here or someone over here.

4

Q.

Depending on which way he was facing?

5

A.

Exactly.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

Or

And you heard his testimony that he was always

facing the street?

8

A.

Yes, I did.

9

Q.

Until he kneeled down.

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

Once he kneeled down would he have been able to have

12

been shot from the street?

13

.,..
.......

Well, as long as this truck doesn't obscure him .

14

Q.

But you --

15

A.

That means that he has to -- everything I know about

16

it says we have to -- the bullet is not going to come around

17

and circle him and shoot someone from behind him.

18

think that requires much expertise.

19

Q.

You can have a seat.

And I don't

So given all of the evidence

20

that you have examined, the testimony that you have heard, the

21

witnesses statements that you have read, the medical examiner's

22

reports etc., everything, have you been able to form an opinion

23

as to how this crime may have occurred?

24
25

A.

Well, I really can't say exactly how this crime

occurred.
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1
2

Q.

Okay.

Can you -- given the best evidence, your best

or most logical explanation?
I can tell you some things that I -- in my opinion

3

A.

4

are correct.

5

Q.

Okay.

6

A.

In my opinion there was another weapon.

7

Why don't you do it that way.
There wasn't

just one weapon.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

And that's based on the fact that we have shots fired

10

here and no cartridge cases.

11

in this area we should find cartridge cases.

12

indicate that -- since this one indicates there were shots that

13

it was -- in all likelihood, as far as I'm concerned was a

14

weapon that doesn't eject, which could be a revolver, could be

15

a single shot, could be lots of things.

16

Now, if a semiautomatic is fired
So that would

So if someone here gets shot, someone here has been

17

shot, I am not able to come up with a good way that someone

18

gets in the car, drives along here, shooting as they go along,

19

stopping, or not stopping, and then shooting over the car or

20

through the truck, and hitting someone here, or hitting someone

21

who is around the corner.

22

lots of things that could have happened.

23

which one it is.

24

experience tells me and what my investigation of this tells me.

25

Q.

That's --that's -- so there are
I can't tell you

I can only say what I have done and what my

And what is that?
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1

A.

And that is that a vehicle or a person standing right

2

here has almost an impossible shot to hit someone around the

3

corner of this house and with no damage to the vehicle to shoot

4

someone here that's kneeling down.

5

matches that.

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

If I draw a line from the front damage in the white

8

I can't draw a line that

car windshields

9

Q.

10

A.

Yes?
to the damage in the back window it comes out here

11

in the area, again, in front of the mailbox maybe give or take

12

a little bit.

But certainly not here.

How far from the shell casings was that?

13
14

A.

Oh, a minimum of 25 feet.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

And your experience has been that .22 wouldn't

kick out a shell that far?

17

A.

They don't.

18

Q.

How do you explain then the pattern of shell casings

19
20

in Exhibit 19?
A.

I explain this pattern the same way that

21

Mr. Wakefield did, that there is a more or less stationary

22

shooting from right here.

23

Q.

Okay.

You can have a seat.

Just one last question:

24

If Sabrina were running towards the backyard or toward the

25

backdoor or side door, and she was shot in the chest, from
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'

1
2

which direction would the shooter have to have been placed?
She is running -- if she is running along the east

A.

3

side of the house to the south, if she shot was in the chest

4

the person has to be in front of her.

5

Q.

Which would be?

6

A.

South from the backyard area.

7

Q.

In the carport?

8

A.

In the carport, backyard.

9

Q.

Okay.

And assuming that that was -- well, would

10

there be another explanation for the

11

happened

12
13

for the shell casings to then be out on the road?

A.

I don't know how the shell casings got through either

they got there -MR. SHAW:

14

15

assuming that's what

Calls for speculation then, Your Honor, if

he doesn't know.

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17

MR. SHAW:

18

THE COURT:

That's what he is here to do.

Speculate?
11\7ell, yeah, he can't speculate.

19

doesn't know then he can't render an opinion on that.

20

sustained.

21
22

MR.

RICP~S:

All right.

Okay.

If he
So

That's all the

questions I have.

23

THE COURT:

24

Mr. Shaw.

25

MR. SHAW:

All right.

Thank you, Your Honor.
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1
2

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHAW:

3

Q.

Mr. Gaskill, it is true, is it not, that you do not

4

know whether any vehicles were parked in front of the blue Ford

5

truck?
Well, I wasn't there and I don't have any

6

A.

7

photographs.

8

Q.

9

that.

All I have is a persons' statements.

That's a simple yes or no, right?

You don't know

You don't know where any vehicles were parked, right?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

In front of the blue Ford truck.

12

A.

No, I don't.

13

Q.

All we have is the crime scene investigators that

14

take photographs to accurately depict the scene as they find

15

it, correct?

16

A.

Right.

17

Q.

All right.

18

up against that shot

19

THE COURT:

20

jury can see.

I'm sorry.

Why don't you and I stand up

then.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SHAW:

25

Let's see, Mr. Shaw, I don't think the

You are kind of blocking their view.

MR. SHAW:
22

Now, if I were to put this straight edge

Why don't you maybe move that.
Put it right out here.

Let me stand over

here.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Professor
Ja~~s Gaskill
- Cross
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors. by MR. SHAW

226

1

Q.

If I were to put this straight edge up against that

2

photograph at a point somewhere between the blue Ford and the

3

window -- well, wait a minute you don't mark it, I do.

4

A.

Oh, I'm sorry.

5

Q.

If I put it here and it hits the window, right,

6

Excuse me.

can hit the rear window, right?

7

A.

If you put it there it can, yes.

8

Q.

If you put it here it can hit Richard Esquivel,

9

it

right?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And that same bullet path goes immediately over

12

Richard and into the Ford truck in the garage next door, does

13

it not?

14

A.

15

THE COURT:

MR. SHAW:

19

THE COURT:
Q.

Q.

I am blocking everybody?
I think you are blocking their view.

Go through that again straight on.
THE COURT:

21

22

Mr. Shaw, again, I'm not sure the jurors

on this end can see what you're demonstrating.

18

20

I mean, that's the

path you have got.

16

17

Well, yeah, it certainly can.

Maybe we have got a marker on something.

If I put this straight edge lined up with the front

23

edge of that blue Ford and the rear window of the Cavalier,

24

there is a clear path, is there not, to the Cavalier?

25

A.

Yes, there is from the back of the blue truck.
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1

2
3

Okay.

Q.

I can move it ever so slightly and still get a

clear path to the Cavalier, can I not?
A.

Absolutely.

You can move it to the east as far as

4

you want and as long as you don't get passed it, of course, you

5

can still hit the Cavalier, sure.

6

And, in fact, on that edge as it's depicted here,

Q.

7

further ahead of the blue Ford truck and into the Cavalier you

8

also have a line that lines up with the top left part of the

9

windshield on the Cavalier, do you not?

10

A.

Well, I wouldn't line it up that way.

11

way I line it up.

12

okay to move it now?

13
14

That's not the

You have it lined up a little bit -- am I

I'm just saying, on this particular edge it lines up

Q.

with the

15

A.

The way you have it, yes.

16

Q.

And then if we go slightly further it lines up with

17

the -- you can line it up with the Ford truck and Richard

18

Esquivel, can you not?

19

A.

Sure, as long as we can clear the truck I'm happy.

20

Q.

Right.

And in the location of the car that is

21

parked, allegedly, in this location is further or closer to the

22

driveway entrance or driveway approach -- closer to the

23

driveway approach in this location, you are going to have a

24

gap, are you not, between that car and the front edge of the

25

blue Ford?
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1

A.

This -- actually, as Sandy testified, this is not

2

drawn to scale.

3

and a full-sized sedan in front of the Nava home, there is very

4

little extra room.

5

Q.

And if you put two vehicles, a pickup truck

Well, do you know the distance right here from right

6

there on the westerly edge of the Nava home to the front edge

7

of that Ford truck?

8

9

A.

No.

Did you measure that distance?

We don't have pictures of the front.

We only

have pictures of the back.

10

Q.

11

saying?

12

measurements as to what that distance might have been.

13

A.

You didn't measure the distance though, is what I'm
You didn't measure right here or try to get any

No.

We only had photos of the back of the truck.

We

14

don't have photos of the front of the truck.

15

of the red vehicle to the -- about the middle of this pattern

16

is a little over 75 feet.

17
18

Q.

Okay.

But from the back

Do you know the length of that blue Ford

truck?

19

A.

Not exactly.

20

Q.

If -- I mean, if we were to step it off, I mean,

21

what's the coR~on length of a vehicle?

22

that in your experience?

23

A.

A little over 20 feet.

24

Q.

Twenty feet for a vehicle?

25

A.

Well maybe that.

Are you familiar with
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1

Q.

Twenty feet?

2

A.

Well, I don't know how long that truck is.

3

Q.

Well if I were to step here and assuming my feet

4

are --my steps are about 3 feet,

5

at max?

6

A.

Yeah, I don't know the length of this truck.

7

Q.

You don't know the length of the car?

8

A.

No, but we parked two cars there for that very

9
10

purpose.

Q.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

15 feet maybe

Okay?

So I could maybe get kind of a -I understand.

But you don't know that you placed

11

that car that you parked there in it's proper location, do you,

12

Mr. Gaskill?

13

A,

...

I wanted to know how much -- about how much room have

14

we got if we parked two cars there total.

15

I parked a truck and not a large sedan but a regular-sized

16

sedan right there.

17

shorter than this blue truck would indicate.

18
19

Q.

There is not much room.

The question was, Mr. Gaskill:

A.

That's right.

21

Q.

-- on the night in question?

You don't know the

You don't know where it

was parked; could be two or three feet either way?

23

A.

Sure.

24

Q.

Exactly.

25

This is a bit

proper location of any parked car relative to the blue truck

20

22

That's what I did.

So there could be a gap right here, too,

right?
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1

A.

Well, there would be a gap, but not a big one.

2

Q.

Well, now wait a minute.

3

it's parked how do you know the length of the gap?

4

5

If you don't know where

A.

Because I know -- I parked two cars there and I

looked at it.

6

Q.

You didn't park it right here, did you?

7

A.

Well, the gap would be the same if I parked it here

8

or if I park

9

long, and so

I mean, the space is "X" long, the cars are "X"

10

Q.

Assuming

11

A.

-- it's going to have extra space.

12

Q.

Assuming you park the correct type of vehicle.

You

13

don't know what type of vehicle it was and I'm not giving you

14

numbers.

15

A.

There is not a lot of room there.

16

Q.

Fair enough.

Now, with respect to the height of that

17

vehicle that was allegedly parked in that location.

18

nothing about the height -- you can have a seat.

You know

19

A.

Thank you.

20

Q.

You know nothing about the height of the vehicle, do

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Okay.

21

you?

And as you testified earlier during that voir

24

dire examination, you didn't stand up on a Yukon Denali in the

25

doorjamb and look over that car that was parked in that
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1

location, did you?

2

A.

No, I did not.

3

Q.

Okay.

Recognizing.there is a damage to the Ford

4

truck parked in the neighbor's garage, you saw those

5

photographs, right?

6

A.

Yes, I did.

7

Q.

Those are on the same basic line, that damage to that

8

truck is on the same basic line, is it not, as Richard Esquivel

9

standing in the location he was?

10

A.

I don't think so.

11

Q.

Well, let's do it again.

12

A.

I don't think that we can say exactly where that

13

window is in -Q.

14
15

jury.

Again, let me get out of here so I don't block the
Have you got the little pointer?
do.

16

A.

I

17

Q.

But look, if we were to line up the Ford truck front

18

window with the area with Mr. Esquivel you put on the map is

19

hit, we have a straight line, do we not, to a space between the

20

Ford truck and any vehicle parked in front of it?

21

A.

I have not actually done a trajectory from the truck.

22

Q.

This is a very simple question, Mr. Gaskill.

23

A.

What I'm saying is that I can't answer that.

24

Q.

Looking at what I'm doing right here.

25

I'm lining up

the middle of that circle with the front edge of the right
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1

window in the Ford truck, looking at that line you have a

2

straight line through Richard Esquivel into the Ford truck, did

3

we not?

4

A.

5

You have it, as you placed it now, you absolutely

have a straight line.

6

Q.

Thank you.

7

A.

My

8

Q.

Is that --

9

A.

it may not
THE COURT:

10
11

the only thing that was --

A.

Let him answer the question.

-- it may not be a straight line because I haven't

12

done that straight line.

13

indication was that that line was more over into the area where

14

the cartridge cases are.

15
16
17

Q.

So didn't -- my preliminary

So you didn't even check that line in your

examination, is that what you are telling this jury?
A.

Yeah, but I didn't do it precisely.

But when I

18

looked from the window out and kind of figured out where that

19

truck was and when I get there the truck is not exactly in the

20

same place and no photographs that I could precisely do that.

21

But, it came -- that bullet appeared to come more from where

22

the cartridge cases were, that was my opinion.

23
24
25

Q.

Point is:

You didn't examine it on the night in

question, right?
A.

I didn't examine any of this on the night in
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1

question.
Q.

2

Exactly.

And what I just did here in lining up those

3

two trajectories from Richard Esquivel to that Ford truck

4

clearly shows the shooting could have commenced in that

5

location immediately in front of the blue Ford truck, does it

6

not?

7

A.

Your depiction of it shows that, yes.

8

Q.

I'm sorry I didn't mean to interrupt.

9

And you did

not test that particular theory, did you?

10

A.

What theory?

11

Q.

That the shooting occurred on this line right here.

12

A.

I think that I testified that as long as it clears

13

the truck the shooting could be anywhere.
Q.

14

While we are on it in that location right there, you

15

testified that you expected .22 casings to go traveling a

16

distance of 15 -- 10 to 15 feet, correct?

17

A.

Maximum.

18

Q.

Assuming that truck is roughly 15 feet we have shell

19

casings starting at the end of the rear of the Ford truck,

20

right?

21

A.

This truck depiction is not accurate.

22

Q.

Let's look at a photograph then.
THE COURT:

23

Let me just ask though.

24

on this end see what he was referring to?

25

sure.

Can the jurors

Just want to make
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Q.

1

Let's look at a photograph.

Nathan, can you pull it

2

up.

3

standing in front of people -- showing the location of the blue

4

Ford truck relative to the Nava horne, the horne to the west, and

5

the mailbox, right?

Now there is a photograph marked State's Exhibit 5 -- I'm

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Right.

8

right?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Right.

11

It also shows the height of that Ford truck,

And you -- are you saying that the diagram

that Ms. Ladd from CSI prepared is not reflective of Exhibit 5?

12

A.

According to her testimony.

13

Q.

It's not?

14

A.

According to her testimony it's not drawn to scale.

15

Q.

Well, she testified that it was pretty close to

16

17
18

scale, did she not?

A.

I don't recall that she said -- what I recall is she

said this is not drawn to scale.

19

Q.

That's what you recall?

20

A.

That's what I recall.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

Yeah.

23

Q.

When I talk about for instance the Cavalier

24
25

photograph.

You can have a seat.

Not drawn to scale, huh?

Let's look at that one.

MR. SHAW:

Can you find that one Nathan in 38,
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1

Exhibit 38?

2

Q.

That window right there.

And then you looked at --

3

that's 33, correct?

4

According to the best evidence that photograph then depicts in

5

your opinion someone shooting from the inside?

6

that question?

7

8

9

A.

And you went to 34 and counsel asked you:

Do you recall

I recall that question but that's not --that's not

my exact answer and I'd like to clarify that.

Q.

And I'll give you credit.

You didn't say that you

10

are testifying in front of this jury that the shot came from

11

inside the car, right?

12

A.

Exactly.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

A.

I don't know.

15

Q.

But in order for you to opine that it came from

You don't know, right?
If I had the window, I would know.

16

inside the car you would have to ignore the best evidence, that

17

being the statements, the witness testimony from Richard

18

Esquivel and Lacey Randall.

19

A.

No.

Why would I have to ignore that?

20

Q.

They were standing right in front of the car both of

21

them said that there was no one in the car.

22

testimony, didn't you?

23

A.

I did.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

You heard that

And so assuming their testimony is accurate,

your opinion would be that that bullet or that projectile or
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1

whatever made that hole, that carne from the outside in, if you

2

were to factor in their testimony.

3
4

A.

There is no reason why it couldn't have come from the

other side of the car?

5

Q.

There is no damage to the other side of the car.

6

A.

The other side, as I recall, the window was open.

7

Q.

It was?

8

A.

I believe it was.

9

it was.

10

Q.

You believe it was?

11

A.

Based on photographs I looked at.

12
13
14

15

MR. SHAW:

The photograph indicate to me that

Well, we may not have that one, Nathan.

If you could just find that for later.
Q.

So do -- you are not telling this jury that that shot

carne from inside or outside you simply don't know?

16

A.

I believe that's my testimony.

17

Q.

Okay.

Now, when you talked about where the shooting

18

actually starts, you're not trying to tell this jury precisely

19

where they started shooting-- and I'm not talking about the

20

first two shots.

21

shot as the vehicle -- as the SUV is traveling westbound.

22

are not trying to tell this jury precisely where they started,

23

are you?

I'm talking about the shots that are being

24

A.

No, I can't do that.

25

Q.

Okay.

You

So if, in fact, are you familiar with the
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1

mathematic equation that 1.478 per second, per mile, per hour,

2

are you familiar with that as an indication of how far you

3

travel on a feet per second basis which is calculated using

4

miles per hour.

A.

So were just converting miles per hour to feet per

7

Q.

Feet per second.

8

A.

Feet per second.

9

Q.

Are you familiar with that?

10

A.

Yeah.

11

Q.

Okay.

5
6

hour?

And so if, in fact, someone was

12

traveling -- this vehicle was traveling 1 mile per hour, at

13

1.47 feet per second, times 1 mile per hour, the vehicle

14

literally moves essentially one and a half feet in the time

15

period of 1001, right?

16

A.

Yep, pretty close.

17

Q.

And you can extend that out.

18

an hour it moves 3 feet per second 1001, correct?

19

A.

Pretty close.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

For instance at 2 miles

And at 5 miles an hour it moves roughly 7 feet

per second, right.

22

A.

Pretty good math.

23

Q.

At 10 miles an hour it moves roughly 14.7 --well,

24

25

exactly 14.7 at 10 miles an hour, right?
A.

Pretty close.
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1

2

Q.

Are you familiar with the standard of human

perception and reaction time?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Don't know anything about that?

5

A.

Not enough to testify about it.

6

Q.

Okay.

Fair enough.

You know, however, that the

7

witnesses have testified that these shots were in rapid

8

succession.

9

A.

I don't remember a good characterization.

10

one said, "Pop.

11

shooting as it was moving.

12

that I heard, to say how many seconds between the first shot

13

and the last shot, which I would have been interested to hear.

14
15

Q.

Pop.

Pop."

I think

And another one said that it was
I don't -- no one ever attempted,

You didn't hear anybody say they were in rapid

succession when witnesses testified that --

16

A.

I don't recall that.

17

Q.

You have, have you not, experienced firing a handgun

18

in rapid succession?

19

A.

Many times.

20

Q.

And is it fair to say that you could empty a 10-round

21

22

magazine in a second and a half?
A.

Pretty quick.

Yeah.

Depending on the weapon, of

23

course, pretty much pull the trigger it fires.

24

the trigger quite a few times in a short time.

25

Q.

You can pull

So the point is that if these shots are fired in
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1

rapid succession and they are fired in a location slightly in

2

front of or between the two cars in front of the blue truck or

3

between the two cars, they can get of out that handgun very

4

quickly, can they not?

5

A.

Absolutely.

Absolutely.

6

Q.

If this vehicle is moving, coasting somewhat

7

westbound at some speed, those casings might be struck by the

8

vehicle and moved further to the west, correct?

9

10
11

A.

I wouldn't move them to the west.

They could bounce

back out into the road, certainly.

Q.

Well, let's just say that the Nava home is going to

12

sit here, okay?

13

shell casings are found in, somewhere in there, right?

This is the truck.

This is the area that the

14

A.

(Witness nods head.)

15

Q.

Mailbox is here.

16

A.

(Witness nods head.)

17

Q.

Now, you know, that this road -- this SUV had pulled

18

out from the north curb, correct?

19

A.

That's the testimony, right.

20

Q.

Let's just-- I know this isn't exactly accurate, but

21

it pulled out into the street and somewhere in here it then

22

travels in this direction, right?

23

A.

Right.

24

Q.

Did you hear witnesses say that the SUV was

25

essentially in the middle of the road as it went westbound, did
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1

you remember that?

2

A.

I remember that yeah.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Right.

5

Q.

And as that vehicle travels westbound those shell

So it's middle of the road westbound, right.

6

casings are ejected, you presume, it's right hand eject, right?

7

Most of them are.

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

They are rejected out to the right, correct?

10

A.

Yeah, I think we can pretty well assume they are

11

ejected from the right because it's pretty unusual for one to

12

not be.

13

Q.

14

In order for this shooter from the front passenger

seat to shoot he has to be shooting back this way, right?

15

A.

Exactly.

16

Q.

So the angle if perpendicular to the gun if he is

17

shooting backwards is right there, isn't it, Mr. Gaskill?

18

A.

Well, if I wasn't accurate --

19

Q.

That is a yes or no question.

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

THE COURT:

22
23

Your Honor, I ask that he --

No.

No.

No.

Let him answer the

question.

A.

If I'm not accurate in my depiction I'm certainly not

24

going to say that that is an accurate photograph but

25

precisely what it is.

or

The cartridge casings are all to the
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1

west of the vehicle and some of them are up into the drive

2

area, the curb, the approach.

3

going to get all those cartridge cases in that area unless the

4

vehicle is further to the west.

I can't see any way that we're

5

Q.

And maybe it was.

6

A.

Yeah, I think it was.

7

Q.

Maybe it was slightly further.

A.

We don't want to hit the truck.

8

9

It could be here,

too.

10

to the truck.

11

truck gets in the way.

12

Well, maybe it was slightly --

Q.

There was no damage

So start getting back there too far and then the
That's --

Truck is not damaged, I agree.

Back to issue of the

13

casings being struck by the moving Yukon.

14

out in this direction they are going to come out over the

15

windshield over the hood, are they not, in that location or

16

they may even clear the vehicle?

17
18
19
20

21

A.

Sure.

If they are going

They probably clear the vehicle but we don't

know that 'cause we don't know the gun.
Q.

Exactly.

But they could be struck and moved by the

vehicle, couldn't they?

A.

That's not likely in my opinion at all.

They are

22

going to bounce off the vehicle when they hit it.

23

motion of the vehicle is, I don't believe, going to in part

24

much of a trajectory to the cartridge.

25

bounce and bounce where they bounce, you know, depending on if

The forward

They are going to
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1

they hit this way or hit this way.

2

out a little bit.

3
4

Q.

That's why they are spread

Now, shell casings can also be picked up and moved,

right?

5

A.

Certainly.

6

Q.

They can be moved by tire tread, in fact.

You've

7

seen that, where a tire drives over a shell casing, picks it up

8

and kicked it down the road?

9

A.

Oh, yeah, sure.

10

Q.

You've seen that.

Why not?
You've seen, in fact, people step

11

on the shell casing with some sort of a vibrant-type sole, get

12

caught in the shoe and it's moved, right?

13

14
15

A.

Well, I don't think I have ever seen that but

certainly within the realm of possibility.
Q.

Okay.

Those shell casings that are found in the

16

street if the diagram is correct -- and we can look at the

17

photograph again.

18

them are in the street, right?

19

A.

If the diagram is correct, all but two of

Well, I don't

--

do you want me to go look at the

20

diagram again?

21

were in the street some were in the drive approach.

22

were certainly none in front of the blue vehicle.

23

certainly none much further west than the driveway, itself.

I can't see it from here.

But as I recall some
And there
There was

24

Q.

Right.

25

A.

As I recall the diagram is pretty good, yeah.

And I think the diagram
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1

2

Q.

Diagram is a fair depiction of what was seen in the

photographs, right?

3

A.

Yeah.

They wanted it to be so I'm sure it is.

4

Q.

Okay.

One question -- let's see, one question with

5

regard to the Cavalier.

6

parked in the driveway and the fact that --

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SHAW:

9

That's a front view of the Cavalier

Which Exhibit are you referring to?
Excuse me, 3 71 Your Honor.

The fact that

no projectile or bullet was found inside the Cavalier, right?

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

That projectile, there is no way to know what

12

happened to it?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

It could have gone out the same way it came in?

15

A.

I don't think it came out the same way it came in but

16

we don't know.

17

Q.

Could have actually gone down the vents in the dash?

18

A.

I have no idea.

19

Q.

Right.

20

So you don't find anything unusual about the

fact that it wasn't found?

21

A.

Well --

22

Q.

You lose bullets all the time, don't you?

23

A.

We have -- bullets are tricky to find but inside a

24

car we're usually pretty good.

25

inside a car.

It's not that huge of a space

If we're in a house or we're outside then easily
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1

we lose track of bullets.

2

cars most of the time.

But I'm thinking we find bullets in

3

Q.

Sometimes you don't, fair enough?

4

A.

I don't remember any inside a car that I didn't find

5

but I couldn't rule out the possibility.

6

find a bullet in the car and I'm very surprised that they

7

didn't.

8

Q.

9

Now, when you went out -- and counsel showed you a

photograph I think it was Defense Exhibit 9, with the dark

10

A.

11

Q.

Yeah.
Cavalier.

12

one with the flash.

13

neighborhood, did you?

14

15
16

But I would expect to

A.

Yeah, that is that one.

There is the

You did not check ambient light in the

I didn't use a light meter but my eyes were certainly

testing the ambient light when they were there.
Q.

By that I mean, you did not do anything to try to

17

determine which lights were on in Nava house the date of the

18

shooting, did you?

19

A.

Other than just the photographs and by that time --

20

you know, the time that the photographs were taken lights could

21

have been turned on or off.

22

there is a light on under the carport that's not on in another

23

picture.

24
25

Q.

In fact, in some of the pictures

The light in that carport is off.
What I'm asking though is, the fact of the matter is,

is you couldn't replicate ambient light from the Nava house
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1

from the date that you took -- or on the Exhibit 9, defense

2

showed you, could you?

3

A.

The lights in the house were on when we were there

4

just like the lights were on in the pictures.

5

can say.

6
7

Q.

That's what I

Did you look around the neighborhood and see whether

streets lights were working, did you?

8

A.

I did.

9

Q.

You did or did not?

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

Did you look at the Christina Rivera house and see

12

what lights were on there?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Okay.

Are you telling this jury that you personally

15

checked the moon phase on -- when by the way did you go out in

16

January?

17

A.

I don't recall the exact date.

It's in my notes, but

18

I don't have it.

19

believe, of January, the first 10 days of January.

20
21

Q.

Okay.

But it was somewhere in the first week,

I

Did you personally check the moon phase or did

someone else do that?

22

A.

Someone else did that.

23

Q.

Someone else did that?

24

A.

I reviewed it.

25

Q.

So what you did is you relied on information from
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1

someone else relative to whether or not the time that you went

2

out in January actually depicted the same moon phase on

3

August 5th, right?

4

A.

Yeah.

I reviewed that information.

You know, it's a

5

weather report that the US Weather Service puts out.

6

weather service puts out the reports of moon phases --

The

7

Q.

What time?

8

A.

-- in the paper and so forth.

9

Q.

What time did you visit the scene in January, what

10

time of day?

11

A.

About 9: 0 0, 8: 0 0, 9: 0 0.

12

Q.

At night?

~.

...

Right .

14

Q.

The shooting occurred at 10 minutes to 1:00 roughly.

15

A.

12:30, 1:00, yeah.

16

Q.

I

want to talk to you about some things that you

17

agreed on with Mr. Wakefield.

First of all, so the record is

18

clear, you are not an AFTE certified firearm examiner, are you?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Do you know what AFTE stands for?

21

A.

I

22

Q.

What does it stand for?

23

A.

Association of Fire and Tool Mark Examiners.

24

Q.

You have been never -- never served as a firearm

25

do.

examiner, have you?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

You recognize Mr. Wakefield as an expert in his

3

field, don't you?

4

A.

Yes,

5

Q.

You have respect for Mr. Wakefield in his opinions?

6

A.

Certainly.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

I do.

You testified, as did Mr. Wakefield, that the

casings came from the same gun, correct?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Two projectiles that were recovered, one from Sabrina

11

Prieto and one from Rosendo Nevarez, also came from the same

12

gun, correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

But you were unable to tell us if the projectiles and

15

the casings came from the same gun because that important

16

missing link, the weapon, was never found, right?

17

A.

Right.

18

Q.

So you agree you would like to see that weapon

19

yourself?

20

A.

Absolutely.

21

Q.

That's an important piece of evidence that was never

22

found?

23

A.

Right.

24

Q.

You are familiar, are you not, with the ballistics of

25

a .22 long rifle?
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A.

1

Well, yeah.

I don't consider myself a mathematician,

2

but certainly, I'm familiar with the basic ballistics of a

3

rimfire, yes.

Q.

4

Let me just approach, if I might.

.22

The casings that

5

were recovered would be similar to what you are seeing here

6

where are those casings, let's see.

7

casings that were recovered.

8

these, right?

These are the 10 shell

You had an opportunity to examine

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Those are .22 long rifle shell casings, right?

11

A.

Yes, that's the name of the cartridge.

12

Q.

And they are Winchester Super X Cartridges, are they

14

A.

Yes, they are.

15

Q.

The .22 long rifle that's not a rifle caliber,

13

not?

16

necessarily, that's a caliber that can be shot from a

17

semiautomatic handgun?

18
19

A.

Yeah.

Pretty much any kind of gun you name has been

chambered in a .22 in a rifle.

20

Q.

Handguns or rifles, right?

21

A.

Right.

22

Q.

Now, do you know the bullet weight that the

23

projectiles were that were recovered from Rosendo and Sabrina?

24

A.

The fragments?

25

Q.

No.

Yeah, the bullet projectiles that were recovered
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1

from the two deceased?

2

A.

No, I don't.

3

Q.

Did you look at Mr. Wakefield's report on --

4

A.

I did but I don't recall the bullet wounds.

5

Q.

Let's show it to you.

6

right here.

7

A.

8

report.

9

Q.

Got to get through his notes

I'm not sure that I ever saw his notes.

Look right here.

I saw his

You have BSl and BS14, those were

10

the bullets that were recovered from the two deceased parties.

11

Do you understand that?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Showing .22 caliber, caliber and weight.

14

A.

Right.

15

Q.

.22 caliber, 40 grain bullets, right?

16

A.

Well, that's the way I would interpret it, yes.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

So forty grain bullet is sort of the standard

for a .22 long rifle caliber, isn't it?

19

A.

Yes, pretty standard.

20

Q.

And are you familiar with the standard velocity of a

21
22

.22 caliber long rifle 40 grain bullet?
A.

There is a pretty good range because it depends on

23

the weapon.

24

question.

25

Q.

And it depends on, you know, the cartridge in
But there is a range of velocities.

So is it fair to say that somewhere between a
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1

1050 feet percent second and say 1150 feet per second for the

2

standard 40 grain .22 caliber bullet?

3
4
5

6

A.

I think that you could get them to go faster than

that and some slower than that but I wouldn't argue with you.

Q.

Are you familiar also, Mr. Gaskill, with your

experience with the term "Energy foot pounds"?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

What are energy foot pounds?

9

A.

Foot pounds are-- it's just a measure of the energy

10

of the bullet.

11

can be measured. or calculated at any range of the bullet.

12

measure of the energy.

Typically it's measured at the muscle.

But it
A

It a fair statement to say that the lighter the
14

bullet and slower the speed the lower the foot pounds of

15

energy?

16

A.

Yeah, that's how it's calculated.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

And the heavier the bullet and the faster the

speed the higher the foot pounds of energy?

19

A.

Right.

20

Q.

Are foot pounds sometimes referred to as "knock down

21

power."

22

A.

23

Somewhere erroneously, but they are sometimes

associated with that.

24

Q.

And knock down power is a layman's term, isn't it?

25

A.

Not a very good one but, yeah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Professor James Gaskill - Cross by MR. SHAW
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

251

1

Q.

"Stopping power" that's a layman's term, isn't it?

2

A.

It is.

3

Q.

And you are familiar with the fact that one struck

4

with a 40 grain .22 caliber bullet in the chest, let's say, is

5

not going to be knocked backwards to the ground as we sometimes

6

see with shotgun blasts in the movies?

7

A.

Absolutely correct.

8

Q.

And so someone hit with a 40 grain bullet from a .22

9

10

long rifle cartridge can continue to remain upright, correct?
A.

Yeah.

Whether you fall immediatly or whether you

11

don't fall immediately, you know -- the television depiction is

12

incorrect.

13

instantly.

14

15

Q.

You may fall instantly.

You may not fall

You may be able to walk, or run.

Quite a distance

with a bullet in your chest or your back?

16

A.

Yes, that's correct.

17

Q.

And so given that information, isn't it true there is

18

nothing unusual about individuals being in front of the swamp

19

cooler on the grass area as depicted in Exhibit 2?

20

step up and look with me so I can see where you're pointing.
Okay.

21

You can

Nothing unusual about someone being able to

22

stand in this area located in front of the swamp cooler or the

23

north in the grassy area and then being able to travel, or

24

walk, or run to the area of the carport door?

25

A.

It could happen.
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1

Q.

And is it also true with respect to a .22 long rifle

2

cartridge fired from a handgun that there is very little

3

recoil?

4

A.

That's true.

5

Q.

And by "recoil" what are we talking about?

6

A.

We're talking about the force of the weapon in

7

opposition to the force of the bullet going out.

8

Newton's third law of motion:

9

reaction.

So it's

For every action there is a

So the bullet goes out with a certain amount of

10

force; there is the same certain amount of force in the

11

opposite direction.
So if you have a powerful force going forward, you

12
13

14
15

will have a powerful force going backward.

Q.

And that force forward can be effected by the bullet

weight and powder charge behind that bullet weight?

16

A.

Absolutely.

As well as the weight of the weapon.

17

Q.

As well as, the weight of the weapon.

And the force

18

backward, again, is effected by the bullet weight and the

19

powder charge behind the bullet?

20

A.

It's equal and opposite.

21

Q.

And so when we talk about a .22 caliber weapon having

22

very little recoil that means it's not -- it's not bouncing

23

much, is it?

24

A.

25

That's right.

hold it pretty steady.

It depends on the shooter, but you can
Sure.
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2

Q.

So a .22 caliber can be held relatively firm with one

hand, can it not?

3

A.

It can.

4

Q.

And as opposed to say someone handling a .45 ACP the

5

recoil forces are much different, are they not?

6

A.

Sure.

7

Q.

And so while a .45 ACP may be more difficult to keep

8

on target, a .22 caliber semiautomatic, if you would, would be

9

less difficult to keep on target from recoil.

10

A.

Correct.

11

Q.

Fair enough.

12

A.

Sure.

13

Q.

You taught Sandra Ladd?

14

A.

I did.

15

Q.

You taught Paul Rimmasch?

16

A.

I did.

17

Q.

I believe you testified under direct that you had

18

faith in their abilities as criminal crime scene investigators?

19

A.

I do.

20

Q.

Mr. Gaskill, you were the director of the crime lab

They are very good.

They really are.

21

at Weber State University from 1972 until it's demise in late

22

1993; is that accurate?

23

A.

There was a short period I actually resigned from the

24

crime lab and went back to teaching for a short time before the

25

laboratory was turned back over to the Department of Public
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1

Safety.

2

under the direction of the Department of Public Safety for a

3

period of time after that, before it moved to the present

4

location out in the BDO.

5

time that was under the direction of DPS.

6
7

Q.

And then the laboratory remained at Weber State, still

Sorry.

I was not director of it during the

I didn't mean to interrupt you.

Do you mean

when the crime lab closed at Weber State University?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Was it within months of your resigning?

10

A.

Well, months.

11

Q.

Certainly within the year though after you resigned?

12

A.

You know, I don't know exactly when that sequence

13
14
15

16

occurred.
Q.

Well, let me -THE COURT:

Mr. Shaw, would this be a good time to

take a break?

17
18
19

Yeah, but I don't know how many.

{Break taken. )
THE COURT:

All right.

We'll back in session in

State versus Perea.

20

Anything before we bring in the jury?

21

MR.

RICHARDS:

Just one thing, Your Honor?

I know

22

that you ruled fairly early in the game as far as our

23

reconstruction video.

24

produced at this point we are asking that Your Honor reconsider

25

and allow us to put in the reconstruction video.

Based upon all the evidence that's been
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1

2

Let's see.

THE COURT:

Exhibits 28-31.

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SHAW:

6

State's position.
I haven't asked questions that would open

All right.

THE COURT:

8

defense's request.

9

just not sufficient.

It just seems to me that the foundation is
Sc I'll exclude Exhibit's 28, 29, 30, and

MR. SHAW:

And before this Exhibit goes back, we need

to pull the ones that were disallowed.
Yeah.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. RICHARDS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17

They have not been flagged in this.

Okay.

We've got those numbers.

We moved to enter -- I guess I did

move to enter all of those.

18

19

I'm going to deny the

31.

11
12

Exactly.

up that as being admissible now.

7

10

You are talking about

THE COURT:

I think we admitted:

9, 10, 11, 12, 13

16, and 19.

20

MR. HEWARD:

21

THE CLERK:

I'm doing it right now.

22

THE COURT:

Anything else then before we bring back

23

24

25

Is Venna going to pull those out, Judge?

the jury?
MR. HEWARD:

No.

(The following proceedings were held in open court after the
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ju_ry enta.-red the courtroan. )

1

THE COURT:

2

3

Let's have the record reflect the jury is

now present.

4

Go ahead, Mr. Shaw.

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

Q.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Mr. Gaskill, I started to ask you about your

7

experience at the Weber State Crime Lab back in the early 90's.

8

The Weber State Crime Lab was not -- it wasn't really a

9

affiliated with the State of Utah; is that correct?

10
11

It wasn't

managed by the State.

A.

It was funded by the State partially but not managed.

12

It was -- it was managed and partially funded and administered

13

at Weber State University.

14
15

Q.

So you were the lead administer of that crime lab; is

that correct?

16

A.

That's correct.

17

Q.

And you talked about the fact that you left the crime

18

lab, resigned your position.

19

date you resigned?

Do you recall specifically what

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Isn't it true that as part your resignation -- your

22

resignation one reason was because the crime lab had been

23

accused of some impropriety and misconduct?

24

A.

That was not the reason I resigned.

25

Q.

Was the crime lab itself accused of some impropriety
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1

and misconduct during your tenure as its director?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And you resigned after that accusation carne forward,

4

correct?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And you were the person responsible for all of the

7

employees, crirninalists, workers in the Weber State Crime Lab;

8

is that correct?

9

A.

That's correct.

10

Q.

Isn't it also true that there was an investigation of

11

Weber State Crime Lab conducted by the Utah State Attorney

12

General's office?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And you were part of that investigation, were you

16

A.

I was.

17

Q.

Mr. Gaskill, is it also true that in a case

15

not?

18

criminal case, State versus David Valken-Leduc, you

19

misidentified a fingerprint -- two fingerprints actually, from

20

that case as having come from the defendant suspect.

21

fact, those fingerprints came from the victim who was killed.

22

23

A.

That's close.

When, in

I did misidentify two fingerprints.

I

don't know who they ended up matching.

24

MR. SHAW:

25

THE COURT:

That's all.
All right.
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1

Mr. Richards.

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3
4

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RICHARDS:

Did the attorney general in their investigation ever

Q.

5
6

find you at fault at anything?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Okay.

9
10

And have you testified since that time for the

State of Utah, the prosecution, in prosecuting crimes since
that date?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

How many times?

.........

.,

A.

('\, ., . ;- +-

14

Q.

Okay.

15

Just one moment.

t::'l.

~U....Lt-\:...

"'

u.

-F O.taT

..L " - YV

•

You have the exhibit book up there; is that

correct?

16

A.

You are referring to this black one?

17

Q.

Yes.

19

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

If may just show the jury so they can see that right

·18

And let me have you go to State's Exhibit No.

5.

21

there.

22

also Exhibit No. 16 and 17 if you would.

23

24

25

I can pass that around.

MR. SHAW:

And then I want you to look at

Do you want to make a record of what you

are holding up?
MR. RICHARDS:

This is Exhibit No. 5.

And are you
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1

going to verify to the fact that the witness is looking at the

2

same picture?

3

Q.

Is that the same as Exhibit 5 that you are looking

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Okay.

4

at?

That Exhibit No. 5 shows at least a pretty

7

good prospective as where the truck was and distance between

8

the front of the truck and the driveway of the Nava home; is

9

that correct?

10

A.

I think it does.

11

Q.

And then go to Exhibit No. 16 and ask if this is the

12

same picture?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And Exhibit No. 17?

15

A.

And that's the same as the picture that I have, yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

I will just hold those up.

And 16 and 17 show

17

us the location of the back of the truck in comparison to where

18

the shell casings are; is that correct?

19

A.

Yes, they do.

20

Q.

And can you tell from this photograph how far to get

21

seven shells closest to the front of the truck, how far back

22

from the front of the truck would that be?

23
24

25

A.

So you're asking the seven shells closest to the

truck?
Q.

Yes?
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Which would be the -- well, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 and then 4

A.

1
2

and 5 and 2 are kind of in a line.

3

from what?

Q.

4
5

So how far back that is

From the front of the blue pick-up truck, assuming

the blue pick-up truck would be 15 feet as Mr. Shaw said.

6

A.

To the back of the seven would be 30 feet.

7

Q.

So to throw the -- if you could come look at this

8

here real quickly.

If someone were in a vehicle located at

9

this point which is where Mr. Shaw used the straight line of

10

the other exhibit, that would be at least 30 feet to get to the

11

seventh shell casing.

12

A.

Yeah, I think close.

13

~m.

14

THE COURT:

15

Any other questions?

16

MR. SHAW:

RICHARDS:

17
18

Q.

Looking at Exhibit 17-MR. RICHARDS:

more.

25

Your Honor, I'm sorry.

I have one

Good thing I have somebody to remind me.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION (cont 'd)

22

24

Just a couple.

BY MR. SHAW:

20

23

All right.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

19

21

That's all the questions I have.

BY MR. RICHARDS:

Q.

Based upon all of the evidence that you have

reviewed, do you believe that there was more than one gun used
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1

in this crime?

2

3

MR. RICHARDS:

6

THE COURT:

It has but been go ahead and try it one

more time.
A.

7

Yes, I do.
MR. RICHARDS:

8
9

It's been asked and

answered.

4

5

Objection.

That's all I have.

RECROSS-EXAMINATICN (cont 'd)

By MR. SHAW:

10

A.

You wanted me to look at 17.

11

Q.

Sixteen.

12

A.

Sixteen.

13

Q.

Looking at Exhibit 16, it's clear, is it not, that

14
15

that photograph was taken from the ground?
A.

Well, unless somebody

I mean, I don't know.

It

16

appeared that it was taken from someone standing on the ground,

17

yeah, but I don't know that.

18

Q.

Okay.

1~,

A.

It's a little tough to tell.

20

Q.

But looking at that photograph, there a clear line of

21

site, assuming that the shooting take place somewhere in the

22

area of the rear of the Ford truck, there a clear line of sight

23

to the area in front of the swamp cooler, is there not?

24

25

A.

Yeah, you're talking about like up on the sidewalk in

front of -- directly in front of the house?
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1

Q.

Right?

2

A.

There is, yes.

3

Q.

Right.

And of course, this paragraph does not

4

account for an individual being up in the air standing on the

5

floorboard of a Yukon Denali, does it?

6

A.

Well, like I said, I don't know where Sandy was

7

standing when she took this picture.

8

the ground she is.

9

Q.

So I can't say how far of

But even looking at Exhibit 16, you can see from the

10

ground at a perspective west of the truck, you can still very

11

clearly see the window of the Cavalier right rear and right

12

front passenger window of the Cavalier and the Cavalier

13

extending forward outside

14

truck, can you not?

15

A.

You can see

blue Ford pickup

from this angle we can see a little

16

ways down on the door, the rear door, back to about the back of

17

the passenger's rear door window.

18

about the front -- about where the rearview mirror is we can

19

see forward, we can see the fender of the white car.

20

about-- I'm saying, half of the car maybe a little bit more is

21

obscured in this view.

22
23

Q.

And then we can see from

So

Again, that photograph was taken on the night in

question by CSI, correct?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

All but -- it appears that all but two of those shell
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1

casings are in the street?

2

A.

Right.

3

Q.

Thank you, Professor Gaskill.

6

Q.

The vantage point from this particular Exhibit 16

And No. 7 and 8 are up in the approach way.

7

would be from where?

8

please?

9

A.

Okay.

If you could go up to Exhibit No. 2,

This I'm -- depicting this is the mailbox

10

which is slightly to the ·west of the driveway where the

11

cartridge cases are, and it appears that the furthest west

12

cartridge case is about a little bit back from the front of the

13

this car that's depicted as a yellow car here.

14

photograph is further west of that.

15
16

Q.

And the

And if you were shooting a gun from that location

were would the shell casings alight?

17

A.

18

it was.

19

not to be that far forward all -- that would be to me a little

20

bit surprising.

21

this yellow car.

We are back to that issue of we don't know what gun
But if they go to the right then you would expect them

I

would expect them to be more back around

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23

MR. SHAW:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. RICHARDS:

That's all the questions I have.

No further questions.
All right.

Can we excuse Mr. Gaskill?

Yes.
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEB
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OFFACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER OF THE
COURT ON DEFEDANT'S MOTION
TO ALLOW WITNESSES TO TESTIFY
ANONTiviOUSLY FOR SAFETY
PURPOSES

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 071901847

AUG 0 8 2010

RIQO :MARIANO PEREA,
Defendant.

JUDGE ERNIE W. JONES

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Allow Witnesses to Testify
Anonymously for Safety Purposes.
Oral argument was heard on February 19, 2010. Having reviewed the evidence: the
briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Defense counsel has proffered four anonymous witnesses who could potentially
give exculpatory testimony.
2. Defense counsel has represented that these prospective witnesses, because of
concerns for their safety, are \Villing to testify only on condition of complete
anonymity, which includes testifying in closed court under pseudonyms as well as
no advance disclosure of their names to police, investigators, and third persons.
3. Defense counsel has represented that these prospective witnesses fear retaliatory
attacks on themselves or their family should their names be disclosed.
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4. Conditions of complete anonymity would severely hamper the State's ability to
investigate the prospective witnesses and their versions of events.
5. Conditions of complete anonymity proposed by the defense would preclude the
State from adequately preparing for cross examination of these witnesses.
6. Conditions of complete anonymity proposed by the defense would preclude the
State from reconsidering the charges brought against Defendant should the
witnesses' information warrant such reconsideration.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(c) provides: "Except as otherwise provided
or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor ... any other item of
evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made
available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his
case."
2. Good cause has been shown that disclosure of the identities of potential
exculpatory witnesses is necessary for the State to prepare its case.
3. The Court has the power to order that the identity of all prospective defense
witnesses be disclosed to the State.
ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, and based on the Court's rev--iew of the record, the
Defendant's Motion to Allow Witnesses

to

Testify Anonymously for Safety Purposes is

DENIED in part, and RESER\TED in part, as follows:
1. The names and addresses of all prospective defense witnesses shall be disclosed to
the State by February 22, 2010.
2. Any prospective \Vit.11esses whose identities are not rlisclosed to the State by
February 22, 2010, shall not be permitted to testify.
3. Defense counsel is permitted to inform the prospective witnesses that they have
the option not to speak with prosecutors or investigators.
4. Prosecutors and investigators shall be permitted to investigate the prospective
witnesses and their versions of events in the way they see fit, including, as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appropriate, revealing the names of the prospective witnesses to others who may
have information concerning this case.
5. The Court reserves judgment whether witnesses will.be permitted to testify under
pseudonyms.
6. The Court reserves judgment whether the courtroom will be closed to the public
during the testimony of these prospective witnesses.
7. The Court reserves judgment whether the Defendant can waive his right to be

Dated this

~'""i

'3

day o(Mtry, 2010

rnie W. Jones
District Court Judge

Ra

all W. Richard

1

Cminsel for Defendant

./
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1

Februazy 19, 2010; 9:12a.m.

2

PROCEEDINGS

3

* * *
Good morning everyone.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SHAW:

6

THE COURT:

7

State of Utah vs. Riqo Perea.

8

going to do some motions today.

9

reflect that Mr. Shaw and Mr. Heward and Mr. Lyon are here for

10

the State.

Good morning.
This is the time set for the matter of
It 1 s case ending in 184 7.

We 1 re

And let 1 s have the record

Mr. Richards and Ms. Sipes.

11

MR; RICHARDS:

12

THE COURT:

13

I guess I might indicate, I had a chance to talk to

14

Mr. Shaw and Mr. Richards yesterday just to try to get a feel

15

for where we are going in it today.

16

got through a lot more than I believe we are going to

17

acconplish today.

18

just make a record of where we 1 re going in teJ:ms of motions

19

that need to be resolved.

20
21

Also Ms. Richards, right?

I was hoping we could have

Mr. Richards, you filed a notice that you were going

to put on an expert involving coerced confession.
MR. RICHARDS:

23

THE COURT:

25

All right.

Maybe I could just go through and we could

22

24

.&"'ld Bri tta"'ly too.

Yes.

And I think Mr. Shaw told me yesterday

that the State was going to file a motion in limine.
MR. SHAW:

Yes, we should have that by Monday, your
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1

Honor.

2

THE COURT:

3

argue that next Friday again?

4

MR. RICHARDS :

5

THE COURT:

6

Yes .

Evecybody in agreement then?

Let's see,

that's going to be, what, the 26th?

7

MR. SHAW:

8

THE COURT:

9

And the idea is maybe to try to

Okay.

Yeah.
February 26th.

And that will be --

9:00a.m. okay to start?

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE COURT:

Good for me.

All right.

And then I show t.~e ~.efense

12

has filed a motion to declare life without parole as being

13

cruel and unusual, also unnecessary rigor.

14
15

MR. RICHARDS:

Your Honor, could I have just a moment

on that with counsel?

16

THE COURT:

17

(Counsel confer. )

18

Sure.

MR. RICHARDS:

You bet.

Your Honor, on that motion, I just

19

talked to couns$1.

The basis of that motion is that the

20

Supreme Court currently has two cases, the US Supreme Court has

21

two cases before it on the -- not exactly identical but just

22

saying life without parole on a -- both of these are a non --

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

Death penalty?
-- death penalty cases.

But on Meyers

that that was -- I mean, the argument that it's
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1

unconstitutional, after reading those, I felt compelled to file

2

that motion.

3

court' s already denied that very similar motion on the death

4

penalty.

5

on that motion.

6

have talked to counsel on that.

7

sul:mit that on the motions -- on the memos I mean.

I presmne that the court would do something similar

8
9
10

)

I preserved that for appellate pw:poses.

THE COURT:

I

So we would just be willing to

And I don' t have one fran the state.

I

guess that's my ·question, Mr. Shaw, did you want to respond in
writing?

11
12

I understand the court's, and recognize the

MR. SHAW:

We will respond L"l writing, your Honor,

and have that filed -- we're working on that.

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14

MR. HEWARD:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

MR. LYON:

17

THE COURT:

We' 11 just sul:mit that on motion.
Tuesday, your Honor.
Whatever timing --

I think we can be done by Tuesday.
Well, you know, I think Mr. Richards is

To be honest with you or candid with you, I just don't

18

right.

19

know how I could ever grant that motion when I've already

20

denied the motion to strike down the death po-Ilalty and this is

21

a

p:::._nal ty

less severe than the death penalty.

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23

THE COURT:

Yeah, logically.

Yeah, I mean, I guess I'm inclined based

24

on just looking at the motion, I don't want you to have to do

25

any more work than you already have on the table.
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1

MR. SHAW:

I think what we had planned to do was

2

simply inco:r:porate some of the prior arguments very briefly

3

that we've already made in those motions, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

All right.

I definitely want to give you

5

a chance to respond, but I guess my reaction is just from

6

looking at the defense's motion, I don't know that it's well

7

taken.

8

be able to reserve that issue for a later day.

9
10

I think _what Mr. Richards is saying is I just want to

MR. RICHARDS:

Yeah, and I don't want the court to

understand that I don't believe

11

THE COURT:

No.

12

MR. RICHARDS:

very solidly in that motion.

I

13

don't think a person like Riqo should get life without parole.

14

I don' t believe he should.

15

THE COURT:

Yeah, and I'm not asking you

16

MR. RICHARDS:

I understood --

17

THE COURT:

I

mean just reading the motion and the

18

memorandum, my initial reaction was how can I grant this motion.

19

when I 've already ruled the death penalty is not

20

unconstitutional.

21

MR. RICHARDS:

And that's why I said what I said.

22

I 'm not abandoning my .motion, nor am I saying I don't believe

23

that the State needs to respond.

I think they need to respond

24

just so we have that preserved.

But I kind of understood where

25

the handwriting is on the wall on that one, so.
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THE COURT:

1

What I will do then, Mr. Shaw, if the

2

State wants to respond in writing fine, but I am going to deny

3

the motion at this time and to declare life without parole as

4

being cruel and unusual.

5

Okay.

6

Then we had, the Defendant filed a motion in limine

Anything else on that issue or is that --

7

to exclude certain evidence.

8

of the defendant' s cell phone camera.

9

you said you needed some time to respond?

10

MR. SHAW:

11

MR. RICP'..ARDS:

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COURT:

14

I guess the photographs came up
And I think Mr. Shaw,

We would respond on that, yes, your Honor.
So we' 11 argue that Friday?

Yeah, we could argue that Friday.
So we're going to do that motion next

Friday?

15

MR. SHAW:

16

THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay.

All right.

And then I had the

17

Defendant's motion to prohibit the possibility of the death

18

penalty.

19

needed time to respond to that one too.

And I think Mr. Shaw indicated that he felt like you

20

MR. SHAW:

21

THE COURT:

Yes.
Again, I don't mind it, but I guess my

22

initial reaction is we've already argued the question of the

23

constitutionality of the death penalty and isn't this just

24

another way of saying the same thing?

25

appreciation for how this differs from same of your earlier

I guess I didn't have an
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motions, but --

1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

They are just broad on different

3

grounds or aspects, I guess.

4

theory.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

We can argue that -- a different

Different theory then?
Yeah.

So --

So you just want to set that over to next

Friday?

8

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

THE COURT:

That would be fine.

And Mr. Shaw, you are in agreement with

that?

11

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COURT:

14

Yeah, that's fine.
And you will have a response, I guess, by

the same, maybe Monday?

15

MR. SHAW:

Tuesday, Wednesday.

16

what happened to the motion cutoff.

17

cutoff.

18
19
20

THE COURT:
I

I did too.

We're -- I don't know

I thought we had a motion

I know there's a lot of last

minute flurries, but to me a lot of these motions are ones that
could have been filed a long time ago.
MR. HEWARD:

Whatever happened to our cutoff date,

23

THE COURT:

That's what we were just talking about.

24

MR. RICHARDS:

21
22

25

Judge?

try my best.

Well, in answer to that, your Honor, I

And I understand the desirability of the cutoff

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801)
634-5549
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

1

date.

As you may recall, at every time we tried to set one of

2

those, I said I 'm going to do my best to do it before that but

3

I'm not going to be held to that.
The problem is as we get into this stuff, we find

4
5

more and more information.

6

is continuing to give me more information.

7

an evidence and property report this morning that looks about a

8

10-page document.

9

mail and some other things.

10

I mean, I just got

I just got this morning 10 CD discs of jail

THE COURT:

all

And, you know, frankly, the State

Well, I realize that.

I know there's

11

for example,

12

penalty, I mean they are not fact intensive that they could

13

have be=_n filed -- we could have had a deadl; ne for those a

14

long time ago.

15

this schedule together is so we'd get all those things resolved.

16

and handled before -- because I know the nature of trial work

17

is that, you know, as you get closer to the trial date, tl--Lings

18

start popping up that you didn't realize.

19

that.

20

death penalty motions being filed on a case that's been pending

21

for two and a half years.

22

of t'lotese motions t.."'lat deal with t.."'le death

And that's one of the reasons I tried to put

And I understand

But I'm just a little frustrated that we;re seeing these

MR. RICHARDS:

And I apologize.

It's probably my

23

lack of intelligence because sometimes things hit me, and when

24

they hit me, I bring them up.

25

you would call it -- I mean, there is no stack of motions that

There is no -- I don't know what
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1

we're told as defense attorneys we file every single one of

2

these on a death penalty case.

3

and I filed those as early as I could.

4

ones hit me, and I have to file, and I think I need to preserve

5

it.

6

to have a lot of this jail mail.

7

August of 2007.

And some of these new

What I am saying is, I mean, it would have been real nice

8

MR. SHAW:

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

I mean, there are· certain ones,

That's

~_n

I mean this dates back to

provided, though, Randy.

I never got these.

I have never got

these discs.

11

MR. SHAW:

12

what our list says.

13

According on our records you have from

MR. RICHARDS:

I have one -- well, I had a bunch of

14

discs of jail conversations, but I've never got a disc of the

15

jail mail, never.

16

conversations that were intercepted, telephone and visits, but

17

none other than those.

18

I've got a stack of maybe 10 discs of

MR. SHAW:

Those are limine motions.

That has

19

nothing to do with death penalty stuff.

20

responding to two motions on death penalty and life without

21

parole.

22

trial.

23

We 1 re taiking about

And liroine motions come up all the time close to

THE COURT:

Well, let me tell you, we are two weeks

24

from starting this trial, and I 've got plenty of time if you

25

need to set things.

I know we are set for next Friday, but you
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1

know, if you need some other days and some other hearings,

2

let's talk about doing that if we can now because I had a trial

3

that went off.

4

help you out as far as trying to argue those, but -- and we're

5

going to do next Friday which is the 26th.

6

want to try to set things ahead of that or if you want to go to

7

the first week in March and start setting things, but, you

8

know, I just don't want to have you guys show up on March 8

9

with 200 potential jurors in the wings and say, gee, Judge, we

10

need more time or we need to argue this or that. · I just don't

11

\'1ant to keep the jur.{ \'.'aiting.

·unfortunately I've got the next two weeks I can

I don't know if you

I guess that's

t.~e

idea.

12

And I understand that there are times and things that

13

come up that you don't understand or anticipate, but, boy, just

14

-- this is getting a little frustrating.

15

day with a court reporter.

16

that goes to getting this thing ready, and then to find out

17

that we're going to accomplish virtually nothing this morning,

18

it's a little annoying I think, but -- so you may want to think

19

about that.

We set aside a half a

You know, there's a lot of work

You can call me on the phone or call my clerk.

20

MR. SHAW:

21

motion, your Honor, or motion.

22

limine regarding the testimony of James Gaskell.

23

intend to file a motion in limine regarding the testimony of

24

Mr. Aushee (pho~etic) , the defense expert --

25

THE COURT:

Well, I can respond briefly on the State's
We have filed a motion in
We also

On the coerced confession?
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1

MR. SHAW:

On the confession.

And frankly, those,

2

those two motions may require a hearing outside the presence of

3

jury members because, you know, we argue the foundational

4

expertise of those people.

5

do that.

Well, I 'd like to do it next Friday.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR.. RICHARDS:

8

THE COURT:

9

And I don' t know when you want to

We can do it Friday.

We already talked about the coerced

confession issue and that we are going to do next Friday.

10

I assume the motion -MR. RICHARDS:

On Gaskell.

THE COURT:

on Gaskell, we can do the same on

14

MR. RICHARDS:

On next Friday.

15

MR. SHAW:

16

MR.. RICHARDS:

17

THE COURT:

11

I

12
13

And

Friday.

We can do that.
We have the whole day.

All right.

The only motion I show that

18

we are ready to .deal with today is this Defendant's motion to

19

have the witnesses testify in anonymity, I guess, is that the

20

best word?

21

MR. RICHA..'!:IDS:

22

THE COURT:

23

24
25

Yes.

Let' s go ahead if we can and address

that.
MR. RICHARDS:
of Deirdre Gonnan.

And your Honor, I do have an affidavit

I think you may have had that by fax
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1

hopefully?

2

THE COURT:

3

:MR. RICHARDS:

4

:MR. SHAW:

5

THE COURT:

6

And Mr. Shaw --

Yes, we have that one, your Honor.
You want to go ahead and file this, the

affidavit of Deirdre Gonnan?

7

:MR. RICHARDS:

8

THE COURT:

9

That's the actual one.

Yes, if we could, please.

Any objection if we make that part of the

record?
No objection to making it part of the

:MR.. HEWARD:

10

I don't see the relevance of it, but

11

record, your Honor.

12

there's no objection to making i t part of the record.
THE COURT:

13

We' 11 go ahead and make it part of the

And Mr. Richards, I might indicate I did get a chance

14

record.

15

to read your brief on the matter, so go ahead.

16
17

:MR.. RI.CHARDS:

Thank you.

And I 1 11 try to tie in the

relevance of Ms. Gonnan 1 s affidavit here shortly.
This is a difficult case, not only because i t

18
19

involves the death penalty potentially but also because i t

20

involves gangs.

21

frightening to most people, partic-l.llarly to those that may

22

witness the situation and to actually be called upon to

23

testify.

24
25

And i t involves situations that are relatively

And I would like to believe that retaliation doesn't

happen, but i t does.

I would like to believe that somehow our
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1

witnesses could be protected in a normal courtroom setting, but

2

I don't believe that that's possible.

3

factors.

4

I point to a number of

I mention some of those in my memorandum.
Since this case has arisen, we've had one person

5

shot, Mr. Ashton, in retaliation.

6

or the home of riis grandmother where he stayed a good portion

7

of his life who's been shot at least twice and maybe three

8

times either in retaliation, or we think maybe more accurately

9

in the warning type shootings.

10

We've had my client's home,

We had an incident in the courtroom on the day of the

11

prelimina....'"'Y hearL"'lg in retaliation, in the courthouse, exC'.J.se

12

me, where my client' s mother and my client 1 s sister were

13

sev·erely beat.e.."'l in t."'le elevator of the courthouse.

14

all places where you would think that there would be some

15

sanctuary, some safety, some guarantee that people won 1 t be

16

hurt, you would think it would be in the courthouse.

17

it didn 1 t happen -- it didn 1 t occur, it didn 1 t ---the

18

protection wasn 1 t there.

19

mother and my client is sister were beat.a'"'l in retaliation.

20

Let me put it that way.

I mean of

And yet

My client 1 s

I unfortunately opened the paper today, and I read on

--

-

21

the front oaae of the local section -- I brouaht it.

22

to ask that this be entered into evidence today.

23

counsel has seen that.

24

MR. HEWARD:

25

MR. RICHARDS:

I'm going

I presume

I haven 1 t seen that, Judge.
You are welcome to read through it.
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1

It 1 s an article today.

It 1 s entitled Perea 1 s colleagues or

2

colleague faces charges of aggravated assault for retaliation

3

in this case against the, apparently the victim 1 s family, the

4

Prieto family.
It troubles me on a number of levels.

5

Obviously, my

6

heart dropped when I read that because the jury questionnaires

7

have gone out, the jurors potentially would read that article

8

and that certainly bodes poorly against my client.

9

going to try to figure out a way to get around that.

10

And I 1 m
I don 1 t

know what to do, frankly.
The a...-ticle also me..."ltions that there have bee."l

11
12

retaliatory shootings against my client from the other side and

13

arrests.

I don't know if you 1 ve had a chance to read the

14

article.

It was not very timely, at least not from the

15

defense 1 s standpoint.
I don 1 t know that the prosecution particularly

16

17

disagrees with me that the witnesses in this particular case

18

are in some danger.

19

happen danger, this is a very real danger because it has

20

happened.
I

21

hav~

And this isn 1 t a fanciful maybe it might

had the opportunity in preparing for this

22

trial to talk to several witnesses.

Now these witnesses talked

23

to me on the condition that I not raise their name, and I will

24

honor that today.

25

our case.

These witnesses are incredibly important to

At least two of these witnesses would be witnesses
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1

that would have been there at the scene and observed a portion

2

or all of the happenings.

3

incredibly exculpatory as far as my client is concerned.

4

Both of those wimesses would testify that the

Both of those witnesses are

5

what infonnation they have and what infonnation that they

6

observed would 0dicate that my client is not the one that shot

7

the gun from the car.

8
9

I have two wimesses that will say that.

Both of them have told me that they will not testify
without being granted some sort of protection.

10

don't have a wi mess protection program ability.

11

the State either cL""es.

12

chance of getting something of that nature.

13

to devise some other method.

14

Now I certainly
I don't think

They would certair..ly have a lot better

And so I've tried

I have one wimess tl'-..at will -- I have two other

15

wimesses that I've talked to who will testify that someone

16

else sul:mitted to them that they had -- someone else, not my

17

client, admi.tted to them. that they had done the shooting.

18

have two of them.

19

they are afraid.

20

I

Neither one of them will testify because
And it 1 s a very real fear, a very real. fear.

So where that leaves me as a defense attorney in a

21

capital case is in a situation where I have a client that I

22

believe is not guilty

23

MR. HEWARD:

Judge, I '11 object to that.

24

Mr. Richards' beliefs has no business in this courtroom and it

25

is totally inproper and unethical for him to be saying he
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1

believes anything about this.

2

THE COURT:

3

goes without saying.

4

job is, but --

Well, I suppose to a certain extent that
He is defending him and that's what his

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

THE COURT:

And I presume that --

-- as far as the motion goes, I

7

understand you are struggling with trying to figure out how to

8

put this evidence on and protect the witnesses.

9

just need to focus on that issue rather than --

10

MR. RICHARDS:

All right.

So maybe we

I've been appointed to

11

represent my clie.."lt who has plead not guilty 1 and I have

12

evidence that would indicate that he is not guilty.

13

evidence I just ·laid out to you.

14

that's all right with counsel.

15

don't know what to do.

17

represent my client.

18

what I've been appointed to do.

19

very seriously.

20

Let me put it that way, if

So I 'm in a dilerm:na, your Honor.

16

I have

I can -- and I

I on the one hand have a duty to
I have a duty to save his life.

That's

And I take that assignment

I have four witnesses that have came to me in

21

confidence and told me info:r::mation that I think would be

22

incredibly inq;:>ortant to the -- saving my client's life and to

23

the d-=-fense case --

24

25

THE COURT:

Let me ask you, what is your suggestion

as far as how we would do this?
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

Well, my suggestion is this.

That --

2

and I 've talked to these witnesses.

3

and I propose we bring them in through the back door, maybe, of

4

the elevator or something, bring them into the courtroom and

5

have the jury there.

6

prosecution their names, but we agree privately that we assign

7

them an anonymous name that could be used, a John Doe or

8

something of that nature.

9
10
11
12

THE COURT:

If we can bring them in,

I don't mind at that point telling the

They would actually come and testify here

in court.
MR. RICHARDS:
here in court.

They actually would came and testify

Counsel would be told their names.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. RICHARDS:

Counsel, as well as myself would be

15

ordered, as well as all the court personnel, and we would ask

16

that a minimum of court personnel be present, would all be

17

instructed that they are not to divulge that name to anyone.

18

My client has agreed, and he will do so today, agree

19

not to be present during that portion of the testimony because

20

of the fear that even he could somehow be forced or coerced or

21

forced to divulge those names at some later date.

22

be agreeable not to be in the courtroom.

23

And he would

We would ask that the investigating officers not be

24

in the courtroani.

And I do that for a very real reason.

25

that is because I have had experience that if I give these
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1

names today to counsel, they will then give them to their

2

investigators who will then go out and start talking to these

3

individuals and will frighten them off.

4

that will happen.

5

against counsel because I don't think they would ever want that

6

to happen.

7

infoDnation about these individuals, they would send out people

8

that would --

And I believe that

And I don't mean that in any malicious way

>c

9

But I think it -- in their effort to get

THE COURT:

What about the courtroan, though?

I

10

mean, if they cane in and testify in front of the jury, you are

11

not asking me to close the courtroom, are you?

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE COURT:

I'm asking you to close the courtroan.

How can I do that?

Is there any case law

14

or statute that allows a district court judge to close the

15

courtroan in the middle of a murder trial?

16

understand what you are b:ying to do is to protect their

17

identity, but --

18
19

MR. RICHARDS:

22

Well, we do it all the time.

We do it

in juvenile court cases every single day.

20
21

I mean, I

THE COURT:

Yeah, juvenile court is different, isn't

it?
MR. RICHARDS:

No.

It's different, although the

23

Supreme Court has ruled that the -- under the 14th Amendment,

24

the rights under a public trial apply to juveniles; however,

25

they've carved out these exceptions because of an effort to
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1

protect the juvenile.

2

THE COURT:

But are you aware of any cases?

I didn't

3

see anything in 'your brief that said that there' s any case law

4

out there that say it's all right or it's pennissible for the

5

district court judge to close the courtroom in a murder trial

6

to the public.

7

people.

8

everybody.

9

witnesses and spectators and everybody else, but that's a

10

I mean, I know we're concerned about protecting

That's .why we have security and bailiffs and
And we're certainly sensitive to try and protect

pretty drastic move, isn't it, to close the courtroom?

11

:MR. RICHARDS:

It's a ve:r:y drastic move a.."'l.d I

12

understand that, but I don't see any other way to do it.

13

know that t.'llere are closed hearings in cases.

14

I had some, some of the other capital homicide cases .
My client

15

And I

We've :b.ad some.

is willing to waive his right to a public

And it is a defense right under the Sixth Amendment as

16

trial.

17

applied to the states under the Fourteenth and also under the

18

Utah constitutional provision is a defense right to have a

19

public trial.

20

And traditionally, and I know you are astute of

21

histo:r:y as far as legal goes, but that was a right specifically

22

designed to protect the defendants so there couldn't be private

23

trials with -- and so it's a defense right is what I am saying.

24

And he's willing: to waive that.

25

present during that portion.

He's even willing to not be
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1

And I 'm not talking about the whole trial.

1

2

talking about four witnesses.

3

of those witnesses will go more than 15, 20 minutes.

4

closing the courtroom for a total of maybe one hour, one and a

5

half hour hours closed, the rest of the courtroom would be

6

open.

7

That's it.

I 'm

I don't imagine any
So we're

I would also agree that if the prosecution has any

8

witnesses that they would so desire that we could give them the

9

same treatment and my client would agree to that as well.

10

The problem, the dilemma we have, as I mentioned, is

to protect my clie.."lt and

11

either I put these witnesses on to

12

represent him in this manner, or I 'm left with a dilemma do I

13

put these witnesses on knowing that there's a very good

14

likelihood they might be hurt or killed because I've put their

15

info~tion

16

tr.{

out.

Now I had-- on some of the conversations I did have

17

an investigator with me, and so I could presumably have 1"-..im

18

testify, but I

19

objections on t:.'la.t, but even that, t.'l,.en I'm potentially

20

relegating them to the retaliation, possible death in order to

21

save my client's life.

22

my client die or do I let the witnesses die?

23

real thing because there have been shootings and we know that' s

24

occurred.

25

~ought

there would be potentially some hearsay

So I'm in a Catch-22 position; do I let 1

Now that's what I'm requesting.

And it's a very

And I think it's
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1

doable.

2

court can because of these extenuating circumstances order

3

that.

4

I think constitutionally it's okay.

And I think the

·Now as I 've had an opportunity to read through the
And I want to go

5

State's reply, they cite a number of cases.

6

through those briefly, and then I want to talk about a couple

7

of other issues.

8
9
10

The cases they cite' the one case' the Alvarado case'
California case that they cite very heavily, that's a
defendant's right case.

It's a case where the court came down

11 , on the cor..frontation clause issue.

It' a defendant's right,

12

not the state's ..

It's a constitutional confrontation, Sixth

13

li..me."l.dment issue.

And the court r.a"tt.e do\<l.n on that, that I

14

understand that's a defendant's right.

15

And that's in light -- there's also a California

16

statute, and I have a copy of that.

17

1054. 7 that says the disclosure required, and this is

18

disclosure of names and witnesses, 30 days prior to trial,

19

unless good cause is shown why disclosure should be denied,

20

restricted or deferred.

21

or possible danger to the safety of victims or witnesses,

22

possible loss or destruction of evidence or compromising an

23

investigation.

24
25

It's California Penal Code

And good cause is limited to threats

And so California has a specific law that deals with
it, under Utah law a similar one.

I attempted to approach the
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1

Rules Committee on that and we're still trying to deal with

2

that, but at this point we don't have such the law.

3

would be a good idea.

4

at least adhere to in under the circumstances.

5

They cite a case of US vs. Crockett.

..

But it

And I think it's one that the court can

Again, that was

6

a defendant's right case.

And the question in that case, the

7

Crockett decision was the defendant was asked or wanted to ask

8

the prosecution and the witnesses where they were living at the

9

time, and they were not allowed to do so.

10

And the court affirmed the conviction.

11

was tr.a.at restriction even against the defenda.."".l.t.

12

defendant that brought this under the confrontation clause

13

right and even that

14

the defendant and held to be held okay.

15

cited by the State in their brief.

16

~'as

denied.

And so there
It was the

That i!"..fonnation was denied to
And that's a case

The case of Smith vs. Illinois, the United States

17

Supreme Court case decision, 390 US 129, that was also a

18

defendant's right.

19

for the informer' s actual name.

That was a reversal where they were asking
And that was reversed.

20

We're not opposed to him knowing the actual name.

21

fact, we intend to give that to him if called as a witness.

22

But again, this is defendant's right under the confrontation

23

clause.

24
25

In

The other case they cite, the MM vs. Varis, is a
civil case.

I don't think it has any application under
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1

criminal law.

2

That's a civil case under a 1983 class action.

Let me talk to you about a couple of issues that they

3

raise in their memorandum.

4

a right to cross-examine.

5

cross-examination.

6

as they want.

7

these witnesses -- well, they will be able to cross-examine

8

them as well as I am able to cross-examine same of their

9

witnesses .

10

One is they said they want to have
And I have no problem with full

They can cross-examine as long and as hard

They will have the witness' s names, and same of

Now, they've complained that they would like to have

11

a.."'l opportu......ity to talk to these people before..,..&"ld.

12

response to that I say kind of welcome to my world.

13

tell you how many cases I 1 Ve wa.."'l.ted to talk to a state witness

14

and I've been denied that privilege.

15

report, maybe not much in that.

16

that I've been told by the prosecution not to talk to you, I

17

can 1 t do anything further.

18

it's frankly, happened in this case.

19

cou.-ple of their witnesses and they've said, they -- they ire

20

telling me we don't have to talk to you, Mr. Richards .

21

I I'm unable to talk to them.

I guess in
I can 1 t

I get maybe a police

And if I -- if they tell me

And that happens all the time.

And

I 've tried to talk to a

And so

So as far as giving them the names

22

beforehand so that they can talk to them, again, welcome to my

23

world.

24
25

I had Deirdre Gorman, one of the premier federal
defense attorneys give an affidavit.

And I 1 m going to tell you
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1

why I had her do that.

2

work in the federal system, I've had a number of trials in the

3

federal court, there are severe restrictions as far as what

4

defense attorneys get.

5

where there' s been testimony in many cases, and in most cases

6

the actual corrq;>laining witness 1 if you have an aggravated

7

assault or a murder or sanething of that nature, the actual

8

witness will testify in a grand jury proceeding.

In the federal system, and I do sane

There's been a grand jury proceeding

9

The grand jury brings down an indictment and the

10

state -- the federal government, excuse me, then puts this

11

wit••1.ess on the st&"'ld.

12

finish with all of their examination, and then they pull out

13

off their desk a stack of transcripts from the indictment,

14

grand jury indicbnent hearing.

15

they say, counsel, your witness.

16

this thick, and this is over an inch thick.

17

several hundred pages long, and they drop it on the desk and

18

they say your witness.

19

And they ask the qu.estions and then they

And they do one of these, and

And sq tha"'l sam.e.'i'}ow I'm

And literally I 've had one

S1.."PPPSed

I 've had one

to be able to put my

20

hand on that and divine eve....'"'y-thing in there and do an effective

21

cross-examination, which is a joke.

22

that's the reason for Deirdre

23

But we deal with it.

Go~'s

And

affidavit.

There's also over in the federal system, and she

24

talks about that to sane extent, they don't disclose all of

25

their witnesses.

Quite often 1 and I 've been in trials where
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1

they've thrown on a witness that I have no idea they were going

2

to throw on.

You're talking federal court, right?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RICHARDS:

I 'm talking federal court, yeah, but

5

they throw on me these witnesses and I 'm expected to

6

cross-examine them not having any idea.
And so what I am telling you is that' s their major

7
8

concern as I read their brief.

That' s their major concern.

9

And I 'm saying that, my heavens, I deal with it everyday.

This

is kind of the life of a defense attorney.

10

And we're willing to give them the r.ame.

11

We wa.."'lt the

12

court to order that nobody in the court, including the

13

prosecutors, leak that name out to an:x'body.

14

the courtroom be closed.
I think that handles the issues.

15

And we're asking

I think it allows

But without that, I'm in an ethical

16

us to put on our defense.

17

bind because I have to make a decision potentially and very

18

really whose life am I willing to sacrifice.

19

to be i..l'l that position.

20

there's a very easy solution.

21

22

I

THE COURT:

And I don't want

I think you can understand it.

And

Can I ask, Mr. Richards, you said you are

willing to give the State the names of these four witnesses?

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. RICHARDS:

Yeah.

When are you willing to do that?
The day of trial.
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1

THE COURT:

Well, then there 1 s no way they can

2

prepare.

3

like you do in federal court?

4

5

You are just saying you got to come into this blind

MR. RICHARDS:

in the federal system --

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RICHARDS:

8

THE COURT:

9

Just like I am as a defense attorney

Right
just as blind.
at least under the state rules aren 1 t

we -- the idea is to allow both sides to prepare for trial, to

10

be able to cross-examine, whether it 1 s on the defense or the

11

prosec-ution.

12

right?

13

The idea is -wooe 1 ve gone away from trial by ambush,

I mean --

MR. RICP..ARDS:

I understand that, your Honor.

But,

14

you know, it 1 s really nice on the prosecution 1 s side because

15

they have the ability to subpoena people and talk to them and

16

force them to talk to them, and I don 1 t.

17

about trial by ambush, even in the state system, and even in

18

this particular case, there are witnesses that I am unable to

19

talk to because they won 1 t talk to me.

20

THE

21 I

MR. RICHARDS:

22

THE COURT:

23

isn' t it, to a certain extent?

COURT:

I mean, you talk

So my preparation --

But --- is nominal at best.

Retaliation is a part of every case,

24

MR. RI.CHARDS:

25

THE COURT:

No.

I mean every witness who gets on the
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THE COURT:

1

Again, you know, I understand the

2

predicament you are in, but I'm just almost appalled to think

3

that there are four witnesses out there who could clear,

4

potentially clear your client on a capital murder case and

5

either you or your client don't think that the state or law

6

enforcement ought to know about that?

I mean, I would have

7 , thought you would be over to the police department in a
8

heartbeat saying, hey, we've got people who can clear our

9

client on this murder, save him the trial and the possibility

10

of a death penalty and we're not going to turn it over to law

11

eraorcement because --

12

MR. RICHARDS:

Well, let me throw you in my shoes for
You have a witness who comes to you and

13

just a minute.

Okay?

14

says, listen, I am talking to you because I think it's the

15

right thing to do, but I'm afraid because I'm on the side of

16

the other gang, or on this gang, either one, but I'm afraid

17

that if my information comes out, that I will be hurt or

18

killed.

19

THE CO'l1RT:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

Okay.
And I 'm willing to talk to you on

21

conditions of confidentiality and tell you what I know and I

22

but they say boo-fore I do that I need the assurance, No. 1, that

23

you won't tell anybody about my name; and No. 2, that before I

24

testify, I need to have some assurance that my name won't be

25

thrown out nor my testimony so other people can retaliate.
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So that person comes and talks to you.

1

And we

2

already know in ·this case that there's been retaliation.

3

know we had at least one shooting, almost potentially fatal,

4

attempted murder.

5

one, agg assault, so it's a very real situation.

We've had drive-bys.

We

We just had this new

6

And it's even more real because asstnning they are a

7

member of the opposing gang, not only -- well, it's their own

8

people.

9

that's a very real situation.

10

It' s their own people they are going to kill.

And

So they've come to me, and I tell them I will talk in

11

confir..a'"'l.ce and I '11 talk to the court and see if I can get

12

something done, and that's the situation.

13

you.

14

THE COURT:

So I throw that to

I really understand the situation.

What

15

I don't understand, though, is that there are people out there

16

that can clear your client, that were there when the murder

17

took place and can say it was somebody else who did it, and yet

18

they are willing to not came forward and let Mr. Perea take the

19

fall on this?

20

concept, I guess .

21

willing to testify to the jury but they don' t want anybody else

22

to know about until the day of trial?

23
24
25

I mean, I -- I im having a tough time with that
These people are willing to tell you and

MR. RICHARDS:

I mean --

But they don't want anybody to know

about it period, even after trial.
THE COURT:

That' s what I am saying.

It' s almost
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1

ludicrous, isn't it, to think we've got people out there that

2

can clear your client, and they don't want to say anything?

3

They don't want anybody to know?

4

true.

5

department saying, look, we have

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

I mean, if it's true, it's

They ought to be breaking down the doors of the police

Knowing they are going to get killed?

Well, but that' s what I 'm saying.

Their

8

situation I don't think is any different than a lot of other

9

murder cases, or a lot of other rape cases where people are
I just think, my gosh, if I had

10

worried about retaliation.

11

been the witness to a murder and I know it was sam.eboct.f ct.."ler

12

than Mr. Perea, but I'm not going to came forward unless I get

13

some kind of -- ,it just -- I 'm just kind of puzzled by this

14

concept
MR. RICHARDS:

· 15

But it's because we live in a

16

different world, your Honor.

17

think if you had that threat, the very real threat that you

18

might be killed, you are going: to think twice about it and say,

19

listen, is it going to be me and my kids a..'l'ld m-y fand.ly that

20

gets killed, or is it going to be Riqo that gets executed maybe

21

I

sometime down the road?

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

We don't live in a gang world.

I

I think I 1 ll let Riqo
- go.

But I guess -I can understand that very really.

Why wouldn't you turn this over. to law

enforcement or the prosecutors to give them a chance -- I mean,
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1

you really think if they can verify if somebody else did the

2

murder, that they want to go ahead with the prosecution on this

3

case?

4

I mean, I have -MR.. RICHARDS:

If they believe, and I apologize in

5

advance for saying this, but they believe that my client is

6

guilty.

7
8

THE COURT:

Well, yeah, but if they've -- if you've

got exculpatory evidence, don't you think they ought to --

9

MR. RICHARDS:

I didn't get an objection.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICP..A..'tiDS:

12

If they believe that my client is guilty, and so what

Huh?
I didn't get a.'"l objection on that one.

13

t.~ey

14

give them the name, John Doe was there and he saw it and that

15

he's willing to testify.

16

do, a..'"ld I believe this is what would happen, is I would

So then they go and do what they do; and that is,

17

they turn i t over to their police officer, Thomas or Beck,

18

whoever i t is they have working on the case, and they go and

19

talk to the person.

20

at that point they are a little scared because they don't trust

21

the police any more than most gang members do.

22

A"ld rrraybe the person tells them, although

And then they also potentially, and the witnesses

23

believing it because I think it happens, they then go and say

24

to Jane Doe or Jim Doe or whoever, and now their witness, well,

25

you know that John Doe just told me that he was there, he saw
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1

somebody else do it, Joe do it.

2

.And so then John Doe, his name is out there, ratting

3

out somebody other than my client, or claiming that my client

4

didn't do it either way, and they are afraid of that.

5

Certainly they

6

be talking because police do that.

7

~e.

Because they know the police are going to
That's what they do.

And we know that from this very case because when we

8

put Thomas on the stand, he's saying, well we've had statements

9

from a number of people that you did, Riqo, and they named the

10

names.

And they talked about Flaco said you did and so and so

11

said you did, and sOir.ebody else said you did.

12

their own witness who supposedly claims in the preliminary

13

hearing at least --

14

THE COURT:

I :mea.."l, we have

So what you are telling me is you don' t

15

trust the system?

16

prosecution to do the right thing in this case?

17

at least, at least your witnesses are saying that, I guess,

18

they don't trust the law enforcement.

19

You don't trust law enforcement or the

MR. RICHARDS:

So, therefore,

That's what my witnesses believe.

And

20

I believe that if we give the names today to the prosecution

21

that thev will send out an officer to qo
- talk to the -person.

22

-

THE COURT:

Rightly so, don't you think?

I mean,

23

they need -- don't they need to verify this infonnation,

24

whether or not it's true, what witness

25

MR. RICHARDS:

So what does the witness do?
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1

witness knows -- listen I got Officer Thomas for instance

2

coming to me now saying this, Richards told me that you have

3

information that Riqo didn 1 t do it.

4

well, let 1 s see I just got screwed by Richards because he told

5

me he wouldn 1 t do that.

6

hard because Thomas thinks Riqo did it.

7

that Thomas is going to be telling my buddies, my other gang

8

members that I did it or that I said that Riqo didn 1 t do it.

9

can almost guarantee what the witness is going to say in that

10

situation.

11

No, I didn 1 t say that to

t-~e

I got Thomas who 1 s reeling me real

Ric.~ds.

take

14

testify t:l-...at somebody else did it?

16
17

I

fall for the murder that

MR. RICHARDS:
the time, your

I can guarantee that.

So they are willing to let somebody else

13

15

And I know darn well ·

They are going to say, well, you know, forget this.

THE COURT:

12

And they are going to say,

t-~ey wit-~essed

and could

Is that --

And you don 1 t think that happens all

~onor?

THE COtlRT:

I guess if they don 1 t have any moral

18

courage to step up to the plate and say, hey, you know what, I

19

saw what happened here and· it wasn 1 t Riqo Perea.

20

just blown away.

21

have no backbone,. no SPine.
. but mv aosh what does it sav about

22

their credibility as a witness?

23

I mean, I 1 m

I mean I know there are people out there that

--

MR. RICHARDS:

-

We have 159 people that have been

24

exonerated off of death row --

25

THE COURT:

Right.

Okay.
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

that were proven to be innocent.

Okay.
And nobody came forward on any of

them.

5

THE COURT:

I know.

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

Nobody.

I don't doubt for a moment, Mr. Richards,

8

that there are people out there with no backbone, that aren't

9

willing to come in and testify as to what they saw concerning a

10

murder.

But if ,these people really saw this, I would think

11

they would came in here and talk to law e..""'..forceme.."'lt about what

12

they observed.

13

got to

tu._~

I just-- I don't know how else you do it.

it over to law enforcement, don't you?

MR. RICHARDS:

14

You

No, you don't.

We can do it the way I

15

propose.

16

this standpoint.

17

and I 've got three kids, because I do, and I love them.

And I

18

look at it and I'm a gang member and I say, listen, I'm

and

19

I know Riqo didri' t do it.

You

20

know, I saw it or somebody told me, somebody else admitted to

21

me.

22

to come out.

23

Here it is.

24

came out in the paper.

25

And what I am saying is that they look at it from
Assuming I'm the person, and I've got a wife

I

got evidence ti-..at he didn' t.

But I know that if I tell that to the police, that's going

came out in the paper today.

Or wherever it is.

We .got names and pictures and all that stuff that
So they know it' s going to come out.

So I'm thinking, let's see, if I do that, my family
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1

might get hurt or killed, I might get hurt or killed, and maybe

2

I don't like Riqo that much, but-Isn't it going to came out anyway?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. RI"CHARDS :

5

THE COURT:

motion.

7

going to testify.

8

there.

10

I mean let's assume that we grant your

They are going to get on the witness stand.

6

9

No.

Right?

The jw:y is going to hear it.

They are

So it's out

It's just the question of timing, isn't it?

MR. RICHARDS:

Well, no, because two things happen.

No. 1, the jury doesn't know their name -Right.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE COURT:

-- because we use John Doe.

See, I don't have a.'"'l.y problem with that,
But what I am.

14

with having a witness maybe using an alias.

15

having trouble with is this concept that we don't want to give

16

it to the prosecutor or law enforcement ahead of time so they

17

can at least verify or check out the story.

18

something about these people that are going to testify.

19

are going to have a fair trial for both sides, you know -- I

20

mean, they turned over all the police reports to you, gave you

21

all the discovery.

22

were supposed to turn over whatever you had other than maybe

23

the defendant's statements, but I thought the idea was we were

24

going to have a fair trial.

25

of time everything was going to be out on the table.

T'ney need to know
If we

I signed an order, I think, indicating you

Everybody was going to know ahead
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1

what I am having trouble with right now is this concept that we

2

don 1 t want to let the prosecutors know who you are going to

3

call.

I

MR. RICHARDS:

4

Because what will happen, and I know

5

what will happen, they are going to send their officer out

6

there and do exactly what I said.

7

to say well, no, it didn 1 t happen, because I 1 m afraid.

8

Because, no, they don 1 t have backbone because they think they

9

may be --

10

THE COURT:

And then my witness is going

I thought they were afraid of somebody

11

else rather than law enforcement.

I give law enforcement and

12

the prosecutor a little more credit that than you do.

13

they are honest --

I think

14

MR. RICHARDS:

I do too.

15

THE CQURT:

that they are out to try to solve this

17

MR. RICHARDS :

I do too.

18

THE COURT:

16

case.

They want to put the right person in jail

19

or prison or whatever for

20

what this is all about.

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

these murders, and that 1 s

So what do they -- what do you think

the officer is going to do?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

camrr~tting

He 1 s going to investigate.
He 1 s going to go to John Doe and he 1 s

going to say, listen, I got word that you, Mr. J. Doe, I got
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1

word that you were there and you saw it happen.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. RICHARDS:

And they'll say, well, where did you

4

get that from?

5

they are going to say whoa, you know, so much for that

6

confidentiality, so much for the safety of my family.

7

they are going to say, I 'm not going to say anything on this.

8

Or they are going to use the tactics that Thomas and Gent used

9

in examining my client, and that is say other people have said

10

Well, the defense told us.

And at that point,

And then

you've done this.

11

And so I mea...."l, it's -- and they are going to tell

They are going to go to the next person.

12

other persons.

13

Jane Doe just told me that so and so confessed to this.

14

do you say about that?

Hey,
'h'!f'..at

And they got -- and so then at that point Jane Doe is

15
16

afraid.

17

this to happen.

18

Like I say, it even happens to us.

19

might 1'-..ave a name, but tr..at does me no good if I can't go talk

20

to them.

21

you know, from your middle lane, the prosecutors told me I

22

don' t have to.

23

trial --

24
25

And that 1 s what I am afraid of.

It 1 s not 1musual for

It happens all the time in the federal system.
Because a lot of times I

And I go talk to them all the time.

,so where' s the fairness and

THE COURT:

And they say,

o~_nness

of the

I can't comment on what the prosecutors

did or did not say, but that seems so unusual.

I mean, I was a
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1

prosecutor, and I can tell you what we told the witnesses was

2

simply this.

3

have no obligation to do so.

You can talk to the defense if you want, but you
I mean

4

MR. RICHARDS:

Exactly.

5

THE COURT·:

that' s a different stor.y than saying

6

the prosecutor told me not to talk to you.

7

prosecutors do that.

8

tell a witness you don' t talk to the defense.

9
10

I don't think most

And I don't think they can do that, to

MR. RICHARDS:

No, but they can tell them you don't

have to.
Tr...at' s right.

11

THE CXYv"RT:

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE COURT:

I can't do that.

And that's true in this case.

They could

14

go talk to these four witnesses and the witnesses could say, we

15

don' t want to talk to you, and that's fine.

16

their decision, .so.

17

MR. RICHARDS:

That' s -- that' s

Well, it's not fair, though, because

18

if I do the· same thing, if I have my witness Jane Doe, and I

19

say, listen, you don • t have to talk. to the prosecl.ltor --

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22
23

Right.
-- you don't have to do that if you

don't want to, I 've just cammi tted a felony offense.
THE COURT:

Well, it d_.::p=o_nds -- and again, it gets

24

back to this, witnesses call all the time and say, do I have to

25

talk to this attorney?

And you tell them, look, you can talk
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1

to them if you want, that's your decision.

I 'm not telling you

•.

2

you can or cannot, but that' s your decision

3

MR. RICHARDS:

That's not true, Judge.

4

THE COURT:

to talk to

5

MR. RICHARDS:

That's not true, Judge.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. RICHARDS:

8

9

What's not true?

to talk to the prosecutor.
MR. HEWARD:

That's not what he said.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICHARDS:

12

13

I can't tell Jane Doe you don't have

It' s the witness's decision.
No, but I can't tell her that.

I

can't tell her you don't have to talk to them -THE COURT:

But you agree it happens all the time

14

that the police go out to interview a witness and the witness

15

says, I don' t want to talk to you guys.

16
17

MR. RICHARDS:

I agree.

I agree it happens, but then

they get a subpoena and they bring them into court --

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

going to go to jail.

21

T"'rlE C01JRT:

Right.
-- and you say, you testify or you are

No.

w"'hat happens is they get on the

22

witness stand and testify.

23

them, well, we tried to talk to you about this case and you

24

refused to talk to us.

25

MR. RICHARDS:

And then the other side says to

That's what happens.
Yeah.
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THE COURT:

1
2

The jw:y decides if they are telling the

truth.

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

So it happens all the time.

That's right, that they refuse to·

5

testify, or they refuse to talk to either the defense or law

6

enforcement.

7

MR. RICHARDS:

So we're just leveling the plane here.

8

Now the prosecutor has a couple of witnesses they can't talk to

9

before trial together with the

10

THE COURT:

It seems like it becomes a game now.

I

11

just -- I just can't get beyond this concept that, my God, you

12

got four witnesses out there that can clear your client, and we

13

don't want to let t.'llem talk to the police or the prosecutors

14

because we think they are wrong, they've done a wrong --

15

MR. RICHARDS:

Because they won't.

16

THE COURT:

they got the wrong motives .

17

MR. RICHARDS:

You don't think I asked t."'"lem, hey, do

18

you mind, you and I going to talk to the prosecutor?

19

absolutely not.

They said

I won't do it.

20

THE COURT:

I guess again

21

MR. RICHARDS:

They won't.

22

THE COURT:

it says something about their

23

character, doesn't it, that they are a witness to a murder and

24

they don't want to talk to law enforcement about it but they

25

are going to tell 12 strangers in the jw:y box about it?
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

Under the anonymous protection.

Yeah.
Under the court's protection, sure

they would.

5

THE COURT:

6

their character and background.

7

murder and they 'are not willing to talk to law enforcement, or

8

at least talk to the prosecutors about it?

9

Again, I think it says something about

MR. RICHARDS:

If they are an eyewitness to a

Well, could I have an instruction from

10

you on every witness that I talk to that's refused to talk to

11

me, an i.."lst...-uction to the ju.....-y that that impinges

12

character because they won't talk to me?

13

THE COURT:

t..~n t.~eir

Well, I think that's what the jury is

14

there for; they need to decide credibility.

15

instruction from the judge, they can decide themselves after

16

listening to the testilnony.

17

MR. RICHARDS:

They don' t need an

So why can't the prosecutor do the

18

same thing that I have to do, and that is say, well, you d.idn' t

19

came forward to the police, I haven' t had the chance to talk to

20

you, have I?

Why can't they do that?
You can ask that question to any witness.

21

THE COti'RT:

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23
24
25

playing field.

I know.

So now we've leveled the

They are in the same boat as I am.

THE COURT:

I don' t know how -- why you think it' s

leveling the playing field.

They turned over all their
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1

witnesses, all the police reports, all the witness statements,

2

the preliminacy hearing transcripts, and I signed an order

3

saying I want the defense to do the same thing.

4

leveling the playing field.

5

That 1 s

I mean for years it was just like you were saying,

6

the prosecutors knew absolutely nothing about what the defense

7

was going to put on because the defense has no obligation to do

8

so.

9

decided maybe we, need to change this and, quote, level the

10

But the longer they looked at that, the legislature

playing field.

11
12

MR. RICF..ARDS: · But it 1 s okay for the prosecution
witnesses not to talk to me?

13

THE COt.lRT:

Yeah, t..lLey don 1 t have any -- none of the

14

witnesses can talk to any -- they don 1 t have to talk to

15

anybody.

That's always been the rule.

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17

THE COURT:

18

But I can 1 t tell them that.

Well, you ca..."'l tell t."lem it 1 s their

decision.

19

MR.. RICHARDS :

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RICHARDS:

No, I can' t.

Well, we obviously disagree on that.
Well, I tell you, I've been threatened

22

by a number of prosecutors and i f I tell a witness, hey, you

23

don't have to talk to the police, then I'm only at least

24

obstructing justice and may be t:anp,=ring.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
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1

2

MR. RICHARDS:

I 've been told that by a number of

prosecutors in a number of different cases.

3

THE CQURT:

4

MR. RICHARDS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

Okay.
Okay.

I didn't mean to cut you off.
That was --

I just wanted to make sure I understood

8

on sane of this what you are asking for and how you want to

9

proceed on this.

10

All right.

....

MR.

.l..L

12

hour.

13

short break.

14
15

16
17
18

The State, or do you need a short recess?

HE':~'RD:

Judge, we 1 ve been going just over

a.."'l

The court reporter, I suspect her fingers could use a

THE COURT:
recess then.

Okay.

Let 1 s take about a 10, 15 minute

Okay?
(A Recess

THE COURT:

is taken by the

Cou....~.)

We're back in session in State vs. Perea.

Both parties are present.

And Mr. Heward or Mr. Shaw?

19

MR. HE"IIVA..'RD :

20

Judge, several things that go to conpel after the

It' s me.

Thank you, your Honor.

21

argume..11.t +-hat Mr. Richa-rds made to go +-irrough b=>_fore responding

22

to his brief, several times there were references made to what

23

a prosecutor 1 s duty is.

24

3. 8 about the special responsibilities of the prosecutor.

25

your Honor alluded to, it is our responsibility to do justice,

That 1 s specifically covered in Rule
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1

not to convict.

And whether Mr. Richards wants to talk about

2

someone else that he's dealt with, the three prosecutors, four

3

prosecutors assigned to this case take that responsibility very

4

seriously.
There is no infonnation that counsel has referred to

5

There is no infonnation from statements

6

that's came to us.

7

from witnesses at the scene that don't put the gun in this

8

defendant's hand.

9

infonnation?

And would the State love to have that

Absolutely.

Is that infonnation that the State

10

would investigate diligently in an effort to detennine if this

11

defendant isn't the person who canmi tted the two murders

12

the two attempted murders?

13

anything otherwise is absolute blasphemy.

14

responsibilities to ourselves, we have responsibilities to this

15

court, and we have responsibilities as prosecutors.

Absolutely.

And to indicate
We have

You know, Mr. Richards like to editorialize.

16

~~d

He

17

likes to talk about beliefs, Judge.

Beliefs have a place in

18

our society.

It's in religion.

19

a court of law that we deal with facts aT'ld we deal with

20

evidence.

21

And it's in churches.

This is

The gang problems and the witness problems t."::.e

22

defense counsel refers to that his witnesses would have, have

23

equal application as you point out to the state.

24

people willing to cooperate?

25

in?

Are those

Are those people willing to came

Are those people perhaps fearful?

All of those things

Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School,
BYU.
Noteworthy
Reporting,
LLC Clark
(801)
634-5549
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

1

that he talks about have equal application to the State's

2

witnesses .
He asks you to close this courtroom, and you ask what

3
·4

authority?

And "the response comes back there is none.

He

5

tells you he's had other closed hearings, although, he doesn't

6

cite to any of them in which what he is asking you to do has

7

never been done.

8

been done.

9
10

The reason for that, Judge, is it hasn't ever

Another very important point that was glossed over
and hasn't been addressed, when we send out a jury

11. questionnaire, we tell them t.'le witnesses.

We do that so when

12

we impanel the jury we make sure we get a fair and impartial

13

jury.

14

jurors, perspective juror's knowledge and notice who these

15

witnesses are to see if they know them, to see if they've had

16

any contact with them, to see if they can be fair and

17

impartial.

Defe...'"'l.se counsel would now

r~ve

you exclude from those

In essence he wants to set that up for a reversal.
Counsel says, welcome to my world.

18 .

That's

19

interesting, Judge.

And I think you point that out as you go

20

through with him, he does have the names of the State's

21

witnesses.

22

provided.

23

he chooses to talk to them is his choice, whether they choose

24

to respond is their choice, but he knows who they are, he has

25

the ability to investigate, and the ability to prepare to

He dpes have any statements that they rJ.ave
He does have the ability to talk to them.
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1

cross-examine them.

He has whatever statements that they have

2

provided be consistent or inconsistent.

3

I thought it was interesting when he turns and throws

4

the document, a civil case, at the State cites about not having

5

any application.

6

see how many civil cases there are.

7

provides to the court as support for this position.

8
9

When you read the defendant 1 s memorandum, you
And that would be what he

You know, I thought long and hard about what is the
response to a request that has no basis in our law and no case

10

support in our country.

11

Defendant WS-LJ.ts trial kr,i surprise, Defendant wants two sets of

12

rules; one that applies to the State to their advantage and one

13

that applies to the Defendant to his advantage.

14

And that 1 s really where we are at.

Defendant cites the Carrier case, (phonetic)

15

unpublished deci.sion out of the California Court of Appeals.

16

Read Carrier.

17

length about a detective talking about a gang issue.

18

in Carrier, Judge, was whether or not hearsay was admissible.

19
20
21

Does it deal with t:J:'!..is issue?

No.

States at
T'ne issue

He cites · a civil case, Lozano vs. the City of
Hazelton that

I individuals

~cifically

dealt with whether or not

named plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the city of

22

Hazelton could be anonymous.

23

case as counsel tells you would have no precedential value to

24

your Honor in

25

~ciding

That would be a civil case, a

this case.

Interestingly enough, the case deals with whether or
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1

not the captioned. plaintiffs can use pseudonyms, not whether or

2

not a witness when they came in to testify have to identify

3

themselves, not whether or not they have to provide that

4

infonnation ahead of time.
As I thought through these things, I ultimately came

5

What is the law?

6

back to the question:

7

in toda.v and he Proffers for vour Honor some SPecific

8

infonnation.

9

severely beaten individuals in the defendant's family because

-

-

Defense counsel comes

-

.

I won' t even respond to the issue in regards to

10

there was no one severely beaten, and there's bailiffs in this

11

courtroom who

12

issue whether or not they contributed to there being a problem.

w~-e

involved in that.

A."1d we won't address the

We will focus on what is the law.

13

Counsel comes in

14

and tells your Honor I have two alibi witnesses.

15

going to came in and tell the court that it wasn't this

16

d~-Fe.T'ldant,

17

witnesses.

18

regards to those people coming in and testifying that someone

19

told me someone else did it.

20

that it was someone else.

They are

A.Tld I have two hearsay

Interesting how we would get around the rules in

Interestingly enough, when I come back to what is the

21

law, there is very specific law in this country in regards to

22

fair trials r

23

confrontation, and it applies equally to the State as it does

24

the Defendant.

25

th~e'

s very specific law about right to

There's also a very specific section in the code of
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1

the State of Utah about alibi and notice requirements.

77-14-2

2

says, A Defendant, whether or not written demand has been made,

3

who intends to offer evidence of an alibi shall, shall I '11

4

emphasize, not less than 10 days before trial or at such other

5

time as the court may allow, file and serve on the prosecuting

6

attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim alibi.

7

The notice shall contain specific information as to the place

8

where the defendant claims to have been at the time of the

9

alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to the

10

defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the

11

witnesses b-.f wham he proposes to establish alibi.

12

addresses.

13

would like this court to ignore that statute as well.

14

Names and

Actually none of that is being done and counsel

The United States Constitution, the Constitution of

15

the State of Utah very specific, your Honor, about the right to

16

confront and crqss-examine.

17

cite about cross-examination being the heart of the case that

18

goes before a court, the ability to test a witness, the ability

19

to know whether or not they have a partiC"ular bias, whether or

20
21
22

I not they have a
in the past

In fact, very specific in cases we

particular connection, whether or not they are

cr~le

witnesses.

As you went through several times with the defense

23

counsel and he continued to repeat for you, they don't want to

24

tell us who that person is until they get here, thereby

25

effectively elinlinating our ability to prepare for
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1

cross-examination.

2

The ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses,

3

your Honor, is at the very core of a fair trial, the very core

4

of a fair trial.

5

defendant 1 s motion, you are saying, I 1 m going to allow an

6

unfair trial to take place.

7

And in essence if you were to grant

Are their witness problems for the defense?

8

claim there are.

9

prosecution?

10

They

Are there witness problems for the

Yes, there are.

The bottom line is, Judge, when you look at this,

is

t.~ere

12

lots of cases which when you take time to read them, all that

13

ca...'"1.9s back to are cases where they have said it may be

14

appropriate for .a court to limit whether or not a person 1 s

15

address or their residence is disclosed.

16

not.~ng,

no Utah case, no US case, and they cite to

11

Absolutely no case was provided by them that

17

indicated that you could keep a witness secret, spring them on

18

the State at the last minute or in reversal that the State

19

could do that.

20

Interestingly enough, the Alvarado case, which we

21

provided for your Honor, in which the california prosecutors

22

chose to do that, and very rightfully so the California Supreme

23

Court reversed it.

24

difficulty than the present one.

25

In a case that presents even more

Factually in Alvarado you have a stabbing that takes
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1

place inside a jail, witnesses who said we saw what happened

2

but we cannot be labeled as a snitch.

3

State of California looked at that and said the very core of

4

those trials came down to witnesses being in the court, being

5

able to be cross-examined and people knowing who they are.

6

The Supreme Court of the

The State isn't -- this case isn't about the state

7

convicting this Defendant, your Honor.

8

the person who cammi tted the four crimes that he's charged

9

with.

10
11

We would ask you to deny the Defendant's motion.

There

is no basis in law or fact.
THE COURT:

All right.

12

response, Mr. Richards?

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14

It's about convicting

them in my brief.

Thank you, Mr. Heward.

There are, in fact, cases.

Z...ny

I cited

I 'll cite them here.

15

United States vs. Doe, Ninth Circuit, where it said

16

that courts have allowed parties to use pseudonyms in unusual

17

cases where nondisclosure of the plaintiffs -- the party's

18

identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment,

19

injury, ridicule and personal embarrassment.

20

It' s a federal case.

21

been reversed.

22

won't waste the court's time.

23

T'r..a.t 1 s a case.

It's a Ninth Circuit case.

There's your case.

And it hasn't

We've cited others.

I

You've read them already.

Counsel brings up a problem with not letting the

24

jurors know if they -- all of the witnesses.

25

That's all, four.

We have four.

We have -- we're proposing four alternates.
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1

I would suggest if they didn't know anybody else in this group,

2

it's probably a pretty good guess they won't know these

3

individuals.

4

need to pick a couple more, we can do that.

5

care of that issue.

6

But if we do, we have four alternates.

If we

That would take

At same point in time the court can say we're going

7

to have a couple of witnesses.

8

discuss that or solve that problem.

If you know them, then we can
That's easy to solve.

Counsel says that I have the ability to talk to

9
10

witnesses and I don't want to be--labor that other than saying I

11

tried i...'"1 this case to tr".f to talk to some of

12

they 1 ve told me they won't talk to me.

13

do it.

14

their witnesses talk to me, but it 1 s not okay if they can't

15

talk to.

16

witnesses a.'"ld

That's it.

They won't

So for somehow it's okay for them not to insist that

I don'.t see the fairness for same reason there.
Counsel says that we don 1 t have witnesses who were

17

severely beaten.

18

altercation.

19

all over her face.

20

beaten.

21

severe beating.

22

t..~e

I tend to disagree with that.

I saw this

I saw Tamra Sherril came out and there was blood
I would define that as being severely

When you have blood all over your face, that 1 s a

Counsel is concerned about alibi witnesses.

We don 1 t

23

have an alibi witness.

None of these witnesses are going to

24

say that Riqo wasn 1 t there.

25

They are just saying they are going to testify that they saw it

So it 1 s not an alibi witness.
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1

differently.
So that whole argument just needs to be buried right

2
3

now.

We're not bringing in alibi witnesses.

An alibi witness

4

is one that says, hey, it couldn 1 t have been Riqo because he

5

was in California at the time.

6

He was there.

7

witness.

I don 1 t have nobody like that.

No question about it.

So we don't have an alibi

8

Finally, the confrontation clause guaranteed under

9

both the 14th Amendment which applies the Sixth Amendment to

10

the State's as well Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah

11

Constitution is a

12

me.

13

accused oerson.

14

t"'lef~""ldant'

s right, an accused right, excuse

Both those are entitled rights of the accused, of an

.

'

And this court and every court in the nation has said

15

that the state does not have that confrontation clause right.

16

And if it' s admissible hearsay under one of the exceptions, the

17

defense can put that on and the state can't say well, we have a

18

right to confront.

19

confrontation clause is a defendant' s right.

20

I

-- it

That's not the law.

The law is that that

is, and I agree with Mr. Heward that they

21

r.ave witnesses that are afraid as well.

And like I said

22

earlier r I I m more than happy to allow the same treatment on

23

those witnesses.

24

closed courtroom.

25

goes and not get any of that information out.

T'ney don't have -- we can put them into a

We can use pseudonyms on them as far as that
And like I said,
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1

my client will stand up today and waive his right to have, to

2

be in the presence of them.

3

been done in the past.

4

And that can be done.

That has

I know it can be done.

I give the court, because I try to accommodate

5

whatever I can, I would give one proposal, I guess.

And that

6

is and, I mean, I 1 d have to talk to these witnesses, but

7

potentially if we could at least close the courtroom and use

8

pseudonyms in the courtroom and have the courtroom closed --

9

excuse me, I 1 m getting over a cold -- I have no problem giving

10

counsel the names of these individuals as long as we have an

11

order that -- and also I could even deliver and see if they

12

want to testify, want to talk to the prosecution.

13

like

14

~~e

But I would

following:
No. 1, that the court order the names or identifying

15

infonnation of these witnesses not be disclosed or given out by

16

the prosecutor or law en:forcement.

17

give them the name, and they could have the names so they can

18

do background checks, those type of things.

19

that.

20

infonnation is n:ot then given out by themselves or law

21

enforcement or by any p=-.rson and so that they feel that they

22

are not in danger.

23

In other words, we could

I qon 1 t mind doing

But there be a specific order of the court ti-..at that

I would like an order, because apparently counsel, I

24

think, believe -.- I guess I

e&"'l 1 t

use that word.

I understood

25

counsel to say that it would be okay for me to tell a witness
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an

1

that they have

option not to talk to the prosecution.

2

could get a specific order of the court to that effect, and

3

that's the word I would use, they have an option not to talk if

4

they don't want to, but I'm not going to do that unless I have

5

an order of the _court that I can say that to because I don't

6

want certainly to be charged with any kind of crime.

7

will give them the names by, on or before March 5th

8

March 4th which would give me time to talk to these individuals

9

and see if that would be satisfactory.
alternative.

11

And like I say, that is done all the time.

12

unconstitutional.

14

And we

That would be an

10

13

If I

It would still require the closing of the court.
It's not

It's done all the time.

THE COURT:

Mr. Ric.l-tards, can I just ask you

something else?

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

THE COURT:

Certainly.

You know, I realize you are kind of in a

17

bind because people have come forward and you have made a

18

promise you wouldn't divulge their identity and everything, but

19

I wonder why couldn' t you at least in the past six months came

20

to the prosecutors or even the law enforcement and say, you

21

know, I got infor.mation out there that you need to be looking

22

at, so and so.

23

promise not to identify them, but it certainly would have given

24

law enforcement and the prosecutors an opportunity --

25

>That wouldn't have in any way violated your

MR. RICHARDS:

I have talked to counsel on that.
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1

told them who I believe did this.

2
3

THE COURT:

MR. HEWARD:

That 1 s inaccurate.

He has not provided

us one name of a person that he said could have --

6
7

And give them info:onation so they

could at least qheck that?

4
5

Okay.

MR. RICHARDS:

What I am saying is I talked to Chris

Shaw.

8

MR. SHAW:

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

THE COURT:

Not with names and witnesses.
Not witnesses.

I told you who I --

Obviously, these witnesses have came

11 , forward and r..ave told you that somebody else did it.
12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

believe

14

person has done it.

Uh-huh.

And I told them who I

I mean that I have info:onation tl-.&at a particular

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SHAW:

17

That's nothing new.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SHAW:

And I 1 ve given them that name.
Okay.
But that's nothing new, if I can respond.
And-I 'm just asking Mr. Richards --- with a name without further opportunity

20

to discuss where and how they got the name and what supporting

21

evidence there might be; it does us no good.

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SHAW:

25

Well --

I was thinking out loud here.
Well, and let me say to, that's came about

fairly recently in that sense.

We didn't know about this
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1

issue, Mr. Richards, of anonymous witnesses until fairly

2

recently.
THE COURT:

3

Okay.

Well, I was just trying to figure

4

this out.

5

somebody comes to me and says, you know, your client didn 1 t do

6

it, so and so did it, I would have thought at some point they

7

would have gone to the prosecutors and said, you know, I

8

received infonnation that so and so -MR. RICHARDS:

9
10

I'm just figuring if I'm a defense lawyer and

I 've had extensive conversations and I

told them who I think there's evidence that did it.
Okay.

11

THE eot."RT:

12

MR.. RICHARDS:

In fact, it's one of the first
So it's not news to

t.'~Lem.

13

suspects in the case.

14

suspects.

15

investigating all the way along.

16

that they did prints against every one of them.

17

sw:prise to them, and I 've been talking to them

These are one of five names that they have been

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20
21

These are

It's the name of the people
So it's not a

All right.
-- for over a year about that, longer

than that.
T"riE COUK'I':

All right.

Well, it seems to me on your

22

motion, what I am going to do is take it under advisement on

23

the question of whether or not when or if these witnesses

24

testify they have to use their true identity.

25

I '11 also take it under advisement on the question of
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1

whether or not the Defendant can waive his right to be present

2

and also the question of whether to close the courtroom.

3

I think before we ever get to any of that, the real

4

question that needs to be resolved is whether or not you have

5

to turn over the names of the witnesses.

6

the burden needs to be on them.

7

because you've talked to people, you promised you wouldn't

8

disclose their i,denti ty.

9

decision on their own as to whether or not, one, they are going

And my thinking is

I understand you're in a bind

I think they need to make the

10

to testify; and two, if they do, I think they have to

11

think the prosecutors

12

think the burden needs to go back on them.

r..a..re

to know who they are.

I

And so I

And I tr..ink what needs to happen, Mr. Richards, is

13

14

you need to tell them, the judge

15

promise.

16

testify in this case, their identity has to be turned over to

17

the prosecutors.,

The judge has ordered that if they are going to

Okay?

18

MR. RICHARDS:

19

THE COURT:

20
21

22

you are not violating a

I'm okay doing that.

I think that's what you were saying at

the end.
MR. RICHARDS:

Can I get an order from the court that

says that I can tell them they have an opportunity --

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.
to talk or not?

That's up to them.

If they don't want to
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1

talk to the prosecution, that's their decision.

2

MR. RI.CHARDS:

3

THE COURT:

4

of the judge.

5

that's

6
7

8
9

And I can tell them that?

Yeah, you can tell them that 1 s the order

You know, if they don 1 t want to talk, I guess

And so Mr. Richards gets to keep the

MR. HEWARD:

name secret until the 4th of March as he said?
THE COURT:

No, no. I'm going to get to that.

ordering it by Monday.

They have to decide.

I'm

I '11 give you the

10

weekend to try to talk to these people, but by Monday at

11

1:00 o'clock t."iey either got to fish or cut bate, so to speak.

12
13

MR. RICHARDS:

Assuming I can get ahold of them.

How

about next Friday?

14

MR. HEWARD:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HEWARD:

17

THE COURT:

18

have to tell me that on Monday.

19

like I said, wei re two weeks from trial, and I think they need

20

to know, No. 1, if these people are going to testify then they

21

are going to have to turn over their identity to the

22

prosecutors.

23
24
25

Monday would be great.
I think we need to get on it.
Monday would be great.
If you can't get ahold of them, you'll

MR. RICHARDS:

But I just, I think, you know,

And then can I get an order from the

court that the prosecutor or law enforcement not
THE COURT:

Not disclose --
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MR. RICHARDS:

1

2

infonnation?

3
4

THE COURT:

MR. HEWARD:

6

THE COURT:

10

Right.
The prosecutors need to know, of course,

whoever is investigating
MR. RICHARDS:

8

9

Except those that are involved in the

case.

5

7

-- disclose names or identify any

I mean, they couldn't go out and talk

to other witnesses and say, well, John Doe has said this has
occurred.

11

THE COURT:

I don't know how -- I don't know how you

12

put that kind of limit on it.

13

is investigating the case has got to have some latitude to be

14

able to talk to these witnesses and follow up on the

15

infonnation if they get any from them.

16

of infonnation they are going to get.

17

MR. RICHARDS:

I think law enforce -- whoever

I don't know what kind
But I --

Can they do it without

all I am

18

saying is that they do it without disclosing their names or

19

identifying information, that they don; t say John Doe told me

20

this.

They can say, hey, we have some infonnation.

21

T"'rlE COti"RT:

22

MR. HEWARD:

23
24

25

Well, I don 1 t know how you -He 1 s asking you to restrict our ability

to go and investigate.
THE COURT:

I don 1 t think I can go do that.

Obviously, I don 1 t want law enforcement to just leaking their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Noteworthy
Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

60

1

names, as you put it, to other people.

2

can restrict the investigation to say, law enforcement you can

3

go out but you can' t do the following.

4

handcuffing --

5
6

MR. RICHARDS:

But I don't think you

I just think I would be

I'm not going to get any one of these

witnesses .
They may not.

THE CO'ORT:

7

I think that's a decision

8

they need to make.

And like I say, I 'm trying to take the

9

burden off your shoulders so it doesn't look like you are,

10

somehow violating confidentiality.

11

them and say the judge has ordered if you are going to testify,

12

you have to give the names to the prosecutor.

13

MR. RICHARDS:

I think you need to talk to

B".J.t the.."1 I'm stuck with, in the

14

position that assuming they say, well, if the prosecutors or

15

law enforcement can give out names or identifying infonnation

16

to other people; I'm not willing to give you that.

17

T:riE COURT:

I guess that's a decision they've got to

18

make because it's the same thing that goes for the State' s

19

witnesses .

20

than what the

21

worried about retaliation.

22

confidentiality.

23
24

25

I just don't see your position is any differe.."'lt
S~te

is going through.

MR. RICHARDS:

All these witnesses are

All of them are worried about

Yeah, but if the State's witnesses

don' t testify, Mr. Heward doesn' t get executed.
MR. HEWARD:

If my --

Here we go with Mr. Richards making this
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1

This is totally inappropriate.

about us again, .Judge.

It is.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. RICHARDS:

6

No, it's not, your Honor.

It's not that -Well, if my guy dies, if they don' t

know that --

7

THE COURT:

We understand that it's a death penalty

I don't think anybody is -- in fact, that 1 s why we are

8

case.

9

doing what we are doing on this case.

10

I think we go above and

beyond on capital murder cases because of the consequences.

11

So you

~"'low;

I think we're all aware of that.

~.nd

12

like Mr. Heward said, the State is interested in prosecuting

13

the right person for this.

14

people are not willing to give their identity to the

15

prosecutors and the law enforcement follow up on what they are

16

going to say, then they are not going to testify.

17

how else to put it.

18

MR. RICHARDS:

But it just seems to me if these

Okay.

I don't know

I mean, I guess that's your

19

ruling.

I just -- I can understand, because to be honest with

20

the court, if I were in their position, and I thought there was

21

a realistic possibility that myself or my family would get

22

killed, I might not come forward.

23

THE COURT:

Well, that 1 s true.

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

any backbone as far as that goes.

Because I 1 m a person that doesn 1 t have
If it comes to me and my
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1

family, I don't have a backbone.

2

THE COURT:

Well, I guess, like I said, I understand

3

that.

And I understand people have a different opinion on

4

what's important and their priorities.

5

that if they are going to testify in this courtroom, they have

6

to divulge their identity either to you or to the prosecutors

7 . by Monday.

And you need, if they are going to give i t to you,

8

then you give it, to them.

9

and let you know.

10

But they need to make the decision

You don't represent these folks.

11

Mr. Perea.

12

attorney/client privilege.

13

But i t just seems to me

You represent

So there's no confidentiality there.

MR. RICHARDS:

There' s no

Oh, I 'm not worried about the

14

attorney/client privilege.

15

gets killed, and their death could be on my shoulders.

16

think I have an ethical duty --

17
18
19
20
21

T"'rlE COURT:

I'm worried about if one of them
And I

So if one of the State's witnesses gets

killed, whose shoulder does that fall upon?
:MF.. RICH.l\RDS :

Well, if there' s anything that they

can do to prevent it, I think they have the duty to do that.
THE COURT:

Right.

T'nat' s what I am saying, you're

22

case is no different than the prosecutor's.

They've got

23

witnesses that are worried about being retaliated against and

24

hurt, injured, killed.

25

anybody, really.

It's just not any different for
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

Well, it is because if they are so

2

afraid that their witnesses are going to be damaged, No. 1,

3

they have the opportunity to do a plea bargain -- I 'm sorry for

4

not standing up.

5

particularly in the sex offense cases.

6

want to have to put their witnesses on because it's going to be

7

so damaging to them, they offer a phenomenal plea bargain.

And that happens quite often.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

that.

11
12

That's right.

We have --

All the time they don't

It happens all the time.

I don't have that ability.

I can't do

I don't.
THE COURT:

Actually it's worse for

t.~e

State tr.an it

is for the defense.

13

MR. RICHARDS:

No, it's not, no, because if they have

14

somebody that they think that's going to be killed, or we're

15

let's assume they had their only witness in this case said,

16

hey, if I get on the stand, I know I'm going to get killed.

17

They have the option at that point to say, well, we're not

18

going to go forward on the case.

19

case, they can dismiss.

20

did.

21
22

I don't have that ability.

I wish I

I don't.
T'"rlE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I understand the argument

but, you know, it's the same about

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

If they believe that' s the

So I'm forced to make that call.

But what good does it do to disclose the

identity of the witnesses on the day of trial if they are only
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1

going to be on the stand for 45 minutes?

2

prosecution can do to prepare and cross-examine that witness.

3

4

It accomplishes exactly what

MR. HEWARD:

Mr. Richards is trying to do, trial by sw:prise.

5

6

THE cOURT:

It is.

MR.. RICHARDS:

8

THE COURT:

10

It does no good to come in on the

day .of trial and say by the way, my true name is

7

9

There's nothing the

name is.

I understand.

The jw:y doesn't care who the witness ' s

They don't know who they are from Adam.

So you might

as well use the alias or whatever during the trial, but -MR.. RICHARDS:

11

Your Honor, yeah, counsel brings up a

12

very good point.

We get witness statements all the time where

13

the wit..'"lesses' names are redacted.

14

we have to try to somehow define it.

15

do it to us.

16

No. 2 --

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. RICHARDS:

We get it all

t.~e

time and

That's not unusual; they

Well, it' s just not going to happo--n.
I'm saying I'll give the name, but

19

I just don't want them to go out and blurt it out to evexybody

20

because

21

THE COURT:

T'ney are not going to leak it to anybody

22

other than the l:aw enforcement people who are investigating the

23

case.

24
25

MR. RICHARDS:

I'm okay with that.

If we can get an

order to that, that they get an order that law enforcement not
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1

leak it out to anybody else, any evidence.

2
3

THE COURT:

MR. RICHARDS:

If I can get an order to that effect,

we are there.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. HEWARD:

8

THE COURT:

9

They

are not going to. leak

4
5

I trust that's not going to happen.

want the order?

Okay.

Mr. Heward, you okay with that?

No, Judge, I'm not okay with that.
How do you want -- I guess how do you

Obviously if they are going to give the names

10

to the prosecutors and to the investigators, and the

11

investigators are going to go out and do the investigation,

12

right?

That's -- so for same reason I think Mr. Richards is

13

worried

t..~t

14

they are just go:L."'lg to go leak

MR. HEWARD:

Right.

t..~e

name --

And how does the investigator go

15

out and investigate whether or not what they are saying is

16

accurate if they don't have the ability to go up to another

17

person saying we have reason to believe that Joe Jones was

18

there?

How do you do that?

19
20

THE COURT:

I'm not going to put that kind of

restriction on law enforcement then.

21

All right.

22
23

You can't do that.

Okay?

Anything else on this issue?

. MR. RICHARDS:

Just I would like to sul:mit the

newspaper

24

THE COURT:

The newspaper?

25

MR. RICHARDS:

-- to the court if I could.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SHAW:

3

THE COURT:

4

Any objection?

No objection.
All right.

So that was the only motion

that we are able to get through.

5
6

Have you seen that?

Let me ask a couple of other things.

I know we

talked yesterday about the defense has submitted their expert

7 . on mitigation.

I believe it was Dee Russell.

You filed a

8

notice, his CV is included and I think Mr. Shaw you said you

9

got a copy of his report?

10

MR. SHAW:

11

THE COURT:

12

That's correct.
So we're all squared away as far as that

issue?

13

MR. RICHARDS :

14

THE COURT:

I thi.."lk so .

The other thing, of course, on the

15

questionnaire, I 'd really like to spend same time next week

16

going through the 200 people that we did the questionnaire on

17

because I think as I read through it, theres a lot of people

18

that just are not going to make it.

19

excused for one reason or another.

20

MR.. RICHARDS:

21

THE COURT:

22

I agree.

And I was hoping we could spend a good

part of Friday going through that trying to decide.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

They are just going to be

I agree.

If we can do that.

And the other

question I had is we talked about a time line.

We're going to
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1

start on March 8th with jucy selection.

2

we'd get through most of it by Thursday.

3

trying to figure out whether we bring the jucy back on Friday

4

at 9 a.m. or 1:00 o'clock to select the jucy.

5

that?

6

7

10

And I guess I was

Any thoughts on

I guess it's just hard to say until we

:MR. HEWARD:

see how fast or slow it' s going.

8
9

And we thought maybe

THE COURT:

What I am worried about is the people

that come in on Monday, some of them are going to be coming
back, that are qualified.

11

MR. RICHARDS:

12

THE COURT:

Could we have them called?

Figure out, do we have them call in, do

13

we just tell them to be back on a certain date or certain

14

time

15

Well, there's -- I suppose you can

:MR. HEWARD:

16

handle in what's most convenient or what's most efficient.

17

most convenient ·is to tell them to came back at a certain time,

18

but that might ?Ot be very efficient.

19

done sooner, we may be done later.
:MR. RICHARDS:

20
21

And

Because again, we may be

I think the afternoon, Friday

afternoon we knqw we' 11 be done by then.

22

THE COURT:

Well, we hope.

That's what I said.

23

guess what I am trying to get away from is I worry about

24

jurors.

25

thumbs and we don't want that either.

I

They just don't want to sit around twiddling their
And yet, like I say, we
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1

want them back here at a certain time to make the selection.

2

MR. HEWARD:

And I suppose then from that standpoint,

3

you could tell them to came at 1: 30 or whatever time you chose

4

on Friday afternoon, and then if we were done earlier, we could

5

decide whether or not we wanted to go to the time and expense

6

of moving that up.

7

THE COURT:

Because by my figures if we seat 12, each

8

side has 10 perernptories.

Plus, if you are going to seat three

9

or four alternates on each side as a peremptory I think you are

10

looking at around 40, 44 people we'd have to qualify.

And I

11

know we talked yesterday about maybe qualify-ing more tha."l t.lLat

12

just in case.

So that' s a lot of people.

I'm just trying to figure out what's the best way to

13
14

keep this moving.

15

know if there's a simple solution for that or not, or whether

16

we need to call all the people and tell them we are targeting

17

Friday but i t may cl-..cu"'lge, because I obviously have to tell them

18

something if we decide when they came in and they are qualified

19

they are going to be coming back on a..'"l.other day for jury

20

selection.

21

Anyway, think about it, and then I don't

So all right.

The other ttli.ng is at sorr.e point I

22

still would like to talk about those lesser included offenses.

23

I'd really like to do that before you get started with the

24

trial.

25

more proposed instructions.

I know, Mr. Ricl-.ards, I think you s'l..ll:xni tted five or six
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

Should we do that Friday also?

Tcy to do that also Friday?

As I recall,

3

I think I'm more concerned about what the State's response is

4

to sane of those lesser includeds.

5

negligent homicide and homicide by assault and aggravated

6

assault.

There was manslaughter and

Okay.
All right.

7

And then, you know, we got a Decorum

8

Order.

9

figure out when's
. a good time to put that in effect.

10

We haven't published that yet.

I'm just trying to

.

I don't

know if you've had a chance to think about that.
RI~.JIDS:

11

MR.

12

THE COURT:

I'm --

I know we drafted one up, but I didn't

13

want to put it out too soon because, you know, I want to make

14

sure the trial is going.

15

start on March 8th.
MR. RICHARDS:

16
17

Is there any reason to do that before

the 8th?
THE COURT:

18
19

It looks like we're on target to

. Well, that's what I was wondering.

thoughts?

20

MR. SHAW: · I don't see -- I don't think so.

21

THE COURT:

22

And I assume it's understood by both

parties no ~g to the press at this point in time?

23

MR. SHAW:

24

THE COURT:

25

Any

We've honored that. ·
I know you have.

But I know how these trials work.

You've done a nice job.

And the week before trial, I
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1

can just guarantee there' s going to be several articles in the

2

paper about it.

3

from our standpoint, but I think I can put some restrictions on

4

the parties and the witnesses.

5

All right.

6

And you know, there's no way to control that

Any problems other than that that you can

see?

7

MR. SHAW:

8

MR. RICHARDS:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. SHAW:

11 • the bench on

l"li t.."l

No.
No.

Any other issues we need to address?
There is one issue I 'd like to approach

counsel.

12

THE COURT:

13

(Discussion held at the bench.)

14

(Proceedings concluded at 11:12 a.m.)

All right.

15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22

23
24

25
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5

6

This is to certify that the foregoing proceedings

7
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8

reporter in and for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake

9

County, Utah ;

10
11

That the proceedings were reported by me in

12

stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into

13

printed form, and that a true and correct transcription of said

14
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15
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16
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1

Feb.ruazy 26, 2010

2

PROCEEDINGS

3

* * *

\

'·

This is the time set on State of Utah vs.

THE COURT:

4
5

Riqo Perea, Case No. 184 7 .

6

Mr. Heward and Mr. Lyon for the State.

7

MR. SHAW:

8

THE COURT:

9

And let's see, I got Mr. Shaw and

Yes, your Honor.
And Mr. Richards and Ms. Sipes for the

Defendant.

10

MR. RICHARDS:

Yes.

11

MS. SIPES:

Good morning, your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

And Mr. Perea is also present.

This was

13

the time we were going to try to deal with a number of motions

14

that have been filed in this case.

15

place to start, we should have the record reflect, I had a

16

telephone conference yesterday with the attorneys from the

17

State and also with Mr. Ric..l-:Lards .

18

this on the record, but you indicated the State had filed a

19

motion to have Mr. Ri,....hards disqualified on the case aT'ld also a

20

motion to have the trial continued and just indicated to me

21

that you wanted to deal with that motion and have the court

22

rule on it as soon as possible.

23

indicated that he just got the motion, needed a little time to

24

maybe respond to it in writing.

25

MR. RICHARDS :

Noteworthy
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1
2

THE COURT:

So anyway, Mr. Shaw, if you want to put

something on the record then for the record, go ahead.

3

MR. SHAW:

Yes, your Honor.

Thank you.

4

Your Honor, given the telephone conference that we

5

had yesterday, it's the State's position that we still at this

6

juncture need then to move the court to strike the trial date

7

and continue these proceedings.

8

into our position relative to the conflict of interest that has

9

arisen for me to adequately address that.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. SHAW:

Okay.

And it is necessary that I go

Go ahead.

You know, I U."1dersta.'1.d Mr. Ric.l}ards hasn't

12

had an opportunity to respond to that, but I need to say, for

13

the record, that rhis

14

February 19th, 2010 in our last hearing.

15

well, aware of what went on there.

con~lict

developed fully on Friday,
And the court is

16

We had cited in our motion to disqualify and continue

17

tr..is trial to t...ry to resolve this po_rspective conflict, various

18

parts of the record wherein we believe that it is clear that

19

the conflict is not a potential col"'..flict but is a real acttlal

20

and concurrent conflict.

21

And let me say if I can in the most simplest ter.ms,

22

basically what happo_ned at that hearing was further record in

23

addition to the motion that Mr. Richards filed relative to the

24

testifying of anonymous witnesses, further record was presented

25

to this court that the reasons that he was not willing to .
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1

reveal the name of those witnesses were that they were in fear

2

for their lives, their families were in fear for their lives,

3

or retaliation of some sort.

4

that representation.

5

Mr. Richards in a direct conflict with his client because he

6

has manifested a duty to third pe-rsons to the disadvantage of

7

his client.

That conduct in and of itself places

It's the State's position, and the court said, and I

8

9

And the record is replete with

think accurately and correctly, that those witnesses unless

10

disclosed won't testify.

11

t.."'lose wit.."'lesses should be disclosed by lf..onday of t..'ris week at

12

1: 00 o'clock.

13

subseqt.1e.11.t discovecy d.ocume.11.t that says he's taL'k:ed to two

14

people and that those two people won't testify abse.."'lt him

15

securing the ability for them to testify anonymously.

The court also gave direction that

Nevertheless, Mr. Richards has filed a

In doing tr.at, he r.as further complicated this matter

16

ma~""lifested

that :his du'b.f of loyal 'b.f to his client is

17

and

18

compromised.

19

Mr. Richards said could exonerate pote.."'ltially Mr. Perea.

20

claimed and proffered on the record that those witnesses, two

21

of which were there at the scene and would indicate that

22

Mr. Perea was not the shooter.

23

info.r:mation, we don't know what that infonnation is, but had

24

info.r:mation that he w"as not the shooter.

25

These are witnesses, remember your Honor, that
He

Two other witnesses had

Now that places Mr. Richards and his client in a
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1

direct conflict of interest by his refusal to identify those

2

witnesses .

3

The core conflict is had we known, the State known

4

about these witnesses six months or a year ago, and this has

5

been out there six months or a year, the record is very clear

6

on that, we would have had the ability to try to corroborate

7

that infoz:mation, further investigate that infoz:mation, and

8

then make a decision relative to this case that could frankly

9

benefit Mr. Perea.

10

So this isn't a potential conflict, it's not a

11

conflict t..l-at doesn't eY..ist or :may not be out there.

12

real terms of this conflict. are this may not be a death penalty

13

case if the State had that infonnation.

14

And we don't.

And so 10 working days bt=>._fore trial, this comes out

15

essentially.

16

witnesses need to be disclosed.

17

And the court has ruled correctly that those

There is a lot of

18
19

The vr:>ry

guid::~nce

from our state Supreme

Court on how to deal with this particular issue.
1

The State is

concerned, number one, that Mr. Richards has created a Sixt..h

20

Amendment argument that because of this conflict he has now put

21

himself in the position of ineffective assistance of counsel.

22

And the court knows and we know that on appeal,

23

appellate counsel often turns on trial counsel.

That's the

24

very first issue that's raised on capital appeals, ineffective

25

assistance of counsel.

It' s raised in other contexts, criminal
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1

context also.

2

this juncture is inadequate to protect any verdict on appeal.

3

And that's any verdict.

4

charged with a death penalty inposed, guilty as charged with

5

life without parole inposed, guilty as charged with life with

6

parole, guilty of some lesser included offense.

7

verdict is at risk.

I mean guilty as

I mean any verdict.

That's any

Now, I want the court to also understand that we have

8
9

And so what we are facing is a record that at

not taken this position lightly.

When we left this hearing on

10

Friday afternoon of the 19th, the hearing we had that day, we

11

we."'lt

12

research into this matter.

13

since Friday afternoon, Saturday, Sunday, yesterday -- the

14

whole we=-..Jc.

15

at the Attorney General's office.

16

this course of action.

17

i..~ately

back to t.l-).e office, we began carnprehensive

We've been working on this case

We have consulted with the appellate capital team
They have advised us to take

We spe..."'lt an hour on the phone with

18

another hour Tuesday.

19

last night at about 5: 30 or 6: 00 o 1 clock.

20

level of our concern regarding this matter.

21

t.~em

Monday,

We spent 15 or 20 minutes on the phone
And that is +-he

Now that or...ly deals with :Mr. Perea' s right to

22

effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

23

are also concerned ti'.at this infonr..ation has impacted the

24

State's ability to proceed fairly in this case.

25

preparing for trial, your Honor.
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1

existence of a potential Sixth Amendment violation at this late

2

stage.

3

ago by defense counsel.

This matter could have been raised six months or a year

4
.5

That 1 s very clear.

·And I think the court said it best, you said you were
appalled by the fact that that information hadn 1 t been turned

6

over to law enforcement.

7

Attorney General 1 s Office and so will be the Supreme Court of

8

the State of Utah.

9

I

And so are we.

And so are the

That 1 s what we are concerned about.

have had the unfortunate or fortunate experience of

10

having been placed in this very context as a neutral appoin'Lo.d

11

la~yer

12

Judge Baldwin to investigate and advise the court and conduct a

13

hearing on whether a conflict of interest rising to the level

14

of a Sixth .Amendment violation occurred in a murder case.

15

was the Richard Gunn case here a few years ago.

i..'1. a murder case in t:.:b.is

16

f"\1U"'Mr
C --...-..
~.z

•• - - I

•·Tho~o.

••T::OS
n-

'1:'--·--- -by

::oppo-i ni-o...-:1

-

That

Your Honor, the conflict in that case nearly was an
Webe~

Cou..""l.ty Attorney's Office

17

alleged violation betwee."1. the

18

and the Public Defenders Association by previous counsel who

19

t-ad indicated because of t.'h.is

20

association system, there wasn 1 t enough money to properly

21

dofend a

22

the death po._nalty in that case; nonetheless, we had to deal

23

with that issue.

24
25

deat.~

po._nalty case.

.i::'.!JJ.i..

system, +-he P'ublic d.o.fend.or 1 s

The State subsequently removed

So we had a hearing wherein John Caine and Steve
Laker were called as witnesses.

We went down that road.
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I was

8

And I had to

1

appointed special counsel to the defendant.

2

consult with him on numerous occasions about the nature and

3

extent the infonnation he had received from prior counsel,

4

review the contract of employment relative to the Public

5

Defenders Association and the County.

6

All of those things in a conflict like that, this is

7

not what we have in this case.

8

conduct which given the court's ruling and given the current

9

status of this case is directly to the disadvantage of

10

Mr. Perea.

11

tha-t-.....

12

.;S

~

We have a direct conflict,

This is an actual conflict.

--

a pe.,.. .....ea:y

_____ , -

con-F'1

oj ,...of-

This is a conflict

----:•-·

WO. be1

oj

Q .. TQ

The law on this matter is clear.

In the event of an

13

actual concurrent conflict, this court has to hold a hearing

14

after counsel is appointed by the court, not counsel that we

15

choose, not counsel that Mr. Richards chooses, but indepo._ndent

16

counsel appointed by the court, to deal with this issue because

17

i.11 order to protect t..'h..is record, we have to have -- two things

18

can happen.

19

conflict is so direct, so concurrent, so problematic i t amounts

20

to a p.::._r say conflict and Mr. Richards can't participate as

21

trial counsel, or potentially t.'h.is court could under +-he

22

Y'.aughan and Level decisions, this court could hold a hearing,

23

enter findings of fact and conclusions of law finding that

24

Mr. Perea is capable of entering a knowing and intelligent

25

waiver of any conflict.

This court could rule after a hearing that the

But that has to be a hearing held on
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1

the record and that has to have -- and the court has to make

2

findings of fact sufficient to support any waiver.

3

Now I won't go into this further with regard to what

4

our position is on that, but let me just say that that is very

5

clear in the Maughan case.

6

City murder case.

7

who had been appointed went to Spokane, Washington, and they

8

started telling witnesses they couldn't talk to the police.

9

State vs.

~.aughan,

that's a Brigham

That conflict was wherein defense counsel

And the Supreme Court sent -- and then Maughan waived

10

the conflict.

11

to determine

12

regard to Mr. Williams who was co-counsel at the time.

13

The Supreme Court sent that back for a hearing
whet..~er

!Yf.aughan could waive

t..~e

co!".flict

wit.~

Those lawyers were working in the interests of the

14

client; although, the State argued unethically, and that was a

15

conflict.

16

That 1 s a minor comparison to what 1 s gone on here.
In the Lovell decision the conflict was essentially

17

Lovell plead guilty to the aggravated :murder, he was se.."'lte..""lced.

18

Immediately after sentencing, he asked Mr.· Caine to withdraw,

19

1

and on appeal argued t..'E.t because of the long-time personal

20

relationship that Reed Ricl-..ards had had with John Caine, they

21

being fol:Ifier, them being fm::m=--r law partners and having real

22

estate interests in common, that there was a conflict, and he

23

wan.ted that case overturned and his plea withdrawn.

24
25

The court sent that back on appeal, sent it back on a
23B ruling on the conflict issue.

They said, look, we have to
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1

investigate this.

And there 1 s very clear guidance about the

2

trial court finding after a hearing facts to support whether or

3

not the conflict was real, concurrent or could have been

4

waived.
In that case there was evidence that initially

5
6

Mr. Lovell thought that Mr. caine' s representation was helpful

7

to him because he did have a relationship with Mr. Richards.

8

Now bear in mind that ;i.n that case Reed Richards had gone, had

9

left the County Attorney's Office.

10

five and a half months I

11

before

~..r.

~-lieve

He had bee-n gone for almost

before they entered the plea,

Lovell entered the plea.
So, so those two conflicts, situations pale in

12

13

comparison to what we have presently

14

Because we have an allegation, a proffer of evidence that there

15

are witnesses out there that refuse to testify unless they can

16

do so anonymously.

17

court 1 s ord.o.r, he won't reveal who they are.

18

real problem, your Honor.

19

be~ore

this court.

And Mr. Richards won't, in spite of this
Tr...at' s a ver:f

A.""ld frankly, five days b=>_fore working

~_fore

trial

20

starts is simply not enough time to acL""'qtlately address this

21

issue.

22

ourselves and our police officers and everything that goes into

23

it.

24

a problem, I believe.

25

Again, we should be getting ready for trial, preparing

And we are about to create a record that's going to cause

And again, we can address this argument on the
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1

conflict itself, but this has prejudiced the State's ability to

2

proceed.

3

Mr. Perea's right to effective assistance of counsel.

4

that IS f that IS a big f big problem.

5

It's also prejudiced more importantly perhaps
And

I weult to also suggest that we're running out of

6

time.

7

case isn't continued, we have to seek the assistance of the

8

Attorney General' s Office to try to stay these proceedings.

9

Because this is the level of the problem that we are facing

10

And with all due respect certainly, your Honor, if this

today, five days be--fore we're supposed to start to pick a jucy.
Jl..nd we are also of the opinion that th..is court in

11

12

holding a conflict hearing, those witnesses ought to be

13

summoned into this court, they ought to be placed under oath,

14

and they ought to be examined as to the nature and extent of

15

the promises that were made to them.

16

Now, for purposes of a conflict hearing, the State

17

would agree that at least at that level t.'t!eir information does

18

not need to go out to police officers and law

19

that we can examine tl-.at particular problem in a conflict

20

hearing.

21

enforcemo~t

so

But that's the State of the record, your Honor.
And tl-t.e State r.&.a.S done absolutr:>Jy nothing to create
This is not our problem.

This is a defense

22

this record.

23

problem for not revealing this infonr.ation or at least bringing

24

it to the attention of t.'l-).e court six months ago.

25

r..ad this hearing at a minimum back in August, and that is the

We could have
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1

current statement.

2

strike the trial.

3

THE COURT:

That' s why we are asking the court to

Mr. Shaw, can I ask you, you mentioned

4

you thought that somehow what's happened here affects the

5

state's ability to go forward.

6

How does that affect the State's ability to put on a case?
MR. SHAW:

7

I'm curious, I d.idn' t get that.

It doesn't affect our ability to go

8

forward and proceed with the case.

In fact, as pro-counsel

9

will stand up and tell you too, we want this case tried just

10

like everybody else.

But it affects our ability in the sense

11

t.'llat we are essentially conceding to a Sixth Ame..Tldme..'l'lt

12

ineffective assistance of counsel issue here.

13

that on the record, your Honor.

And we cannot do

We're prepared to put this case on with the witnesses

14
15

that we have, make no mistake about that.

16

go.

17

~-lieve

18

need to have them here in court and they need to tell us the

19

nature and the extent of this conflict that' s created.

20

that's a very important part of this court's decision on

21

whether or not J.Vf..r. Perea could l'v-a.ive

22

We're prepared to

But in ardor to solve this problem, these four witnesses I
need to be tPrned over, we need to talk to them, we

'b.~

And

p:>ta"'ltial cor1.flict.

Again, I don't want to argue whether or not he can or

23

can't waive fr..at today, but, yeah, I don't want the court to

24

misunderstand that.

25

pretrial, we shouldn' t be handling this type of a motion, these

But when we talk about preparing for
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1

kind of proceedings at this stage five days before trial.

2

could have bee=>-n done and handled months ago.

3

yes, it does affect our ability and it does prejudice our

4

ability to prepare our case as we would like so that we can do

5

it in the most efficient and professional, competent manner.

6

This

So in that sense,

We 1 re here messing around with, and I shouldn 1 t even
This is

7

say messing around.

This is a Sixth .Amendment issue.

8

ing;:>ortant.

9

stage in the proceeding because of the position Mr. Richards

But we are here arguing this motion at this late

10

has taken and has taken as late as February 19th, and that

11

position conti.."lues .

12

witnesses .
THE COURT:

13

We still don 1 t :b..ave

t.~e

names of t.l,.ose

Let me ask you one other question.

I

14

know it 1 s a fine line sometimes, but you agree, I mean I can 1 t

15

as a judge tell the defense to disclose the names of these

16

people.

17

under the rules of discovery, you have to disclose

18

But I certainly can 1 t dictate to the defense or the

19

proseC'Jtion, you know, we need t.."r).e names -- you have to

20

divulge.

21

anything.

22

They can decide to just rest on what the State offers.

23

again, I know that' s a fine line sometimes but

I

can say if you are going to call them as witnesses
~he

names.

Because the defense has no obligation to put on
They can decide they are not going to c= 11 anybody.

24

MR. SF..AW:

25

THE COURT:

And

I agree with that.

Okay.
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1

MR. SHAW:

But the problem here is that in taking

2

that position, the record is already made clear, last Friday

3

that there are witnesses out there that could exonerate

4

allegedly Mr. Perea.

5

witnesses on but in light -- and the reason he' s not putting

6

them on, that's what is important here, the reason he disclosed

7

last week was that he owes a duty of loyalty to them because

8

he' s promised them he wouldn't divulge their names.

9

him in a direct conflict of interest with Mr. Perea.

Granted, he doesn't have to put those

That puts
If those

10

witnesses, as he proffered, are going to say that they were

11

t.'lj,ere and so.TI~..eone else did it.

12

isn't clear here.

13

14
15

That's +-he subtly +-hat ma:trbe

It is very clear.

TrlE COURT:

I get the issue.

I

don't have any problem with that.
MR.. SHAW:

And I agree they could choose, well, we
~.aybe

16

are not going to call those witnesses.

17

them or r....aybe we should evaluate t.'l)em to detennine whether or

18

not this is, in fact, the case should proceed as it is charged.

19

we should call

But you agree, the defense attor:ney

T'.ti.t!,; COU"'Rl':

20

doesn't have any obligation to help law enforcement with the

21

prosecution to solve the murder.

22

MR. SHAW:

23

T'tiE COtiRT:

Absolutely.
And that's kind of what we are at here,

24

is what is the responsibility of the defense?

25

witnesses could very well have came to Mr. Richards and told
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1

him something that either helps the state or helps the defense.

2

I don 1 t know that he has any legal obligation to came forward,

3

unless he 1 s going to call them as witnesses.

4

MR. SHAW:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SHAW:

7

Right.

And that 1 s what he intended to do.

And -- okay.
That 1 s what he intend-od to do.

attempt to do it has created this problem.

8 ·is responsible for this problem.
9

And his

And the State now

We -- the State gets hit both

ways because on appeal the defense lawyers then attack trial

10

counsel.

11

record ' for
not
correcti...'ig tho- --- ..

12

And that 1 s the problem here.

13

Then the Supreme Court attacks the State for not
han~1;ng ~~0 mat~or pr~-ly

..

--··

-·- ..

---

--r~

·

Had Mr. Richards said, look, his duty to those

14

witnesses would be thus, I can 1 t keep your name co:r1£ido.ntial.

15

If you choose not to testify, that 1 s your problem.

16

duty.

17

continues to create t.."'lat duty, continues to Inarl..ifest to eve.."l

18

today.

19

He owes them no duty.

That 1 s the

Instead he 1 s created a duty, and

I agree that he doesn't have to disclose them, but

20

now the problem is created, they are out there, and the

21

appellate cou.."'l.sel is going to j'll!rp on t.'lll.s if we don 1 t go

22

through the process of curing the defect and detennining if i t

23

is waivable No. 1, No. 2 whether Mr. Perea understands the

24

direct conflict, whether he consents to it and whether he

25

knowingly and intelligently can waive it.

And that's the State
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1

of the record.

And this court has to make a finding on that

2

prior to going forward in a trial phase.
All right.

That' s our position.

3

THE COURT:

Thanks, Mr. Shaw.

4

Mr. Richards, I certainly give everybody the benefit

5

of the record.

6

know you wanted the opportunity to respond in writing to the

7

State's motion, but go ahead if--

8
9

I went a little longer than I thought because I

MR. RICHARDS:
thought i t would too.

That did go a little longer than I
I do think I need to respond briefly.

I

10

do reserve the right to pos~ne this for final conclusion

11

until sometime next \"reo-k..

12

same of the brightest minds on the defense side as far as the

13

appellate attorneys.

14

all believe that there is no conflict and this is an

15

unnecessary proceeding, but I'll go ahead and address i t but

16

reserve the right to put toge1:.11.o=>_r a memorandum and then address

17

i t properly whe..""l I have other cou.""lsel p=>-rhaps.

18

I've contacted, I've also contacted

I had a conference with them, and they

Just a couple of things .

No. 1, this isn't a

19

situation that I or my client created.

20

that the State could have avoicLod.

21

extent that they get up and say they are so concerned about my

22

client's rights, they are concerned about this potential

23

conflict, which I don 1 t believe t.""l!:>_re 1 s one, but and they have

24

the perfect way to resolve it.

25

hearing or the testimony as I suggested.
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1

that.

I understand.

2

get up here and say they do so with clean hands belies the

3

facts to me.

4

THE CO'ORT:

They can make that call.

But for them to

Well, but we're kind of missing the

5

target here.

6

witnesses to the jw:y or to people in the courtroom.

7

question of giving them the names before the trial gets

8

started.

9

situation that you or the witnesses have elected -- because I

And that's not a situation they created.

It's a

That's a

gave you until Monday to decide whether or not you wanted to

10
11

It's not a question of hiding the identity of the

1

give t-hose na.T!'.es up to the State.

I'm a little puzzled by the

12

argument that it's not a situation created by the defense.

13

is .

14

witnesses

15

It

All you have to do is give them the names of these

MR. RICHARDS:

Except they won' t agree not to talk to

16

other people and have their investigators st-.a.re all this

17

info:cnation with people who :might hann these individuals.

18

therein lies the basis of the lack of conflict.

19

t:::U.ked to t."'J.ese individuals, some of them are better for us

20

than others certainly, but after having talked to these

21

individna 1 s, t.l,ey all said fr.at t.l,ey wouldn't testify without

22

this anomini ty.

23

T""dE COURT:

24

table, has it?

25

that under advisement.

Okay.

1md

After having

But tr.a.a t' s never bee.'"'l off the

I mean, .reme.rnber I said we're going to take
I said I think the first step here is
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1

to decide if they are willing to testify and are you willing to

2

give the names up to the prosecution?

3

thing I asked.

4

can use pseudonyms or false names or whatever on the witness

5

stand and what they do in the courtroom.

6

just thought we needed to break this down and say, I think the

7

first decision is are they willing to testify?

8

willing to give up the names to the prosecution so that they

9

can at least prepare for cross-examination here.

10

I think that's the only

I haven't made a ruling on whether or not they

That's never -- but I

And are you

And that --

and I don' t know whether I

11

MEL RICH.n...RDs:

I understand e:Y.actly what the court's

12

order was, and I think I followed it.

13

go forward under those parameters.

T'ney are not willing to

All right.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

Therein I think resolves the issue of

16

conflict.

17

that counsel has been in so many trials where witnesses decide

18

they don't want to testify as to things that they either saw or

19

things they!ve told counsel, investigators or police or

20

whatever.

21

I 1 ve bee..'"'l in, and I know your Honor has and I know

That happens all the time.
Jl..nd t.L"ie last t:b.ing we do as cow'"'lsel is put on a

22

witness that' s going to get up and say well, I don 1 t rem.ernbo...r,

23

wf1..iC!'1. is what would happo_n here.

24

would then have to say, well, isn 1 t it true that you talked to

· 25

me?

I k..l"low that would happ=-_n.

And they will say, no, I didn't tell you that.

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801)
634-5549
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

I don 1 t

19

And what that does is i t makes

1

recall ever telling you that.

2

me look bad in front of the jw:y.

3

help our case, it hurts our case.

4

And not only does i t not

So given those parameters, we made a decision that

5

we, given those parameters, are not going to call those

6

witnesses.

7

opinion that would hurt our case more than it would help our

8

case.

9

reasonable and I think it's logical, and I think you having

10

been a prosecutor and having, I know, had hundreds of these

11

happ=>_n to you, you Jr_Tlow exactly where I can coming from.

Plain and simple we won 1 t call them.

Because in my

It' s a tactical decision on our part, and I think it 1 s a

12

I want to make it very clear that I do not represent

13

these people.

14

never told them that I would represent them.

15

to them with the understanding that they would -- I wouldn 1 t

16

divulge their names unless we could have this anonymous

17

hearing.

18

my opinion.

19

20
21

1

I

I have never represented these people.

ca..'1. 1 t do t.l-ta.t.

I have

I simply talked

A.'1.d, t.lierefore, the case is over in

And so I don 1 t see that there's a conflict based

upon tr.a.at.
As far as, you know, the potential conflict, that

I

bothers me to sar-ue exta'"lt.

I mean,

Y~.

Shaw r.a.as gotte11 u-p and

22

said he has potentially a conflict because if somebody

23

testifies differently as to what occurred in this unrecord-oci

24

alleged confession of my client, that he would have to then

25

step up and testify because he heard it.
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1

potential conflicts on either side.

2

this situation rises to a potential conflict because putting

3

these witnesses on the stand may hurt us more than help us, and

4

we believe at this point given those parameters.

5

My client wants to go

6

right to speedy trial.

7

that.

I don 1 t believe ours in

to trial and he is invoking his

If he should do that verbally, we 1 11 do

He wants to go to trial a week from Monday.

8

I 1 Ve also had private counsel unrelated to me that is

9

also death penalty qualified, who had talked to my client about
And if we need to bring him in, we can do that,

10

these issues.

11

but he has taLlced. to :bim he 1 s told me.

12

waiver if even necessary that he understands all the

13

consequences, Mr. Perea does, and wants to go ahead with trial

14

without utilizing these witnesses given the rulings of the

15

court.

16

respect the rulings the court makes and understand that 1 s the

17

ruling and

18

A.T'ld it would be a

And I want the court to understand that I highly

t.~t 1 s

where we are at.

It 1 s interesting that the State mentioned the :V.aughan

19

case because that's one that the court disqualified

20

Mr. Williams, left Mr. Mauro on.

21

the court 1 s decision on the trial court cuJ.d said they could

22

both represent him and currently are both representing him on

23

the ongoing trial.

24

there was multiple times more severe than any potential

25

possible conflict in this case.

The Supreme Court reversed

So that v.-as a reversal.
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1

want to say today.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

Okay.
That's where we are at.

All right.

Just so I understand, you

agree that your duty is to your client, not to the witnesses?

6

MR. RICHARDS:

7

THE COURT:

Oh, absolutely.

Absolutely.

And you also agree

I mean, as a ·judge,

8

I can 1 t order you to turn over the names of anybody unless you

9

are going to call them as witnesses.

10

rules of discovecy come into play.

11

MR. RICHA..TIDS :

And then, of course, the

Jl.nd given the rulings t.l-at t.l-te court

12

has made, we're not going to call those witnesses.

13

not because I have any duty to those witnesses, it 1 s because

14

it 1 s not going to do me any good; it 1 s going to hurt me.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SHAW:

17

Maughan.

18

correctly understood.

19

All right.

And it 1 s

Mr. Shaw.

Yes, your Honor.

Counsel misreads .

I want to make sure that the ruling is correct, or

Wnat happ.o._ned in lf.eughan was the one lawyer was

20

disqualified, the other lawyer was allowed to remain by the

21

defendant 1 s choosing.

22

order saying pick one or the other.

23

Mr. Williams w-as disqualified.

24
25

In other words, Judge Hadfield issued an
He picked Mr. Mauro.

The Supreme Court didn 1 t reverse the judge 1 s
position.

What they did is they sent it back for a hearing so
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1

the judge could find after a hearing and enter findings of fact

2

which would have deter.mined whether or not the alleged conflict

3

could be knowingly and intentionally waived.
Let me read from that case.

4

5

This is instructions

regarding waiver on remand.

6

"We recognize the challenges that confront a district

7

court when assessing whether a Defendant has knowingly and

8

voluntarily waived an attorney's potential conflict of

9

interest.

As we noted above, the specter of being whipsawed by

10

claims of error no matter which way a judge rules is more than

11

fanciful.

12

Defendant may seo-k a waiver and then try to use it to his or

13

her advantage later."

14

We are sensitive

That's what the problem is here.

That's exactly the

15

problem here.

16

Mr. Perea to waive this potential -- this isn't a potential

17

conflict; this is a concurrent conflict.

18

I don't owe him any duty.

19

that he has marlifested with these people, trying to keep their

20

names confidential to the detriment of his client, given the

21

level of infonnation that

22

We have no record before us that allows

J:-f..r. Ric...'1ards ca.T"J. say

He's already demonstrated the duty

t.~ey

allegedly have.

Then the court goes on and says this:

"We,

23

therefore, instruct the District Court to

24

qualified conflict counsel to represe..-·1.t Mr. V.aaugha..."'l for the

25

limited purposes -- purpose of ascertaining whether Mr. Maughan
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1

desires to waive the potential conflict with respect to

2

Mr. Williams and to ensure that Mr. Mauro' s waiver is knowing

3

and voluntary. "

4

It's also important to note in the case of State vs.

5

Holland.

It cited a Supreme Court case, Glasser vs. United

6

States that essentially says this, whether -- basically says

7

whether counsel' s conduct is prejudicial is really not relevant

8

to the detenni.nation of whether a Sixth Amendment ineffective

9

assistance of counsel has arisen.

And Glasser says, let me

10

just read it out of Holland, it says this:

In Glasser, the

11

Supreme Court reversed a conviction because

a.""l

12

represented co-defendants with adverse interests.

13

refused to inquire into the issue of prejudice because the

14

right to

15

absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to

16

the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.
Tr~s

17

1

The court

assistance of counsel is too fundamental and

court has no infor.mation bP_fore it today on the

amount of prejudice.

18
19

r~ve

attorney

It doesn't rratter, but we still have no

infor.m.ation available that would allow anyone to conclude

20

Mr. Perea can waive this conflict knowingly and intentionally.

21

And that is the proble.-rn.

That is t..'lte problem.

22

If our Supreme Court is going to send back Lovell and

23

send back Maughan for hearings on this very issue, what's going

24

to happo_n when we get whipsawed, whe.."1 this district court gets

25

whipsawed by the Supreme Court and they tell us, prosecutors,
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1

you di.dn' t stand up and do your duty either.

2

got set up here, Judge.

3

set up in the current state of this record.

The classic whipsaw.

That's what we
That's what is

And we can't do anything about it until counsel is

4

5

appointed for Mr. Perea to examine this issue of conflict and

6

detennine if i t can be waived and whether he can knowingly and

7

intelligently do it.

8

Honor.

9

10

But that's the status of the case, your

It can't be any clearer.
THE COURT:

All right.

hearing then next week and then deal with the issue?

11

MF.. F.ICF.l\.RDS :

12

~.

13

THE COURT:

14

SHAW:

Yeah.

First we have to appoint counsel.
Right.

And I think Mr. Richards

mentioned he had somebody in mind.

15

MR. SHAW:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR..

18

Should we set it for a

SH..~W:

I don't think that' s good enough.
Well, do you even know who it is?
Well, I don't.

I have an idea.

I have an

idea.

19

MR. RIC"rlARDS:

I ca...'"l tell you tl-.Lat I contacted

20

Mr. Roy Cole who is one of the few capital qualified attorneys

21

.h'"'l town.

22

he would be willing to come and testify.

~.nd

he J:-~s gone and alread-.f spoken with 1.-f..r. Perea and

23

T'".clE COURT:

24

MR. SHAW:

25

~..re

Well,

you okay with 1-I.!I'. Cole?
ho~o's
_,.._

tho
-

t~N
'=::'·

to happ=>-n, this is a public defender case.

I think what has
I

think Mr. Balis
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1

(phonetic) needs to be notified of the issue, and I think

2

Mr. Balis should select somebody to handle it within the public

3

defender realm.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. SHAW:

Okay.

They've got to be death qualified.

I don't think they have to be death

6

qualified for conflict pw:poses.

7

issue because we are dealing simply with the issues of waiver

8

knowingly and intelligently.
THE COURT:

9

I don' t think that's the

Is there same reservation about Mr. Cole?

10

I know this is hitting it kind of broadsided, but I guess I'm

11

having trouble

u..T'ln~rstanding

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SHAW:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

16

MR. SHAW:

17

MR. RI~..PDS:

18

MR. SHAW:

why

~,...

Cole is not

He's not a public defender.
Right.
And the county has --

Neither were you.

Huh?
Neither were you on t.'l-).e othP_r case.

I know but the County -- the court ordered

19

the county to pay for it after the county -- what happo_ned in

20

that case is John Caine and Bill Dais stipulated to my

21

appointment.

22

1-.nd the..J. t..'!,_e court advised.

THE COURT:

I guess that's what I am asking if you

23

are willing to do that.

24

Cole?

25

MR. SHAW:

Are you willing to stipulate to Mr.

We are supposed to stay out of the
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1

decisions relative to the appointment of counsel.

2

THE COURT:

Well, if you want to stay out, I' 11 just

3

make the appointment.

4

have any objection to Mr. Cole?

5

this issue.
MR.. SHAW:

6

cL~artment.

I mean, that's why I was asking do you

No, no, no.

Either you are in or out on

There's an issue between the

7

civil

We're not -- as the prosecutors, we're not

8

supposed to be involved in the issue of appointment of counsel.

9

That would be Mr. Wilson or Mr. Allred from our office.

They

10

are the ones who handle the appointment of counsel issue in

11

indigent cases.

12

They are s1..-pposed to be a

THE COURT:

~..inese wa 1 1

--

You know, the problem is, like you say,

13

we are a week from trial.

14

resolved if at all possible before we bring in 200 jurors a

15

week from :Monday so.

16

to know.

17

say, I 'm just trying to move th.is th.i.."'lg along if we

18

I'm hying to get this thing

If you are opposed to it, I guess I need

If you don't have a position and, you know, like I

MR.. SHAW:

Well, that's

~""'a.'1.

we want the court to rule

19

on our motion to continue because we don' t think we can move

20

this thing along adequately, your Honor.

21

THE COURT:

L-et me ask you, do you agree though tr..a t

22

if Mr. Perea agrees to waive any pot:P_ntial, does that resolve

23

the problem?

24

MR. SHAW:

25

THE COURT:

No, it doesn't.
Why?
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1

MR. SHAW:

It doesn't resolve the problem until this

2

court has a hearing and makes sufficient findings of fact and a

3

ruling--

4

THE COURT:

Well 1 and I know that.

We're going to

I'm going to make findings -- I just, I

5

give you a hearing.

6

guess I'm trying to figure out where we are in agreement or

7

disagreement on the issue.

8
9

10

MR. SHAW:

whether he can waive it may differ from the court's and from
counsel's

11

12

As I told the court 1 our view regarding

~_nding

THE COURT:

on what evidence comes out at that hearing.
How long do you t:h.i!'.k t.."'e

MR.. RICHARDS:

14

THE COURT:

or I got all day on Thursday, the 4th, or all day on the 5th.
MR. RICHARDS:

17

THE CO't.'IRT:

21
22
23
24
25

Your Honor, I'm good Tuesday morning.

I can give you half a day on Tuesday

morning.

19

20

A couple of hours, I guess .

Well, I got next Tuesday in the morning

16

18

ng is

going to take?

13

15

hear~

MR. RICH..ZffiDS:

all day.

I could do that.

I can do Thursday

Yeah, I could do Thursday all day or Friday all day.
MR. SHAW:

'VI.'Ihat about the State' s request to h=ve

these witnesses subpoo_naed to that hearing?
THE COURT:

No. 1

Well, I think if you want to subpoena

witnesses that's your responsibility not mine.
MR. SHAW:

But we don't know who they are yet.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SHAW:

3

Well, and I don 1 t either.
Don 1 t they go to the very core of the

duty?

THE COURT:

4

5

say.

6

to--

They may, depend.ing on what they have to

But I don't know that I can -- how do I order people

MR. SHAW:

7

I think the court can order them disclosed

8

in the context of this hearing.

9

THE COURT:

Well, but

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE CQT.JRT:

I disagree.

Like I say, it 1 s your hearing.

If you

12

want them there, I guess you need to make arrangements to have

13

them.

14

based on

If you don 1 t want them there, I guess I have to rule

15

MR. SHAW:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SHAW:

We don 1 t even know who they are.
Yeah, that 1 s what I say.
So we are asking the court to order t.'l-:l.ose

18

names disclosed so we can evaluate that and have them here i f

19

necessary.

20
21

THE COURT:

Well, I thought we went through this.

I

thought you agreed I do not have --

22

MR. SHAW:

23

THE COURT:

That 1 s for trial pw:poses.
Yeah, but it doesn 1 t make any difference
I can 1 t require the rio.fense to turn

24

if it 1 s trial or hearing.

25

over names of witnesses unless they are going to testify.
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1

they are not going to testify, I can't say I need to know what

2

your trial strategy is, I need to know who you are going to

3

call, I can't do that.
MR. SHAW:

4

For the limited pw:poses of assessing the

5

duties that Mr. Richards has manifested to those witnesses, you

6

can.

7

about disclosing and calling them as trial witnesses.

8

talking about we have a record created thus far that puts every

9

one in mind.

That's what we are talking about.

THE COURT:

10

We're not talking
We're

I'm just not inclined to do that at this

11

po-iTlt.

12

asked you, there's no way I can force the defense to disclose

13

the identity of people if they are not going to call them, so.

14

I u..Tlri.:::..,-.staTld your position.

I

MR. SHAW:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR.

17

sa~:

I just-- that's why I

Well
Okay.

--

if that' s the court' s ruling, t:r-.aa t' s

the court' s ruling, I guess .

18

THE COURT:

Which day is better for the State?

19

M:"(. SHAW:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

Well , the next question is -Probably Thursday would be better for

21 1 :me if tr.at' s at all possible si...uply because I'm going to No. 1
22

try to have to get a memo prepared, and No. 2, I think I might

23

r~ve

24
25

another attorney came in on tl1is trial, so.
THE COURT:

You are &.inking about somebody

ot..~er

than Mr. Cole?
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR.. RICHARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

To help argue the motion, yeah.

Okay.

MR. RICHARDS:

So the 4th is the best?

I can

If that works it would be good.

MR. SHAW:

Well, we would prefer as mentioned to have

Mr. Balis appoint someone to deal with this issue.

10

know how conflict counsel can get up to

11

issu.e.

12

afternoon, every day, virtually all day.

13

How about

do it all day on the 4th.

8

9

To argue the motion?

for the State?

6
7

No, I'm saying another attorney to --

~

I don't

fully on this

We've been t-rorki.'l"lg on t.'llls isS"..J.e si."1.ce Friday

T"'rlE COURT:

Like I say, I ' 11 give you a hearing.

I 'm

14

trying to keep this trial on track if at all possible.

15

the State doesn't want to do that, but I guess I'm just trying

16

to see if we can resolve the issue before trial.

17

where you are coming from.

18
19

MR. SHAW:

So I know

And that prejudices the State's case.

T"nat prejudices our ability to put on a case

20

THE COURT:

21

MR.

22

I know

SHl:>.:W:

this late date.

Okay.
-- by

dealing with t.c'1i.s kind of motion at

That' s the problem.

23

T"rlE COURT:

24

MR.

25

THE COURT:

Hg"WARJ) :

All right.

4th, 5th or 2nd?

Tuesday, t.."le 2nd.

The 2nd.

You Y.-ant to do it in the

Noteworthy
Reporting,
LLC Clark
(801)
634-5549
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31

I

1

morning then?

2

Well, I guess how do we resolve the

MR.. HEWARD:

3

issue, Judge, of the appointment?

4

I 'm ·going to appoint Mr. Cole.

THE COURT:

I '11 talk

to Mr. Balis but that's the one name I 've got is Roy Cole.

5
6

MR.. SHAW:

7

MR.. HEWARD:

Then -We' 11 submit a name as well.

If the

defense is going to su1:mi t one, we' 11 sul:mi t one as well.

8

9

MR.. RICHARDS:

It d.oesn' t matter to me.

fine with Mike.

10

~.FD:

11

MF..

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE COURT:

14

and find out.

15

both of them.

16

If you want to ask Mike to do it, I 'm

!vf..ike

~_lis

is fine, your Honor.

That's fine with me.

All right.

Let me talk to both of them

I'm sure this is going to come as a sw:prise to

Okay.

So I got Roy Cole and I got Mike Balis and

17

I' 11 make the appointment on one of those.

18

can do the hearing on Thursday morning then?

19

at 9:00 o'clock?

MR. HE""WARD:

20

21 1 first issue is if they

A.T'ld you t:b.ink we

You want to start

I guess the issue dep=-..nds on what
CA.L'i

be reacty b-.i Tuesday morning.

I

MR. RICHARDS:

22

And that's my problem.

I just don't

you know, I 'm going to be in hearings all day today.

23

think

24

I got another cammi tment tomorrow.

25

have time nor will my co-counsel.

I just don't think I '11
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So you want to go on the 4th?

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

MR. HEWARD:

Go on the 4th.

But, Judge, what Mr. Richards is saying

4

just continues to make the record worse.

5

both sides in a position that we're -- in the time p=-_riod we

6

should be preparing, we're not, because we are having to deal

7

with issues that we should have dealt with six months to a year

8

ago.

9

Then let us march down the road that we are talking about to

10
11

We're just putting

We would ask your Honor to continue this case today.

detel::mine whether or not we can even go any farther.
Jl..nd I Y-"'low tb.at, but honest to God, t-lri.s

THE COt.lF..T:

12

case has been p=-_nd.ing for two and a half years .

13

it at least twice.

14

And I mean, I 've set deadlines and motions and hearings .

15

Defendant has been sitting in jail for two and a half years.

16

just-- I know you want to continue the case.

17

to keep it on track at all possible.

18

but I just

19

20
21

And we've set

We have 200 jurors ready to came in on it.

MR. f;...!:.,;Wl-\RD:

The
I

I'd like to t..-ry

I realize your position

The State hasn 1 t asked for a continuance

once, Judge, not one time.
THE COURT:

Well, tr...at rr..a.y be true, but the point is

22

if you can't get ready for a trial in two and a half years, I

23

mean I'm just-- you know, I'm frustrated too because I thought

24

we put up a sc..'ledule.

25

on same of the motions and then we end up continuing same of

And I come in here and we're ready to go
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1

them.

2

to do.

3

in these cases because there is.

4

concede that we're going to continue this case.

5

but --

And I understand the frustration.

I know there's a lot

I 'm not saying that there isn't a lot of work involved

6

and cutoffs.

8

ignore them.

9

You talk about them.

THE COURT:

I may have to

And your Honor has set the guidelines

MR. HEWARD:

7

But I'm just not ready to

I know.

10

necessarily your fault.

11

MR.

12

THE COURT:

RI~P-DS:

The defense continue to

I know.

I 'm not saying it's

Well --

It' s frustrating for me as a judge

13

because I 'm trying to move this case along, and we got motions

14

and I can tell you it' s going to happo-n again today.

15

have no response on same of the motions .

16

them, and again, I have no response.

17

feel like I 'm the only one that wants this case to go to trial.

18

It's just, like I say, it's two and a half years and here we

19

are, you know, a week from trial and people are asking to

20

continue.

21

to give up this trial setting.

22

asking for is what dates are available next weo_k that we can do

23

this hearing.

And I

And we end up bumping

And I just -- I mean I

And I just-- I guess I'm just not willing right now

24

MR. HEVmRD:

25

MR.. RICHARDS:

I :may have to, but all I ':m

TlJ.esday.
Tuesday i t is.
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MS. SIPES:

1

Your Honor, just so -- I would not be

2

able to be here Tuesday.

3

that I'm covering for and I don't have anybody to cover for me.

4

Thursday I do have the day free.
THE COURT:

5

6

There are other attorneys out of town

Well, let's go with Thursday then.

We' 11

put forth and we' 11 do it at 9 a.m.
I 'm not available on the 4th, your

MR. HEWARD:

7
8

Honor.
MR. SHAW:

9

That's right.

THE COURT:

10
11

wi t..'l-).out you t..,_en.

12

Well, I guess we' 11 just have to go

I don' t k..T'low what to do.
Why do we go without -- we won' t go

MR. HEWARD:

13

without defense counsel, but we will go without the State's

14

representation?

15

THE COURT:

I guess I 'm just trying to give everybody

16

a chance to get ready for the hearing.

17

going to be virtually i.mpossible to satisfy ev.:.rybody' s

18

schedule.

Let's go with the 4th, nine clock.

19

MR. RiuL'Z\RDS:

20

THE COURT:

21

And I realize it's

9:00 o'clock we' 11 be here.

All right.

Now the other thing I just

wanted to clarify on the record, th.ere was -- the Defenrlant r...ad
I

I think we kind of

22

filed that motion to exclude witnesses.

23

talked about it a little bit.

24

this right.

25

identify the witnesses that the defense filed, the defense has

I just -w-anted to make sure I had

It was my undorstanding that on this motion to
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I

1

decided not to give up those names.

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Is that --

That's correct, your Honor.

I mean

I had set a deadline for Monday, the

22nd --

5

MR. RICHARDS:

I understand that.

6

THE COURT:

at 1:00 o'clock, and that was the

7
8

9

10
11

court order.

And your decision was --

MR. RICHARDS:

I'm not going to call them because

strategically I think it would be detrimental in our case to
call them at this point.
THE COLlRT:

~.11

right.

Now let !!'.e just ask.

~..s

I

12

read your response to the discovexy, you say you can' t find two

13

of the witnesses.

14

15
16

Is that correct, Mr. Richards?

MR. RICHARDS:

I'm still t.I:ying to locate t-wo.

are the two lesser quality.
THE COURT:

I guess, my thinking is if you can't find

17

t.'l-:!.e witnesses, doesn't this part of the issue become moot?

18

other words --

19

lv.IK. RIC'"iARDS:

It potentially could.

20

THE COURT:

if you can' t locate people

21

HR.

22

THE COURT:

23

They

RICHA.~S:

In

Tr.Ld.t' s trtle.

at least to two issues, this issue

would be moot.

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

THE COURT:

That's correct.

I still a."tl. tr..{i..Tlg.

Now the other two witnesses , though,
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1

you've indicated that they said they wouldn't testify.

2

guess I was a little confused about the way you've written this

3

up in your response.

4

willing to testify without the court's protection as requested.

5

And again, we've talked about this.

6

won't protect their identity, but I think you have to turn the

7

names over to the State.

8
9

And I

You say neither of those witnesses are

I'm not saying that we

Am I misreading that or --

MR. RICHARDS:

Could I have just a manent, your

Honor?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HEWA.~:

Sure.

Judge, w:h.ile they are th.ii1king about

12

that, on that motion you never made findings and conclusions;

13

we would ask for that.

14

Things kind of fell off.

15

your Honor with regards to --

16

T""rlE COURT:

· 17
18

You simply -- we got to the end of it.
There were never any findings made by

I thought that's why we were doing the

hearing on Thursday to make findings.
MR. HEWARD:

No.

On the motion where they wanted

19

have the witnesses testify anonymously.

20

findings and conclusions.

21

22
23

THE COURT:

to

You never made

I did.""l.' t know I was s~l:-'posed. to.

I knew

I had to make findings on the conflict of counsel but
MR. HEW'Jl..RD:

Right, but there was a motion.

And

24

you've got to make findings a~d conclusion so t~ere's a final

25

order on that. . And that

~-as

never done.

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801)
634-5549
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. RICHARDS:

3

Do you want to prepare a suggested order?
I don't think you finished ruling on

it.

4

THE COURT:

I guess the question is which motion?

I

5

know they are close, but there are actually two issues , right?

6

One is the question of whether or not I disqualified

7

Mr. Richards.

8

you?

9

MR.. HEWARD:

10
11

THE COURT:

No.

You're asking about the anonymous

wi t..~esses?

12

13

You are not asking for findings on that, are

Yes.

MR. HEWARD:

The ones we were here on last

w~_k.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you want to sub:n.i t some kind of

15

suggested or proposed findings?

16

MR. HEWARD:

I'm not sure I can do that until you

17

make t-hose, your Honor.

18

There was certainly arguments presented to you fra..'"Il both sides.

19

T:8E COt.i"R:T:

I don't know what your thinking was.

Okay.

Well, I guess I' 11 take that undor

20

advisement and try to draft something and sul::mit it to you.

21

you need

22
23

I

of fact on the

MR.. HEWARD:

Correct.

THE COURT:

.All right.

anonyrr~us w~t~esses.

And then an ul ti.mate court's

decision.

24
25

fin~ings

So

I '11 try to get something out

on that.
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1

MR. RICHARDS :

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

But again my question was about the way

3

this is worded in the order, you almost make it sound like that

4

the reason they won't come forward is because I can't guarantee

5

protection.

6

And again, I don' t think I ever said that.

MR. RICHARDS:

No, it's, it's -- they say if we have

7

to turn the names over to the prosecution and they can go out

8

and spread their names and their proposed testimony around,

9

that they won't do i t under those parameters.

10

THE COURT:

That's it.

And I guess, again, maybe it's just

11

semantics, but I never got t..lLe i..rnpression that the State was

12

going to quote, leak the info.:z:mation to somebody else, but

13

obviously investigators and law enforcement need an opportunity

14

to go out and talk to them and try to verify wr...at they would be

15

testifying to, but are we talking about the same thing here?

16

MR. RIC.liARDS:

Well, my understanding when we had the

17

hearing, and maybe this would resolve the whole tJ-!.ing, my

18

understanding -w-as we said we'd turn over the names as long as

19

counsel wouldn; t give out the names or identifying ir..foDr.ation

20

to anyone else.

21

And then the colJ.rt said how about t..'le law e.?">..forcement

22

officers so they can investigate?

23

have any problem with that as long as the officers don' t the.."1

24

disclose those names or

25

They are worried about other people in the gang.

t.~t

And I said, well, I don't

info.J::mation to other individuals.
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1

police go out and say, well, Joe Jones said that he was there

2

and saw that i t was not Riqo that was shooting or something to

3

that nature --

4

THE COURT:

Well, I don 1 t think law enforcement has

5

the idea that they are just going to go out and make trouble

6

for these people, are they?

7

investigation to have the name.

8

State was coming from was to say, you know, you can 1 t just say

9

you can only give it to A, B and C, the names of witnesses,

10

I mean but they do need

to do an

And I thought that 1 s where the

but

11

MR.

RI~..P.DS:

Well, the problem is I understood the

12

State said, no, we want to be able to have our officers go out

13

and talk to Sam Smith and say, Sam, Joe Jones told me that

14

this.

15

that, then that whole confidentiality thing, the dilemma comes.

And the minute he does that, the minute the officer does

16

THE COURT:

Wouldn't it be part of their

17

investigation t-rying to

18

it 1 s true?

19

I

MR. RICHARDS:

~_rify

what they are saying, whet.'iLer

Exactly.

I U.."lderstand that's their

20

I

21

j allowed.

We're not willing to go tl-.LO.t far.

22

I

1'1R. HEWARD:

position.

And so based on that, the witnesses say we're not
'!':'"'.at's

Yeah, but Mr. Richards would like to

23

dictate how the State investigates their .L."'lfonnation.

24

specifically only wanted to give us the in-Formation n=-xt Friday

25

on the 4th so we have the weekend with which to track down and
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1

verify and interview.

2

Mr. Richards, you are not going to dictate nor is the court

3

going to dictate how the State investigates their case.

4

an executive branch function.

5

THE COURT:

Your ruling as I understand it, no,

That's

And I know the deadline has came and

6

gone, so the witnesses aren't going to testify, but I just was

7

a little troubled with the way this was worded because i t

8

almost makes it sound like, well, they would have testified but

9

since the court can' t guarantee their protection, we are not

10

going to.

11

said

12

protect their identify here.

tr~t.

And I didn't think that was real -- I mean we never
The court' s never said I can't protect or won't

MR. RICHARDS:

13

And your Honor, I probably worded that

And I can reword it if you would like to say that they

14

wrong.

15

wouldn' t be willing to came forth if their names have to go to

16

the State and the State is going to give that, names and

17

iP.fonna.tion out to oth=>_r people.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. RICHARDS:

20

Okay.
And could we just make tl-...at arnendment

on the record somehow?
T.r.Lat ' s fine .

21

T"".tiE COu'RI' :

22

I guess the other question I had, and I think

Sure .

23

V.I.!:'. He-v.-ard raised it last week, and maybe I misunderstood what

24

the proffer of what these wit.."1.esses would have said.

25

of the witnesses going to testify that they didn • t have
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1

personal knowledge of what happened but if somebody else had

2

told them that or?

3

MR. :H:EWARD:

4

THE COURT:

5

That's what defense counsel said.
That's what I just wanted to clarify.

Is

that --

6

MR.. RICHARDS:

We had -- I don't know how much I can

7

lay out on this, but we had someone over there, actually three

8

that would have been there and could testify differently than

9

what some of the State's witnesses have testified to.

10

one individual that's confessed to actually doing the shooting.
Wouldn't -+-h..at be hearsay?

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

We have

Tr.at would be a statement.

It would

be hearsay, yes, statement against interest.

14

THE COURT:

Statement against

15

MR. RICHARDS:

Interest.

And if I got up and say,

16

hey, I 'm the one that did the shooting, I think tr.at comes in

17

u_n.der 803.

18
19

THE COURT:
is not, is not

~~e

So the witness

you would be calling

one?

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

T"rlE COti'RT:

22

t.~t

Oh, no.

Th;:y are saying samebott.{ else told t..lLem

that they did the shooting?

23

MR. RICHARDS:

Exactly.

24

MR. HEWARD:

25

that statement in, your Honor.

Stateme.."lt against interest doesn't get
That's clearly hearsay.
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1

THE COURT:

Well, it's all moot now anyway.

I just

2

wanted to clarify what the witnesses were -- I mean, I kind of

3

agree with Mr. Heward.

4

the stand and say, well, I talked to so and so, and he actually

5

told me that he committed the crime.

6

it's got to be an admission against the witness --

7

I mean otherwise everybody could get on

MR. HEWARD:

8

makes it admissible.

9

THE COURT:

Statement of the defendant in this case

Or the witness, doesn't it?

10

MR. RICHARDS:

11

THE CO'CJRT:

12

And how would you ever --

Or the witness, right.

In o+-her words if the witness got on the

stand and said --

13

MR. RICHARDS:

14

T'"rlE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

No.

If I get up and I testify --

Okay.

hey, I was talking to Sharon Sipes

16

and Sharon Sipes said that she w-as the one that did the

17

shooting, not Riqo Perea, that's admissible because it's a

18

statement agai..'"lst her interest.

19

MR. HEWARD:

20

T"rlE COu"RT:

22

MR.

23

THE COURT:

25

It's not admissible through

Mr. Richards .

21

24

That's what t..'l-).e rule says.

Yeah, see --

RICHA..~S:

Sure it is.

I don' t w-ant to get in an argum.en.t over

I'm just t...."'Ying to clarify -MR. RICHARDS:

Notewortby

Well, then Mr. Perea's testimony or
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1

his statements to the Officer Thomas and ~._nt would not be

2

admissible under that rule.

3
4

They. are admissible as nonhearsay under

MR. HEWARD:

Rule 801.

5

THE COURT:

Yeah.

And I don't want-- I want to

6

clarify for the record you had four witnesses, three of which

7

you claim were going to say that they were there and they can

8

testify that somebody else pulled the trigger, right?

9

don 1 t mean to put words in your mouth.

10

MR. RICHARDS:

Yeah.

Or I

They could testify that things

11

happened differe."ltly t.'i-a."l some of the state's witnesses

12

testified to.

13

talked to individual A; individual A admitted that he or she is

14

the one that p..llled the trig<?_r.

15

16

The other one would came in and say that I

THE·· COURT:

Okay.

And now of the two t.r.a t you can 1 t

locate --

17

MR.. RICHll..RDS :

18

THE COURT:

The-j"

would be two of the three.

Two of the three t.r.at would say what?

19

T"hat they were there or

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

TrlE COti'RT:

22

MR. RICHARDS:

23

TdE COURT:

That they were there.

Tl-l.d.t th-:".f were there.

And certain things

See, this gets a little difficult too.

24

And again, I don' t know how far to go, but I do think we need

25

to make a record as to what these witnesses were going to
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Saying that is different than what the state 1 s

1

testify to.

2

witnesses are going to say, that 1 s pretty general, isn 1 t it?

3
4

5

I can put together a proffer and have

MR. RICHARDS:
that by Thursday.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So at least put something on the

6

record as to what they would have testified to, what you

7

believe they would testify to.

8

All right.

9

So my findings, of course, is that the

defense is precluded from calling these four witnesses because

10

the defense had failed to comply with the discovery request.

11

And I 'd set a deadline for this last Monday,

12

like I said, I 1 11 go ahead and prepare findings on that

13

particular issue.

22nd.

And

Okay?

14

MR. RICHARDS:

15

THE COURT:

16

t.~e

Good enough.

All right.

Let 1 s see if we can handle

another issue then.

17

MR.

18

TrlE COlJRT:

19

MR. RICW...P..DS:

20

MR. HEWARD:

21

TrlE COl.JRT:

22

MR. RICF.A.'R.DS:

RICH..Zl:...~S:

Could we --

You need a break?
No, I 1 m ready to go.
I

could use a break.

Let' s take about -Could we do the Gaskell matter first?

23

T'ne only reason I request that is we got Mr. Gaskell here and I

24

don 1 t want him to sit through --

25

THE COl.JRT:

No problem.

All right.

Let's take 10 ,
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1
2

15 minutes.
MR. SHAW:

If we're going to do the Gaskell matter

3

first, I would like to sul::mi.t, at least let the court review

4

his report because I don't know if you have seen that.
I haven't seen the report.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR.. RICHARDS :

7

MR.. SHAW:

8

bP_fore you go back on recess.

9

10
11

THE COURT:

No, that' s fine.

Let me give that to you, your Honor,

You can just leave that here if you want.

Take about a 15 minute recess.
(A

Recess is taken by the Court. )

12
13

14

15
16

17
18

19
20
,.., ..

.G..L

22
23

24
25
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1

March 4th, 2010 9:05 a.m.

2

P R 0 C E E D I N G S

3

* * *
THE COURT:

4

071901847

This is the time set for further

5

hearings.

6

[sic].

7

we've got Mr. Richards and Ms. Sipes, is that right, for the

8

defense?

THE COURT:

10

And the record should also reflect that
Anyone else?

There is also Kent Hart.

MR. RICHARDS:

He'll make

his -THE COURT:

14
15

And

That's correct.

Mr. Perea is also present.

12

13

Mr. Shaw and Mr. Heward are here for the State.

MR. RICHARDS:

9

11

State of Utah versus Riqo Perea in case ending 2215

right.

Appreciate you coming, Mr. Hart.

All

That's --

16

MR. HEWARD:

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Bouwhuis is also present.
That's who I was looking for.

Should we

18

deal with that motion first?

19

it's still the State's motion to disqualify Mr. Richards.

20

not sure you want to proceed.

21

asked for a hearing so

22

or just want him to make a proffer as to what he has done?

23
24

25

MR. SHAW:

I

I

know Bouwhuis is here.

Actually,

I

And
I'm

think the State had

don't know if you want him to testify

Well, first of all, I would like to

address the filing of an Amicus brief.
THE COURT:

Okay.
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1

MR. SHAW:

2

sworn.

3

with him.
THE COURT:

5

MR. SHAW:

THE COURT:

8

someplace else.

9

could --

...•

Okay.
But, yes, I want to address this Amicus

I know Mr. Bouwhuis probably needs to be

I thought we'd try to get him in and out if we

10

MR. SHAW:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. SHAW:

Yeah.
-- as to accommodate his schedule.

I will be brief on the Amicus.
All right.

Go ahead.

The State is moving to strike the Amicus

15

brief, Your Honor.

16

supports the filing of an Amicus brief without Court

17

invitation.

18

is no rule in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

19

of the Utah Rules of appellate Procedure requires a motion and

20

leave of the Court to file an Amicus or an invitation from the

21

Court.

22

'

And then, yes, we would like Mr. Bouwhuis

situation.

7

-....,

071901847

And have him tell us what he's done and go through that

4

6

Case No.

There is no precedent, no rule at all that

There is no rule in the Criminal Procedure.

There

In fact, Rule 24

It's wholly improper to simply file a motion to ask

23

the Court for leave for an Amicus brief, because as counsel put

24

it, "They are keenly interested."

25

action.

They are not parties to this

.

They have no standing to file a brief.

It's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

Case No.

Noteworthy Reporting

1

unprecedented at a trial court level.

2

memorandum should be stricken.

071901847

That motion, that

For those reasons.

This is not a matter in which the Utah Criminal

3

4

Defense Association or Criminal Defense Lawyers are -- have any

5

interest in at this level.

6

file a brief then fine.

7

that should be stricken from the record immediately and not

8

considered at all.

10

But at this point in time, Your Honor,

All right.

THE COURT:

9

If at appeal they are invited to

Mr. Richards or Mr. Hart, I

guess is that

11

MR. SHAH:

Well, the State is going to object to

12

Mr. Hart having any argument whatsoever in this matter.

13

not a party.

He is

Let me hear from Mr. Richards then.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. RICHARDS:

Your Honor, in regard to their motion
there is a

16

I believe that all Amicus briefs are done

17

petition done, I seldom see a Court, even on an appeal, Supreme

18

Court or the Utah Supreme Court, any of them, that actually

19

solicit Amicus briefs.
Typically what happens is an individual or a group or

20
21

whoever it is filing the Amicus briefs, do so with a motion to

22

have, as far as friend of the court-type situation, which is

23

exactly what is happening here.

24

is unprecedented is simply not true.

25

time.

And for Mr. Shaw to say this
This happens all the

I don't know that there are very many appellate briefs
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1

that go to the Supreme Court that don't have at least one or

2

more Amicus briefs filed.

3

On the trial court level it happens also.

One of the

4

main cases the State sites in their brief and we have sited in

5

our brief is the case of State versus Maughan, which was very a

6

similar case to this.

7

knows there was Amicus filing at the trial court level and

8

Amicus counsel was allowed to argue it at the trial court

9

level.

And that particular case as counsel well

The fact that this has all fallen down here so

10
11

quickly certainly plays into it, as well.

12

we are trying to prepare for trial.

13

of our time working on this particular motion rather than on

14

important motions or working on the case.

15

asked counsel, Mr. Hart, to help out on this thing.

16

think it's appropriate.

17

precedent that this occurred.

18

to the court and beneficial.
THE COURT:

20

Any response?

21

MR. SHAW:

We're having to spend all

And I specifically

I think it's certainly

And I
certainly

I think it would be instructive

All right.

19

We got this motion

Thanks Mr. Richards.

Well, the problem with that argument, Your

22

Honor, is that there is no rule that allows it in a criminal

23

proceeding.

24

brief.

25

They filed a motion with it without an order of this Court and

And this Court has to invite that motion and

What they've done is they have circumvented a process.
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And that's simply not proper.

071901847

1

they include a brief.

2

appellate level it's only allowed filing the motion.

3

court of law.

4

advantage as we go through it.

5

There is no request that has been filed to this Court and the

6

State objects to it.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. RICHARDS:

9

THE COURT:

There is simply no precedent.

Okay.
May I respond briefly?

Sure.
Procedurally that's how it's always

11

done.

I mean, I have seen amicus briefs filed.

12

actually filed one myself some time ago.

13

brief and you file the motion at the same time.

14

how it ' s done .

15

This is a

This is not create the procedure to your

MR. RICHARDS:

10

At the

THE COURT:

Okay.

I have

And you also file the
It's typically

Well, I guess I agree with

16

Mr. Shaw though.

17

here.

18

until 5:00 yesterday.

19

at it.

20

strike the pleading, itself, the brief that was filed by

21

Mr. Hart.

22

I just don't know that there is not a rule

And I was kind of surprised to get it.

I didn't get it

But I haven't had a chance to even look

But I think Mr. Shaw's motion is well taken.

I'm going

And I appreciate your interest in the case, Mr. Hart,

23

and I don't mean to be condescending, at all.

But Mr. Richards

24

you filed a brief, originally you had not and that's one of the

25

reasons we continued this is you indicated you didn't have
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1

time.

And I don't fault you for that, but you have now filed a

2

written response to the State's motion and I have considered

3

your brief at this point.

4

But I think the problem is, is if I start allowing

5

Amicus briefs on this, I mean, next thing you know the State

6

will turn to SAP, which is the organization that handles a lot

7

of things for the prosecutors.

8

briefs from everybody.

9

that it's necessary or appropriate under the law.

And I will be just inundated by

And at this point I just don't know

So I'm going to grant the State's motion to strike.

10

11

I just don't think-- I haven't invited the brief.

And I just

12

don't think there was any rule that permits it at least in

13

state court.
But again, Mr. Hart, I just want to tell you, I

14

15

appreciate your interest in your case.

16

that you're concerned about and I understood that.

17

will strike the brief and it won't be part of the record.

18

Okay?

19

But I just

Anything else on that issue before we return to

20

Mr. Bouwhuis?

21

MR.

22

I know it is an issue

RICa~s:

We would like it part of the record

just not part of your consideration.

23

THE COURT:

Right.

24

How would you like to handle Mr. Bouwhuis?

25

this kind of area-- at least that I'm not familiar with and I
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1

don't know if there is any rules.

2

want him to make a proffer on what he has done or if you want

3

him to actually testify.

4

motion so I will kind of let you take the lead on this Mr.

5

Shaw, if you would like.

6

MR. SHAW:

7

THE COURT:

8

I don't know if you just

It was actually kind of the State's

We want Mr. Bouwhuis sworn.
Did you want him to come up and be a

witness then?

9

MR. SHAW:

10

THE COURT:

Yes.
All right.

Mr. Bouwhuis.

* * *

11

12

MICHAEL BOUWHUIS,

13

railed by the Plaintiff, having been duly

14

sworn, is examined and testifies as follows:

15

** *

16

EXAMINATION

17

BY MR. SHAW:

18

Q.

Good morning, Mr. Bouwhuis.

19

A.

Good morning.

20

Q.

State your full for the record.

21

A.

Michael D. Bouwhuis.

22

Q.

And you are an attorney; is that correct?

23

A.

I am.

24

Q.

How long have you been practicing law?

25

A.

Oh, about 16 and a half years.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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What is your area of practice or do you have a

Q.

primary area of practice?
The primary area is criminal defense.

A.

There is some

other things but mostly criminal defense.
Can you give a brief background into your criminal

Q.

defense history?
Well, back in 1993 I started doing the public defense

A.

8

working for Box Elder County, did that for a few years.

9

did -- all along done private work.

I also

I can't remember the year

10

but I have been doing public defense work for Weber County for

11

13 years, maybe.
Kind of cases I have handled range anywhere from

12
13

theft, drugs, rape, murder, kidnapping, pretty much the entire

14

range.

15

I have not handled any capital cases.

Q.

Okay.

What is your current occupation?

Do you have

16

a -- do you have a position with the Public Defender's Office

17

at present?

18

A.

I do.

I'm the -- the official name is the

19

coordinator for Indigent Defense Services for Weber County.

20

It's a mouthful.

21
22

Q.

Okay.

And how long have you been appointed in that

position?

23

A.

Officially, October 1st of 2009.

24

Q.

Prior to that, could you give some background

25

relative to your quote assignments as a Weber County Public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defender?

2

Well, I've been working in two courts.

A.

I'm assigned

3

two courts, Judge Direda, before Judge Allphin, and then Judge

4

Lyon.

5

calendars, get assigned new cases and handle those cases from

6

the beginning to end.

7

8
9

And so each week I would appear on law and motion

Q.

Have you ever served as conflict counsel in a

situation such as this particular proceeding?
A.

Well, that is some what vague in all do respect.

I

10

have served as conflict counsel, never in a capital case, and

11

never in a case where it was alleged that there was

12

the case here, they are witnesses who are saying their safety

13

is at risk if they come and testify and certain arrangements to

14

be made.

15

Q.

as is

This is a unique situation, we'll concede that.

You

16

haven't had an opportunity and I won't suspect that most people

17

would.

18

other instances is that what you're saying?

But you have served in a conflict counsel capacity in

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Can you tell us what you have been asked to do in

21

22

this particular case?
A.

Okay.

My -- I received a call from the court and

23

spoke with Judge Jones he asked me -- he advised me of the

24

claimed conflict here, asked me if I would go visit with

25

Mr. Perea at the jail, talk to him about the two parties'
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1

positions, advise him of his options, and find out if he had

2

any questions, find out what he wanted to do, whether he wanted

3

to waive a potential conflict or would rather have Mr. Richards

4

replaced.

5

Q.

Okay.

Now, you said waive a particular -- a

6

potential conflict or have Mr. Richards replaced, you mean have

7

him Mr. Richards in placed by him by waiving potential
MR. RICHARDS:

8

Replaced I think he said.

9

Q.

Oh, replaced.

10

A.

Right.

11

Q.

Yes.

12

A.

What I meant to say was that the court wanted me to

You want me to clarify?

13

find out if Mr. Perea was willing to waive the conflict of

14

interest with the claimed conflict or whether he would -- is

15

not willing to have that waived and have Mr. Richards removed

16

from the case.

17
18

Q.

And so that was the assignment that Judge Jones gave

you in this particular instance?

19

A.

It is.

20

Q.

Now, as part of that assignment you received a brief

21

from the State; is that correct?

22

A.

I did.

23

Q.

You also received a transcript of the proceedings

24
25

from February 19th 2010; is that correct?

A.

I

did.
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1
2

Q.

And I hope you received a copy of the Defendant's

brief, did you receive that?
I

did not but I had a telephone conversation with

3

A.

4

Mr. Richards.

5

brief and he verbally gave me his response.

6

071901847

Q.

He had previously received a copy of the State's

Okay.

And so, your view in this case was to -- was

7

that you were to consult with Mr. Perea as independent counsel

8

appointed by the Court to determine whether he understood the

9

issue; is that fair?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

And whether, in fact, he desired to waive any

12

conflict issue?

13

A.

Correct.

14

Q.

And keep Mr. Richards on the case?

15

A.

Correct.

16

Q.

Or remove Mr. Richards, correct?

17

A.

That is correct.

18

Q.

Did you explain to Mr. Perea that this is -- this

19

issue is -- conflict issue, directly impacts, potentially, his

20

right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth

21

Amendment of the United States Constitution?

22

A.

I did.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

And, in fact,

25

I did.

I read to Mr. Perea a number of

portions of the State's brief so that I could fully convey to
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by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
J. Reuben Clark Law
Michael
Bouwhuis
- Library,
Examination
by School, BYU.
SHAW
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MR.

13

Noteworthy Reporting

1

2

Case No.

him the concerns the State had.
Q.

Okay.

And did you also consult with Mr. Perea about

3

the alleged anonymous witnesses, in terms of the --

4

Mr. Richards failure to discuss those names?

5

071901847

A.

I did.

I reviewed the facts as I understand them,

6

regarding the nature of these witnesses and the State's concern

7

and Mr. Richards' response.

8
9

Q.

clear.

And when we talk about the State's concern, let's be
What we're

what you were asked to do and I'm

10

understanding you're -- you did it this way, would be to

11

consult with Mr. Perea and inform him the State was concerned

12

about the fact that there were undisclosed witnesses that were

13

potentially exculpatory?

14

A.

That's correct.

15

Q.

Did you explain to him the ramifications of what that

16
17

means?
A.

I did.

I told him that -- I'm not sure if this goes

18

to your question, but I told him that -- well, I don't know how

19

exactly I explained it to him.

20

with the four witnesses and how they would -- indicated to

21

Mr. Richards they were willing to come forward and testify

22

under certain conditions that were aimed to protect their

23

safety.

24

Mr. Richards has an obligation to Mr. Perea to make sure he

25

presents the best defense he can.

But we talked about the issue

I explained to Mr. Perea the claimed conflict that

./

And that there is a claim
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1

that he can't do that because he -- in protecting the witnesses

2

he is placing their security over the interest of Mr. Perea to

3

have a zealous defense.

4

Q.

And did he respond to you when you explained that?

5

A.

He did.

And, in fact, Mr. Perea's response -- and I

6

reviewed -- I actually became quite redundant.

7

necessarily, but the conversation.

8

about 45 minutes and from the beginning to the end and in

9

between he was fairly consistent and unequivocal.

10

Not him

I visited with him for

He said,

"I

want Mr. Richards on my case. "

11

I wanted to make sure he understood that there was a

12

concern that his defense may be compromised because these

13

people had information that, according to Mr. Richards, would

14

be exculpatory.

15

But, of course, at the same time I'm --

Mr. Perea, by the way, was -- he didn't seem

16

surprised by anything I told him.

He didn't seem to be

17

learning anything new.

18

issues.

19

position, also making sure he understood his attorney's

20

position.

He seemed to be fully aware of the

And so as I'm talking to him about the State's

Can't remember the question.

21

22

Q.

Well, that's exactly what I was looking for.

Do you

23

also

24

if, in fact, he exercises a knowing and intelligent waiver, he

25

waives his right to effective assistance of counsel as it

did you also speak with Mr. Perea about the fact that
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1

relates to this particular issue, both at the trial court level

2

and at the appellate court level?

A.

3

I did.

I made it clear to him that he had the option

4

of -- if he wasn't comfortable with Mr. Richards and the

5

position he's taken with regards to these witnesses, that he

6

could have Mr. Richards removed and have another attorney serve

7

as lead counsel in his case.

8

possibility that that would delay his case perhaps six to nine

9

months, that's an estimate.

10

I explained to him there was a

And he indicated to me he was fine with that.

I

11

said -- I said to him that if somebody were to suggest to him

12

that extra six to nine might be worth the wait, if it ended up

13

with him getting a better defense.

And he indicated he

14

understood that and he said, again,

"I want Mr. Richards on my

15

case.

16

trusts him."

17

Q.

I trust him.

He had worked very hard for me.

My family

Specifically, with regard to Mr. Perea's right to

18

appeal though, did you talk to him about the fact if he waives

19

at this level that waiver would follow him henceforth and

20

forever at any appellate court level?

21

A.

I believe we did talk about that.

I took some notes

22

as we talked but I don't have the transcript.

We had a long

23

conversation and went over things several times.

I believe

24

that I talked to him about the appellate issue.

But I'm not

25

going to say unequivocally that he did.
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1

2

Q.

071901847

Do you need more time to do so today, such that we

have an unequivocal record that he understands that?

3

A.

That's probably fair to say, yeah.

4

Q.

Okay.

We can get to that in a minute.

With respect

5

to the interview at the jail -- this occurred at the jail,

6

right?

7

A.

It did.

8

Q.

Were you able to meet with Mr. Perea in close

9

quarters, in other words, or were you behind glass or --

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

-- anything like that?

12

A.

Actually,

I had anticipated it would be a non contact

13

visit but we were able to visit in a room, about 8 by 8 room,

14

seated across the table from each other, close contact.

15
16
17

Q.

And during that conversation did Mr. Perea appear to

be of clear mind?

A.

He did.

And that's one of the issues that I wanted

18

to cover with him.

19

mentioned for 45 minutes.

20

conversation.

21

the conversations I asked him -- because I had vague

22

recollection that there may have been some competency

23

evaluation in this case, so I asked him about

24

Recognizing, of course I'm not an expert or psychologist or

25

anything like that.

Of course, I did talk to

h~m,

as I

He appeared to track the

His responses were appropriate.

At the end of

that~
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But, he acknowledged that there had been some testing

2

done.

3

communication.

4

anything at the time that we talked, drugs, or alcohol, or

5

medications and I believe he indicated he was not.

6

like he understood -- at least he expressed that he understood

7

the things that I had said to him, the questions I had asked

8

him.

9

consistent with that, that he understood what we were talking

10

But I didn't see that as impacting in any way our
I asked him if he was under the influence of

And, in fact, my observations of his responses would be

about.

11

Q.

His responses were appropriate?

12

A.

They were.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

And he felt

And so you didn't detect any physical and/or

mental deficiency?

15

A.

I did not.

16

Q.

Okay.

Did you nave any conversation-- and I'm not

17

asking you-- this is all part of the record.

I'm not asking

18

you to disclose, discuss confidences, but prior to your

19

interview did you have a conversation with Mr. Richards about

20

the psychological testing that was done on Mr. Perea?

21

A.

I did not.

22

Q.

So you didn't take that into account when you met

23

with Mr. Perea, fair?
A.

24

25

done.

Well, I was aware that there had been some testing
And so -- I'm not sure how to answer the question.
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1

did, as I indicated previously, toward the end of your

2

conversation, just to be clear I asked him about the testing,

3

but, again, at that point we had been talking for 45 minutes

4

and I had had an opportunity to observe his responses and not

5

only the things that he said, but his, you know, body language

6

and all that.

7

those things.

Of course, again, I'm not an expert looking for

8

Q.

Sure.

9

A.

Just as a person who has been in the system for over

10

16 years and aware that those issues can impact the ability of

11

a person to understand.

12

'

Q.

Right.

And I'm not trying to paint you into a corner

13

on that particular issue at all.

14

you having that in mind during the course of the interview with

15

Mr. Perea, you felt that he was, nevertheless, able to

16

articulate his responses appropriately to you and answer your

17

questions appropriately; is that correct?

18

A.

I did.

I just want to know that

And, in fact, I -- well, I did.

I mean, over

19

the years I have dealt with thousands of criminal defendants.

20

And, of course, we get a variety of personalities and

21

abilities.

22

him understanding me and responding appropriately.

And I didn't detect any problems whatsoever with

23

Q.

How long did the interview last?

24

A.

Forty-five minutes.

25

Q.

Forty-five minutes.

Do you know?

You may have said that already.
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1

And at the end of the day -- and we will get this as part of

2

the record from the Defendant -- but at the end of the day

3

Mr. Perea, did he express a willingness to keep Mr. Richards on

4

the case to you affirmatively?

5

A.

He did.

6

Q.

And, in fact, he did that repeatedly throughout.

And

7

I, of course, I had a conversation with him and asked did you

8

or one of your colleagues express a desire to make sure that

9

his -- if he was going to waive it was knowing and intelligent.

10

So I think I went over everything probably three times.

11

was consistent throughout.

12

But he

I asked him -- in fact I asked him at one point if

13

Mr. Richards had threatened him in any way to get him to waive

14

the conflict and he laughed at me and said, "No, Mr. Richards

15

is a very nice man.

16

and consistent and unequivocal.

17

to remain on the case."

He wouldn't do that."

MR. SHAW:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. RICHARDS:

22

He said, "I want Mr. Richards

That's all.

18

21

But he was clear

Mr. Richards, any questions or -Do we need for him to talk about that

issue?
THE COURT:

Well, I guess that's the question.

23

you want to take a break and talk to him further on that

24

question about understanding the appellate issue?

25

MR. SHAW:

Do

I think he should.
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1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

THE COURT:

3

Why don't we do that.

All right.

Let's just take a short

recess if we would.

4

And Mr. Bouwhuis if you will talk to Mr. Perea just

5

for a few minutes.

6

short recess.

Let us know.

Why don't we just take a

(Break Taken.)

7

THE COURT:

8

9

Back on the record in the State versus

Perea and Mr. Bouwhuis is back on the witness stand.

10

Go ahead and ask him.

11

Mr. Perea is also present.

12

MR. SHAW:

13

071901847

Q.

Thank you, Your Honor.

(BY MR. SHAW)

Mr. Bouwhuis, we took a recess and you

14

have now had an opportunity to further discuss Mr. Perea's

15

waiver of any potential conflict regarding the Sixth Amendment

16

ineffective assistance of counsel as it relates to future

17

appeal; is that accurate?

18

A.

That is correct.

19

Q.

And do you feel like you've had an ample opportunity

20
21

to clarify that particular issue with the defendant?
A.

I do.

And I may tell you what I did.

It just took,

22

you know, four or five minutes back there and I explained to

23

him just generally what the appeals process is, that if he is

24

convicted that there would be an appeal or a number of appeals

25

that those appeals would be looking at potential errors that
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were committed at the trial court level.
And that if he waives the potential conflict here

2
3

that waiver would be binding on him and that any further

4

appellate -- any appellate review is going to maintain that

5

that is binding, that he can't then claim that Mr. Richards had

6

a conflict and therefore was ineffective.

7

Q.

What was his response to that explanation?

8

A.

His response was the same as it was the other day

9

when I visited with him.

He said, ni still want Mr. Richards

10

on my case."

11

different times if he understood that he a right to not have

12

Mr. Richards on the case to have somebody else.

13

was consistent and said, "I want him on the case.

14

him to continue with the case."

15
16

Q.

I again asked him the question, two or three

And he, again,
And I want

And did Mr. Perea's responses appear to you as though

he understood the appellate process?

17

A.

Well, yeah, I indicated to him as I did the other day

18

in talking to him nobody expects you to be an attorney in this

19

process, but I need to make sure you understand as best you

20

can.

And he appeared to understand.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

I asked him several times if he had any questions

23
24

25

about what I was explaining to him and he did not.
Q.

Okay.

You feel you've had adequate time to discuss

all of these issues with him now?
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1

A.

I do.

Let me add, if I may.

071901847

Mr. Richards had

2

prepared and given to me a typed written waiver of conflict

3

potential conflict.

4

Mr. Perea at the jail, I reviewed some of that with him and

5

than handed it to him and had him read it.

6

he could read English.

7

told me he read through it.

8

questions about it and he did not.

9

understood it and he said he did.

And at the end of my conversation with

He indicated that

He appeared to read through it.
I asked him if he had any
I asked him if he

10

Q.

Did you sign it at the jail or --

11

A.

He did not.

12

Q.

Did you hold that for him to sign today?

13

A.

I

14

He

felt it was best that he sign it here in open

court.

15

MR. SHAW:

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. RICHARDS:

19

THE COURT:

20

Do you remember the date of the interview?

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

24

THE COURT:

25

THE WITNESS:

That's all, Your Honor.
I have no questions.

Can we excuse Mr. Bouwhuis then?
Yes, we would like to.

I have one question Mr. Bouwhuis.

It was Tuesday.

That was the second.

This Tuesday?
Yes.
That's going to be March 2nd.
March 2nd.
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2

So March 2nd.

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE WITNESS :

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SHAW:

8

MR. RICHARDS:

9

THE COURT:

And what time early

It was from 1:00 to 1:45.
Okay.

In the afternoon then.

Yes .
All right.

Any other questions?

No.
I would like to --

You're okay with him --

10

THE WITNESS:

11

MR. RICHARDS:

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE WITNESS:

14

MR. SHAW:

You want the forms?
Well --

Leave the waiver form.
Leave it up here.

Should we offer -- should we mark it as an

exhibit?

16

MR. RICHARDS:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SHAW:

19

THE COURT:

20

071901847

afternoon?

3

15

Case No.

Let me see it here.

Can we go ahead and excuse him though?
Yes, we can.
Mr. Bouwhuis, I just want to take an

opportunity to tell you thank you for your help.

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

You're welcome.
I know this was kind of a rush situation

23

I really appreciate the fact that you were willing to drop what

24

you were doing to help us out.

25

THE WITNESS:

That's fine.

No problem.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
may contain errors. by MR. SHAW
Michae~ Bouwbuis
- OCR,
Examination

24

Case No.

Noteworthy Reporting
1

THE COURT:

Thanks for coming.

2

All right?

Any other evidence?

3

MR. SHAW:

4

THE COURT:

5

If I may approach, Your Honor.
This is the waiver of the conflict.

MR. SHAW:

7

THE CLERK:

8

MR. SHAW:

actually.

Let's mark it as Exhibit 1.
Is that State's one or Defense one?
It doesn't matter.

It's their form

It probably ought to be theirs.
So we should have Mr. Perea go ahead and

10

THE COURT:

11

sign that today in open court?
Yes.

What we would like to do is we would

12

MR. SHAW:

13

like to have Mr. Perea sworn.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SHAW:

Okay.
We would like the Court now to inquire

16

into those same lines of questioning.

17

out.

18

is fully capable today of understanding these things.

19

not under the influence of anything and going through it.

21

MR. RICHARDS:

22

THE COURT:

25

Established that he
He is

You all right with that, Mr. Richards?

THE COURT:

24

And I'm happy to help

But we would like Mr. Perea sworn.

20

23

And

have we marked this as an exhibit yet?

6

9

071901847

I'm okay with the inquiry on that.

As long as we focus just on the conflict,

right?
MR. RICHARDS:

Focusing on the conflict.

I think

that we have to remember that anything he says here would not
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1

be used against him in the trial.

2

have the right to object at any point if we start to get into

3

attorney/client privileged information.

4

MR. SHAW:

And then number three that I

Well, let me say for the record that I'm

5

happy to allow the Court to ask those questions, if the Court

6

so desires and Mr. Richards so desires and I can supplement the

7

record if I feel the need to.
All right.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

specifically not waiving any attorney/client privilege?
No, that's stipulated.

11

MR. SHAW:

12

MR. RICHARDS:

13

THE COURT:

14

And also that Mr. Perea is

Okay.

All right.

Let's have Mr. Perea sworn then, if we

could.

15

***

16

RIQ:) PEREA,

17
18

having been first duly sworn, was examined and

testified as follows:

***

19
20

THE COURT:

All right.

Now, Mr. Shaw, I think just

21

to be consistent if it's okay I'll let you go ahead and ask

22

those same questions.

23

MR. SHAW:

24
25

I'm happy to do so, Your Honor.
EXAMINATION

BY MR. SHAW:
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1

Q.

I guess I get to ask the questions, Mr. Perea.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Would you please state your full name?

4

A.

Riqo Marrano Perea.

5

Q.

And what is your date of birth?

6

A.

11/7/87.

7

Q.

11/7/87?

8

A.

Uh-huh.

9

Q.

Makes you 22 and a couple, a few months, right?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Now, you have sat here in court today and listened to

12

Mr. Bouwhuis' testimony; is that correct?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And you were also here on February 19th when we had a

15

brief hearing on Mr. Richards motion to have witnesses testify

16

anonymously.

17

A.

Yes, I do.

18

Q.

And the issue in that particular hearing was that

Do you remember that?

19

unless those witnesses were disclosed such that the State knew

20

their names, they would not be allowed to testify, that was the

21

Court's ultimate ruling.

Did you understand that?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And understanding that those witnesses who have not

24

yet been disclosed may have exculpatory information.

25

me explain what exculpatory means.
Perea
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1

A.

Please.

2

Q.

That means that they could testify in your behalf

3

like Mr. Richards proffered, that you did not commit the crimes

4

for which you are charged.

Do you understand that?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

So that they would testify in your favor, correct?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And that you specifically understood that those

9

particular anonymous witnesses and there were four, right?

10

A.

(Witness nods head.)

11

Q.

There are four potential anonymous witnesses?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

You knew that?

14

A.

(Witness nods head.)

15

Q.

And two of those witnesses would have testified if

16

they were allowed to remain anonymous that you were not the

17

person that committed the crime?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

You fully understand today that you're charged with

20

two counts of aggravated murder?

21

A.

(Witness nods head.}

22

Q.

And two counts of attempted murder, correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Do you understand that at present you face the

25

possibility of a -- the death penalty being imposed by a jury?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

Case No.

071901847

Other potential sentences are life without

parole --

4

A.

(Witness nods head.)

5

Q.

-- and life with the possibility of parole under the

6

current charge.

Do you understand that?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Now, back to these anonymous witnesses.

9

You

understand that going forward today and having Mr. Richards

10

remain as counsel that those witness are not going to testify

11

on your behalf?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

Nevertheless, you are willing to go forward

with the trial that's scheduled to commence next week?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

Regarding your discussions with Mr. Bouwhuis

17

at the jail on Tuesday, do you agree that you had enough time

18

to speak with Mr. Bouwhuis regarding this particular issue?

19

A.

20

before.

21

Q.

A week ago?

22

A.

A week ago,

23

Q.

The first time the State brought up the issue?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

You were able to understand what was going on at that

Yes.

I understood the issue when we had this hearing

yes.
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071901847

point in time?
A.

Yes.

Well, there was words I didn't understand but I

understand the situation, yes.

Q.

Sure.

Okay.

And yeah we don't expect you to

5

understand all the legal jargon.

But you felt like at that

6

hearing on the -- what was that?

The 26th?

Friday, the 26th?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

You felt like you understood the issue that was

9

presented to the Court at that point in time?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

And so what you're -- are you telling me then

12

that you had from Friday last week through today to think about

13

this issue again?

14

A.

Yes,

15

Q.

And you have had an opportunity to talk with conflict

16

I have.

counsel, Mike Bouwhuis, that the Court appointed?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And do you feel that Mr. Bouwhuis has done his job

19

efficiently and effectively?

20

A.

From what the Judge requested for him to do, yes.

21

Q.

Is there anything about what Mr. Bouwhuis did in

22

interviewing you and talking to you and explaining this issue

23

to you that you would like to have redone?

24
25

A.

No.

I think he was patient with me.

He explained

what I didn't really understand as far as your guyses legal
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1

talk.

2

patient with me.

3

what was going on.

4

Case No.

071901847

So he actually explained everything to me and was

Q.

Okay.

And so I was able to understand, comprehend

Now, you understand also that this issue

5

that's been brought up, regarding the alleged conflict of

6

interest that the State has raised because of Mr. Richards'

7

willingness to keep witnesses that could help you anonymous,

8

that essentially that creates potentially a constitutional

9

right that you have under the Sixth Amendment of the United

10

States Constitution.

Do you understand that?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And both Mr. Richards and Mr. Bouwhuis have informed

13

you and spoken with you about that particular right to have

14

effective counsel in any proceeding; is that correct?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

And are you willing then to go forward at this

17

point with Mr. Richards as your lawyer and proceed to trial in

18

this case?

19

A.

Yes, I am.

20

Q.

And are you willing also to concede that by doing so,

21

you are waiving any future right to make a claim that

22

Mr. Richards, was ineffective in his representation of you in

23

this particular trial?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

That's a lot.
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MR. RICHARDS:

2

MR. SHAW:

3

Case No.
~rudge

Well, let me rephrase that.

Let me say for the record that this is only with

5

respect to this particular issue.

6

interest issue.

Okay?

7

Q.

And you do understand that?

8

A.

Yes.

g

Q.

Okay.

11

week, keep Mr. Richards on as trial counsel?
A.

Yes, I am.
MR. SHAW:

13

THE COURT:

15

This conflict of

You are willing to proceed with trial next

12

14

I know where

you're going.

4

10

071901847

Q.

Okay.

Let me have just one moment.

Sure.

One other thing.

Just physically today, you are not

under the influence of any alcohol or drugs, correct?

16

A.

Correct.

17

Q.

You feel that you have a sound mind today?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

You are able to proceed today and execute, sign a

20
21

waiver of the conflict?
A.

Yes, I will do the best to sign as I can.

22

MR. SHAW:

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

(Whereupon Defendant signs waiver.)

24

25

I might approach the witness Your Honor.

Q.

Mr. Perea, for the record, what you have signed is a
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1

waiver of conflict of --potential conflict of interest.

2

marked as Defense Exhibit 1.
THE COURT:

Any objection?

4

MS. SIPES:

Was that dated, as well?

Did he date it,

as well.
I don't know if he dated it or not.

6

MR. SHAW:

7

THE COURT:

8

THE vliTNESS:

9

MR. SHAW:

He needs to date it.

Today is March 4th.

Fourth.

March 4.

Okay.

Thank you.

So there is no objection from the

THE COURT:

10
11

defense?

12

MR. SHAW:

13

THE COL"RT:

That's their Exhibit.
\hJell,

\lle

\rJill go ahead and receive the

14

Defendant's Exhibit 1, which was the waiver of conflict or

15

potential conflict.

16

It's

I will offer that to the Court.

3

5

071901847

Q.

(BY MR. SHAW)

Let me just establish for the record

17

also, Mr. Perea, that the document that you just signed is the

18

same document that Mr. Bouwhuis showed you at the jail and

19

discussed with you; is that correct?

20

A.

You want me to look at it?

21

Q.

Did you look at it?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And also for the record you read and write the

24
25

This is the same one.

English language?
A.

Yes.
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2
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071901847

You have -- did you have any difficulty reading and

Q.

understanding Exhibit 1?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Okay.

THE COURT:

5
6

Case

All right.

We'll go ahead and receive

Exhibit 1.

7

MR. SHAW:

8

MR. RICHARDS:

9

THE COURT:

I think that's all, Your Honor.
I have no questions.

No questions.

All right.

10

You may step down.

11

Any other evidence that we need to take?

12

MR. SHAW:

13

State would rest.

14

MR. RICHARDS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SHAW:

Thank you, sir.

I don't think so, Your Honor.

I don't have anything.

Did you want to argue the matter or -Yeah.

I mean, I don't -- I think given

17

the record before us today I think that there is sufficient

18

evidence in the record for the Court to make specific findings

19

of fact that will allow

~I.

20

we'd ask that the Court

QO

21

in this matter and we'll submit it on that basis.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

25

Perea to waive the conflict.

And

so such that an order can be entered

Mr. Richards anything else?
Just want to make it clear that all

he's waving is the conflict.

THE COURT:

Right.
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Okay.

Not any prior rulings of the

1

MR. RICHARDS:

2

Court or anything of that nature.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

071901847

We'll-- this is actually, as I

4

recall, State's motion to have Mr. Richards disqualified from

5

the case, and also a motion to continue.

6

rule at least on the record for now as to that motion.

7

certainly understand the States concern in this matter.

8

don't think there is anything more frustrating as either a

9

prosecutor or defense attorney to try a case and do everything

And I think I can
I
I

10

right and then find out that the appellate court has overturned

11

the case because of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether

12

that be an allegation against a defense lawyer or a prosecutor.

13

Boy, there is nothing more frustrating then to have -- find out

14

that you did it all right and now you have got to retry a case

15

because in the eyes of the appellate court there was some

16

ineffective assistance by one of the attorneys.

17

In this case, of course, Mr. Richards is an

18

experienced criminal defense attorney.

19

involved in about seven death penalty cases.

20

MR. RICHARDS:

21

THE COURT:

22

That's correct.

And I know he's been a defense attorney

for well over 20 years now.

23

MR. RICHARDS:

24

THE COURT:

25

I think he's been

That is 25, actually.

Twenty-five years.

All right.

Congratulations.
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Case No.

071901847

Anyway, Mr. Richards is experienced, he knows what he

2

is doing.

3

the best they can.

4

is here.

5

ineffective or was because he didn't identify these four

6

witnesses.

7

And these are witnesses who potentially if their testimony was

8

accepted could clear Mr. Perea on this murder charge.

9

argument is that somehow Mr. Richards doesn't have the

10

11

At least we hope.

You know, most attorneys just do

But I understand where the State's concern

The State's argument of course, Mr. Richards is

And had decided not to call those as witnesses.

And the

Defendant's best interest at heart.
Certainly, the Court ruled earlier that the defense

12

can call these witnesses, but if they decide to do so they had

13

to disclose the name of those four witnesses last Monday, which

14

was the 22nd of February.

15

of discovery.

16

And that was pursuant to the rules

Certainly, I want to make it clear that the defense

17

attorney, of course, has no duty, no obligation to call any

18

witnesses or put on any evidence at all in a case, whether it

19

be a murder case or any other criminal case.

20

to call witnesses or offer evidence at trial.

21

They have no duty

Certainly the Court has to be careful about trying to

22

interfere with or somehow dictate what the defense or the

23

prosecution does by way of evidence.

24

can't, compel the defense to have witnesses testify.

25

parties certainly can subpoena witnesses to testify, both the

The State, of course
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1

071901847

prosecution and the defense.

2

And the one thing I guess that I'm concerned about is

3

that the Court does have the ability, I think, to try to insure

4

a fair trial.

5

just want to make sure that if both parties are going to call

6

witnesses then the other side knows who those witnesses are

7

going to be.

8

background and try to check on the story.

9

And that's what I'm trying to deal with here.

And they have an opportunity to check on their

And I ruled back on February 19th that if the defense

10

intended to call these witnesses, they had to disclose their

11

identity.

12

the Court has ruled that they can not testify in this case.

13

And since they have not disclosed their identity,

The question came up as to why the defense won't

14

identify the witnesses.

15

argument was that they were afraid that if they testified

16

somehow there would be retaliation, they might be injured or

17

killed for testifying in this case.

18

I

And I know Mr. Richards' original

But, of course, there is another aspect of that and

19

another reason which may be the reason that they don't want to

20

testify is that after someone looked at their story it might

21

fall apart.

22

proffer as to what they might say, we don't know exactly what

23

the testimony might be, and to a certain extent it's

24

speculation as to what they would testify and why they are not

25

testifying.

And in reality, at this point it's simply a

And so, it becomes very difficult to figure out
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1

the real reason, the real motivation as to why they won't

2

testify.
It is the defense's decision not to call these

3

4

witnesses.

And in my opinion, the fact that the defense

5

decides not to call these witnesses does not really mean that

6

it's ineffective assistance of counsel by the defense.

7

be strategy.

8

after thinking about it, after talking to the witnesses, and

9

his client, it's not a good idea to put them on the stand.

It may

It may be that Mr. Richards has decided that

I

10

What I sensed in this case is that there was a little

11

shift in opinion, and maybe not deliberately by Mr. Richards.

12

But it seemed to me that the argument he made on the 19th of

13

February was that, you guys, I feel like I'm caught in a catch

14

22, as far as trying to identifying these witnesses, they are

15

afraid to come forward without some protection, they are afraid

16

of the retaliation.

17

the best interest of my client.

18

And yet, I'm concerned about protecting

But on the 26th of February what I heard Mr. Richards

19

say is that he simply decided as a defense attorney for

20

Mr. Perea that it's not-- it's not in his best interest to

21

call these witnesses because they won't help his client.

22

can get on the stand and simply say I don't recall and that

23

could have the impact or the effect on the jury of saying,

24

well, these witnesses are hiding something.

25

They

And I think Mr. Richards said on the 26th, "If I put
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1

them on as witnesses they simply could hurt my client.' s case

2

and his chances of being acquitted."

3

this point the witnesses decided not to cooperate in this

4

matter.

He also indicated that at

And as I recall, he also told us that he cannot

5
6

locate or is unable to locate at least two of the four

7

witnesses.

8

moot because if he can't locate the witnesses then they are not

9

going to be able to testify for whatever reason.

10

And if that's true, of course, all of this becomes

So, in addition to that, or course now we have the

11

waiver, you have the testimony here today from Mr. Bouwhuis and

12

from the Defendant.

13

Defendant has waived that conflict of interest or potential

14

conflict, he's done so in writing here today.

15

been asked all the appropriate questions.

16

informed decision after talking to Mr. Bouwhuis, who has been

17

appointed by the Court as independent counsel.

18

he understands what the issue is.

19

conflict is both knowing and voluntary.

20

And the Court is going to find that the

I think he's

It appears to be an

It appears that

His decision to waive the

And as I mentioned before it's an informed decision

21

on his part.

He understands English.

He has been present at

22

all of the hearings.

23

where we have dealt with this issue in court.

24

opportunity to talk to his attorney.

25

an excellent job.

I think we have now had three hearings
He's had an

I think Mr. Bouwhuis did

He spent 45 minutes with Mr. Perea at the
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1

jail.

2

him.

3

that the Defendant understands the impact and the effect of

4

this waiver.

5

He went over all of the options that were available to
He's discussed all of the issues.

So based on that I will deny the State's motion to

6

disqualify Mr. Richards.

7

motion to continue the trial.

8
9
10

And it appeared to me

And I will also deny the State's

Are there any other findings you think I need to make
at this point or any other issues you think I need address?

I

thought I covered it all, but sometimes you

11

MR. RICHARDS:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. RICHARDS:

Just one matter, Your Honor.

Okay.
And that is, one of the reasons that

14

we believed that the witnesses at this stage would not be

15

helpful to our case is the fact that we couldn't somehow figure

16

out how to do this anonymous system.

17

Court's ruling and I'm not asking the Court to go back.

18

want to make it clear that is the reason we believe at this

19

point that they would be ineffective and may be harmful to us

20

because that's the situation.

21

THE COURT:

1\nd we understand the
I

just

But you understand that the ruling that I

22

made was that I didn't say that I wouldn't try to protect them,

23

I didn't say that I wouldn't let them testify anonymously.

24

What I said was:

25

is you give the names to the prosecution.

I think the first thing that needs to happen
And then after
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1

that's done we would try to figure out a way to protect them in

2

the courtroom.

3

not to identify them, it's seems to me I don't have to really

4

deal with the issue of trying to protect their identity.

5

least that's what I understand.

But since we've -- since the decision was made

MR. RICHARDS:

6

At

But my understanding was is that when

7

we gave those name to the prosecution that they could then give

8

it to their investigators and they could go and tell other

9

people about it.
Okay.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RICHARDS:

12

Which kind of undermined the

situation.
In other words, we would be allowed to

MR. HEWARD:

13
14

do which is exactly what we should do, which is try to verify

15

their information.

16

do.

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Richards didn't want us to be able to

Yeah.

I just don't know how you would --

18

I know what the witnesses concerns were and I understand what

19

yours were.

20

investigators and the prosecutors from at least checking out

21

their stories and what they are going to testify to and the

22

background.

23

were going to leak this information to somebody else.

24
25

But I just can't -- I can't prohibit the

I know what the concern was.

MR. RICHARDS:

You thought they

Well, we made that offer that we would

give it to them as long as they wouldn't leak it and they said
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no we have to be able to

2
3

Case No.

THE COURT:

And based on that you then decided not to

give the names?

4

MR. RICHARDS:

Because it would be useless in our

5

opinion.

6

Mr. Shaw's -- or rather Mr. Heward.

And from a protocol standpoint I understand that

MR. HEWARD:

7

Mr. Heward was the one who responded on

8

the original motion, which is why I was responded now, Your

9

Honor.

THE COURT:

10

Right.

That's okay.

But I just -- I

11

guess didn't want to get into a catch 22, which is to say, and

12

this was your argument before, I thought was that, well, geez,

13

we would really like to call these witness but the State or --

14

excuse me, the Court won't protect them.

15

I thought was:

16

you make a decision as to whether you'll divulge their identity

17

to the State.

19

We are not going to deal with that issue until

MR. HEWARD:

18

And what I was saying

Which their written pleading indicated

they are not willing do that.

THE COURT:

20

Right.

And so as a result of the

21

unwillingness, for whatever reason, I have decided that they

22

cannot testify because their names haven't been given to the

23

State.

24

MR. RICHARDS:

25

MR. SHAW:

I guess we have made our record.

I guess the only thing I would add for
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1

purposes for the finding, is specifically that the Court finds

2

that Mr. Perea has concurred with both conflict counsel and

3

Mr. Richards now and he has made a direct statement that he

4

believes it's in his best interest to go forward, specifically

5

in way of any conflict or potential conflict.

6
7

I will make that finding.

THE COURT:

appropriate.

I think it's

All right.

8

Anything else then on the motion, Mr. Richards?

9

MR. RICHARDS:

10

MR. SHAW:

11

THE COURT:

No.

No, Your Honor.
Can we move -- I don't know if maybe you

12

have a preference, but I thought maybe we could deal with the

13

State's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr -- how

14

do you say it?

15

one or if you prefer to

Ofshe.

16

MR. HEWARD:

17

THE COURT:

I don't know if you want to deal with

That's fine.
Well, I did get State's request for

18

discovery notes, but I -- my question is, and I almost think we

19

could dissolve this issue without that.

20

the State feels about it.

21
22

MR. LYONS:

going to rule.

I

But I don't know how

guess it depends on how Your Honor is

We might be able to --

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. LYONS:

Your Honor, what I want to do is just lay

25

out in summary briefly the State's reasoning why Dr. Of she
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..
WAIVER OF CONFLICT OR POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST

I, Riqo Perea, have been advised by counsel that claims of conflict of
interest and the potential for a conflict of interest have been raised by the
prosecution in my case. I understand that the claim for conflict or potential conflict
arises out of a decision not to disclose the names of witnesses who claim to have
information that I did not shoot the victims I have been charged with killing and
.. .
InJurmg.
I understand a "conflict" may arise when a lawyer represents one client at the
risk of materially limiting the lawyers responsibility to another client. I understand
that Mr. Richards has never represented in the past any of the four individuals who
may have information that I did not shoot the victims in this case; that he does not
now represent any of the four individuals who may have information that I did not
shoot the victims in this case; and, that Mr. Richards specifically informed the
individuals that he does not represent them.
I have discussed with Mr. Richards, and understand that the names and
identities have not been disclosed to the prosecution or law enforcement because
our request that the prosecution and law enforcement be ordered not to disclose
their names and identities has been objected to by the prosecution and denied by
the court. As a consequence, the court has indicated those individuals may not
testify at my trial.
If any conflict of interest does arise out of our decision to refuse to disclose
the names and identities of these particular individuals, I hereby waive any conflict
of interest or potential conflict of interest arising out of the decision not to disclose
the names and identities of the four individuals who claim to have information that I
did not shoot the victims I have been charged with killing and injuring.
DATED this _ _ day of March, 2010.
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